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Summary. 
Between 1935 and 1975, the British motor cycle industry 
declined from world supremacy to bankruptcy. The industry 
blamed its troubles on government policy, specifically 
taxation and regulation. These, it was maintained, had 
weakened the manufacturers' ability to effectively meet 
foreign competition, particularly after 1960 from Japan. 
The existing historiography has identified boardroom 
mismanagement as the main culprit. However, what the 
literature lacks is a wider perspective, especially one which 
extends to the period before 1945. Those years are critical 
to understanding the nature of the industry. This 
dissertation provides such a perspective combined with an 
analysis based on extensive primary research, particularly 
amongst recently opened trade and company records, as well as 
government documents at the Public Records Office. 
Although no single factor was entirely responsible for the 
industry's downfall, this dissertation will offer several 
explanations of varying importance. The failure to develop a 
cheap, lightweight motor cycle is particularly significant. 
This, in turn, reflected a 'management culture' which 
prevailed within many company boardrooms. The 'culture' was 
closely related to and influenced by a deep seated dedication 
to motor cycle sport and resulted in a narrow view of the 
market and the 'typical' consumer, both in Britain and abroad. 
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Introduction. 
In December 1969, as the British motor cycle industry tottered 
on the verge of financial collapse, a brief was delivered to the 
Parliamentary Secretary for the Minister of Technology from the 
Motor cycle and Cycle Industries Association, a body which 
represented virtually all motor cycle and cycle manufacturers in 
Britain. 1 The brief, which was signed on behalf of the 
Association by Lionel Jofeh, Managing Director of BSA's Motor 
Cycle Division, Britain's dominant manufacturer, provided the 
industry's explanation for its current predicament. It was once, 
the manufacturers claimed, "at the top level of world production" 
but, since 1945, had been in long term decline. This was caused 
in large part because of the severe battering they had received 
at the hands of foreign competitors, first Italy, and more 
recently, from the Japanese. 
2 
Jofeh and the other manufacturers were aware, the brief 
continued, of widespread criticism which accused them of having 
"let the Italians and the Japanese steal our markets. " It was 
true that many of the overseas markets, indeed even the home 
market itself, once the exclusive preserve of British motor cycle 
manufacturers, had been taken over by their foreign rivals. The 
fault, they insisted, was not theirs. Rather it was the result 
of government policy which during the critical years after 1945 
had forced them to divert their output overseas, thus making it 
impossible for the British manufacturers to meet the strong home 
demand for motor cycles. This had left them unprepared to 
1. Up until 1956 the Association had been known as the British 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Manufacturers and Traders' Union. 
2. See untitled brief, prepared for a meeting held on 11 
December 1969, contained in the Industries' Association Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/116. 
2 
compete against the large numbers of imported motorised two 
wheeled vehicles which flooded into the country after the mid- 
1950s. Moreover, they had been hobbled for years by "a severe 
restriction on the home market" in the form of regulations and 
tax which had smothered consumer interest. Hence, even though 
"mass demand existed, " the manufacturers argued that they had 
been prevented from "getting into gear to meet it because of 
artificial fiscal barriers. "3 
Foreign rivals, by contrast, had enjoyed the full support of 
their respective governments, and benefited from being allowed 
"unrestricted development and sale of the simplest form of 
transport available - mopeds, scooters and motor cycles. 114 All 
this had placed the British manufacturers at a considerable 
disadvantage. While the Italian and Japanese home markets 
flourished, Britain's had grown at a slower rate than it was 
capable of. This-interpretation was supported by the most basic 
trade statistics. In 1950, for example, there had been 761,500 
two wheeled motorised vehicles registered in Britain, a total 
which had increased to 1,343,000'in 1968. By contrast, the 
number of motor cars registered had 
jumped from 2,307,379 to 
11,078,000 over the same period of time. Furthermore, the slower 
rate of growth in motor cycle usage was aggravated by an actual 
overall drop in production. In 1950,171,300 motor cycles had 
been produced by British factories, a total that fell to 84,000 
in 1968. By contrast, imports, which were negligible in 1950, 
had shot up to 111,700 in 1968. 
3. Iola. 
4. Ibi . 
3 
Such was the manufacturers' case. However, six years later an 
independent report commissioned by the Department of Industry to 
investigate the plight of British motor cycle manufacturers, came 
to very different conclusions. The report, authored by the 
Boston Consulting Group and entitled Strategy Alternatives for 
the British Motor Cycle Industry, was a sharp criticism of the 
manufacturers' past performance. They had been, over the years, 
too preoccupied with "a concern for short-term profitability, " 
which had badly eroded their competitive position relative to 
their Japanese rivals. 5 
The Report further noted how lower investment and antiquated 
factories, which produced only a fraction of Japanese output, had 
contributed to the state of the British industry. Over 
1974/1975, for example, its entire output totalled 20,000 motor 
cycles, compared with over two million from just one Japanese 
firm, Honda. The British manufacturers were particularly 
criticised for what was called 'segment retreat. ' This was the 
process by which they reacted to the advance of their Japanese 
competitors, who initially built mostly small motor cycles with 
an engine capacity of less than 250cc, but had gradually moved 
'up' the market with larger and larger motor cycles. 
As the competition increased, the British manufacturers failed 
to develop newer and improved light to medium weight models to 
counter their Japanese rivals and simply vacated the various 
market segments one after the other. By 1975, the British 
industry produced nothing smaller than machines in the 500cc 
engine displacement class, with the majority of production in the 
5. See Boston Consulting Group, Strategy Alternatives for the 
British Motor Cycle Industry, London: HMSO, 1975, p. x. 
4 
750cc and 850cc classes, and had nowhere left to retreat. Backed 
by a vastly greater manufacturing base, enhanced by modern 
factories and far larger research and development establishments, 
the Japanese now produced models which were considerably more 
sophisticated than those of the British and had steadily 
encroached on the British share of motor cycle markets around the 
world. 6 
The Report provided the justification for the Wilson government 
to cease subsidising the motor cycle industry, which had absorbed 
nearly £24 million since 1973.7 Press coverage at the time 
confirmed a wide-spread belief that British motor cycle 
manufacturers were the architects of their own misfortune and did 
not deserve continued government support. 
8 Indeed, since its 
publication, the Report has come to be used at the Harvard 
Business School as a case study of entrepreneurial failure and it 
has been referred to for illustrative purposes in at least two 
studies of the problems confronting British manufacturing in 
general. 
9 Popular business journals have been attracted to the 
6. Ibid, p. xv. 
7. See remarks of Eric Varley, Secretary of State for Industry, 
in Hansard, [896] 1974-1975,31 July 1975, cols. 2059-2062. 
8. See, for example, 'Who's left holding the motor-bicycle 
baby? ' 9 August 1975 The Economist, pp. 75-76, and 'How British 
motorbikes went backing down the wrong road' by Terry Dodsworth, 
Financial Times, 2 August 1975, contained in MRC MSS 123, Temp 3. 
See also leading articles, 'An industry outclassed', The Times, 1 
August 1975, p. 15, and 'A short ride to disaster', The Guardian, 
1 August 1975, p. 12. 
9. See Richard T. Pascale, 'Perspectives on Strategy: The Real 
Story behind Honda's Success', California Management Review, 
Spring 1984, pp. 49-50 and Robin Wensley, 'Marketing Strategy', 
contained in M. J. Baker (ed), The Marketing Book, London: 
Heinemann, 1987, p. 37. The Boston Consulting Group report is 
explicitly noted in Karel Williams, John Williams and Denis 
Thomas, Why are the British bad at manufacturing?, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, pp. 27-28 and pp. 48-49 and D. O. 
Ughanwa and M. J. Baker, The Role of Design in International 
Competitiveness, London: Routledge, 1989, pp. 16-17 and pp. 78-79. 
5 
subject as well. One noted that, throughout British business 
history, "there can be few cases of industries collapsing so 
swiftly and so completely. X110 
While the wreckage of the industry has come to be surrounded by 
a considerable literature, very little of it originates from 
academic sources. 
l" Foremost is Barbara Smith's History of the 
British Motor Cycle Industry, 1945-1975, which shares many of the 
criticisms of British motor cycle manufacturers made by the 
Boston Consulting Group. Smith identifies three major causes for 
the industry's decline: a long term fall in demand for motor 
cycles in the over 250cc engine displacement class in the British 
market after 1962; intense competition from Japan and finally, 
the manufacturers' inability "to organise themselves to maintain 
sales. " She also identifies the period 1954 to 1962 as years 
when the industry had an opportunity to prepare for the coming 
foreign competition, which was instead squandered through failure 
to respond effectively to market conditions. 
12 Other published 
academic accounts include Nick Rogers' history of the industry 
over 1945-1975 and two 
journal articles, one addressing the 
inter-war period and the other a comparative study of the British 
and Italian 
industries up to 1980.13 There is also an 
10. See Tom Lester, 'How the British Bikes Crashed', Management 
oda , May 
1976, pp. 44-53. 
il. There is no real equivalent, for example, of studies of the 
British motor industry, such as Roy Church, The Rise and Decline 
of the British Motor Industry, London: Macmillan, 1994 or even 
popular histories like Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers, London: 
Fontana, 1989. 
12. See Barbara Smith, The History of the British Motor Cycle 
Tridustry X945-1975, Birmingham: The Centre for Urban and 
Regional Studies, University of Birmingham, 1981, p. v. and p. 25. 
13. See Nick Rogers, The British Motor Cycle Industry 1945-75, 
nY0nramme Notes for an epic still to be written, Birmingham: The 
Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham, 
1979, Steve Koerner, 'The British Motor Cycle Industry during the 
1930s', The Journal of Transport History, March 1995, pp. 55-76 
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unpublished history of the British industry before 1939, dealing 
specifically with the precipitate fall in demand for motor cycles 
after 1929.14 There are several unpublished dissertations which 
deal with various facets of the industry. One is a detailed 
history of a medium-sized firm, another covers industrial 
relations in the industry over the period 1951 to 1973 and two 
others cover the establishment of the workers' cooperative at 
Meriden-15 Another unpublished dissertation addresses the 
sociology of the so-called 'outlaw' motor cyclists. 16 
it is unusual to read an account which defends the record of 
the industry against its many critics. One emanates from the 
right-wing Centre for Policy Studies and places the blame for the 
demise of the industry squarely on the shoulders of successive 
governments. It attributes the constant manipulation of domestic 
demand by fiscal regulation, combined with a disastrous rescue 
attempt in 1973, for the weak performance of the industry after 
1945.17 More reliable are the small number of published accounts 
and M. Cenzatti, 'Restructuring in the motorcycle industry in 
Great Britain and Italy until 1980', Environment and Planning, 
Vol. 8,1990, pp. 339-355. Although it focuses on an American 
motor cycle producer, see also Peter Stanfield, 'Heritage Design: 
The Harley-Davidson Motor Company', Journal of Design History, 
Vol. 5, No. 2,1992, pp. 141-155 
14. See Michael Miller, 'The British Motor Cycle Industry before 
1939' (a copy of this paper was kindly provided by its author). 
15. See John Kelly, History of Veloce Ltd. - Motorcycle 
Manufacturers Hall Green, Birmingham, (Phd. dissertation 
Bradford University, 1978), John Tomlinson, The Meriden 
Cooperative, (MA dissertation, Warwick University, 1980), Martin 
Fairclough, The Political Economy of Producer Cooperatives: A 
c}udy of Triumph Motorcycles (Meriden) Ltd. and Britain's 
Indu t al Decline, (Phd. dissertation, Bristol Univeristy, 1986) 
and Steve Koerner, Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining at 
two British Motor Cycle Factories: A Study of BSA/Small Heath 
mr; umph/Meriden 1951-1973, (MA dissertation, Warwick 
University, 1990)- 
16. See Ian Harris, Myth and Reality in the Motorcycle 
Subculture, (Phd. dissertation, Warwick University, 1986). 
17. See Jock Bruce-Gardyne, Meriden - Odyssey of a Lame Duck, 
London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1973. The rescue attempt and 
7 
that have originated from veterans of the industry, mainly former 
managerial or sales staff who are sharply critical of those who 
sat in the industry's boardrooms. 18 These books contain many 
insights into the inner workings of specific firms, the industry 
generally as well as the causes of its collapse. They do, 
however, need to be treated with some caution. This literature, 
as Smith warns, "engenders nostalgia, inter-personal vituperation 
and shame that so much was lost so negligently. 1119 Other 
published sources include a large number of histories of 
individual firms, such as Triumph, BSA, Matchless, Norton and 
Veloce (Velocette). These vary considerably in quality, but as a 
rule are more concerned with describing sports events and various 
technical aspects of the motor cycles themselves than they are 
business histories. 20 
Ironically, British motor cycles now seem to be the object of 
greater attention, as an integral part of the burgeoning 
'industrial heritage industry', than they ever enjoyed while the 
factories still operated. Indeed, the literature written for 
motor cycle enthusiasts is growing at a prolific rate. There is, 
the subsequent workers' occupation of Triumph's Meriden factory 
are covered, from a partisan perspective, in Meriden - Historical 
Summary. 1972-1974, London: Norton Villiers Triumph Ltd., 1974 
(no author indicated). 
18. See, above all, Bert Hopwood, Whatever Happened to the 
British Motorcycle Industry?, Sparkford: Haynes Publishing 
Group, 1981, and also Ivor Davies, Its a Triumph, Sparkford, 
Haynes Publishing Group, 1980 and Neale Shilton, A Million Miles 
ggo, Sparkford, Haynes Publishing Group, 1982. 
19. See Smith, op cit, p. 3. 
20. See, for example, Barry Ryerson, Giants of Small Heath - The 
History of BSA, Sparkford: Haynes Publishing Group, 1980, Harry 
Louis and Bob Currie, The Story of Triumph Motor Cycles, 
Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1975, Gregor Grant, AJS - The 
History of a Great Motor Cycle, Cambridge: Patrick Stephens 
Ltd., 1969, Peter Hartley, Matchless - Once the Largest British 
Motor Cycle Manufacturer, London: Osprey Publishing Company, 
1981 and Mick Woollett, Norton, London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 
1992. 
8 
for example, a recent multi-volume history which, however, also 
tends to focus more on the motor cycles themselves instead of the 
commercial side of the industry, but does complement several 
other histories of the motor cycling movement world-wide. 
21 
What all the literature, academic, popular or otherwise, lacks 
is a larger historical context. This is a crucial lacuna. For, 
as this dissertation will show, a fuller understanding of the 
industry's final demise means examining its history before 1939 
as well as the post war era. A longer historical perspective 
will provide a fuller understanding of the various forces that 
caused the eventual collapse of the industry. 
22 
To undertake this analysis, use will be made of a variety of 
sources. In particular, extensive reference has been made to the 
records of the Motor Cycle Association, only recently opened to 
researchers. This archive, now on deposit at the Modern Records 
Centre at the University of Warwick, contains a comprehensive 
collection of minutes, guardbooks and other documentation which 
21. See Steve Wilson, British Motor Cycles (in six volumes), 
Cambridge: Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1992. Another, now dated, 
history of the industry is 'Ixion' (the Rev. B. H. Davies), Motor 
Cycle Cavalcade, London: Iliffe & Sons, 1951. For more general 
histories, see, among others, Massimo Clarke (ed) 100 Years of 
Notorcycles -A Century of History and Development, New York: 
Portland House, 1988, Richard Hough and L. J. K. Setright, A 
History of the World's Motorcycles, London: George Allen & Unwin 
Ltd., 1966, Phil Shilling, The Motorcycle World, New York: 
Random House, 1974, and Gary Johnstone, Classic Motorcycles, 
London: Boxtree Ltd., 1993 (this latter book accompanied a 
Channel 4 tv series of the same name). 
22. It has also been noted that little has been done to place 
the role of motor cycles and motor cycling (especially sports 
activity) into a social context. This particularly true of the 
period before 1939: "The social history of the motor cycle 
between the wars, to which a side-car could be added to transport 
a small family, has been obscured by the more sensational antics 
of the next generation of motor cyclists, whose leather 
jackets 
and long hair spread moral panic 
in the 1950s. " See Richard 
Holt, Snort and the British, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990, pp. 198-199. See also, John Stevenson, British Society, 
1914-1945, London: Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 391-392. 
9 
provide in-depth information about the industry for the entire 
period covered. Unfortunately, the remaining archives of 
individual firms are not remotely as well preserved. Fragments 
of various financial records for BSA and Triumph have survived 
along with most of the former's Directors' Minute Books. 
Information on other firms has been obtained from either the 
secondary literature, the business and popular press or from 
annual reports on deposit at the Guildhall Library in London. 
The new material qualifies and adds to earlier interpretations 
of the industry's history. This dissertation will argue that the 
collapse of the British motor cycle industry had far more to do 
with internal weaknesses that built up during the time in 
question than it did foreign, primarily Japanese, competition. 
Instead, a hierarchy of explanatory variables will be examined 
during the course of the following chapters. These range from 
managerial 'culture', (especially how those in the company 
boardrooms perceived markets), government policy, labour 
relations and foreign competition to the peculiarities of the 
motor cycle market, both in Britain and abroad. Finally, this 
dissertation seeks to take up the invitation contained in the 
conclusion of a more recent summary of literature on British 
economic decline. We are asked, in "place of generalizations 
about 'British' attitudes and 'British' institutions, " to produce 
"close, empirical inquiries into actual British enterprises and 
their decision-makers. " What follows proposes to do just that. 23 
Attention will be given to three major episodes in the history 
of the industry which are pivotal to both its development and 
23. See Michael Dintenfass, The Decline of Industrial Britain, 
1870-1980, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 71. 
10 
fall. The first, and most important, is the drastic fall in the 
demand for motor cycles which occurred after 1929 and lasted 
until 1939. The response of the industry to this crisis, how it 
tried to re-stimulate demand and, in particular, its growing 
dependence as comparatively low volume manufacturers of heavy 
weight (350cc to 500cc engine displacement classes) motor cycles 
became a defining characteristic. Indeed, this characteristic 
would colour its responses to future changes in the market right 
through to its death throes during the 1970s. 
The second episode began in the years after 1945 when, with the 
pre-war competition temporarily knocked out of action or 
otherwise unable to satisfy demand for cheap personal motorised 
transport, British manufacturers were in a position to 
consolidate their world-wide supremacy. That they failed do so 
was the result of factors both in and out of the control of the 
manufacturers. The third and final episode covers the period 
when international rivals resumed production and gradually 
undermined the position of British manufacturers, first at home 
and then abroad. 
The episodes will be examined chronologically over six 
chapters. The first provides a brief background to the industry 
up to 1935 and then describes the years to 1939; the second 
covers the war years; the third the period between 1945 and 1951; 
the fourth the period between 1951 and 1956 and the fifth, the 
years 1956 to 1961. The final chapter concludes with the 
collapse of virtually the whole industry in 1975. 
11 
Chapter 1. 
Crisis in Demand, 1935-1939. 
In December 1934 a special issue of the popular journal, The 
Motor Cycle, was devoted to the theme of 'British Supremacy'. 
The issue was a celebration of the ascendency of the British 
Motor Cycle industry over all international rivals. This 
supremacy was manifested, various articles in the issue 
claimed, in a number of ways. Not only were British motor 
cycle companies producing more than anyone else but they were 
also represented as being ahead of all others in terms of 
design and workmanship. 1 In the sporting field especially, 
British products were described as particularly successful, 
winning race after race, both on Home and foreign tracks. 
2 
Was there any truth behind these claims or were they merely 
the puffing of some over-enthusiastic or perhaps xenophobic 
trade journalists? The British motor cycle industry had 
emerged from the bicycle industry at around the turn of the 
century and, for a time, evolved alongside the motor car 
industry (production of motor cars only outstripped that of 
motor cycles in 1924). During the Great War the industry 
suffered a set back when much of its productive capacity was 
diverted into munitions work, allowing American motor cycle 
1. One particular manifestation of the advanced state of the 
British motor cycle industry, at least during the 1920s, was 
that fact that its designers were evidently much in demand 
with Continental manufacturers. See 'English designers on the 
Continent', by Erwin Tragatsch, Classic Bike, January 1982, 
pp. 46-51. 
2. The Motor Cycle, 13 December 1934. The Isle of Man TT 
(Tourist Trophy) Race results are, provided in detail, along 
with the nationality of the participants in Nick Harris, 
MCýtorcourse History of the Isle of Man TT Races. 1907-1989, 
Richmond, Surrey: Hazelton Publications, 1990. 
12 
companies to move into Dominion and Empire markets. After 
1919 production grew rapidly and British companies were able 
to regain the markets their American competitors had won over 
during the war. By 1925 Britain was the world's undisputed 
volume producer and the biggest exporter, shipping abroad more 
motor cycles than all other rivals combined. 
3 Indeed, such 
was the formidable reputation of British motor cycles, for 
example, that it was remarked they overshadowed the domestic 
competition in Continental trade shows. In Italy, for a time, 
even I1 Duce was accompanied by an escort of British built 
motor cycles. 
4 
Moreover, although the British motor cycle industry produced 
far less than its motor car counterpart, 125,000 units 
compared to 160,266 (worth £5,161,000 compared to £32,869,000) 
at the beginning of the 1930s, it was arguably a more 
successful industry in terms of international acceptability 
and prestige. 
5 While motor car sales tended to be 
3. For the formative years of the industry, see Eric Walford, 
Farly Days in the British Motor Cycle Industry. Coventry: 
British Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders' 
Union, (no date but probably 1934), W. F. Grew, The Cycle 
Industry. Its Origin. History and Latest Developments, 
London: Pitman and Sons, 1921, pp. 105-112 and 'The Evolution 
of the Motor Cycle', by Lieut-Col. E. W. C. Sandes, The Royal 
eng veers' Journal, Vol. LIX, 1945. See also Cyril Ayton, Bob 
Holliday, Cyril Posthumus and Mike Winfields, The History of 
or Cycling. Norwich: Orbis Publishing Ltd., 1979, pp. 109- 
110. 
4. A photo of British built motor cycles in use at an Italian 
Fascist rally was published in The Motor Cycle, 14 November 
1929, p. 733 and again on 6 June 1935, p. 777. The Midland Bank 
ýrý, nth]y Review also commented on the popularity of British 
motor cycles among Italians in its March/April issue of 1933 
at p. 5- 
5. The motor cycle and motor car output figures are derived 
from the 1930 Census of Production. Part 2. London: HMSO 
1931, p. 334. By way of comparison, that same year the British 
bicycle industry produced 878,966 units, worth a total of 
£3,410,000. 
13 
concentrated in the Home, Empire and Dominion markets, British 
motor cycles sold in many areas where the former did not, a 
point that was remarked upon at the time. 6 In 1927 a reporter 
with the Daily Telegraph was moved to write: 
It is depressing to the motorist travelling on the 
Continent to meet so rarely a British-made motor- 
car, but everywhere the British motor-cycle is upon 
the roads, and the foreigner willingly concedes its 
superiority. In design, lightness, and efficiency 
it beats everything. 
in terms of the proportion of machines exported, the motor 
cycle industry far outdid its motor car counterpart. In 1929, 
for example, 62,377 out of a total 147,000 motor cycles, or 
approximately 42 per cent of production, was sent abroad. By 
comparison, that same year, the motor car industry exported 
only 23,891 out of a total of 182,347 cars, or 13 per cent of 
production [see Appendix 1, Tables I& II]. The contrast 
between international motor cycle and motor car producers was 
striking. Although the Americans overwhelmingly dominated the 
motor car manufacturing league, making over five million units 
in 1929 compared to barely 200,000 units by number two 
producer Britain, the situation was reversed with respect to 
motor cycles. The 147,000 units manufactured in 1929, 
compared to America's 31,900, meant that Britain was well 
ahead. 
8 
6. See various Board of Trade memos, including one authored 
by C. E. House entitled Motor Cars, regarding British motor car 
and motor cycle sales dated 13 September 1938 contained in 
public Records Office (PRO) BT 59/24/489/20 and BT 59/24/589. 
7. See the Daily Telegraph, 22 August 1927, contained in the 
newspaper clipping Book MSS 204/10/1/2, on deposit at the 
Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University of Warwick. 
8. Figures are from A Survey of the Trade in Motor Vehicles, 
Report of the Imperial Economic Committee, Thirtieth Report, 
London: HMSO 1936, pp. 7-9 and p. 101. The relative difference 
between the two industries was also noted in G. C. Allen, 
14 
It was also true that the motor cycle industry was far more 
secure in the home market, for although both industries were 
protected by the McKenna Duties, the motor car firms had more 
need of the tariff wall. In 1929, a mere 103 foreign motor 
cycles entered Britain compared to 21,520 foreign motor cars. 
During 1937 only 200 foreign motor cycles arrived compared to 
18,609 cars. 
What was the industry producing during the 1930s? British 
motor cycle companies were notable for their varied and 
extensive product lines. British consumers had the widest 
choice of motor cycles anywhere in the world, ranging from 
small single cylinder machines to large displacement twin and 
even four cylinder models. 
9 As one industry leader boasted, 
it was "literally true to say that there is no class of public 
or size of pocket which is not adequately catered for. " 
However, British consumers seemed to have a particularly 
marked preference for the big single cylinder machines in the 
350cc and 500cc displacement classes [see Appendix 1, Table 
III]. No doubt these larger machines were also necessary in 
order to haul the many side cars on the road. 
10 
ýtish Industries and Their Organization, London: Longmans, 
1959, p. 181. 
9. For the best consolidated guide to the various models 
being produced by the industry during the 1930s see Roy Bacon, 
British Motorcycles of the 1930s, The A-Z of pre-war marques, 
London: Osprey Publishing Company, 1986. See also Bob 
Currie, Great British Motor Cycles of the Thirties, London: 
Ivy Leaf, 1991 and C. J. Ayton, Guide to Pre-war British Motor 
_Qycles, 
Feltham: Temple Press, 1985, for more general 
descriptions of the motor cycles produced at this time. 
10. The boast was made by Major H. R. Watling in The Motor 
Cycle Overseas Annual and Buyers' Guide 1925, published by the 
popular journal The Motor Cycle, London: Illiffe and Sons, 
1925, p. 12. See also Phil Schilling, op cit, p. 54. 
15 
This inclination towards larger displacement motor cycles 
had been established right from the beginnings of the 
industry. In 1913, for example, models available to British 
consumers were in the 170cc to 600cc range, with the majority 
in the 350cc to 500cc classes. In 1921, the smallest engine 
displacement size on the market was still only 211cc and even 
as late as 1925, only one firm offered a machine under 100cc 
(a 98cc Alcyon). The predilection for larger sized motor 
cycles is suggestive of the fact that they provided a cheaper 
substitute for the far more expensive motor cars, as well as 
being used for sports and touring purposes. Until the mid- 
1920s even a small motor car cost between £250 and £500, while 
a good quality 500cc motor cycle side car combination cost 
around £150.11 Little wonder that a visiting American 
automotive engineer observed that motor cycles "held the same 
position in England as Ford in America", and more 
specifically, "that the class of people who possessed Fords in 
America have motor cycles in England. "12 
What was the structure of this highly successful industry 
during the period in question? In certain respects, the motor 
cycle industry shared some common characteristics with its 
motor car counter-part, having started with a vast number of 
firms of varying sizes and then slimmed down during the late 
11. For information about model ranges in the years quoted, 
see the 'Buyers' Guide' contained in The Motor Cycle, 20 
November 1913, 'Buyers' Guide', contained in ibid, 17 March 
1921 and 'Price Classifications of 1925 Machines', ibid, 27 
November 1924. Car prices are derived from the 'Buyers' 
Guide' contained in The Motor, 5 November 1920. Motor cycle 
side car combination prices come from the 'Buyers' Guide' from 
The Motor cycle, 17 March 1921. 
12. See 'A Survey of current motor cycle design', by D. S. 
Heather, proceedings of the Institution of Automobile 
Engineers, 1918/1919, Vol. XII, p. 56. 
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1920s and early 1930s. For example, in 1925 there were 
approximately 120 firms in Britain manufacturing motor cycles; 
by 1939 this total was 32.13 
As in the motor car industry, several of the larger motor 
cycle companies, a so-called 'Big Six'14, dominated, followed 
by a number of medium sized firms, several of whom extensively 
used proprietary parts (mainly motors). There were also 
specialized firms who built expensive sports and touring 
machines as well as three major proprietary engine 
manufacturers, the most prominent being Wolverhampton based 
Villiers Engineering. Although there were companies, such as 
Rover, which built both cars and motor cycles at the turn of 
the century, these links had been largely severed by the 
1920s. 
Most of the firms in the industry were privately owned and 
only a few of them were registered on the stock market. In 
marked contrast with the motor car industry, ownership and 
management was exclusively British and would remain so during 
the entire period covered by this dissertation. The industry 
shared a number of general supply and accessory firms with its 
motor car counterpart, such as Dunlop tyres and Joseph Lucas 
electrics, although the motor cycle factories were capable of 
13. See 'Ixion', op cit, pp. 66-97. A large proportion of 
these firms were simply backyard or small garage based 
enterprises which had dropped out of the market by the end of 
the 1920s. The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader thought the 
depletion of firms caused by the Depression was a positive 
development insofar that it "weeded out" what were termed 
ttmushroom concerns". See "Promise of Prosperity", 4 March 
1938. 
14. The membership of the 'Big Six' was, in alphabetical 
order, Ariel Motors, Associated Motor Cycles (formally 
Matchless Motorcycles) BSA, Enfield Cycles (Royal Enfield), 
Norton Motors and Triumph. 
17 
producing a great deal of in-house work, a point noted at the 
time. 15 
The 'Big Six' accounted for a very large proportion of the 
industry's production. Indeed, it has been estimated that two 
firms alone manufactured slightly over 60 per cent of gross 
output. 
16 Of the 'Six', BSA (Birmingham Small Arms) was the 
clear market leader (a position it had held since the early 
1920s) producing between 12,000 and 18,000 machines per year 
for much of the 1930s, or around 20-25 per cent of total 
British motor cycle output. 17 As for the others, they 
continually jockeyed for the number two spot, which regularly 
changed from year to year. 
18 All of the 'Big Six' were 
located in the Birmingham-Coventry-Redditch area, with the 
exception of Matchless (Associated Motor Cycles - AMC - after 
1937) which was based in London. 
15. See Alfred Plummer, New British Industries in the 20th 
Century, London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd., 1937, p. 95; 
a thorough description of the wide range of the services that 
the Triumph factory in Coventry was capable of can be found on 
Jack Wick's tape of reminisces on deposit at the Coventry 
Records Office. Wicks was a staff designer who began work at 
Triumph in the late 1930s. 
16. See Michael Miller, 'The British Motor Cycle Industry 
Before 1939' (Unpublished, University of East Anglia) p. l. A 
copy of this paper was kindly provided to the author by Mr. 
Miller. According to one post-war survey these two unnamed 
firms produced 63 per cent of all output, see H. Leak and A. 
Maizels, The Structure of British Industry, (1945), p. 52. 
Lack of sufficient documentation about the output of 
individual firms prevents a more precise calculation of market 
share. 
17. BSA's best pre-war year was 1926 when it manufactured a 
total of 29,099 motor cycles. In 1933 production had dropped 
to a low of 10,979 units and thereafter it fluctuated from 
year to year with a high of 18,563 in 1937. See BSA's Report 
ýn Accourtý s" 12 months ended July 1938, contained in the BSA 
Collection, MRC, MSS 19A/2/37 p. 4. 
18. This observation is based on a communication between J. M. 
West, who was BMW's British Sales Manager during the 1930s, 
and the author 
in June 1991. 
18 
Matchless had been founded by the Collier family in the late 
nineteenth century, originally as a bicycle maker, and had 
branched out into motor cycles by the turn of the century. In 
the late 1920s Matchless manufactured a full line of machines, 
ranging from 250cc to 1000cc engine displacement, with a 
particular emphasis on the 350cc to 500cc single cylinder 
classes. It also supplied motor car companies such as Morgan 
with proprietary engine units. 
19 In 1931, a rival 
manufacturer, AJS, a Wolverhampton based firm which had 
diversified into radios and commercial vehicles, went into 
receivership. Matchless picked up the motor cycle end of the 
business, shut down the Wolverhampton factory and moved the 
production facilities to its factory in Woolwich, east London. 
There Matchless continued to manufacture, side by side, two 
essentially identical lines of motor cycle, one badged as 
Matchless, the other AJS, a practice it would follow until the 
mid-1960s. This policy, commonly known as 'badge 
engineering', was also carried on by other motor cycle 
companies as well. 
20 
Throughout the late 1920s, Matchless was profitable. In 
1929, for example, it returned healthy profits and distributed 
dividends of 12 1/2 per cent. Profits declined at the onset 
of the Depression, although by 1934 the company was able to 
pay out dividends of 5 per cent. Recovery was due, 
in part, 
to the company's proprietary engine work (which also included 
19. See Hartley, op cit, pp. 10-64. 
20. See ibid, p. 117, Gregor Grant AJS - The History of a 
Qreat Motor Cvcle, London: Patrick Stephens, 1969, p. 13 and 
Bacon, _o-. =, 
pp. 13-19 and pp. 102-107. In 1932 Matchless 
bought Wolverhampton based Sunbeam motor cycles from ICI 
although 
it did little to develop the marque afterwards. 
19 
aircraft components) and to its re-entry in the bicycle 
trade. 21 
Another major firm was Ariel Motors, based in Birmingham. 
Founded by Charles Sangster during the late nineteenth century 
as a bicycle and bicycle components manufacturer, by the 1920s 
it had evolved into the more diversified Components Ltd. 
Owned by Sangster, the firm had expanded into motor cycle and 
motor car production, along with a variety of other related 
activities. However, Components Ltd. was hard hit by the 
Depression and went into receivership in 1931. Charles 
Sangster's son, Jack, who was then General Manager of the 
motor cycle and automotive end of the business, was able to 
negotiate an arrangement with the receiver whereby he took 
over the rights to motor cycle production along with a good 
part of its plant and equipment. 
22 
Jack Sangster, who would in time become the industry's 
single most dominant figure, had been educated at 
Hurstpierpoint College in West Sussex and served an 
engineering apprenticeship at the Triumph motor cycle factory 
in Nuremberg, Germany. After the war, he worked in the motor 
car industry (he designed the Rover Eight) and then returned 
to his father's company. Under his direction the new firm, 
Ariel Motors (JS), was established at a factory in Selly Oak, 
Birmingham. The company produced a wide range of motor 
cycles, mostly single cylinder machines from 250cc to 995cc 
21. See Stock Exchange Gazette, 25 April and 27 September 
1935. 
22. See Peter Hartley, The Ariel Story, Watford: Argus 
Books, 1980, pp. 11-71. 
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engine displacement but also had an innovative four cylinder 
machine, which was produced in limited numbers. 23 
The Triumph company also had its origins in the bicycle 
trade. Founded by a German Jew, Siegfried Bettmann, who had 
emigrated to England from Nuremberg in the 1880s, the company 
subsequently moved into motor cycle manufacturing in the early 
1900s. Based at a multi-storey factory in the centre of 
Coventry, Triumph offered a limited range of machines, mostly 
in the single cylinder, 250cc to 500cc engine displacement 
classes. During the 1920s, Triumph commenced motor car 
manufacture so that its factory simultaneously produced motor 
bicycles, motor cycles and cars. It was the latter which 
brought the company down. An ill-fated decision to 
manufacture higher priced models left the company's finances 
in a shambles. In 1934, it carried over a huge debt from the 
previous year and appeared to be on the edge of bankruptcy. 
24 
Enfield Cycle was founded as a bicycle manufacturer during 
the late nineteenth century in Redditch. A contract to 
provide rifle parts to the Royal Small Arms factory in Enfield 
led to the adoption of the name 'Royal Enfield' for its 
bicycles and later motor cycles. The company was led by 
Managing Director Robert Walker Smith, whose son Frank was 
Assistant Managing Director. After the former's death in 
1933, Frank Smith became Managing Director, a position he 
23. Ibid, pp. 100-106 and pp. 118-131. See also the entry on 
Jack Sangster contained in the Dictionary of Business 
'Biography, prepared by Barbara Smith, vol. 5, pp. 55-59. 
24. For biographical information on Bettmann, see Steven 
Morewood, Pioneers and Inheritors: Top Management in the 
Anrr Motor Industry 1896-1972, Coventry: Coventry 
polytechnic, 1990, pp. 104-117 and Ivor Davies, op cit, pp. 11- 
36. The information on Triumph's financial situation is from 
The Economist, 15 December, 1934. 
21 
would hold for the next thirty years. Enfield produced a 
modest but comprehensive range of models, from a 250cc single 
cylinder machine to a 1000 V-twin. However, like the others 
its best sellers were mostly single cylinder models in the 
350cc to 500cc engine displacement classes. 
25 
Norton was probably the lowest volume producer of the 'Big 
Six'. Founded by James L. Norton at the turn of the century, 
it had at first supplied the bicycle trade but quickly moved 
on to motor cycles. Although initially owned privately by 
Norton, the company had experienced severe financial troubles 
in 1913. It was picked up in an auction by Bob Shelly, owner 
of R. J. Shelly, a machining concern that was a major Norton 
creditor. Shelly was in turn owned by C. A. Vandervell and 
company, a leading magneto manufacturer and an important 
Norton supplier. Although James Norton stayed on the company 
board, Charles Vandervell became Chairman of the renamed 
Norton Motors Ltd., which continued to be privately owned. 
26 
of all the major producers, Norton had the most limited 
model line-up, mostly 
in the 350cc to 500cc engine 
displacement range, all single cylinder machines. 
27 It was 
also the one most oriented 
towards motor cycle sport. Indeed, 
the company was probably the single most successful race 
participant in Britain and overseas. 
Between 1926 and 1939, 
25. See Peter Hartley, The Story of Royal Enfield Motor 
C es, Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1981. 
26. See Mick Woollett, o cit, pp. 11-74. C. A. Vandervell and 
Company later became known as CAV and was subsequently 
purchased by Joseph 
Lucas in 1925. The purchase gave Lucas a 
,, virtual monopoly" over the supply of lighting and 
ignition 
equipment for 
both the British motor cycle and motor car 
industries. See Harold Nockold, Lucas: The First Hundred 
zevolume I: The King of the Road. London: David & 
Charles, 1976, pp. 204-205. 
27. See Bacon, op cit, pp. 124-127. 
22 
at least one Norton placed in the top three places at the Isle 
of Man TT, at that time the world's premier road race event. 28 
Norton was not unique in its close involvement with the race 
track. There were important implications for nearly all firms 
relating to sporting success. The close relationship between 
the industry and sport was widely recognised. One technical 
journal noted that there were "undoubted commercial advantages 
that follow upon success in this [the TT] and other trials of 
a sports character, " and indeed it was judged a "ruling 
factor. " As a trade journal observed, emphasis on sporting 
events was "a useful device in breaking down sales 
resistance. " Thus, a firm whose motor cycles did well at the 
TT was almost certain to enjoy improved sales shortly 
afterwards. 
29 
A second aspect of race track activity which attracted the 
industry was its role as a surrogate form of research and 
development. It was generally acknowledged that the TT was in 
effect a "testing ground" and acted as a means of 
improving 
motor cycle performance and reliability under the most severe 
of conditions. 
30 Brakes, frames and transmissions and road- 
28. In two notable years, 1935 and 1937, Norton motor cycles 
placed in five of the six top slots. See Matthew 
Freundenberg, The Isle of Man TT. Bourne End: Aston 
publications Ltd., 1990, pp. 162-164. 
29. See 'Motor Cycles', The Autombile Engineer, August 1928, 
p. 273 and 'Motor cycle sport', The Export Trader, July 1937, 
p. 231. J. M. West recalled that "many chaps of quite high 
standing" had confided to him that their choice of a new 
machine was dependent on the outcome of the TT races: "I'm 
going to buy whatever wins the TT. " J. M. West 
interview, 23 
November 1994. 
30. A writer in a popular journal noted that the value of the 
TT races "cannot be over-stressed. " Not only was it simply 
sport, but the 
"machines are subjected to a gruelling more 
severe than could 
be imposed by any other test. " See 'The 
future of motor cylce sport', by T. W. Loughborough, The Motor 
C clist Review, July 1927, p. 14. 
23 
holding qualities in general, had it was believed, all been 
improved as a direct benefit of the trial and error process 
that had taken place during race after race. As one expert 
asserted during a meeting of the Institute of Automobile 
Engineers, "there can be no possible doubt that road racing 
has come more to improve the breed than any other single 
item. " Moreover, in the absence of any extensive research and 
development facilities, the track was, many believed, an 
excellent substitute. 
31 
It was also true that many throughout the industry's 
management were keen motor cycle enthusiasts. Brothers Harry 
and Charles Collier, sons of Matchless founder Henry Collier, 
who would become the company's joint managing directors, 
regularly rode motor cycles. Indeed, Harry Collier raced 
semi-professionally and had a distinguished career at the TT. 
Donald Heather, a Matchless company director during this time, 
was unusual amongst the industry's senior management by virtue 
of his higher education (he had an engineering degree from 
London University), also regularly rode a motor cycle and 
attended sports activities. At Ariel Motors, owner Jack 
Sangster had a successful career as a trials rider before the 
Great War and subsequently continued to ride whenever 
possible. Enfield Cycle Managing Director Frank Smith was 
also an active motor cyclist and James Norton raced semi- 
31. See 'The influence of racing on motor cycle design', by 
'G. E. T. ', The Export Trader, July 1934, pp. 245-246 and 'Motor 
cycle progress: past, present and future', by H. D. Teage, 
0 eed' as of the Institution of Automobile Engineers, 
1931/1932 session, vol. XXVI, p. 385. During the course of an 
earlier IAE meeting 
it was noted that there was "a great 
dearth of technical publications relating to motor cycles. " 
See 'The super-sports motor cycle', by John Wallace, ibid, 
1929-1930 session, Vol. XXIV, pp. 161. 
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professionally for several years before 1914 and during the 
early 1920s, as part of a publicity campaign to increase sales 
in South Africa, rode one of his company's motor cycle side- 
car combinations across the country. 
32 
The industry's top leadership was proud of its personal 
involvement and dedication to motor cycling. Indeed, managers 
often made a point of letting their customers know that they 
too shared an equal interest in motor cycle activities, 
especially sports. In 1939, for example, a number of managing 
directors rode their motor cycles in a procession to the 
Donnington race track at the season's opening. Attending 
these events undoubtedly gave the industry's leaders an 
opportunity to mix with many of the people who either already 
owned their motor cycles or might soon be buying a new model. 
No doubt it also gave them a first hand insight into any 
upcoming changes in market demand. However, one suspects that 
they would have been there anyhow, commercial advantage or 
not. 
33 
While the other 'Big Six' firms were frequently owned and 
managed by motor cycle enthusiasts, BSA was the notable 
exception. No doubt this owed much to the fact that BSA had 
always been far more than a motor cycle manufacturer. 
32. See photo feature about James Norton's sales tour of 
South Africa, The Motor Cycle, 21 December 1921, p. 865. 
33. Managing Directors present at the 1939 Donnington event 
included Jack Whitlock (Rudge-Whitworth), Ernest Humphries (OK 
Supreme), Edward Turner (Triumph), Jack Sangster (Ariel and 
Triumph) and Gilbert Smith (Norton). See untitled feature, 
The Export Trader, June 1939, p. 250. Another activity shared 
by many of the industry's top executives was membership of the 
Worshipful Company of Masons. In 1950 Major Watling was 
appointed Master 
for the Birmingham area and often presided 
over meetings attended 
by a number of industry managing 
See directors. 
April 1950t1pd 36ews 
item, The Motor Cycle and Cycle 
25 
Originally founded in the mid-nineteenth century as small arms 
manufacturer, it had subsequently expanded into bicycles and 
then motor cars (Daimler and Lanchester), steel, machine tools 
and other businesses which gave it access to resources 
34 unavailable to the other firms. 
The differences between BSA and the other 'Big Six' firms 
were also reflected in its Board, which often included well 
known figures from business and political circles. The 
various chairmen during this period, Sir Hallewell Roger 
(1906-1928), Sir Edward Manville (1928-1932), Arthur Pollen 
(1932) and Sir Alexander Roger (1932-1940), were all engaged 
in a variety of activities besides BSA. Two of them, for 
example, were MPs and all the others held senior positions 
with national banks or organisations such as the Federation of 
British Industries (FBI). 35 Sir Patrick ('Paddy') Hannon was. 
in many ways typical. He served on the BSA Board between 1923 
and 1957, and was Vice-Chairman for a good portion of the 
period. He was especially well-connected in the political 
world. A long-time Parliamentarian, Hannon represented the 
34. In his speech to the 1922 Annual General Meeting, BSA's 
Chairman specifically noted that the recent acquisition of 
Jessops and Sons, a steel manufacturer, was designed in part 
to give the parent firm a greater degree of control over raw 
materials. See Chairman's speech, delivered on 25 April 1922. 
Copy contained in the BSA papers on deposit at the Birmingham 
Central Reference Library, MS 321/A (Reports and Accounts). 
35. Rogers was Unionist MP for Moseley in Birmingham between 
1918 and 1921. Manville had been President of the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) during 1911-1912, a 
founding Vice-President and long-time Council member of the 
FBI and a Conservative MP for Coventry. While in Parliament, 
he was Chairman of the House of Commons Industrial Group. 
Before becoming appointed Chairman, Arthur Pollen had been on 
the BSA Board during the 1920s and was also a Vice-President 
of the FBI. Alexander Roger was a Director of the Commercial 
Bank and the Midland and was also a Vice-President of the FBI. 
See the various entries for the above in the Dictionary of 
Rusiness Biography. 
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Moseley district in Birmingham for the Conservative Party 
between 1921 and 1950 and was a close associate of Neville 
Chamberlain (who had also been on the BSA Board as Managing 
Director of BSA Cycles, which covered both the motor cycle and 
bicycles subsidiaries, during the early 1920s). 36 
Other Board members during this time had similar 
backgrounds. Lord Eugene Ramsden, long-time Unionist MP for 
Bradford North, was Chairman of the National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations during 1938-1939 and a 
Director of the Lloyds Bank. Sir Francis Joseph was President 
of the FBI in 1935 and a Director of the Midland Bank. 
Commander G. Herbert, who was Managing Director of BSA Cycles 
left the company in 1935 to become a Director of Standard 
Motors, where his brother-in-law R. W. Maudslay was chairman 
and founder. Although he was not actually on the Board for 
most of the 1920s and 1930s, former Director Dudley Docker, 
one of Britain's leading business figures, remained highly 
influential and was often consulted about company affairs. 37 
Nor was the question of leadership all that separated BSA 
from the other firms. Not only was it the industry's biggest 
producer but it also offered the single most comprehensive 
model line-up available in Britain, or for that matter, 
36. Hannon was also a founder of the British Commonwealth 
Union, founder and President of the National Union of 
Manufacturers and a Vice-President of the FBI. After the war 
he would be appointed a Director of the Dollar Export Board. 
See Hannon's obituary in The Times, 11 January 1963. Box 17 
of the Hannon Papers, on deposit at the House of Lords Record 
office, contains a large amount of his correspondence with 
Chamberlain. Hannon was also President of the Aston Villa 
Football club. 
37. See R. P. T. Davenport-Hines, Dudley Docker. The Life and 
m; mPS of a Trade Warrier, London: Cambridge University Press, 
1984, pp"214-233. 
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anywhere else. 38 This breadth of production was a point of 
some pride to the company and Chairman Hallewell Roger once 
informed shareholders that the secret of its success was the 
ability to provide a "thoroughly reliable range of machines of 
almost every kind, fit for any purpose, by any person of any 
age in any country and at almost any price. 1139 [See Appendix 
1, Table IV]. 
Yet by the beginning of the 1930s, BSA seemed to be drifting 
into serious financial difficulties. Although the company 
paid out a dividend of 5 per cent for the year ending 31 July 
1930, that was the last time shareholders saw any return on 
their investment for several years. The Depression hurt the 
company, but much of its trouble seems to have been generated 
by general disorganisation and, more particularly, bitter 
dissension among Board members. 40 
Relations between Chairman Manville and Percy Martin, 
Managing Director of the Daimler motor car subsidiary were 
particularly strained. At one highly emotional meeting, 
Manville was reduced to tears after a dispute with Martin, 
although he was then rounded on by Arthur Pollen, for 
"upsetting the whole internal organisation of the company by 
his impulsive and dictatorial methods. ii41 In a letter written 
in 1933, Hannon recalled that Board business over the past few 
years had been "conducted in such an atmosphere in which, to 
38. Ryerson, op cit, p. 46. 
39. See Chairman's Speech, delivered on 29 April 1924, 
contained in the BSA Collection, MS 321/A, Birmingham Central 
Reference Library. 
40. In 1931 BSA suffered a loss of £204,194 and another loss 
of £797,928 the following year. 
41. See correspondence, Hannon-A. W. Wood (a future BSA Board 
member), dated 1 October and 4 October 1932, both contained in 
Box 31, file 1 of the Hannon Papers. 
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put it mildly, feeling of mutual confidence and accommodation 
was not a conspicuous feature. "42 
Both Pollen and Martin soon left the company and the new 
Chairman Alexander Roger was able to convince his fellow Board 
members to work together more effectively. However, the 
company still appeared to function at less than its full 
capacity. The various subsidiaries, although disparate, could 
have been combined into a more cohesive group of mutually 
reinforcing units. This did not happen. In 1937 Chairman 
Roger circulated a memorandum to other Board members noting 
that the various subsidiaries were not only separate 
geographically, but "in essence their products are so diverse 
as to enable one to say they have little or no relation to 
each other. " As will be shown, poor coordination within the 
BSA Group remained an intractable problem. 
43 
The remaining motor cycle companies were a mixed bag. Many 
of the medium sized firms produced a fairly extensive product 
line in their own right, albeit often at a higher price than 
those of the 'Big Six'. Companies such as Velocette, Douglas 
and Rudge provided fairly sophisticated larger displacement 
machines, many of which catered to racing enthusiasts at 
42. See memorandum prepared by Hannon, dated 13 December 1933 
and entitled 'Administration of Birmingham Small Arms 
company', contained in ii. 
43. See memo, 'BSA: Notes on BSA Organisation by the 
Chairman', dated 29 June 1937, contained in MRC MSS 
19A/1/2/54. Roger's confidential assessment of his company 
had already been publicly noted by one business journal. The 
etnrk Exchange Gazette stated that BSA was "far more a holding 
concern than a direct owner and operator of plant. " See 
article contained 
in the 1 February 1935 issue. One of the 
few recorded instances where one subsidiary assisted another 
occured when a BSA motor cycle was 
fitted out with the Daimler 
fluid flywheel and preselective self-changing gearbox. It was 
not a great success. 
See untitled feature about the motor 
cycle in question, 
The Times, 23 November 1933, p. 12. 
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correspondingly higher prices. There were a number of firms, 
such as Francis-Barnett, James and Excelsior, which 
manufactured lighter weight machines and were heavily 
dependent on several proprietary engine manufacturers, 
especially Villiers Engineering. As with the larger 
companies, these firms tended to be owned and managed by motor 
cycle enthusiasts who often were directly involved in the 
design, production and testing of their own products. 
Three examples illustrate this point. Eric Barnett, son of 
Francis and Barnett founder Arthur Barnett, joined the firm in 
1920, being appointed a Director eight years later. A keen 
enthusiast, he participated in sports events such as the 
Scottish Six Days trials and the Colmore Cup. Ernest 
Humphries was the long time Managing Director of OK Supreme, a 
family owned firm. As early as 1899, he was building his own 
motor cycles, one of which was raced in the 1912 Junior TT. 
Finally, virtually the entire Goodman family, owners of 
Velocette, were dedicated motor cycle enthusiasts. Brothers 
Percy and Eugene Goodman were, respectively, Managing Director 
and Works Director. The former was familiar sight on various 
race tracks, a tradition kept up by Eugene's son Peter, who 
headed the company's competitions team until he was injured 
while racing in 1948.44 
The industry was represented by a trade association, the 
British Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders' Union 
'the Union'), whose membership included virtually all 
44. See biographical piece on Barnett, prepared by R. H. 
Thomas, The Export Trader, June 1946, p. 332; and Humphries 
obituary, The Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader, 13 December 1963, 
p. 90. Details on 
the Goodman family are from Wilson, op cit, 
vol. 6, pp. 190-208. 
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enterprises connected in one way or another to the production 
or retailing of bicycles and motor cycles. 45 The Union, which 
was based in Coventry, had a number of functions including 
organising the annual Show (open only to its members for 
display purposes), representation of the views of the industry 
with respect to legislation and taxation, general 
Parliamentary activities and other dealings with government 
including the matters of tariff and import rates. The Union 
arranged for intelligence reports on overseas markets and 
general advertising campaigns as well as technical 
coordination through bodies such as the British Motor Cycle 
and Cyclecar Research Association. The Union also worked 
closely with the Auto Cycle Union (a branch of the RAC) to 
regulate approved sporting events. 
46 
The Union's chief executive body was the Management 
Committee, composed of representatives elected at the Annual 
General Meeting. It met on a regular, usually monthly, basis. 
There were also subsidiary groups such as the Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers' Section, along with similar bodies for 
proprietary article manufacturers and exporters, designed to 
deal with problems specific to those members. The Union's 
President was elected from amongst delegates each year at the 
General Meeting and was usually a senior executive from one of 
the affiliated firms. In fact, virtually every significant 
45. The Union had been founded in 1910, as a continuation of 
an existing organisation representing bicycle manufacturers. 
It kept its name until 1956, when it became known as the 
British Cycle and Motor Cycle Industries' Association. See 
the Union's Annual Report for 1956, p. 2. 
46. An very brief outline of these activities is also 
contained in 'The Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry' by H. R. 
Watling, contained in H. J. Schonfield, The Book of British 
Industries, Edinburgh: Denis Archer, 1933. 
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Managing Director served as union President at some time. 
There was also a small permanent staff, headed by a Director. 
Between 1919 and 1953, the Director was Major H. R. Watling, a 
man well-known to manufacturers and retailers as well as civil 
servants during the course of his duties. 
At the heart of the Union's authority over the industry was 
the Bond and an interlocking series of Agreements that all 
members had to sign as a condition of membership. The Bond 
required all members to strictly follow the rules of the 
Union, preventing them from participation or support of any 
advertising, commercial shows or sporting activity which it 
had not officially sanctioned. Infractions of Union rules 
would invariably result in stiff fines and other penalties, 
which were enforced through the offices of an associated 
organisation, the Cycle Trade Union (CTU). The CTU had 
available to it an arsenal of measures to punish breaches of 
the Bond and Agreements, including fines and placement on a 
'Stop List' (that prevented other Union affiliates from having 
any dealing whatsoever with a wrongdoer). 47 The Bond also set 
the terms and conditions of the allowable discounts and 
rebates that could be offered by manufacturers to their 
retailers and by the retailers to the public. 48 
In essence this system, re-enforced by the agreements 
between the Union, manufacturers, component makers and 
factors, prevented any motor cycle, once the price had been 
47. The Guardbooks of the CTU contain a number of case files 
relating to various miscreants who had broken Union rules and 
had suffered the appropriate punishment. See MRC MSS 
204/CT/3/1/1-5. 
48. See, for example, the 1935 Bond, on deposit with the 
Union Papers in the MRC at MSS 204/4/4/1. The agreements were 
renewed annually. 
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set by the manufacturer, from being sold at a lower price by 
any retailer. It also prevented, among other things, a 
retailer from selling any motor cycle acquired from a 
manufacturer who was outside the Union and vice versa. This 
system had been created in the mid-1920s, as a response by the 
industry to falling profit levels. Starting as an agreement 
limited to several firms, by the 1930s it had been adopted by 
all Union affiliates as a means of stabilising the industry. 49 
Was this price maintenance in fact price fixing? The Union 
did not think so and vehemently asserted that price 
maintenance was fair and voluntary, created in the best 
interests of all concerned, whether they be manufacturers, 
retailers or consumers. 
50 However, although the Union's files 
do not contain much material directly relating to price 
fixing, there is strong evidence that it did in fact take 
place until outlawed during the 1950s. 
51 
49. See document entitled 'Pricing Agreement between: BSA, 
Raleigh, Enfield, A. J. Stevens, H. Collier and Son and Rudge- 
Whitworth', dated 1 September 1927. The preamble of the 
Agreement stated that its purpose was the "promoting and 
protecting" of the trade from "the financial loss and injury 
that would flow from undirected competition and price cutting 
amongst themselves. " See item #134, at the BSA Collection, 
Solihull Public Library. See also memo entitled 'Motor Cycle 
Prices', dated 1 April 1924, which outlined discussions among 
certain companies which had led to "joint action taken to 
increase the retail selling prices of motor cycles by 5% on 
May 1st. " The memo is contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/9. 
50. A point repeatedly made by Major Watling, when he 
testified before the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance in 
July 1948. A verbatim transcript of the proceedings is 
contained 
in PRO BT 64/540, file 376/1949. 
51. In one instance, during the Union's Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers' Section meeting of 5 April 1937, there was what 
was recorded as "a full discussion in which all members 
represented at the meeting took part" that resulted in an 
unanimous agreement to raise retail prices by at least 30/- 
the following month. The minutes are contained in minute book 
MSS 204/i//14. 
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The union was a profit-making institution in its own right, 
thanks to its sponsorship of many successful Annual Motor 
Cycle Shows. Union bank balances were always well into the 
black and throughout nearly all the period in question it 
possessed financial resources measured in tens of thousands of 
pounds, which continued to grow year by year. For example, in 
1934 its balance was £69,561, a total which had jumped to 
£77,888 by 1939.52 
Public interest in the industry was catered for by a popular 
motor cycle press aimed primarily at enthusiasts. Two 
magazines, The Motor Cycle and Motor Cycling, dominated the 
market although there was also a weekly industry journal, the 
cycle and Motor Cycle Trader, which had a circulation 
restricted to the manufacturers and retailers, a fact which 
made its pages echo with more frankly stated opinions than 
were found in the other two. 
53 The two popular journals 
enjoyed a close relationship with the industry. It was not 
uncommon, for example, for their editors to be invited to 
important Manufacturers' Union meetings in order to put 
forward their views. Nor was it unusual for members of the 
press to jump to the industry or back again. 
54 
52. See the Annual Report and Balance Sheet for 1934 and 
1939. Contained in the Union's papers, MRC MSS 204/4/3/2. 
53. In 1934 the circulations of the three journals was 
estimated as follows: The Motor Cycle, 126,004, Motor 
c, 39,160 and the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader as 8,550. 
The 
gures 
are provided in the minutes of the Management 
Committee meeting of 12 March 1935 contained on page 2146 of 
the Union's Minute Book, MRC MSS 204/1/1/12. Another popular 
journal, The Motor Cyclist Review, went out of business in 
1930. 
54. Graham Walker, for example, was an*executive with the 
Rudge-Whitworth motor cycle company before going on to become 
editor of Motor Cycling. 
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There were two major international competitors, the 
Americans and Germans, who offered very different products to 
their clientele. The American industry had been robust until 
just after the Great War, when it had made significant 
incursions into many important British export markets. 
American firms were subsequently devastated by the appearance 
of cheap cars, notably the Ford Model T, which had flooded 
onto the roads after 1913, severely undercutting both their 
home market and competitiveness abroad. 55 By the late 1930s, 
only two companies, Harley-Davidson and Indian, had survived. 
While the American motor cycle market had shrunk radically in 
size, the two companies continued to have some limited, albeit 
declining, success in overseas markets, mainly in the Americas 
and certain British Dominions. Because American motor cycles 
were invariably large, powerful (and higher priced) machines 
designed for long distances and rough roads, they were popular 
in underdeveloped areas. 
56 
The German industry, a leader before 1914, had gradually 
progressed during the 1920s and, in terms of overall 
production, had actually overtaken the British industry in 
55. According to statistics maintained by the Union, in 1934 
the number of motor cycles registered on American roads 
amounted to a total of 95,643 machines although there had been 
210,000 machines registered in 1923, a figures which slipped 
to 126,850 three years later. See Review of the British Cycle 
and Motor Cycle Industry (third edition). Coventry: British 
Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers and Traders' Union Ltd., 
1935, p. 8. For American exports, see memo '111/1922' (which 
describes the situation in Africa and India), dated 17 October 
1922, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/8 (a and b). See 
also memos entitled 'Trade in New Zealand', dated 30 October 
1922 and '225: Trade in Sweden', dated 2 August 1923, both 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/9. 
56. See 'Motor cycles in the USA. Reasons for Decline', 
contained in the Union's Quarterly Journal, October 1927, 
p. 389, MRC MSS 204/4/2/4. See also 'Report on the USA', The 
Motor cycle, 24 December 1924, p. 1066. 
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1929. However, aggregate figures were misleading, since much 
of Germany's powered two-wheel production comprised small 
capacity machines primarily in the 50cc to 100cc range, which 
was in turn a reflection of lower domestic purchasing power. 
Consequently, these machines were popular with the middle 
classes, acting in effect as a substitute for lightweight 
motor cars. 57 The German industry was included a greater 
number of firms than the American, but offered a more 
diversified product line, although less extensive than the 
British. Devastated by the 1929 Crash, it quickly recovered 
after 1933 thanks to the supportive nature of National 
Socialist transport policies. German production overtook the 
British once again in the middle of the decade and this again 
reflected the success of the cheaper, small capacity 
machines. 
58 (See Appendix 1, Table V]. 
If there was real substance to the claims of 'British 
Supremacy' in the motor cycle world, it was equally true that 
the industry suffered from a number of serious weaknesses that 
57. The proportion of motor cycles in Germany under 200cc had 
grown to 60.5 per cent of all registrations by 1936 and jumped 
to 72 per cent in 1938. See Fritz Blaich 'Why Did the Pioneer 
Fall Behind? Motorisation in Germany Between the Wars' in 
Theo Barker (ed) The Economic and Social Effects of the Spread 
of Motor Vehicles, London: Macmillan, 1987, p. 151. For a 
perception from the perspective of British manufacturers, see 
'Trade in Germany - An American view', contained in the 
Union's Quarterly Journal, April 1926, MRC MSS 204/4/2/3. See 
also 'Germany adopts the motor cycle', The New York Times, 6 
January 1929, p. 34 and "German motor cycles - bid for 
supremacy in production", The Times, 5 August 1929, p. 9. 
58. The Motor Cycle had already noted the "amazing growth" of 
the German motor cycle industry during the late 1920s, see 18 
April 1929, p. 602. For An explanation of the causes for the 
slow growth of the German motor 
industry during the 1920s, see 
I. D. Turner, British Occupation Policy and its effects on the 
tgWn of Wolfsburg and the Volkswagenwerk, 1945-1949, 
(unpublished UMIST Phd. dissertation, 1984) and R. J. Overy, 
"Cars Roads and Economic Recovery in Germany", Economic 
History Review, 2nd Series, Vol. XXVIIi, (1975), pp. 466-483. 
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could not be glossed over. Indeed its supremacy had been 
undermined from the late 1920s onwards and by 1935 the 
industry found itself in the middle of a severe crisis. 
In brief, home and export markets had suffered a massive 
drop in sales and motor cycle usage. Between 1929 and 1934, 
overall production had tumbled from 120,000 to 60,000 units, 
the number of motor cycle registrations (the index of the 
motor cycles in actual use in Great Britain) had declined from 
an all-time high of 790,000 to 540,000 units, while exports 
had virtually collapsed, falling from 62,377 to 16,807 units 
(although, in relative terms, British exports still remained 
greater than those of her rivals). Of course some of the drop 
could be attributed to the world-wide Depression which had hit 
other businesses equally hard. Yet the motor car industry, 
while suffering initially, had recovered by 1935 and was 
enjoying record sales. What was happening in the market? Why 
had British and overseas consumers stopped buying motor cycles 
at the previous rate? 
Two major factors underlay the shift in consumer preference. 
One was that while the prices of motor cars, especially the 
light-weight or 'baby' cars produced by Austin and Ford, had 
continued to drop during the 1920s and 1930s, those of motor 
cycles had remained relatively constant, so eroding their 
original advantage. 
59 The second factor was the continuing 
59. By the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Trader's (SMMT) 
calculations, using a benchmark of 100 in 1924, prices had 
dropped to 49.8 by 1935. See the SMMT, The Motor Industry of 
treat Britain1939, p. 47. The question of motor car prices 
during the interwar period is addressed in Roy Church and 
Michael Miller 'The Big Three: Competition, Management, and 
Marketing in the British Motor Industry, 1922-1939' in Barry 
Supple (ed. ), Essays in British Business History, Oxford: 
Clarenden Press, 1977; the drop in car prices also eroded the 
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technical improvements occurring in the motor car industry: 
electric starters, all-metal bodies (providing better weather 
protection) and vastly improved suspension systems were only 
some of features now frequently added as standard to even 
economy cars. 
60 
By comparison, motor cycles had remained technologically 
unchanged and continued to demand more of their operators: 
they had to be kick started, there was no effective protection 
against inclement weather, suspension systems were 
questionable and they were by nature inherently unstable. 61 
Carrying capacity, even with a sidecar, was still less than 
that offered by the smallest standard motor car. Despite the 
best efforts of designers, motor cycle riders and their 
pillion passengers remained far more vulnerable to injury than 
if they were in a motor car. 
Motor cycles had also suffered in relation to motor cars in 
terms of social acceptability and prestige. Ownership of a 
two-wheeled vehicle simply did not have the same cachet that 
increasingly came with ownership of four wheeled transport. 
Writing in a popular journal, one motor cyclist had to admit 
that his chosen mode of travel put him at a disadvantage. "i 
must agree, " he noted, "that occasionally people in business 
advantage motor cycles had previously enjoyed with respect to 
maintenance costs. See Ayton et al, Op. Cit., p. 40. 
60. For detail on advances in motor car technology, see T. P. 
Newcombe and R. T. Spurr, A Technical History of the Motor Car, 
Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1979, p. 42, p. 48 and p. 43. 
61. This was a point discussed in popular journals, see for 
example, 'Finality of design. Has the motor cycle field 
stagnated? ', The Motor Cyclist Review, November 1929, p. 229. 
In fairness to the motor cycle industry, it should be noted 
that there had been great advances in the quality of tyres, 
brakes and steering mechanisms. These, however, were simply 
insufficient to counter-balance the natural disadvantages of 
the motor cycle when compared to the motor car. 
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are rather inclined to look down their noses at a fellow who 
turns up on a motor cycle. 1j62 Although the industry did its 
best to promote continued use of its products on the grounds 
of cheaper running costs, this appeared to have become a 
losing battle. 63 
It was the matter of price which was probably the most 
important determining factor in the choices British consumers 
made between a car and a motor cycle (with or without a 
sidecar), notwithstanding Hire/Purchase schemes and low 
deposits. As the motor car industry adapted more and more to 
American style systems of mass production, the type of motor 
car bought by British consumers changed. There was a sharp 
increase in the sales of models with ratings of less than ten 
horse-power. Indeed, between 1929 and 1936 the numbers of 
these machines registered for road use increased by 236,353 to 
842,514, or 256 per cent. Higher volume production was 
followed by lower prices. Moreover, there was also a 
concurrent development which was probably just as, or perhaps 
even more, damaging to motor cycle sales. This was the growth 
62. See also 'Motor cycle or car? ', by Richard Twelvetrees, 
The Motor Cycle, 8 August 1929, pp. 203-204. The point of 
diminished social prestige is directly addressed in 
Christopher T. Brunner, The Problem of Motor Transport, 
London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1928, pp. 33-34. Nor had this 
problem improved by the end of the 1930s. Columnist Francis 
Jones referred to the "typical case in the suburbanite, not 
too sure of his own social standing, who is a bit doubtful 
about what the neighbours will think if he is seen going about 
by motor cycle instead of a small car. " See, 'Attack the 
market from the top' by Francis Jones, Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Irgder, 7 July 1939, p. 18. 
63. See, for example, 'Sidecar combos for business and 
pleasure' The Motor Cyclist Review, August 1925, p. 23, 'Where 
does the sidecar stand? ', ibid, October 1928, p. 160 and carry 
on by sidecar, Coventry: British Cycle and Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers and Traders' Union, 1927. The latter is 
contained as an 
insert within the British Industries, 15 
September 1927, MRC MSS 200/F/4/24/13. 
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of the used car market, which seriously undercut the economy 
appeal of the motor cycle. 64 
This comparison was especially acute in the competition 
between motor cycle sidecar combinations and light cars such 
as the Austin Seven (users of solo motor cycles would not 
necessarily be as tempted to switch their machines for a four 
wheeled vehicle). In the late 1920s there was still a 
distinct price advantage between a 350cc motor cycle 
combination and a used eight horse power car. However, ten 
years later this difference had nearly vanished. Indeed, 
registration figures of motor cycle combinations show a 
consistent deterioration, far more acute than those of solo 
motor cycles. 
65 [See Appendix 1, Tables VI and VII]. 
Much the same phenomenon was occurring in key overseas 
markets as well. In Australia and New Zealand, for example, 
motor cycle dealers informed British manufacturers that sales 
had been hurt by four wheeled competition. One Australian 
retailer described how increasing numbers of second hand 
Austin Sevens were threatening the motor cycle trade. 
However, he warned, it was the 112nd hand American car market" 
64. See Road Traffic Census, 1936 Report, London: HMSO, 
1937, p. 10. Over the same period of time, the number of motor 
cycles registered for road use dropped from 731,298 to 
505,779, or a decrease of 31 per cent. 
65. Miller identifies the "long-run extermination of 
combinations and tri-cycles" on the fact that they "served as 
cheap substitutes for light cars and vans. " With "their 
discomfort, exposure to the elements, and limited loads, they 
were poor substitutes, and only cheapness to run could allow 
them to compete. " All prices used are derived from this 
source. See Miller, Op. Cit, p. 6. This disadvantage was well 
understood by the industry. As one trade journal noted, "why 
should a man be expected to pay £60 for a motor cycle when he 
can get a really first class used car for even less? " See 
'Making motor cycle sales' by 'A Well-Known Dealer', for 
ceadC cle Trader, 29 January 1937, pp. 80-81. 
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that most impeded motor cycle sales. Formerly, he continued, 
"it was the custom of many motor cyclists to buy first a solo 
machine, then a side-car outfit, and eventually a motor car. 
A large percentage of them now begin by purchasing solo 
machines, and sooner or later acquire cars without becoming 
buyers of sidecars. "66 Nor was this process exclusive to the 
so-called 'White Dominions'. A report received from East 
Africa at around the same time noted that: "In the old days 
most chieftains rode Sunbeam bicycles and the sons rode 
Raleigh bicycles. Nowadays, the Raleigh is common amongst the 
natives and the Chieftains use American cars, whilst the sons 
ride motor cycles. "67 
While motor cycle manufacturers saw the 'top end' of their 
markets, at home and abroad, eaten away by cheaper cars, they 
also encountered a similar problem at the bottom end. During 
the late 1920s, there was a phenomenal increase in bicycle 
usage in Britain and by the mid-1930s there were thought to be 
anywhere up to fourteen million of them in use. 
68 At an 
average price of between £3.00 and £5.00 each the bicycle met 
a need for personal transport among those in urban or suburban 
areas who were not satisfied with public transport. No doubt 
66. See memo entitled 'Trade in Australia', dated 5 November 
1925, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/12. 
67. See memo entitled 'Trade in East Africa', dated February 
1927, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/15. Reports from 
Japan indicated that motor cycle sales there had also been 
threatened by increasing numbers of light motor cars along 
with an improved public transport system. See memo entitled 
'60/35: Japan - Use of British motor cycles', dated 21 March 
1935, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/l/37a. 
68. According to Ministry of Transport's 1936 Road Traffic 
Cetýsus, bicycle use had increased by 94.98 per cent from 1931 
to 1935. See on cit, p. 6. 
I 
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these commuters could not afford either a car or a motor cycle 
at the prices being charged for the models available. 69 
What did the critics of the state of the industry have to 
say about all this? What were their remedies for this crisis? 
The critics were found in three general groupings. First, 
there were those inside the industry, whether from particular 
firms or from the retail end of the business, who thought that 
more motor cycles could be sold given a change of attitude 
from those who manufactured and distributed them. Second, 
there were technical people such as engineers and press 
commentators disturbed by the lack of progress in the 
industry, who made numerous and unfavourable comparisons 
between Britain, Italy and Germany. Finally, there were those 
offended by the fundamental character of motor cycles, 
especially their noise as well as the manner in which their 
riders operated them. These latter critics tended to be 
ordinary citizens, members of organizations such as the Anti- 
Noise League and the Pedestrian Association, although they 
also included sections of the trade and business press, the 
judiciary and Parliamentarians. 
The criticism boiled down to two major issues. Growing 
numbers of the public had become increasingly irritated by the 
level of noise created by motor cycles during sports events, 
never mind during normal use or in the hands of over- 
enthusiastic riders. Government officials received complaint 
after complaint about the noise and disruption caused by 
69. The average price of bicycles is found in the Census of 
production for 1935 at p. 377; see also Miller, op. cit. for 
details on other perceived barriers preventing bicycle owners 
upgrading to motor cycles. 
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rallies, trials, beach racing and so forth. There was also 
public uproar about the hazards of pillion riding, the high 
fatality rate among young motor cyclists as well as the 
dangers created for other road users by reckless riding 
habits. 70 
The latter point was addressed by H. A. Tripp, Assistant 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, when he gave evidence 
before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the theme 
of 'The Prevention of Road Accidents' in May 1938. Tripp 
attributed the dangers of motor cycle riding to the very 
nature of the machine itself: serious injuries were 
inevitable, "largely on account of the vulnerability of the 
motor cyclist. " Another group of critics who caused the 
industry much irritation were coroners. Indeed, the 
manufacturers were often deeply offended by their findings 
which were full of harsh condemnations against the supposedly 
reckless behaviour of young motor cyclists and the 
correspondingly high level of fatal accidents. In 1934, Major 
Watling had actually petitioned the Lord Chancellor, urging 
him to prevent coroners from including such gratuitous 
criticism in their reports. 
71 
70. Some of the complaints to various public officials can be 
found in the PRO H045, particularly sub-files 17413,17413 and 
456309. There was evidently a widespread belief among motor 
cyclists that they were subject to much 
bias and 
discrimination from the courts and the police forces. See, 
for example, "Those Anti-Magistrates" contained in The Motor 
rvglist Review, March 1929, p. 413. 
71. See House of Lords Sessional Papers, 1937-1938/4, Report 
by I; hA Select Committee of the House of Lords on the 
n- e tion of Road Accidents together with the Proceedings of 
the Committee. Minutes of Evidence and Index. " (1938). 
Tripp's evidence is found at pp. 49-50. Mention of Watling's 
approach to the 
Lord Chancellor about British coroners is 
contained with 
the Union's Annual Report for 1934, p. 3, MRC 
MSS 204/4/3/2. Evidently, he kept up the pressure in 1935 and 
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However, far more fundamental to the future of the industry 
was the debate over the economy motor cycle and its attendant 
theme, the potential for gaining female consumers, which had 
been the subject of much controversy for years. This 
criticism really turned on the issue of what the market was or 
rather what it could become. The critics maintained that it 
could be much enlarged if only the industry would adopt a more 
progressive approach to what they made and how they marketed 
their products. This was especially true for the 
manufacturers of 'economy' motor cycles, since some press 
commentators saw the small machines as the salvation of the 
industry. 72 
The question of how to convince women, who made up only a 
small proportion of Britain's motor cycling population, to buy 
more of their products posed an especially difficult problem 
for the industry. Throughout the 1920s there had been a 
concerted effort by the popular motor cycle press to make 
motor cycling more appealing to women. The Motor Cycle, for 
example, had a regular column, entitled 'Through Feminine 
Goggles', written by female sports figures, and there were 
also numerous although irregular features about motor cycle 
maintenance and suggestions of touring destinations prepared 
with women specifically in mind. 
73 At the same time, 
1936 as well. There is no indication on whether or not the 
Lord Chancellor was ever receptive to the Union's lobbying. 
72. There was considerable discussion in the motor cycle 
press during the 1920s and 1930s about what kind of machines 
should be built by 
the manufacturers. See for example "An 
'Everyman' Prophecy" by 'Ixion', The Motor Cycle, 31 January 
1929 p. 158 and "Making Motor Cycle Sales" The Motor Cycle and 
"ynle Trader, 29 January 1937 p. 80. 
73. See 'Through Feminine Goggles', The Motor Cycle 1 June 
1922, pp. 712-715, ibid, 15 February 1923, pp. 212-214 and ibid, 
4 February 1926, pp. 157-159. Such publicity was not only 
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manufacturers went out of their way to encourage and publicise 
the activities of female motor cycle sports participants. In 
1926, for example, the Union sponsored a banquet during the 
annual Motor Cycle Show in order to publicly honour them. 74 
The campaign to interest women in motor cycling was not a 
great success. Although it claimed that more motor cycles 
were being purchased and ridden by women, the industry failed 
to develop this potential market because of its inability to 
resolve its own internal contradictions. 75 On the one hand, 
the manufacturers thought they could best publicise motor 
cycle use by encouraging female competition riders. But, on 
the other, many in the industry also believed that women 
should be prevented from participating in those same sports 
events. In 1927, for example, Marjorie Cottle, undoubtedly 
Britain's best known female motor cycle rider, was banned from 
a trials event simply on the basis of her sex, even though she 
had more than proved her competence in earlier contests. 76 
found in the trade press. In 1928 Pitman and Sons, who 
produced a series of books as part of 'The Motor Cyclists' 
Library', also published Motor Cycling for Women, written by 
twin sisters Betty and Nancy Debenham, who were well-known 
motor cycle enthusiasts. The book, which contained chapters 
with titles such as 'Our First Side Car Tour' and 'The Road 
Girl's Complexion', also included an introduction prepared by 
Major Watling, who thought its appearance was "significant of 
the growing interest in motor cycling amongst women. " 
74. See 'My Lady comes to Town' by 'Hildegard', The Motor 
C_, 14 October 1926, pp. 694-697. 
75. An undated [probably late 1920s] photo story about 
Marjorie Cottle, a well-known motor cycle trials rider, shows 
her presenting a bouquet to the aviator Amy Johnson, "on 
behalf of 50,000 admiring British women motor cyclists. " The 
story is contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/25. 
76. See 'Random jottings' by 'Waysider', contained in The 
""otor CyCl st Review, July 1927, p. 12. Women had already been 
expelled from the Motor Cycle Club (MCC) in 1910, without any 
explanation. Women were finally readmitted in 1946, in 
recognition of their war-time contributions to British 
industry generally. See 'The MCC decides ... ', The Motor 
C e, 31 January 1946, p. 87. 
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Others noted that the emphasis on sports was by its very 
nature a self-limiting strategy when it came to enlarging the 
market. Women seemed to ride motor cycles for much the same 
reason as many men. As one observer noted, instead of 
creating a new type of consumer, most female riders "are all 
more or less of the sporting class, who use motor cycles for 
the pleasure they provide rather than for business or shopping 
purposes. 1177 That factor, in turn, raised the question of 
whether or not the industry should change its current 
manufacturing strategy and start to concentrate on providing 
British consumers with a utility or 'Everyman' motor cycle. 
This was a point also much discussed in the late 1920s. The 
Motor Cycle, for example, criticised the industry for having 
overly catered to "the needs of the sporting athletic rider. " 
Manufacturers should try and improve comfort and economy 
instead of always stressing how fast their motor cycles could 
go. The journal challenged them to develop a cheap, reliable 
and low-powered machine and offered a prize of £500 for the 
company that could provide such a machine. 
78 Major Watling 
also championed the cause of this type of motor cycle. 
Writing in another popular journal, he stressed how such a 
machine would increase the size of the motor cycle market by 
appealing to non-motor cyclists, those he defined as "the 
parson, retired civil servant, the business man and the 
clerk. " In private correspondence with manufacturers, Watling 
was even more emphatic. While sports oriented buyers were 
77. See untitled feature, The Motor Cyclist Review, February 
1927, p. 651. 
78. See 'A plea for 'Everyman' motor cycles', The Motor 
_Cycle, 
3 January 1929, pp. 30-31. There is no record of any 
manufacturer having claimed the prize. 
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"comparatively few", the number of 'utility' buyers was 
"illimitable. "79 
Few manufacturers took up this challenge. In large part, 
the problem was that, in the absence of any effective 
marketing surveys, no-one in the trade really knew who exactly 
was buying motorcycles and why. 80 There were two schools of 
thought which addressed this question. In public, the 
industry confidently asserted that their market was made up of 
mostly young working-class males, who primarily used motor 
cycles to commute to and from work. 81 The growth of suburban 
housing estates and new factories outside of city centres had 
facilitated this development. Some within the industry 
79. See 'The 'Utility' motor cycle', by Major H. R. Watling, 
The Motor Cyclist Review, September 1929, pp. 129-130. See 
also memo entitled '87/26 - Silencing of motor cycles' dated 
12 August 1926, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/14. 
80. From what evidence that survives, it seems that there was 
no systematic marketing surveys of any description being 
conducted for the motor cycle industry at this time. As one 
industry based commentator remarked: "Who uses motor cycles, 
and why? is a simple question, and the answer should not be 
too difficult to find if some attempts were made to discover 
it. And yet today there is no one in the country who can with 
accuracy provide that answer, because the job of finding it 
out has never been properly tackled. " See "Who rides motor 
cycles - and why? ", The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 4 March 
1938, p. 165. 
81. At least this was the opinion of BSA's Chairman, who in a 
speech to shareholders, identified "the wage earning classes" 
as "the backbone of the motor cycle market on which the 
prospects of your Birmingham factory depends. " See Chairman's 
eec of 15 November 1932. Copy on deposit in the BSA 
papers, MS 321/A (Reports and Accounts) at the Birmingham 
Central Reference Library. His words were later echoed by the 
Chairman of AMC during his speech to the shareholders at the 
Annual General Meeting held on 28 December 1939 when he 
identified their market as being "principally comprised of 
young men. " See AMC Annual Report for 1938/39, on deposit at 
the Guildhall Library, London. Company chairmen were not the 
only ones who in believed the connection between motor cycles 
and the working classes. Leo Amery, then Secretary for the 
Dominions, declared that the motor cycle was "the poor man's 
car. " See 'A flourishing industry', Daily Telegraph, 6 
October 1926, contained in newspaper clipping book MSS MRC 
204/10/1/1. 
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regretted the association between the working class and the 
motor cycle. As one journal observed, the problem seemed to 
be that the industry had now slipped downmarket in comparison 
with its motor car counterpart: "Cars are Harrow, bikes are 
Borstal. "82 
The critics remained unconvinced. Was a large displacement 
350cc to 500cc motor cycle, the industry's biggest selling 
product, really necessary for day to day commuting? After 
all, one could quite as easily reach the local factory on a 
small 150cc (or less) machine. Nor did this take into account 
the fact that motor cycle use had a strong appeal to many who 
were hardly working-class commuters, even if they were only a 
minority of the market. Throughout this period, The Motor 
ce regularly carried news about the Public Schools Motor 
Cycle Club as well as kindred groups such as the Oxford 
University MCC. 
83 These were unlikely to have been bastions 
82. This was the opinion of 'Peeping Tom' in "Hampered by the 
DU [Dealer/Union] Agreement", Cycle and Motor Cycle Trader, 17 
June 1938, p. 214. S. A. Davis of the British Motor Cycle 
Association was quite certain of the connection between the 
working class and the motor cycle when providing testimony 
before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the 
vre_vetion of Road Accidents on May 19,1938. See pp. 337-338 
of the Proceedings. One 
business journal noted that the motor 
cycle industry's main clientele 
"tends to be restricted to 
workers living at a greater 
distance than the average from 
their employment. Week-end pleasure users, though numerous, 
tend to become proselytes to small-car ownership, and youthful 
lovers of speed find light sports cars more to their taste. " 
See 'Cycle and Motor Cycles', The Economist, 30 November 1935 
pp. 1059-1060. 
83. Although many public schoolboys were devoted to their 
motor cycles, some headmasters clearly 
disapproved. In 1923 
there was an inter-school competition sponsored by the North 
West London Motor Club at Amersham. The match could not be 
prevented but, 
"for some reason or reasons presently unknown", 
the headmasters had forbidden their boys to compete under the 
names of their respective schools; The Motor Cycle 12 
September 1923, 'Motor cyclists in the making', pp. 373-374. 
See also, 'Schools 
in competition', ibid, 11 January 1923, 
p. 63. The Motor 
Cycle also produced a special volume 
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of proletarian membership. Nor could T. E. 'Lawrence of 
Arabia' Lawrence, then probably Britain's best known motor 
cycling enthusiast, have been thought of as a typical factory 
commuter. 
84 
Sporting events were often the focus of attention for large 
groups of motor cycle enthusiasts and these, too, attracted 
spectators from various social backgrounds. The New Statesman 
reported that at the Isle of Man TT races "universities and 
public schools vie with the garage hands and Birmingham 
stockbrokers in their interest. " Crowds on the Island were 
said to be teeming with "thousands of youngsters in Harris 
tweeds with club ties; as many North Country artisans with 
their sweethearts; and the greedy efficient people who sell 
cycles in every city and town from Land's End to John 
O'Groats. i85 
These races attracted much of the critics' ire. They 
pointed to the industry's near obsessive pre-occupation with 
sports functions such as the TT, events characterised by an 
emphasis on speed and good handling that generally required 
large and high-powered motor cycles. This accent had in turn 
a corresponding and, some thought, detrimental influence on 
motor cycle design and expended resources that could have been 
entitled The Motor Cycle Book for Boys London: Iliffe and 
Sons Ltd., 1928. If the illustrations are to be believed, 
this was directed at the male offspring of middle-class 
parents. 
84. After Lawrence died in a motor cycle accident, he 
received an obituary 
in The Motor Cycle issue of 23 May 1935, 
p. 708. Lawrence regularly rode, 
indeed was killed on, a 
Brough superior, undoubtedly the most expensive motor cycle in 
Britain at the time. A Brough could cost as much as a new 
higher grade economy car, about £140. 
85. See 'About Motoring', New Statesman, 12 June, 1926. 
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used to develop more utilitarian models. 86 One trade journal 
blamed the industry for devoting "an excess of energy to the 
sporting element of motor cycling, with its resultant excess 
of noise, lack of flexibility, and limited appeal. i87 Major 
Watling, another critic of over-reliance on the race track, 
actually counselled abandoning the 1931 TT. What was the 
point, he wrote privately, of focusing so much attention on an 
event which provided only "temporary advantage to not more 
than two firms. 88 
By 1935, the critics were concluding that the industry was 
truly at a cross-road. As one correspondent wrote in the 
motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, the industry could not have it 
86. "Every credit must be given to those responsible for the 
advanced stage of development that the racing motor cycle 
engine has attained. Nevertheless, to put relatively 
expensive, heavy, noisy engines, difficult to start, and 
sometimes critically stressed, into commercial production and 
available to the general public is not in the best interests 
of the Industry. " 'The Motor Cycle Industry', The Automobile 
Engineer, January 1936, pp. 1-2. 
87. See 'What's wrong with the motor cycle trade? ', a 'A 
Rider', The Garage and Motor Agent, 11 February 1933, pp. 672- 
674 and 'Making motor cycle sales' by 'A Well-Known Dealer', 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 29 January 1937, pp. 80-81. Not 
everyone thought that large sports oriented motor cycles were 
such a bad thing. Speaking at the London School of Economics, 
Sir Arnold Wilson, a Tory MP, said that at least the expenses 
associated with motor cycling kept young men from spending 
their money on drinking. See 'Everybody's Business', by 
'Carbon', The Motor Cycle, 13 March 1935, p. 607. 
88. See memo entitled 'TT Races 1931', dated 26 February 1931, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/26. The year before 
Watling had written that he was "much concerned with the fact 
that the TT races have once more caused a flood of criticism. 
Hectic articles emphasising the speed and danger and drawing 
attention to the 'high spots' of the TT, have been circulating 
in the press, and so far as this country is concerned, nothing 
but damage has been done. " See memo '187/30. Propaganda for 
motor cycling', 
dated 14 July 1930, contained in Guardbook MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/23. This opinion was shared by the technical 
press several years on, which noted that the industry remained 
held back by a "continued emphasis of the sporting and racing 
aspects. " See 
'The Motor Cycle Industry', The Automobile 
Znaneer, January 1936, pp. 1-2. 
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both ways. It would have to chose between building the big, 
often sports oriented, motor cycles or the smaller commuting 
machines: "You can make your sporting machine, you can make 
it fast, but so far you can't make it quiet. You can make 
your motor cycle for the million, but the million just isn't 
there for a single-track vehicle. 1189 Such was the choice: 
either the industry would continue to stagnate, catering to 
its traditional market, or it could attempt to break into a 
new stratum of potential customers. 
How did the industry and its constituent members respond to 
the crisis and attempt to confound the critics? On 9 July 
1935, the Union scheduled a special Management Committee 
meeting to discuss the alarming drop in motor cycle 
registrations and exports. The mood of industry leaders was 
not only dampened by low sales. The month before, for the 
first time in years, a foreign machine (an Italian Moto Guzzi) 
had won the senior TT. A stinging blow had been dealt to 
British racing prestige-90 At the meeting, a brief was tabled 
by Union Vice-President Eric Barnett which summarised the 
crisis facing the industry. He highlighted several issues 
which underlay the decline in sales: perceived safety hazards 
associated with motor cycle operation, competition from small 
89. See also "Shall we scrap the TT? " by 'Exporter', Motor 
Qycle and Cycle Trader, 26 April 1935, p. 60. Earlier, the 
journal had attributed the decline of the market to the over- 
orientation of manufacturers on the "sporty-boy" enthusiasts, 
who, "in the past few years [was] the mainstay of the motor 
cycle market, and for him alone have the manufacturers 
catered, with the result that practically every machine today 
is noisier and more ferocious than it should be. " See leading 
article, 'No more uncertainty', 'bi ,4 January 1935, p. l. 
See also, The decay of motor cycling', by R. E. Davidson, The 
New statesman and Nation, 14 September 1935, p. 354. 
90. See Two foreign wins', ibid, 28 June 1935, p. 204. 
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economy motor cars, the noise which accompanied motor cycle 
use and high insurance premiums. Barnett was convinced that 
sensationalist press reporting was one of the main reasons the 
public had turned away from the industry. Road accidents, for 
example, "always seem to be given the fullest prominence in 
the newspaper reports and the existing prejudice is thus 
intensified. " This had, in turn, resulted in fewer younger 
consumers. British parents were becoming "more and more 
averse to their boys riding motor cycles: while the girls, 
who seemed likely to swell the ranks of motor cyclists a few 
years ago, have practically faded out of the picture. ""91 
After a lengthy discussion on the issues raised, the 
Committee resolved to set up two sub-committees to study, 
firstly, points raised by the critics, especially the noise 
and safety problems, and, secondly, ways of how to increase 
motor cycle sales. With respect to technical matters, the 
Union began to devote some of its financial resources to 
scientific research to discover better ways of silencing motor 
cycles. By the late 1930s, the Ministry of Transport seemed 
to be satisfied with the progress that was being made. In the 
commercial field, however, the Union had less success, even 
though some efforts were made to coordinate advertising and to 
launch a cooperative insurance scheme to counter high 
premiums. These efforts were 
initially successful but they 
seem to have mostly ended 
inconclusively by 1937, a 
91. A copy of Barnett's memo, dated 9 July 1935 and entitled 
At: v, ew of 
the Situation in the British Motor Cycle Industry is 
contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/38. Barnett, was a 
director of Francis-Barnett, a leading manufacturer of smaller 
displacement motor cycles. 
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development which prompted further criticism from within the 
industry. 92 
Most of the attempts made by the Union to enlarge the market 
came in the form of attacks on the government's formula of 
taxation by weight and engine capacity, which it claimed 
discouraged the public from buying smaller motor cycles and 
was therefore a serious barrier to increased sales. Another 
point of contention was recently implemented legislation which 
required motor cycle driver's licences, tests and compulsory 
third party insurance, the latter point being thought the 
cause of the high insurance premiums. The government may have 
created these requirements out of concern for the public 
interest but, as far as the industry was concerned, they were 
simply further deterrents to sales. The Union's solution was 
for the British government to follow the example of its French 
and German counterparts and either substantially reduce or 
simply remove all tax and regulations on motor cycles of less 
than 200cc displacement. 
93 
if this is was what was being done at the industry level, 
what actions did the individual firms take to increase their 
sales? Did they try and respond to the proposition that there 
was a wider market waiting to 
be tapped if only the right kind 
92. See article entitled "Showmanship, " contained in The 
Cycle and Motor Cycle Trader, 10 September 1937, p. 2225. 
93. A copy of the Union's brief to the government on the 
subject of motor cycle 
taxation is contained in PRO BT 
59/24/589. The question of what position to take with respect 
to taxation was thoroughly canvassed 
in the pages of the 
Union's Quarterly Journal, especially 
in the February and 
August 1929 and June 1930 
issues. Copies of the Journal are 
on deposit 
in MRC MSS 204/4/2/5. In contrast to the Motor 
Cycle Manufacturers' Union, the SMMT was unable to convince 
its members to reach a unified position on taxation, despite 
repeated 
invitations from the government to do so. 
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of motor cycle was offered? In fact, barring several notable 
exceptions among smaller firms, it appears that they virtually 
ignored the critics' suggestions. 
BSA, for example, was undoubtedly in the best position to 
discover whether or not the market was capable of expansion. 
However, instead of developing a new lightweight economy 
model, when it came to promoting its newest offering for the 
1935 season, the company chose to emphasize a medium weight 
sports/enthusiast model, the 'Empire Star', a high performance 
500cc single cylinder machine which had made a sensational 
debut on the race track and cost £65 10s. By 1939 the company 
had actually dropped its only small displacement machine (in 
the 150cc class) from the catalogue. 94 
BSA was not the only manufacturer to continue building the 
larger motor cycles. The dramatic recovery of Triumph after 
1936 also demonstrates how manufacturers judged where market 
demand was strongest. On the verge of bankruptcy, Triumph had 
been purchased by Jack Sangster, who appointed Edward Turner, 
a young designer at Ariel Motors, as the new Managing 
Director. Turner completely re-vamped the factory. The model 
line-up was pruned down to several single cylinder machines in 
the 250cc, 350cc and 500cc classes, all fitted with sports 
specification engines. Most significant, in 1937, he took an 
existing 500cc twin cylinder model and, after a number of 
modifications, launched it as the 'Speed Twin. ' This high- 
94. See the BSA Chairman's Speech of 11 October 1934, which 
specifically mentions the launch of the 'Empire Star' 
machines. According to the Annual "Buyers' Guide" published 
by hg Motor Cycle, the 150cc model was not available in 
1939, although there were more 250cc models for consumers to 
chose from. The company also continued to offer its 500cc and 
1000cc motor cycles. 
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performance machine, which was a smash hit among sports 
riders, cost £76 15s. It was unlikely to be the kind of 
machine that would open a new market of non-traditional motor 
cyclist but it certainly made profits for the company, and 
these jumped from £7,000 in 1936 to £35,000 in 1939.95 
In fact, constructive responses to the critics were 
restricted to the smaller firms, such as the Coventry based 
Francis-Barnett company. For the 1935 season, it offered a 
line-up of seven motor cycles ranging from 150cc to 250cc, two 
of which were variations of the 'Cruiser' model. The Cruiser 
seemed to incorporate many of the features that the critics of 
the industry said a motor cycle should have in order to 
broaden its appeal to potential owners. It carried a 250cc 
motor capable of speeds of up to 50 mph, which was enclosed in 
order to prevent oil from soiling the rider. It had a form of 
weather protection to keep the rider dry, a silencing system 
better than most, and was priced at a modest £37 5s. Although 
selling reasonably well and gaining, no doubt, some welcome 
profit for the company, it never became the breakthrough to a 
new market that some had hoped. 
96 
By the 1938/1939 season a number of companies (none of them 
from the 'Big Six') were offering a line-up of auto-cycles 
95. Sangster only bought the motor cycle operations of the 
company, the bicycle and motor car segments went to separate 
buyers. See 'The Triumph Rejuvenation', The Motor Cycle and 
ýýyle Trader, 31 January 1936, pp. 73-74, Bacon, op cit, 
pp. 180-186, Ivor Davies, op cit, pp. 43-68 and Phil Schilling, 
pp_, pp. 121-124. Profit figures are from the 1949 
Accounts, contained in the Triumph Engineering papers, MSS 
123/2/1/1- 
96. For more on this machine see Peter Watson, "Bridging a 
Gap" Classic Bike, February 1985 and Jonathon Jones, "Comfort 
with Cleanliness" The Classic Motor Cycle, July 1991. I am 
indebted to Mr. Watson for bringing the history of this model 
to my attention. 
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(mopeds). Indeed, British consumers seemed to react 
favourably to them and there was a modest interest in the 
small capacity machines. Because of the outbreak of the war 
it is impossible to determine how successful these might have 
become. 97 
Some thought that the manufacturers' cautious approach 
seemed to have been vindicated when, by the late 1930s, sales 
appeared to have stopped falling and even to have picked up 
slightly. What was confusing about the figures was that, 
while production increased from 55,200 units in 1936 to 82,014 
the following year, motor cycle registration numbers dropped 
from 510,242 to 491,718 over the same period. This seeming 
contradiction was difficult to interpret. Some suspected that 
committed motor cyclists were still buying new machines while 
others simply discarded theirs, being unable to find a place 
for them in the used motor cycle market. Others in the 
industry simply dismissed the validity of government 
statistics. 
98 
Even as the Home market began to stabilize, the industry 
became increasingly concerned about what remained of its 
export market. It was becoming more difficult to export 
97. At the 1939 Show there were nine companies (none from the 
'Big Six') which had auto-cycles on display compared to far 
fewer three years previously. See G. S. Davidson (ed), The 
rýý t_yclists Annual. 1939-1940, London: H. E. W. Publications 
Ltd., 1939 and an untitled feature in The Export Trader, 
December 1938, pp. 377-378. The popularity of the auto-cycles, 
nick-named 'Wilfreds' after a well-known cartoon character of 
the time, was based on the public's desire for very cheap 
transport in anticipation of war-time conditions. See Ayton 
et al, o_R-scit", pp. 170-171 and 'Cheaper than taking the bus', 
by Brian Woolley, The Classic Motor Cycle, February 1989, 
pp. 32-35. 
98. See 'Fewer motor cycles in use,, 1 January 1937 p. 62 and 
'False Figures', 7 May 1937 p. 95, both contained in The Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader. 
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thanks to foreign tariffs and import quotas. In Spain, Poland 
and Denmark, for example, formerly important destinations for 
British motor cycles, manufacturers complained that trade 
barriers prevented them from selling as many machines as they 
could have done otherwise. 
99 In consequence, exports became 
increasingly oriented towards Empire and Dominion markets. 
While sales there had accounted for 41 per cent of exports in 
1929, this had grown to 59 per cent by 1935.100 
[See Appendix 1, Tables VIII and IX]. 
Many in the industry believed that this situation was much 
aggravated by a series of bilateral trade agreements 
negotiated by the Board of Trade. The British government, the 
manufacturers insisted, had to do more to protect their 
interests. However, as Board officials explained, matters 
were actually far more complicated than they appeared on the 
surface. In 1936, for example, when the Union protested at 
low import quotas agreed to during a set of negotiations with 
Argentina, they were told to keep their objections private. 
Trade talks, motor cycle manufacturers were informed, had 
reached a "delicate situation" because of Argentine concerns 
over Britain's preferential treatment of Australian meat. The 
blunt fact was that the Board of Trade's chief priority was to 
99. See memos 'Denmark: Import of motor cycles', dated 7 
February 1936, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/39, 
'Spain: Imports of cycle and motor cycle goods', dated 15 
April 1936, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/40 and 
'Secondary Industries - Treaty Negotiations', dated 15 January 
1937, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/41. 
100. See memo '211/35: Review of the British Cycle and Motor 
Cycle Industry', dated 3 December 1935, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/39. There were also problems with tariffs in 
Empire and Dominion markets as well, thanks to the Ottawa 
Agreement. See, for example, memo '85/36: Australia: Import 
Restrictions', dated 18 June 1936, contained in Guardbook MRC 
MSS 
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ensure a cheap supply of Argentine products, not export more 
British motor cycles. 
101 
An even more serious threat to exports was the prospect of 
vastly increased foreign competition. Spurred on by various 
forms of government incentives, the German motor cycle 
industry launched a vigorous and successful campaign to sell 
its products in traditional British markets, especially in 
Holland, South America and parts of Asia, much to the alarm of 
the British industry. 102 [See Appendix 1, Table X]. The 
Union bitterly complained to Government ministers that they 
were unable to effectively compete with their German rivals 
because of legislative handicaps. This reflected the 
considerable difference in attitude between the two nations 
regarding motor cycles. As one popular journal reported, when 
Reichs-Kanzler Hitler opened the 1935 Berlin Motor Cycle Show, 
he was at "pains to stress the national importance of motor 
cycling and the motor cycle industry. " In contrast, had a 
British politician been in his place, the journal sardonically 
remarked, he could not have resisted "the temptation to 
indulge in a peroration about road accidents, controlling the 
motor cyclist or even abolishing him. ""103 
British manufacturers were convinced that the German 
government did more than simply provide their 
industry with 
encouraging words. Not only 
did the German manufacturers 
101. See memo, 'Argentina: Customs tariff', dated 30 May 
1936, contained in ibid. 
102. A correspondent informed the Union that the Germans were 
"penetrating with the characteristic Teutonic thoroughness 
every country East of Suez. 
" See memo entitled '16/37. 
India: German Motor Cycle Competition', dated 1 February 
1937, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/41. 
103. See leading article entitled 'Motor cycles and the 
politicians', 
The Motor Cycle, 20 February 1935, p. 479. 
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receive various subsidies which enabled them to sell their 
products at prices the British found difficult to match, but 
because of the lack of regulations affecting their motor cycle 
market (compulsory insurance and drivers' licences for 
lightweight motor cycles had been waived) they were able to 
concentrate on fewer models and benefit from larger and longer 
production runs, thus keeping their unit costs comparatively 
low. As a result, the British industry insisted, sales of 
German machines were growing at their expense. 104 
Whitehall officials were not moved by this argument. Civil 
servants reminded industry representatives that German exports 
were predominantly in the 'ultra-light' (auto-cycle or moped) 
category, in contrast with the larger and more expensive 
British motor cycles. As one confided, the real problem 
seemed to be that Germany had "produced a motor cycle which 
the world wants and we appear to have lagged behind. "105 This 
view was shared by others as well. One trade 
journal noted 
that overseas buyers "don't want what we want them to want. 
if the German national were placed as we are, and if cars in 
America were not so cheap as they are, our export trade in 
motor cycles would be worth a small packet of snuff. ""106 
104. See, for example, memos '58/37 - British East Africa: 
Use of lightweight motor cycles', dated 3 May 1937, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/42, 'Motor cycle exports: German 
competition', dated 18 August 1937, contained 
in MRC MSS 
204/3/1/43 and '159/37: Germany: Developments in the bicycle 
and motor cycle 
industry', dated 25 November 1937, ibid. 
105. Information received by the Union noted a "striking 
increase" in German exports of motor cycles of less than 100cc 
capacity. See memo 
'159/37', ibid. See also PRO BT 
59/24/589, entitled "Department of Overseas Trade, discussion 
with UK Trade 
Organisation. No. 25. Motor Cycles dated 26 
October 1938. " 
106. See "Shall we scrap the TT? ", op cit. There was also a 
widespread belief 
that the Germans had moved ahead of the 
British in terms of technical improvements. According to one 
59 
In order to counter the German incursions, British 
manufacturers began a series of price cuts so as to maintain 
their competitiveness. The Germans responded with cuts of 
their own and so commenced a price war which both sides came 
to see as mutually destructive. The British motor cycle 
industry was not alone in this struggle; many other industries 
also engaged in fierce competition with German rivals, a fact 
with quickly came to the attention of the FBI and the Board of 
Trade. The outcome was a complex series of negotiations 
between British and German industries, conducted under the 
sponsorship of both respective governments, with the aim of 
reaching what amounted to a set of 
international cartels. 
This process culminated in the Dusseldorf Agreement of March 
1939. Although the British and German motor cycle industries, 
which were an-integral part of these negotiations, reached 
agreement in principle with respect 
to pricing and market 
share, events later 
that year prevented their consummation. 107 
Had British motor cycle manufacturers been right to avoid 
building small, economy motor cycles during this period as 
they had been urged to do by their critics? Or to put the 
question differently, were 
the circumstances right for the 
industry to vastly increase its productive capacity, a pre- 
authority, "there was more originality of 
design from German 
manufacturers 
in the late 1930s than from any other source. " 
See Hough and Setright, op cit, p. 142. 
107. A COPY of the agreement, entitled 
'Protocoll [sic] of 
the Result of Discussions of 
Expert Delegations of the British 
and German 
Motor Cycle Industry on March 16th 1939', is 
attached to 
the minutes of the Management Committee meeting of 
14 February 1939, contained 
in Minute book MRC MSS 204/1/1/15. 
For an overview of 
the Anglo-German commercial talks, see 
Scott Newton, 
'The 'Anglo-German Connection' and the Political 
Economy of Appeasement', 
Diplomacy and Statecraft, November 
1991, pp"179-207 and 
C. A. MacDonald, The United States, 
itain and Appeasement, 1936-1939. London: Macmillan, 1981. 
60 
condition for any decision to start manufacturing and 
marketing small motor cycles? The reluctance of British motor 
cycle manufacturers to make a determined entry into the 
lightweight market could be traced back to the debacle the 
industry had suffered when it tried to sell scooters in the 
early and mid-1920s. 
108 Industry leaders may have believed 
that such designs had been tried out before and had been a 
failure, making them unwilling, especially under the economic 
conditions then prevailing to take another gamble. It must 
have seemed far better to stick with the tried and true. The 
other problem was that, failing volume production, the small 
displacement machines by definition equalled small profits, a 
point of great concern to the industry. 
109 
Assuming that the industry had wished to change its overall 
orientation, perhaps the only way open to it at the time would 
have been to narrow down the number of models on offer and 
reap the benefits of larger and longer production runs, 
following the German example. But this would have been a very 
difficult strategy for the British industry to pursue-at this 
108. See 'Why not a scooter revival?, by 'Nitor', The Motor 
Cce, 7 November 1935, p. 617 and 'Can the Scooter come Back? ' 
by Francis Jones, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 1 May 1936 
p. 82. This question was also raised during a discussion which 
followed Edward Turner's paper entitled 'Post War Motor Cycle 
Development, ' delivered to a meeting of the Institution of 
Automobile Engineers. See Proceedings of the Institution of' 
tomobile Engineers, Vol. XXXVII, 1942-1943 session, pp. 320- 
321. The scooter craze of the 1920s and two wheeled vehicles 
like the Ner-a-Car are described in chapter four of Cyril 
Ayton et al on cit, and 'Scooter-Mania! ', by Brian Woolley, 
e Classic Motor Cycle, May 1988, pp. 16-20. 
109. For example, according to BSA's financial records, the 
company made a profit margin of 27 per cent on the 150cc size 
machines but made 
45 per cent on their biggest machines, the 
G_g 1000cc V-twins. The 500cc 'Blue Star' machines earned a 
39 per cent margin. This information is drawn from data 
contained 
in BSA's Reports on Accounts, MRC MRC MSS 19A/2/35, 
p. 16. 
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time for a number of reasons. 110 To begin with, many in the 
industry simply did not believe they should be building motor 
cycles on any kind of larger scale production basis, and 
indeed the sentiments of BSA's Chairman, quoted above, about 
catering to all segments of the market, were quite typical. 
Nor were they a recent development. When he delivered his 
evidence to the Committee on Industry and Trade in March 1925, 
Major Watling claimed that, because the industry was so 
"fiercely competitive", it had been segmented into "groups 
which concentrate on special designs for special classes of 
users, for the user seems to be as individualistic as the 
manufacturer. " Under those circumstances, he continued, "it 
is useless to think of 'mass' production for the industry in 
general . "111 
This attitude remained entrenched right to the end of the 
inter-war period. One trade journal stated outright that mass 
production methods, by definition, would depreciate the 
industry's high standards of manufacturing. The Norton 
company quite openly proclaimed that it was very proud of the 
fact that it did not have a moving assembly track at its 
Birmingham factory. To convert to that type of production 
was, in its mind, to compromise with established standards of 
quality and craftsmanship. Hence, the major firms seemed 
110. AMC's policy with respect to manufacturing and marketing 
ran directly contrary to this strategy. After it had acquired 
sunbeam in 1932 the Chairman assured shareholders that the 
company was now able to offer consumers, along with its 
existing Matchless and AJS 
line-ups, three separate and 
competing sets of motor cycle models. This was considered a 
good thing 
in terms of consumer choice. See Matchless/AMC 
nn ai Report for 1933 on deposit 
in the Guildhall Library, 
London. 
111. See Minutes of Evidence, Committee on Industry and 
Trade, (1924-1927), delivered on 12 March 1925, pp. 451-452. 
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quite content to continue building their mostly bigger single 
cylinder machines in comparatively limited numbers, even if 
this meant under-utilising factory and plant. 112 
Another factor which would have prevented the industry from 
boosting output was the fact that it was already having great 
difficulty with quality control. Indeed, there were serious 
problems in the market with regard to defective motor cycles. 
For example, in 1936 A. B. Bourne, editor of The Motor Cycle, 
informed members of the Union's Management Committee that he 
was afraid to publish all of the some 10,000 letters he had 
received from irate customers, since "publication would have a 
damping effect upon other readers' enthusiasm. " This type of 
criticism was not at all exceptional and in 1939 the Union 
actually created a special committee to investigate a range of 
problems ranging from persistent oil leaks to faulty electric 
equipment. 
113 
It is doubtful, therefore, whether or not the industry 
possessed either the facilities or the skilled management that 
would have enabled it to have expanded to the volume necessary 
to service a larger market. There were also those who noted 
112. See 'The Final Inspection', The Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Try, 7 February 1936, p. 84 and "Performance in the Making", 
mhe Export Trader, May 1938, pp. 192-193. 
113. See memo entitled '46/36 Motor Cycles: Criticisms by 
Users', dated 18 March 1936 and contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/39, (this criticism was echoed by disgruntled retailer 
E. p. Huxham in a letter to the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader of 
1 April 1938, p. 11) and memo entitled '99/39. Motor Cycle 
Sales Investigation Committee', dated 16 June 1939, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/47. According to one technical 
journal, another problem was the poor quality of the materials 
used in motor cycle 
frames. These were "as a rule rather 
crudely designed structures 
in which strength and rigidity 
have been obtained by the use of heavy gauge tubing and clumsy 
malleable 
iron lugs. " See 'The Motor Cycle Show', The 
omobiie ob ineer, December 1938, pp. 466-473. 
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that any company which made a serious effort to change 
production programmes would be faced with very significant re- 
tooling costs; as one industry expert observed: 
the management is loth to make radical alternations 
in design, since such alternations are bound to 
involve expense in the purchase of new machinery and 
perhaps in the reorganisation of certain departments 
[so that] ... with few notable exceptions, the improvements during the last few years have been 
concerned chiefly with details like tank finish, 
tool case construction and showy details like 
instrument panels. 114 
Against these obstacles, the manufacturers did possess 
certain advantages. Should they wish to change their 
strategies, labour militancy was not an obstructing factor to 
any re-structuring of their factory practices. Although trade 
unions had been strong in some motor cycle firms before and 
after the Great War, they had been gravely weakened by the 
Depression. Thus, when Jack Sangster took over Triumph he 
immediately instituted a pay cut on a 'take it or leave it, 
basis which was met without resistance. Previously, Triumph 
workers had been among the most militant in the industry. In 
fact there is no record of labour unrest at all during the 
1930s although there were disputes in certain of the component 
industries such as tyre manufacturing. If strikes were non- 
existent, it was true, however, that many of the manufacturers 
did experience shortages of skilled workers, as a result of 
the higher wages being paid in the aeronautics industry as the 
rearmament programme progressed. 
115 
114. See 'Motor Cycle Progress: Past, Present and Future', 
by H. D. Teage, op cit. 
115. A background to labour relations in the British motor 
cycle industry 
is contained in Steve Koerner, Trade Unionism 
and r0llective Bargaining at 
two British Motor Cycle 
_a 
tories" A Study of BSA/Small Heath and Triumph/Meriden, 
1951-1973 (unpublished MA dissertation, University of 
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Another potential barrier to any overhaul of the industry's 
productive capacity was the availability of capital. Yet, 
BSA, AMC and Enfield Cycle all reported rising dividends at 
the end of the decade and the private companies were almost 
certainly profitable. For example, after years without 
dividends, BSA paid out 10 per cent on ordinary shares in 
1938, while AMC's dividends jumped from 5 per cent to 10 per 
cent between 1937 and 1938.116 Much of the increased 
profitability was created by the rearmament programme that 
resulted in many lucrative military contracts, some of which 
involved motor cycles, although others were involved in 
component manufacturing for the aircraft and armaments 
industry. -117 Moreover, during the late 1930s several 
manufacturers made a series of expenditures to enlarge their 
Warwick, 1990). As far as strikes in related industries are 
concerned, a dispute over wages at John Bull Tyre company's 
Leicester factory, which supplied various motor cycle firms, 
was reported in July 1935. Some 400 employees were affected. 
See Cycle and Motor Cycle Trader, 5 July 1935, p. 2. In 
contrast, there is no record of labour disputes in any motor 
cycle factory during this period contained in the trade press. 
For labour shortages, see untitled news feature about the 
labour supply situation, ibid, 29 January 1937, p. 71. 
116. Information about dividends come from Annual Reports of 
the companies concerned during the years in question. 
117. The fact that BSA was benefiting from the rearmament 
drive, primarily from its small arms division and Daimler, was 
noted in the business press. The Statist, for example, 
reported that its turnover had increased due to military 
contracts. See issue of 19 June 1937, p. 965. Profits gained 
by BSA from this source were also remarked upon by the Labour 
Research Department in its Dividends from Defence, (1939), 
p. 17. Other industry firms picked up similar work as well. 
Enfield Cycles, for one, reported military contracts as did 
Matchless Motor Cycles. See Stock Exchange Gazette, 19 
November 1938 and Directors' Report, Matchless Motor Cycle 
Com a, 10th Annual General Meeting, 16 December 1938, copy 
on deposit at the Guildhall Library, London. By the end of 
1938 Norton was so preoccuped with building motor cycles for 
the Armed Forces that it actually dropped out of its racing 
work, much to the 
dismay of many sports enthusiasts. See 'No 
Norton Racing Programme', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 9 
December 1938, p. 199. 
65 
factories, although it is unclear how much this was related to 
motor cycle work as against unrelated rearmament contracts. 118 
For its part, the industry had no trouble identifying the 
root cause for the much diminished motor cycle market. 
Government legislation was fingered as the main culprit for 
discouraging potential consumers. But was there any truth to 
the complaint that the industry was over-taxed and regulated 
during the 1930s? Could the government, lacking hard evidence 
from the industry that relaxation of legislation and lowering 
of tax would increase sales, and under pressure from various 
quarters to retain the laws, have done anything else? 
In fact, 'Neville Chamberlain, who was either Chancellor of 
the Exchequer or Prime Minister for most of the 1930s, had 
been Managing Director of BSA Cycles during the early 1920s 
and would surely have had some understanding (and perhaps 
sympathy) of the industry's problems. Yet the legislation 
remained fundamentally unchanged. Although the 1932 Budget 
did alter the tax structure, to favour sales of motor cycles 
under 150cc capacity, this was not sufficient to satisfy the 
industry, nor did it help significantly to generate demand for 
these lightweight machines. 119 
118. See, for example, 'Velocette factory transformations', 
31 December 1937, p. 256, 'Ariel works extensions', 7 January 
1938, p. 1 and 'Triumph extensions', 3 March 1939, p. 247, all 
contained in ibid. 
119. In fact the government had entertained the notion of 
further relaxing the regulations and taxes on the small motor 
cycles (under 100cc) but had decided not to proceed because 
the industry had failed to produce sufficiently strong 
arguments to explain why further concessions would increase 
their sales. Indeed, most of the industry's arguments seemed 
to be negative comparisons with the situation enjoyed by their 
continental counterparts. Thus, they would argue, if 
deregulation worked in France or Germany, it would perforce 
work in Britain. However, as a minute written by a Mr. Jones, 
dated 20 December 1938, put it, in the absence of more 
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Despite all the criticism of their production programmes, 
there were those in the industry who remained unconvinced that 
there was a market for anything other than what was already 
being produced. To substantiate their case, they merely 
needed to indicate the type of motor cycles that were moving 
off the showroom floors. After all, when the small motor 
cycles were offered up to the public, they were not purchased 
in any great numbers. On the other hand, the big 350cc to 
500cc motor cycle models remained consistent best sellers. 
However, had the companies done really all they could to 
expand their market? How much were they spending on 
advertising and where? The industry was particularly 
disappointed in their failure to convince women, among other 
non-traditional consumers, to buy its products. Yet this 
could only be done by reaching out to the kind of people who 
had never before considered buying a motor cycle, but might if 
they were pitched a convincing case. On the evidence 
available, it is not at all clear that the industry was 
prepared to take such steps to widen their market. 
The fact is that neither the Union or the various firms 
increased their advertising budgets, which lagged far behind 
the motor car and even the bicycle industries, nor did they 
make an effort to place ads in magazines outside the 
enthusiast press that were read by the kind of potential 
information from the Union, "We cannot offer an opinion on how 
far these regulations are an impediment to the use of the 
light-weight motor cycle in the United Kingdom. " To which the 
Department's Comptroller-General had minuted, "I agree. We 
have nothing to work on. " See minute from 'Jones' dated 5 
December 1938 contained in PRO BT 59/24, sub-file 589, 
entitled "Department of Overseas Trade, discussions with UK 
Trade organisations. No. 25, Motor Cycles. " z 
3 
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consumers they hoped would buy their products. 120 [See 
Appendix 1, Table XI]. Nor, for that matter, did the industry 
continue to use the services of a publicity company hired in 
the late 1920s in order to counteract negative press 
coverage-121 
Finally, although the industry did sponsor some limited 
technical research, via the Institution of Automobile 
Engineers,. into the problems associated with large 
displacement motor cycles, this work had a very restricted 
scope. Aside from models produced by the smaller firms, very 
little was evidently ever done to examine how to best 
construct a cheap, low-powered motor cycle, which would have 
enabled the industry to have appealed to a new type of 
consumer. There certainly was money available to them at the 
time to have conducted such work. On this point, the critics 
were not adequately answered. 
122 
120. See memo entitled '112/38: Motor Cycle Propaganda', 
which reproduces a letter received from a dealer which 
commented upon the industry's failure to advertise in what is 
called the 'lay press'. The unnamed correspondent believed 
that if more motor cycles were to be sold it was important to 
advertise in the pages of the popular as opposed to enthusiast 
press as "the people I have in mind are not likely to read 
motor cycle publications. " The memo is contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/45. A columnist in the ader, who had 
recently attended the Motor Show, commented on how much better 
its presentation was in comparison to the Motor Cycle Show. 
He also criticised the motor cycle industry on the grounds 
that, unlike its motor car counterpart, it emphasised the 
sporting side of its products to the detriment of their 
utility function. See "Motor Show Musing" by 'F. J. ' (Francis 
Jones), Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 22 October 1937, p. 66. 
121. See, for example, a report received from the company 
involved, Editorial Services Limited, summarising its 
activities during October 1929. It is attached to a memo from 
Major Watling to members of the Management Committee, dated 20 
November 1929 and contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/22. 
The Union appears to have terminated its contract with this 
company between 1930 and 1931. 
122. All the papers read before meetings of the Institute of 
Automobile Engineers concerned larger displacement motor 
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If considered a question of sound, although conservative, 
business practice, one must conclude that the industry had 
effectively dealt with the circumstances that confronted them 
during the 1930s. Their strategies seemed a fairly rational 
response to the huge drop in sales and the industry was able 
to hold on to a stable and traditional market and most 
important, continued to make money. It would appear that by 
1939 the industry, helped in part by its restrictive trading 
rules as well as its incipient commercial agreement with the 
Germans, had created a nice cozy environment for itself which 
removed any real pressure, external or internal, for 
change. 123 
It may never be known with any certainty whether or not 
there ever was a serious possibility of cultivating a large- 
scale motor cycle market in Britain during this time. The 
point is that the industry was simply not committed to 
discovering if one in fact existed. Instead, the most 
successful company of this period was looking abroad for the 
real growth in sales. In May 1939, Triumph Managing Director 
cycles. See, for example, 'The Engine of the side-car 
Motorcycle' by E. Caudwell, Proceedings of the Institution of 
Automobile Engineers, Vo1. XII, 1918-1919., pp. 345-391, , The 
Light Car and the Motor Cycle Compared' by W. Halcot Hingston, 
'bi , Vol. XVII, 
1921-1922, pp. 23-59, 'The Super-Sports Motor 
Cycle', by John Wallace, ibid, Vol. XXIV, 1929-1930, pp. 161- 
231 and 'Developments in Motor Cycle Design' by V. Page, ibid, 
Vol. XXXII, 1937-1938, pp. 470-491. One study noted that the 
ill-fated Motor Cycle Research Assocation was "not successful 
in obtaining wide support from the industry. " See H. Frank 
Heath and A. L. Heatherington, Industrial Research and 
pAvelooment in the UK. A Survey. London: Faber & Faber 
Ltd., 1946, p. 13. 
123, This section draws, in part, on the argument contained 
in S. M. Bowden, 'Demand and Supply Constraints in the Inter- 
War UK Car Industry: Did the Manufacturers get it Right? ', 
Business History, April 1991, pp. 241-267. 
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Edward Turner gave an interview in which he explained his 
firm's strategy for the near future: 
We are not endeavouring to take a lion's share of 
the home market. Such a course obviously postulates 
undue internal competition which is possibly not for 
the good of the industry as a whole. We prefer to 
concentrate upon the best grade of machine with a 
view to extending our sales not onl in this country 
but in every market in the world. 12X 
Turner's optimism about the sales potential of Triumph motor 
cycles may have been well placed but within a few weeks both 
he and the rest of the industry would have more pressing 
matters to think about. 
124. See 'Building for world competition', The Export Trader, 
May 1939, p. 216. 
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Chapter 2. 
'The War Years, 1939-1945'. 
Soon after the outbreak of war in September 1939 the motor 
cycle industry fell under government control for the coordination 
of war production. In this case the Board of Trade (Industrial 
Supplies Department) presided and as the war dragged on the 
degree of control would become tighter and tighter. One 
immediate effect of hostilities was the cancellation of the Motor 
Cycle Show scheduled for November as well as the imposition of 
petrol rationing. The so-called 'Licence to Acquire' placed 
severe restrictions on the private sales of motor cycles for all 
but urgent or essential use. 1 
Like many other British industries, the motor cycle industry 
was 'concentrated'. What this meant was that the government 
became responsible for the transfer of "resources from peacetime 
to wartime purposes and of ensuring that the available manpower 
and productive capacity of the nation were fully used. "2 In the 
case of the motor cycle industry, some firms would continue 
manufacturing motor cycles while many of the smaller companies 
would be shunted off into general munitions work. However, the 
vast majority of the productive capacity of the industry was 
engaged in the manufacture of motor cycles. 
1. Started up in 1942, the Licence to Acquire restricted the 
purchase of motor cycles (mainly machines with an engine capacity 
under 250cc) for 'essential' civilian use only. For a background 
of the Licence to Acquire, see document, prepared by the 
Secretary to the Interdepartmental Committee for the Post-War 
Resettlement of the Motor Industry, entitled 'Licences to Acquire 
Motor cycles', dated 15 June 1945, contained in PRO WO 185/224. 
2. See G. C. Allen "The Concentration of Production Policy" in 
D. N. Chester (ed) Lessons of the British War Economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 167. See also W. K. Hancock 
and M. M. Gowing, The British War Economy, London: HMSO, 1949. 
For a more recent history of Britain's industrial effort during 
the Second World War, see Alan Milward, War Economy and Society, 
1939-1945, London: Pelican Books, 1987. 
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Thus five of the 'Big Six' were set to work producing motor 
cycles for the British and Allied government, although Velocette 
(outside the 'Big Six') was allowed to manufacture both military 
(especially for the French Army) and civilian machines for export 
only. BSA, being far more than a motor cycle manufacturer with 
its diverse engineering interests, was also a prime contractor 
for the British (and Allied) governments, producing under 
licence, among other things, rifles (Lee-Enfields), light 
automatic weapons (the Sten gun) as well as aircraft machine guns 
(Browning) and cannons (Hispano-Suiza). Its motor car subsidiary 
Daimler built a line of armoured vehicles and aero engines for 
the RAF. The company's workforce ballooned from several thousand 
to nearly 28,000 employees spread out over a number of factories 
throughout the Midlands. 3 
This is not to suggest that other members of the 'Big Six' were 
restricted only to motor cycle work. Some branched out into 
other types of manufacture as the war wore on. Enfield Cycles, 
for example, went into precision instrument production and, at 
various times, Triumph also built tank tracks and small engines 
4 for aviation purposes. 
3. For a detailed account of BSA's contributions to the British 
war effort, see Donovan M. Ward, The Other Battle, (printed 
privately by BSA in 1946). Barry Ryerson's history of the firm, 
The Giants of Small Heath, contains a section on the war years 
although it is largely based upon Ward's account. References to 
BSA's activities are also included in David Thorns, War, Industry 
and Society. The Midlands 1939-1945. London: Routledge, 1989. 
Copies of the various contracts between BSA and government 
ministries such as Aircraft Production and Supply can be found in 
the BSA collection at the Solihull Public library, mainly within 
the series 127-262. 
4. The war-time activities of Triumph Engineering is covered in 
Ivor Davies, on cit, pp. 69-70. Information about Enfield Cycle's 
non-motor cycle manufacturing activities is contained in PRO AVIA 
55/130. 
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Not all of the smaller motor cycle manufacturers were prevented 
from continuing their accustomed production, at least during the 
first two years of hostilities. Firms such as Cotton, Norman and 
Francis-Barnett were encouraged to build machines for the export 
trade and for an extremely limited home market. Union Director 
Major Watling even suggested, in light of the major firms' 
preoccupation with military work, that the minor companies 
consider producing larger (250cc capacity and up) machines for 
sale abroad. 5 
Indeed a form of volume exports did continue, at least up until 
1942, with especial emphasis on the so-called 'hard currency' 
nations such as the USA, Canada and Argentina in favour of those 
within the 'Sterling Area'. Under overall government direction, 
Export Groups, which were staffed by industry personnel, were 
created to stress cooperation (to be brought about by coercion if 
necessary) within the industry and were given a wide ranging 
brief. Not only would they fix export prices to ensure 
competitiveness with the manufacturers, but also seek out raw 
materials and arrange for timber for packing and shipping. 
Export licenses were required which ensured that the motor cycles 
went only to the favoured currency areas. Moreover it was 
5. See memo dated 24 July, 1940, entitled 'EG 24/40: Rationing 
of Materials: Motor Cycles' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/l/49a. Major Watling thought it might be a good idea that 
the smaller companies might "co-operate with a view to keeping 
alive UK export trade in motor cycles in the face of American 
competition and with a view to ensuring the continuance of 
'goodwill' in UK motor cycles so as to enable rapid development 
of motor cycle export trade after the war". See memo dated 28 
December, 1940 and entitled 'Motor Cycle Exports: Suggested 
Standardisation', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/50. 
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expected that 75 per cent of production should go abroad, 
otherwise the raw materials might not be forthcoming. 6 
However, from the very beginning, the top priority was 
equipping the British military. In the months after September 
1939, during the so-called 'Phoney War', there was, in comparison 
to the activity that followed the Dunkirk evacuation, a fairly 
lackadaisical mobilisation. However, the level of motor cycle 
orders had still risen steeply after the Munich Agreement and 
reached 9,000 in 1939, a result of a decision to expand the Army 
from five to ten divisions. Pressure for more production grew 
after September as the Expeditionary Force was sent over to 
France to stem an expected German invasion.? 
At that stage in the war, the General Staff saw motor cycles as 
providing a varied role on the battlefield. Not only would they 
be used for communications purposes, being the favoured means for 
6. See memo entitled 'Bicycle and Motor Cycle Export Groups', 
dated 30 April, 1940 contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/l/49a. 
The Export Groups were charged with keeping statistics, upon 
which would be calculated the allocations of materials. In 1940 
the industry had negotiated an agreement from the Board of Trade 
that allowed approximately 40 per cent of materials, which 
Watling thought reasonable since during 1938 the industry had 
exported between 20 per cent and 40 per cent of output. However, 
even in the spring of 1940 the industry was already concerned 
about the loss of the Baltic and Scandinavian markets (which had 
accounted for 10 per cent of exports in 1938). The loss was 
especially acute in terms of motor cycle engine exports. Some 70 
per cent of the export total went to Sweden and Poland alone, 
along with 20 per cent of all other component parts. See memo 
dated 23 April, 1940 entitled 'Union Export Groups'contained in 
ibid. 
7. For a critical account of the Chamberlain government's 
management of the war economy, see Paul Addison, The Road to 
1945, London: Quartet Books, 1975, pp. 63-70. According to the 
unpublished paper entitled "Historical Narrative: Wheeled 
Vehicle Motor Transport, 1935-1943" the numbers of motor cycles 
ordered by the War Office had grown from 483 in 1935,1,176 in 
1936,2,170 in 1937,2,015 in 1938 and then jumped dramatically 
to 9,447 in 1939. Apparently pre-war estimates forsaw a need for 
a total of 22,295 motor cycles. The paper is contained in PRO 
AVIA 46/192, see especially pp. 20-22. 
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dispatch riders to travel from headquarters to front line troops 
and back, but would also shepherd truck convoys and, perhaps more 
controversially, take over the role once played by horse cavalry 
to reconnoitre ahead of the main body of the army. 8 
Accordingly, most of the motor cycles manufactured for the 
military were in the 350cc plus single cylinder capacity class. 
These machines were more or less the same as those produced 
before the war in the sense that they were essentially civilian 
models modified to meet military specification. Norton, for 
example, one of the major pre-war contractors, supplied its 16H 
model, a 500cc single cylinder side valve machine which was also 
available in a similar form to the public. These were mostly all 
designed as solo machines, although the Army also expressed an 
interest in motor cycle/sidecar combinations. To this end Norton 
developed a variation of the 16H which had a powered sidecar 
wheel. 
9 
The other companies provided their own different versions of 
the 16H and, as the Army was to soon discover, this created a 
great deal of practical servicing difficulties. Not only did it 
8. The subject of the use of motor cycles during the Second 
World War has been addressed by several authors. Among them are, 
David Ansell, Military Motorcycles, London: B. T. Batsford, 1985, 
Steven Shaker and Alan Wise, "Motorcycles" in National Defense, 
September 1984, pp. 30-34, and Captain Robert Sigl, "The Military 
Motorcycle", in Armor, September-October 1982, pp. 26-28. 
9. According to the Manufacturers' Union records, in 1940 the 
War office ordered 18,000 350cc machines, which were to be 
supplied by Enfield, Triumph and Matchless (AMC). Another 36,000 
500cc machines were ordered, to be supplied by BSA and Norton. 
There was also to be a large order for the bigger motor cycles 
from the French government, which would also be supplemented by 
production from the Ariel and Velocette factories. See memo 
dated 12 January, 1940, entitled 'France; Purchase of Military 
Motor Cycles', contained in Guardbook, op cit. The Norton side- 
car outfit did go 
into a limited production, however, this was 
halted after the introduction of the four wheel drive Jeep. See 
Derek Magrath, on cit, p. 68. 
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have to purchase and stock parts in numerous and widely dispersed 
depots for the non-standardised motor cycles but it was also 
necessary to train maintenance staff in repairing a number of 
different types of machines. 
The lightning German successes in France and the Low Countries 
during May and June 1940 seem to have caught the public's 
imagination and excited much speculation about the use of motor 
cycle troops by the Wehrmacht. 
10 Major Watling claimed that he 
had been told by returning members of the defeated BEF that the 
German motor cycle units had been "here, there and everywhere" 
causing disruption and disarray in Allied ranks. One British 
newspaper went so far as to state that the German armed forces, 
contained a large body of motor cyclists which had been 
instrumental in breaking through the French armies and seizing 
the Channel ports-" 
When Major Watling met with a member of the General Staff 
shortly after the evacuation of British army at Dunkirk, he 
repeated the industry's familiar complaint that, 
in contrast to 
Britain, Germany had actively encouraged the use of motor cycles, 
both in and out of the military, during the previous decade. 
Now, he insisted, the full consequences of the effects of what 
the Union considered to be Britain's punitive tax and regulatory 
10. Public perceptions of these motor cycle units seems to have 
been particularly enduring. For example, at the time of writing, 
the 'Blitzkieg' display at the Imperial War Museum contains a 
large displacement motor cycle-sidecar combination which provides 
a general impression of what the public still believes 
is a 
representation of the German armed forces during that phase of 
the war. 
11. See memo dated 24 June, 1940 entitled 'Motor Cycle 
Propaganda', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/49a. The 
article referred to was evidently in a June 
issue of the Evening 
standard. It is noted in a memo dated 7 July 1940, entitled 
'Motor cycle Regulation', contained in ibid. 
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provisions were finally being felt. The crushing defeat on the 
Continent was, in part, directly attributable to this pre-war 
neglect of the motor cycle industry. 12 
Soon after, Watling had a meeting with Sir John Reith, the 
Minister of Transport, and was able to repeat the industry's 
criticisms of government policy. In this case the problem was 
the poor level of training being given to the growing numbers of 
motor cycle operators, especially in the ARP (Air Raid 
Precautions) units and the Home Guard. This poor quality 
training created far more accidents than was necessary, although 
the blackout was responsible for a good share of them as well. 
He was also concerned about the below standard training of motor 
cycle repair units, which had created a high degree of attrition 
among the reserves of machines. -3 
After the Dunkirk evacuation, with a good portion of the Army's 
stocks of motor cycles (as well as much of its other equipment) 
left behind on the beaches, the industry worked flat out to re- 
12. The details of the meeting are contained in 'Motor Cycle 
Propaganda', contained in ibid. There is little written about 
the use of two wheeled transport during the war, however, a 
description of the use of German motor cycle units in France is 
contained in Alistair Horne, To Lose a -Battle - 
France 1940, 
London: Macmillan, 1969, pp. 220-221 and Len Deighton, 
Blitzkrieg, London: Jonathon Cape, 1979, pp. 169-170. 
13. Because of the blackout, motor vehicle accident rates 
increased 100 per cent after only a few months after the outbreak 
of war. See Angus Calder, The People's War, London: Pimlico, 
1992, p. 63. See also memo entitled 'Motor Cycle Regulation', Q. p 
cit. Watling also blamed the government's pre-war attitude 
towards the industry for this situation. It was, he claimed, the 
Road Traffic Act of 1930, which raised the minimum age for a 
motor cycle licence to 16 years and "whereas there was a greater 
discipline imposed from order to order upon motor cyclists - 
either by the 'Construction and Use Regulations' or by taxation. " 
By contrast Germany and Italy had encouraged use of motor 
cycling. In Watling's words: "The responsibility, therefore, 
for our military disaster must to some extent be placed upon the 
shoulders of the authorities in Whitehall who had initiated and 
pursued a repressive policy against motor cycling. " Watling's 
remarks are contained in ibid. 
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equip the military. In fact, it appears that production during 
1940 reached what would be its highest peak for the rest of the 
war. 14 This was also the year when the industry received its 
worst damage from enemy action. In mid-November the Luftwaffe 
launched a major raid against Coventry which devastated the 
centre of the city. One of the factories hit was Triumph 
Engineering, which happened to be located nearly adjacent to the 
gutted Coventry Cathedral. Although many of the machine tools 
and other equipment were later salvaged, virtually all stock 
along with the precious blueprints and business records went up 
in flames and the factory was left a pile of rubble. 15 
Triumph was able to restart very limited production at nearby 
Warwick until a new purpose built factory could be put up in 
Meriden, a village mid-way between Coventry and Birmingham. 
Although work on this factory began in mid-1941, Triumph's output 
was much reduced until 1943, when the Meriden plant was finally 
able to go into full production. Why Triumph received this 
factory when it had not been a military producer on the scale of 
either BSA, AMC or Norton before the war and ranked well behind 
them even after September 1939 is not well explained in either 
published and unpublished accounts. For whatever reason, the new 
14. One study estimates that the British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) left behind 700 tanks, 54,000 motor cars and trucks and 
20,000 motor cycles. See M. M. Postan's British War Production, 
London: HMSO, 1952, p. 117. 
15. According to Bert Hopwood, who was a designer with the 
company at the time, by destroying the new military motor cycles 
that were in the factory, the Luftwaffe may have unintentionally 
done the British army a big favour. He thought it was a poor 
design and would have not lived up to expectations had it been 
deployed in the field. See Hopwood, ou cit, p. 39. The book also 
contains a detailed account of the factory bombing as well as its 
aftermath, at pp. 39-42. Further descriptions of the Coventry 
Blitz can be found in the Home Office files at the PRO, 
particularly HO 199/442. 
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factory (albeit equipped largely with plant salvaged from the 
bombed out Coventry works) provided Triumph with a valuable asset 
and gave it, no doubt, a considerable advantage over the other 
firms in the post-war era. 16 
Only a few days after the Coventry Blitz the Luftwaffe hammered 
Birmingham with a series of heavy bombing raids. BSA's Small 
Heath factory was badly hit although the damage seems to have 
been largely restricted to the armaments section and did not 
directly affect the motor cycle assembly areas. 17 However, the 
raids evidently had a shattering effect on worker morale. Indeed 
it was alleged in confidential Home Office correspondence that 
BSA management had seemingly taken few precautions against the 
raids. 
After the raids it came to be widely believed that the 
workforce had been poorly provided for in terms of an early 
warning system, that the bomb shelters were insufficient and the 
damage was made worse by the failure of management to remove 
inflammatory materials from around the factory, which provided 
ready tinder for the German incendiaries. Many in Birmingham 
believed for long afterwards that the casualties suffered were 
much worse than were publicly admitted. Consequently, it was 
16. According to one company history, owner Jack Sangster wanted 
initially to rebuild on the original factory site on Priory st., 
Coventry. The War Damage commission apparently thought 
otherwise, deciding that Coventry centre was too vulnerable to 
any future bombing attacks and required the company to relocate 
to Meriden. See Louis and Currie, op cit, pp. 27-28. Surviving 
records from the Ministry of Supply do raise some interesting but 
unresolved points about the decision making process that 
surrounded the construction of the Meriden factory. See, in 
particular, the minutes of a meeting of the Ministry's Executive 
committee held on 21 November 1941, which are contained in PRO 
AVIA 22/2491. Further correspondence about Triumph's war damage 
claim is also contained in PRO AVIA 15/1041. 
17. Details of the Small Heath bombing are found in Thorns, Qp 
Cit, pp. 112-113. 
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difficult to convince some workers to attend the factory, never 
mind work normal shifts, and production was badly disrupted for 
some time after the November raids. 18 
The other major manufacturers do not seem to have suffered to 
the same degree from bombing, although the Velocette factory in 
Birmingham was hit but without major damage. Even AMC, located 
as it was in the Woolwich area of south-east London, apparently 
continued to produce straight through the 1940 and 1941 bombings. 
Nor was it stopped by the V1 'Flying Bomb' and V2 rocket attacks 
in 1944 and 1945. Smaller manufacturers such as Francis-Barnett 
and Coventry Eagle were also bombed out of their Coventry 
factories. The James works in Birmingham was badly damaged as 
well by enemy action. The Union headquarters building, being 
sited near the Coventry rail station, was destroyed in during the 
November 1940 raids. Its operations were subsequently relocated 
for the duration of the war to Kenilworth, a small town several 
miles away. 
19 
18. Evidently, BSA Chairman Docker criticised the Small Heath 
workforce for leaving their jobs without permission although it 
is unclear whether or not he had stayed in the factory during the 
bombing or had removed himself somewhere safer. According to a 
confidential Home Office report, the disorder at the BSA works 
brought it to a "complete standstill" and workers who had come in 
to collect wages "took over and controlled the entrance of the 
factory. " Management called their attitude "both ugly and 
menacing. " See undated report contained in PRO HO 192/1178. 
Another confidential report expressed the opinion that BSA 
management had been less than thorough about its air raid 
preparations because the company felt itself hard done by for the 
poor armaments contracts it received during the 1930s. The 
report repeats accounts of workers, especially on the night 
shift, refusing to enter the factory and commence work. Report 
dated November 1940 is contained in PRO HO 192/1232. 
19. See untitled feature about the industry during the war 
contained in the Export Trader, April 1946, pp. 278-280 and the 
Manufacturers' Union 1941 Annual Report, p. 4., contained in MRc 
MSS 204/4/3/2. 
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Despite the growing intensity of the overall British war 
effort, motor cycle production did not actually grow much beyond 
the 1939/1940 levels and, even though annual output was greater 
than anything achieved during the 1930s, it still fell far short 
of the 1929 peak. Several factors underlay this failure to 
expand to full potential. First, because of the drastic 
contraction of the domestic and export markets during the early 
1930s, the six major manufacturers did not necessarily share the 
same productive capacity that the industry possessed in 1929. 
Certainly the total number of producers had dropped. Although 
the industry was servicing a far smaller market than before, it 
is arguable that their factories may have become more efficient. 
Norton, for example, as noted in the previous chapter, had 
refused to convert to an assembly line track system since it 
believed this would compromise its craftsmanship and product 
quality standards. By 1939, however, under pressure from 
increased military contracts, it hired an engineer from BSA and 
made a number of improvements to its factory procedures, 
including the installation of an assembly track. 20 
Moreover, there had been drastic contraction of the Home 
market, understandable under the circumstances of total war. 
Motor cycle registrations dropped from over 400,000 in 1939 to 
just over 100,000 by 1943, thanks no doubt to severe petrol 
20. See Jim Reynolds, o cit, p. 52. According to a press report 
in late 1938, Norton may have had all the military orders it 
could have wished but "all this has thrown a considerable strain 
upon the production facilities of the factory, excellent as they 
are. " The company had placed many of its workforce on regular 
overtime and had added a night shift so as to keep up with the 
contracts. See 'No Norton Racing Programme', Motor Cycle and 
cycle Trader, 9 December 1938, p. 199. 
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rationing, the 'Licence to Acquire', as well as contracting 
supplies of materials, among other things. 21 
Second, by July 1941 the British army had, on the basis of 
recent battlefield experience, decided to scale down the use of 
motor cycles from its earlier projections. Evidently this 
question, or so a senior officer informed Major Watling, had been 
carefully considered by the General Staff including Chief of 
Staff Alanbrooke, and-the unanimous view was that "the motor 
cycle could only usefully be employed for communications - not 
for offensive use. " Moreover, even the Germans, hitherto 
enthusiastic proponents of the aggressive use of motor cycles, 
had been reducing their deployment as well. This was probably a 
result of high losses suffered by motor cycle troops over the 
past campaigns and no doubt many in the German High Command were 
concerned about their applicability on the vast and inhospitable 
Russian front. Thereafter, like the British and other Allied 
forces, German motor cycles would be mostly used for dispatch 
22 
purposes and truck convoy duties. 
21. See Calder, OP cit, pp. 64 and 318. The shortages badly 
effected the anticipated supplies of motor cycles earmarked for 
domestic use. In December 1940 Watling had to inform Union 
members that, although there had been plans to produce 15,000 
machines for the Home market and 10,000 for export, these totals 
would have to be reduced. See memo dated 21 December 1940, 
entitled 'Notes of Interview. Bicycle & Motor Cycle War Export 
Groups: Statistics and Estimates', contained in Guardbook MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/50. 
22. See 'Notes of Interview', prepared by Major Watling and 
dated 31 July 1941, being a conference with Major-General 
Hawksworth, Director of Military Training, War Office (Horse 
Guards). Hawksworth noted that the big problem with the motor 
cycle, either solo or with a sidecar, was that by its very nature 
it "must always be vulnerable. " Watling had trouble disputing 
this point and was forced to concede to the Union Management 
Committee that "I must admit that to a certain extent I 
appreciate and accept their arguments. " The memo is contained in 
the Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/51. No doubt another cause for a 
reduced use of military motor cycles were improved wireless 
communications which undercut the need for dispatch riders. 
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Finally, and most important, the military motor cycle simply 
could not compete either in terms of safety for its operators or 
for general versatility with light armoured vehicles like the 
Bren Gun carrier and, after America's entry in the war in 
December 1941, with the four wheeled drive 'Jeep', a machine 
which could fill many of the roles that had been customarily 
performed by motor cycles. Hence, as far as the General Staff 
was concerned, there was not the need to order motor cycles in 
the quantities that some thought would be necessary at the 
beginning of the war. In some ways, the situation was analogous 
with the problem that the industry faced in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s when cheap motor cars had begun to undercut the 
economy appeal of the motor cycle with the middle and parts of 
the working-classes. Again, the industry could not seem to come 
up with an adequate response, although under these circumstances, 
there may not have been one to employ. 
23 
In the meantime, efforts to continue to supply the export trade 
began to flag under the pressures of war. 24 One notable problem 
was the fact that the reputation of British via-a-vis German 
motor cycles had suffered during the pre-war years. In early 
1940, for example, when the British attempted to increase sales 
of motor cycles to the then neutral Dutch market, they discovered 
23. See ibid. Hawksworth explicitly noted the advantages of the 
Bren carrier in comparison to the motor cycle. In Germany, motor 
cycles increasingly were replaced with four wheeled vehicles such 
as Volkswagen's 'Kabelwagen', although far fewer numbers of them 
were supplied to the Wehrmacht than Jeeps to the Allies - never 
mind the numbers of horses used by the Germans. See Robin Fry 
The yW Beetle, London: David & Charles, 1980, pp. 83-89. 
24. In fact, by 1942 the manufacturers, even if they could get 
hold of sufficient materials, were forbidden by the Ministry of 
Supply from exporting machines of larger than 250cc capacity. 
overall it was noted that "the output of motor cycles has been 
severely limited. " See Manufacturers' Union Annual Report for 
1942, p. 2 contained in MRC MSS 204/4/3/2. 
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that the Germans had become very difficult to dislodge. The 
British Consul-General in Rotterdam wrote a report which noted 
that, thanks to pre-war neglect on the part of British 
manufacturers, the Germans had moved in and had achieved 
"practically a monopoly" of the local motor cycle trade. Not 
only were the German models "more convenient" for users, but 
because of an export discount of 20 per cent, spare parts were 
cheaper, and delivery was faster, while, most important, "the 
quality of their materials is A. 1. "25 
The report was highly critical of the record of British 
manufacturers in Holland. Their machines were "old fashioned 
compared to the German product, " a result of "the conservatism of 
British manufacturers who have ignored German competition for 
years and are now beaten by it in the Dutch market. " Moreover, 
unfavourable comparisons were also drawn by retailers about the 
superior level of service received from German manufacturers-, in 
comparison to the British. Indeed, it seemed "the British 
manufacturers have no interest in their agent so long as he pays 
up (mostly in advance)". Little wonder British motor cycle 
companies had trouble making progress in this important market 
before 1939.26 
Nonetheless, elsewhere, especially in distant overseas markets, 
the German presence had begun to fade away. This was mostly the 
result of demands from their own military combined with an 
25. See Memo from Watling to all members of the Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers' Section, dated 19 April 1940 and entitled '69/40: 
Holland: Development of British Trade' contained Guardbook MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/49a. In August 1938 the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader 
noted that the Germans had captured the Dutch market from the 
British manufacturers although no explanations were provided. 
See "Holland's Imports, Germany Controls the Dutch Motor cycle 
Trade", 26 August 1938, p. 146. 
26. See memo '69/40', Ibid. 
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effective Allied blockade of German ports, although overland 
routes to the east remained open for some time. As for the 
industry's military production, there is no indication that 
British motor cycle companies had any difficulty supplying the 
Armed Forces with a sufficient supply of machines. Indeed, 
unlike other sections of industry which produced four wheeled and 
tracked transportation for the military, the motor cycle 
manufacturers were not only able to meet all British requirements 
but supply the Canadian army as well. 27 
However, the profusion of different models provided by the five 
producers, all with mostly incompatible spares, continued to 
drive service quartermasters to distraction. By way of a letter 
from the Ministry of Supply, several firms were informed that the 
War Office "has expressed very strongly the view that the numbers 
of solo motor cycles at present in service use is excessive and 
that one design should be adopted as soon as is practicable. " By 
early 1944 matters had reached the point where a meeting between 
the ministry of Supply and the leading executives of the industry 
was called in order to discuss the matter. 
28 
The ministry's position was quite clear: the military was fed 
up with trying to maintain all the different types of motor 
cycles used by its various branches and wanted the industry to 
27. Apparently in the spring of 1944, under circumstances the 
Union's Management Committee termed "very obscure" although 
hardly unwelcome to them, the Canadian Army decided to switch its 
preference in motor cycles from Harley-Davidson to Norton. See 
memo dated 22 April 1944 entitled 'S. M. Disposals: Harley- 
Davidson Motor Cycles', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/55. The information about the self-sufficency of British 
motor cycle supply in relation to that of other forms of wheeled 
transport is from "Historical Narrative: Wheeled Vehicle Motor 
Transport", Op it, p. 82. 
28. See letter from Brigadier K. Hedges to AMC, BSA, Norton and 
Triumph, dated 18 January 1944, contained in PRO WO 185/124, file 
entitled "Standardised Motor Cycle Design. " 
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develop a single standardised model. 29 For their part, the 
industry representatives objected, since such a design would 
require at least two years to develop, never mind the trouble of 
trying to find the necessary special jigs and tools for the extra 
work under difficult wartime conditions. Worst of all, the 
manufacturers complained that, ultimately, as far as they were 
concerned, a standardised model built specifically for the 
military would be "useless in other directions" with no direct 
commercial applicability. Norton Managing Director Gilbert Smith 
wanted the government to drop its plans and instead allow the 
motor cycle industry "to use the very limited design capacity, 
left to [it] to perfect their post-war attacks on Home and 
overseas markets. ""30 
In order to break the impasse, Jack Sangster proposed a 
compromise. Companies would use an existing model that all the 
manufactures were already familiar with and then make all the 
necessary modifications. However the Ministry replied that, as 
far as it was concerned, there was no suitable existing design 
and the manufacturers were pointedly reminded that "in relation 
to post-war problems and development of export trade, the motor 
cycle industry was in a far better position than certain other 
industries. " The government had been no more demanding than it 
29. As one War Office representative wrote: "The reasons for 
the existing unsatisfactory state of affairs whereby the Army is 
equipped with multifarious makes and types of vehicles resulting 
in the consequential spares and maintenance problems are so well 
known that they need not be ventilated in this paper. " See 
document entitled "Organisation and weapons policy Committee - 
post war design of vehicles other than armoured fighting 
vehicles", dated January 1945, contained in PRO WO 185/96, 
"policy in connection with post-war standardised military 
vehicles. " 
30. See minutes of meeting held between the Ministry of Supply 
and the motor cycle industry, dated 10 March 1944, contained in 
PRO WO 185/124. 
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had with the motor car industry, which was also heavily committed 
to aircraft production. The required labour and materials would 
be made available, it was now up to the motor cycle manufacturers 
to get on with the job and have a prototype ready by 1946. If 
not, members of the Ministry warned, the industry would be forced 
to come up with a suitable design. 31 
In the meantime, as early as 1941, under prodding from the 
Board of Trade, the industry had begun to consider the question 
of post-war planning. This planning had three aspects. First, 
the industry would list the requirements needed from the 
government in order to facilitate speedy re-conversion from war 
time to peace time production. Second, it would describe what 
measures it intended to take to re-open export markets and, 
finally, manufacturers would undertake a programme to develop new 
motor cycle designs. 
32 
In the meantime, as far as production was concerned, the 
Government set a target of 50,000 motor cycles for 1942. A 
commitment of sufficient labour as well as extra machine tools to 
be imported from the United States was made, although this was 
not always fulfilled. The position of the various manufacturers 
varied: Ariel, for example, was "entirely controlled by the 
31. See memo dated 13 March 1944 and entitled 'W. D. Motor 
Cycles: Design' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/54. 
Evidently the industry's reluctance to put their minds to the 
task of meeting war time requirements caused a great deal of 
frustration at the Ministry of Supply. In a letter to an 
official at the War Office, Brigadier Hedges noted that the motor 
cycle manufacturers "as a whole are showing considerable 
resistance to the idea of producing a new standardised W. D. motor 
cycle. " He thought that it might become necessary for the 
Ministry to "invoke the use of its legal powers if their attitude 
did not improve. " See Hedges to Major-General Munson, i[no date 
but most certainly during 1943-1944] contained in PRO WO 185/124. 
32. See minutes of a meeting at the Ministry of Supply (TT2), 4 
September 1941, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/41. 
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labour position. " There were also worries about shortages of 
necessary machine tools, despite earlier assurances to the 
contrary. BSA said it needed more, but admitted that even if 
they were provided it might not be able to find sufficient 
operators because of shortages of skilled workers. 33 Watling 
stressed that the industry's situation was complicated by the 
fact that it was structured horizontally not vertically. This 
meant that there would likely be potential bottle-necks caused by 
a dependency on specialist component makers, a statement that 
implies that, had it been otherwise, overall production would 
have been higher. 34 
Among all these problems, one hopeful sign for the future was 
the growing potential of the export trade in the coming post-war 
years. Now that the Allied blockage had cut off the Germans and 
Italians from their overseas markets, unprecedented opportunity 
awaited British manufacturers. In Mexico, for'example, after 
1939, the removal of German competition left the field wide open. 
Although during the 1920s and early 1930s this market had been 
dominated by the American producers, the Germans had broken 
through to a whole new range of customers with their light-weight 
machines, such as the 175cc single cylinder 'Wanderers' and 
33. At Norton, for example, matters were chronic, with machine 
tools there reported to be idle "for want of labour. " Major 
Watling was very critical of the way the government had allocated 
this equipment. The Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) he 
charged, "had the first choice and (he) had evidence that they 
were extravagent in their use. " Watling insisted that it was up 
to the Ministry of Supply to ensure that sufficient amounts of 
machine tools were earmarked for the motor cycle industry if it 
were to keep to its assigned production targets. See Ibid. 
34. Ministry of Supply representatives at the meeting suggested 
that the labour situation might be eased through dispersal to 
places like Lancashire. In the event, however, the crisis eased 
and there was no necessity to relocate motor cycle production. 
See 'bam id_ 
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'Maicos', which were especially popular in urban areas. Britain 
could inherit this market, if only it could match the nature, 
quality and price of the machines the Germans had sold there. 35 
Indications were also favourable for future expansion in the 
USA. German products had not been popular there previously, 
since American tastes tended to run towards the large 
displacement Harley-Davidsons and Indians. Market investigations 
conducted by the Department of Overseas Trade in the state of 
California and cities of New Orleans and Philadelphia, which had 
been forwarded to the Manufacturers' Union, suggested that there 
might be a demand for British built machines once civilian 
production resumed. They were warned, however, that expanding 
sales would not be an easy task. In northern California, for 
example, demand was thought weak, "principally because a good 
second hand car is cheaper than a new imported motor cycle. " 
This news had little evident effect on Triumph's Managing 
Director, Edward Turner. In the midst of war, he was busily 
cultivating his pre-war contacts 
in Los Angeles with an eye to a 
build up of exports when the time was right. 
36 
35. See memo dated 31 December 1943 and entitled '26/43: 
Mexico: Development of Post-War Trade. ' In another two memos, 
one dated 27 August 1940, entitled 'E. G. 48/40. Development of 
Overseas Trade: Market Reports' and another dated 16 September 
1940 entitled 'Development of Overseas Trade: Market Reports 
Central and South America', the Union provided members of the War 
Export Group a survey of promising sales prospects. Many of them 
had previously been taken over by German manufacturers but were 
now open to the British again. All memos contained in Guardbook 
MSS MRC 204/3/1/54. 
36. The Department of Overseas market survey is contained in a 
memo dated 23 August 1940, entitled 'E. G. 40/40. Development of 
Overseas Trade: Market Reports: USA', contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/50. Copies of correspondence between Edward 
Turner and Triumph's Los Angeles distributor Bill Johnson are 
reproduced 
in chapter eight of Ivor Davies' Triumph - The 
Complete story, Swindon: The Crowood Press, 1991. 
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Yet this good news was tempered with caution. Shortly after 
the American entry into the war in December 1941, British 
industry generally was warned about the implications of a changed 
export environment in the post-war era. During a speech to a 
conference of Export Groups in late January 1942, the President 
of the Board of Trade informed them that in future there would be 
far closer economic collaboration between Britain and the USA 
which might result in a "possible division of export markets. "37 
The implications of this development, in the view of the Board 
of Trade, was that there would have to be a greater level of 
"cooperation and understanding" among the manufacturers 
themselves if they wished to increase exports. They would now 
have to accept that the "general tendency of export business in 
the future would be on a collective basis instead of [an] 
individual basis. "38 Later on, Watling drew the obvious 
conclusions with respect to the future of the Manufacturers' 
Union and why it was so important to have a membership embracing 
the entire industry: "All that has been said and written of 
post-war organisation of Trade makes it extremely probable that 
the Government will expect Industry to negotiate on all matters 
affecting marketing, sales, propaganda, production and export on 
a collective basis. " Furthermore, manufacturers could expect to 
have materials allocated by the government through the trade 
organisations. 
39 
37. See memo dated 30 January 1942 entitled 'Export Policy' 
(being a report on a conference of export groups the day before), 
contained in Guardbook MSS MRC 204/3/1/52. 
38. bam= 
39. Se letter from Watling to the members of the Motor Cycle. and 
Bicycle export groups, dated 27 March 1942 and entitled 'Union 
Membership' and contained in Guardbook op cit. 
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The motor cycle industry was also warned that the British 
Imperial Preference system might have to be abandoned. Certain 
Dominions, Australia especially, had already indicated their 
intention to start up secondary industries which would compete 
with British imports. This might also have implications with 
respect to the kind of exports Britain could send abroad. 
Perhaps it might be best for British manufacturers to concentrate 
on producing "high grade products" and leave the "cheaper 
products" to be made in the "markets in which there was 
comparatively cheap labour. ""40 
These changes were being brought about largely because of 
increased dependency on American imports shipped in under the 
Lend-Lease Agreement. Although this agreement was essential to 
the continuation of the British war effort, Roosevelt's Lend- 
Lease Administrator E. Stetinius was putting heavy pressure upon 
the Board of Trade to curtail what little export trade remained 
between Britain and other nations. After the war it was feared 
these restrictions might well carry on. The Americans had also 
raised the question of creating a form of joint planning and the 
allocation of markets between themselves and the British. 
41 
40. See memo entitled 'Export Policy', contained in ibid. 
41. See memo dated 12 April 1943 entitled 'Export Trade and Lend 
Lease Agreement', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/53. Sir 
Samuel Beale, Chairman of the Industrial and Export council 
advised delegates at the meeting of the delicate political 
situation in the USA at that time. In particular, he warned them 
about "the position of President Roosevelt vis a vis the US 
Industrialists - the hostility of the Republican Party to British 
Industrialists and to the British Empire generally. " 
Subsequently, Watling told Union members that he personally 
wanted to see greater assertiveness from the British government 
with the Americans, but the facts of the matter were such that 
"we must always bear in mind that at the present time we were 
bound to the US for at least 2 1/2 days' food per week and that 
fact alone - ignoring any question of supplies of munitions and 
material - must ever be present in our mind in existing 
circumstances. " See ibid. 
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In early 1942, the Board of Trade canvassed the industry to 
determine what the problems it thought might impede a speedy 
conversion to civilian production. Considering the wartime 
conditions, the industry's response was quite optimistic. In 
contrast to the bicycle industry, which was only 25 per cent 
engaged in its normal production, the Board was informed that 75 
per cent of the motor cycle industry was devoted to more or less 
regular manufacture, albeit nearly all destined for military use. 
Production was by then limited to seven firms and the civilian 
and export trades had severely dropped. Still, once the 
hostilities ended, the Board was advised, full peacetime 
production could be reached in only "a few months", so long as 
enough raw materials, specifically steel, aluminium, alloys and 
brass, were made available. 
42 
In. answer to a specific question about improving its complement 
of research and design staffs, the industry could only reply that 
there were "enquiries to be made. " In terms of new models in the 
works, the Ministry was informed that at least one firm was 
thinking about producing a light-weight two stroke machine, with 
an engine capacity of between 100 to 125cc, and there was also 
the possibility of a four stroke 175cc model. 
43 Although the 
industry anticipated a strong demand abroad for British motor 
cycles, (in fact, 
it was believed demand would be well in excess 
of supply), 
it did expect some sort of help from the government. 
The time would soon come, argued the manufacturers, for the 
government "to modify 
their attitude towards the industry and 
give real encouragement 
to production and research in technical 
42. See memo dated 25 September 1942 entitled 'Post-War Export 
Trade', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/43. 
43. J_b -d-- 
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problems and design rather than confine their contacts to the 
introduction of restrictive measures. " No explanation was 
provided, at this time at least, about what was meant by "real 
encouragement. "" 
44 
The industry attached some importance to the Imperial 
Preferential Tariff system, although it carefully noted that 
commercial relations with the Germans, previously the industry's 
biggest competitors, had become "definitely friendly" just prior 
to the outbreak of war. The favourable trade agreements extended 
beyond the boundaries of the Empire. For example, the one 
negotiated with Argentina just before the war had been "of very 
definite advantages to the industry" especially when there had 
been fierce competition with the Germans. 
45 
During this period there was also some discussion among 
industry personnel about what could be done in order to best 
prepare for the peace. At least one senior industry leader, 
Triumph Managing Director Edward Turner, publicly reflected on 
the opportunities that would be open to motor cycle manufacturers 
after the war and urged the 
industry to appeal to a broader 
market than it had previously. In a paper delivered to several 
chapter meetings of the Institution of Automobile Engineers, 
Turner expressed the belief that the motor cycle industry, so 
badly hit by the decline in Home and export markets during the 
1930s, could now bounce back if only the right kind of motor 
cycle was produced. 
46 
44. Ibid.. 
45. See Ibid. Presumably the "definitely friendly" relations 
were an allusion 
to the Dusseldorf agreement (March 1939) 
described in the previous chapter. 
46. See "Post-War Motor Cycle Development", by Edward Turner, 
contained 
in the Proceedings of the Institution of Automobile 
Engineers, 1942-1943, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 135-154. A verbatim record 
93 
Turner's remarks, all the more telling coming as they did from 
the Managing Director of a firm whose market share had actually 
increased in the three years preceding the outbreak of war, 
repeated many of the criticisms that had been levelled at the 
industry since 1929. Motor cycle design, he admitted, had been 
uninspired and far too oriented to the racetrack. The industry 
had been, Turner claimed, "almost entirely supported by the 
sporting elements and consequently restricted in its appeal. " 
Turner did not advocate forsaking sporting events completely nor 
abandoning the sports enthusiasts; after all, he conceded, races 
like the Isle of Man TT had a role in stimulating design at the 
top end of the market. What he had in mind, however, was a 
motor cycle that "will attract, by its utility, the ordinary 
pedestrian. "47 
The problem was, as became apparent in the remainder of the 
paper, that Turner was unclear exactly what he meant by the term 
'economy' motor cycle. Like other critics, Turner stressed the 
need for quiet running, easy starting and handling and some form 
of in-built weather protection in order to appeal to potential 
but less dedicated motor cyclists. However, he was reluctant to 
commit himself to specifying just what kind of machine the ideal 
motor cycle would be. Although Turner saw virtue through 
incorporating these features in motor cycles of all capacities, 
he did not actually promote, as was done during the 1930s, trying 
to develop a mass market by way of the 'auto-cycle' or very low 
of the discussions held at meetings in London, Coventry, and 
Luton as well as written comments were included in the same issue 
at pp. 313-352. 
47. ßa1 P. 137. 
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engine displacement class motor cycles along the lines of what 
had been done so successfully in Germany before the war. 48 
Turner's article precipitated a debate, albeit a brief one, 
within the industry about why it had been unable to produce a 
successful 'economy' motor cycle and what the future direction 
should be. Donald Heather, then an AMC Director, dismissed any 
hope of producing a 'utility' motor cycle. Many different 
versions had been tried, he reminded those present at the London 
chapter discussion, but they had all failed: "... the fact 
remains that we have always come back to the sports type, not 
because the industry has not shown an interest in the utility 
machine or has not attempted to make it, but because the sports 
market is, in fact the dominant market. i49 
Turner replied that it was about time the industry faced facts. 
Look at the basic statistics, he urged. Registrations and 
production had declined consistently since 1930: "That would 
rather indicate that a lot of people were not too satisfied with 
the-service they were getting from their machines, and that they 
were going in for cars (as the great majority of them did) or 
preferred to ride bicycles. " Over the years the motor cycle had 
slipped badly when compared to other forms of transport and the 
decline had to be arrested: "We should not be satisfied merely 
to carry on the industry as it is, but should try to develop it 
and make more people motor cycle minded. ""50 
Others present at the meetings found further defects in the 
record of the 'utility' motor cycle. Bertram Marians, Managing 
Director of Phelon and Moore (manufacturers of Panther motor 
48. Ibid. 
49. Ibid, p. 317. 
50. Ib id_, p. 327. 
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cycles), criticised the poor advertising of the industry in 
comparison with its motor car counterpart. Another participant 
blamed "... the innate conservatism" of the British public which 
had failed to buy "several advanced designs. " However, Turner 
himself conceded that not enough effort had gone into producing 
good quality products: "We have lost literally thousands of 
customers through the years because of the utility machine 
falling to pieces, sometimes before the owner paid for it. ""51 
Did any of the companies take up Turner's suggestions and try 
and develop an improved motor cycle design? As before 1939, BSA 
was preparing the most extensive model line-up, which would be 
offered in two phases after the war. The first would be a number 
of essentially pre-war vintage designs, a 250cc, 350cc and 500cc 
models as well as re-conditioned military machines. The second 
range was to be far more comprehensive, covering a 98cc auto- 
cycle (badged as 'New Hudson') plus models in the 250cc, 350cc 
and 500cc capacity. BSA was also studying a Harley-Davidson with 
the intent of producing a 800cc twin cylinder model and 
considering manufacturing 250cc and 500cc shaft drive machines, 
one of which was based on a captured German model. 
52 
Other firms were working on new designs of their own, none of 
which dramatically differed from their pre-war offerings. 
Douglas, for example, capitalising on its work during the war 
producing aircraft components, was readying a 350cc transverse 
'flat' twin cylinder that was unlike anything else in Britain at 
the time although was not marketed until 1947. AMC was the first 
51. Tbc pp. 332, p. 336 and p. 348. 
52. See volume containing material entitled 'Research and Design 
Committee Minutes-Motor Cycle Section', particularly the meeting 
of 29 September 1944, contained 
in MSS 19C. 
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British manufacturer to incorporate hydraulic front forks (until 
then virtually all the manufacturers used the so-called 'girder' 
forks which were thought inferior) based on those used on certain 
pre-war German motor cycles. However, the company also decided 
to drop its 250cc and the large capacity twin cylinder models and 
concentrate on the 350cc and 500cc cylinder machines. Norton's 
prospective 1945 line-up comprised only two models, both dating 
from 1939. A large displacement twin cylinder machine, designed 
to match the Triumph 'Speed Twin', was also under 
consideration. 
53 
And what did Edward Turner's Triumph company have planned? 
Ironically, although its motor cycles were as technologically 
advanced as any in Britain, they were virtually all directed at 
performance oriented customers. In 1945 the smallest projected 
machine was a 350cc model and three variants of the 500cc twin 
cylinder machines were planned. They may have met, in part, the 
criteria Turner had earlier defined for rider satisfaction but 
they were 'utility' or 'economy' machines in only the very 
54 
broadest possible sense. 
The Manufacturers' Union was very interested in taking 
advantage of the suspension of peace-time trading to re-organise 
the Home market. In 1943, the Union and the Motor Cycle Section 
of the Motor Agents Association 
(MAA) formed a special Joint 
Committee, composed of equal representation by manufacturers and 
retailers, in order 
to begin making arrangements for trading in 
53. See the section on Douglas motor cycles contained in 
Wilson's on cit, vol 2, pp. 179-180, Peter Hartley, Matchless 
pp. 132 and 
137, Magrath, OP Cit, p. 69 and Reynolds, op cit, p. 60. 
54. See Roy Bacon's British Motor Cycles of the 1940s and 1950s, 
London: osprey Publishers, 1989, p. 117. 
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Britain once the war ended. There were a number of items which 
both parties wanted reviewed. 55 
For their part, the retailers were unhappy about what they 
believed was a surplus of dealers around the country that had 
built up during the 1930s. There were, they maintained, "too 
many dealers in relation to the number of machines sold. " This 
was caused by the manufacturers having sold some of their 
machines to 'dabblers', dealers who were not really committed to 
the trade. They wanted the rules tightened up with respect to 
what kind of shops could sell motor cycles. Another point of 
concern was control of the prices of second hand machines and of 
the allowances given on vehicles traded in on exchange. This was 
considered to be "essential". 
56 
As for the manufacturers, they wanted an overhaul of the rebate 
system they administered, although there was some division on 
this point. They were also adamant on maintaining their right to 
appoint their own dealers, 'dabblers' or not. Another point the 
manufacturers wished to promote was a standardised discount, 
based on a two-tiered dealership system, to apply across the 
trade and cover all types of motor cycle. This, they believed, 
would "provide the best incentive for the trade to sell more 
motor cycles. i57 Both parties were especially concerned about 
55. The minutes of the Joint Committee have been preserved by 
the Motor Cycle Retailers' Association in their London 
headquarters. The file is marked 'The Motor Cycle Advisory 
committee, 4815'. The writer wishes to thank the Association for 
providing access to this material. A number of years later, 
member Donald Heather would recall the purpose of the Committee 
was "to plan post-war conditions of trading, to avoid chaotic 
trading conditions and to build a prosperous retail side of the 
industry. " See ibid, meeting of 24 July 24 1957. 
56. See jbid, particularly the meetings of 17 September and 11 
November 1943. 
57. Both AMC's Donald Heather and Jack Sangster were in favour 
of a flat discount rate; to have it otherwise "would be 
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dealing with the issue of high insurance premiums. The retailers 
considered this issue to have been "unquestionably ... one of the 
greatest sales deterrents in the past. " It was agreed to have 
the Committee investigate the feasibility of having an industry 
wide insurance plan implemented, which would have the backing of 
the Manufacturers' Union. Several alternatives were reviewed 
though no decision was made before the end of the war. 58 
Over the winter of 1943/1944, with the war clearly going in 
favour of the Allies, the industry and government entered into a 
more intense phase of post-war planning. In a memorandum dated 9 
May 1944, intended as a response to a Board of Trade 
questionnaire distributed in the previous year, the 
Manufacturers' Union provided a comprehensive overview of both 
its current problems and expectations for the future. 
59 
This was not as optimistic an appraisal as their earlier 
memorandum. Worries were now expressed that, although a minority 
(approximately 30 per cent) of the manufacturers thought that the 
transition from war to peace-time production would be 
comparatively painless (assuming, of course, sufficient supplies 
of labour and materials), this was not the case for the 
remainder. They would face a difficult task, "owing to the 
practical restrictions upon design and development since the 
undesirable as 
it would inevitably lead to abuses, to price- 
cutting and the like. " The retailers favoured a rate of between 
20-25 per cent, provided that there was adequate price control. " 
They were, however, "emphatically" opposed to the rebate system 
(in that they had the sympathy of most manufacturers). The 
manufacturers were also 
insistent on their right to have what 
they called 'casual traders' being dealers most in rural areas 
who might also carry other lines of goods unrelated to motor 
cycles. See meetings of 9 December 1943 and 9 March 1944, p-p 
Cit_ 
58. See committee meeting of 27 January 1944, ibid. 
59. A copy of the memorandum, entitled 'Problems of Post-War 
Reconstruction and Development', is contained in PRO BT 60/81/6. 
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outbreak of war. " This would mean that the industry would be 
looking to the government for help in terms of the release of 
technicians and other specialist personnel, provision of research 
equipment as well as new plant and training for other labour. 
The manufacturers were also very anxious about the "excessive 
wear and tear" inflicted on their factory and plant and hoped for 
government relief. 
60 
What sort of specific proposals did the industry put to the 
Board of Trade in order to enable it to "overcome existing 
difficulties"? Top of the list was a request to modify the 
Essential Works Orders (EWO) to give the firms "a greater control 
over labour" (they did not explain how this was to be 
accomplished) which "might eliminate difficulties with respect to 
shortages or excess of personnel to the advantage of both 
employer and employed. " The early return of the skilled labour, 
displaced during the course of the war effort, was deemed 
essential if the manufacturers were to provide "a higher standard 
of performance and economy and easier maintenance. ""61 
Suggestions were also made regarding re-employment of returning 
soldiers and 'directed' labour, as well as the importance of what 
was termed 'key' personnel. On the 'supply side', the industry 
wanted existing tool room plant put at their disposal as soon as 
possible at the conclusion of military contracts, and the 
provision of "cheap money" to allow for needed capital 
expenditure. They also hoped to be allowed to buy surplus 
government plant "at prices equitable to the purchasing 
60. It was estimated that up to 50 per cent of machine tools, 
especially the 
high speed automatic machines, currently deployed 
in the motor cycle industry would need an overhaul. Ibid. 
61. Ibid* 
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manufacturer" as well as "further concessions" with respect to 
income tax allowances for depreciation of plant and machinery. 62 
On the question of re-opening the Home market, the industry 
urged the "complete and speedy" abolition of the Purchase Tax 
which was thought "to restrict the volume of sales in the Home 
Market and thus retard economy in production and reduction of 
price to the consumer". With respect to sales abroad, the 
government was asked to take "emphatic and immediate steps" to 
ensure "the prompt re-establishment of export trade" with a 
minimum of limitations. Moreover, it was assumed that the 
Americans would be requested to drop "the harassing restrictions 
of Lend-Lease. "63 However, potential export success was being 
jeopardised by certain government departments. 
Criticism, for example, was voiced about the effectiveness of 
the Export Credits Guarantee Department. Its insurance was 
considered too expensive, 
department staff were too conservative 
in accepting risks offered by exporters and service was "slow and 
cumbersome. " The 
industry realised the opportunities offered in 
the post-war export market and anticipated being able to replace 
German and Italian manufacturers 
in their previous commercial 
strongholds. To 
this end, the government was asked to impose 
controls on their pre-war competitors and 
thus ensure, over a 
transitional period at least, that British 
industry would be 
protected 
from the "unfair competition" that had characterised 
the latter part of the 1930s. If 
this could be done, the promise 
abroad was considerable: with 
"the improvement in the standard 
62. ýý* 
63. By 1944 Union officials noted that, thanks to the Lend-Lease 
Agreement, they had been shut out of the Canadian and South 
American markets. See memo dated 24 February 1944 entitled 'Post 
War Reconstruction', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/54. 
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of living and the comparatively high cost of other forms of 
mechanical transport" future circumstances "should give UK Motor 
Cycle Manufacturers a valuable opportunity in other Overseas 
Markets. ""64 
However, the memorandum contained a surprising admission of 
internal divisions over how best to re-open markets overseas. 
The Union itself was in favour of some form of collective market 
research that would be centrally coordinated. However, some 
constituent firms were dubious about this on the grounds that 
such a policy was not "practicable. " It might yet be possible 
for individual firms, or limited combinations of firms, to act in 
unison but nothing had been planned yet. 
65 The submission also 
contained a prediction that would be later shown to be, at best, 
wildly optimistic. Encouraged by its modest expansion since 
1939, when annual production was greater than any single year 
since 1929, the Union claimed that, within one year of the 
upcoming Armistice, assuming sufficient skilled labour and 
materials, it could produce 500,000 motor cycles and parts for 
sale at home and abroad. This prediction was based, again far 
too hopefully, on the experience it claimed to have gained in 
supplying the war effort. In light of the fact that the pre-war 
64. See memorandum entitled 'Post-war ... ', contained 
in PRO BT 
60/81/6. 
65. When the Commercial Counsellor at the British Embassy in 
Washington D. C. interviewed Triumph Chairman Jack Sangster in 
June 1946, he was told that very little had been done to organise 
cooperative marketing arrangements. In Sangster's words, 
"most 
manufacturers seemed 
to wish to plough a lone furrow, so far as 
export was concerned, although a considerable element of 
cooperation and uniform practice existed 
in connection with the 
domestic trade. " See notes of the interview, prepared by J. B. 
Greaves, dated 5 June 1946, contained 
in ibid. 
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peak reached in 1927 was only 160,000 units, this was a highly 
ambitious, if not rash, self-imposed target. 
66 
The industry now began to seriously focus on the practical 
problems of improving the export trade to the United States. It 
was a potential market which held much promise but was also one 
where the British manufacturers, with the exception of Triumph 
and Ariel, had little experience and few contacts among existing 
motor cycle distributors. Then in May 1944, a fortuitous 
development occurred. The British Consul-General in Chicago was 
approached by A. R. Child, local manager of the Lockheed Aircraft 
Company, who indicated that he wished to become the American 
representative for British motor cycle manufacturers. 
67 
Child presented a glowing picture of the sales potential of 
North America. In his opinion, because of difficulties they 
would experience converting back to peace-time production, the 
sole American manufacturers, Harley-Davidson and Indian, would be 
unable to produce for the civilian market for two years after the 
end of hostilities and the British now had a golden opportunity 
to step in and fill the gap. Child thought that American 
consumers, who had not bought motor cycles 
in any great numbers 
since the 1920s, were ready for the 
kind of machines Britain 
could produce, whether the sophisticated Ariel Square Four or 
the 
66. See memo, Watling to member of the Manufacturers' Union 
president's Advisory Committee, dated 6 March 1944 and entitled 
'post-war Recontruction', contained in Guardbook ibid. See also 




67. Before working with Lockheed, British born Child had been, 
among other 
things, Harley-Davidson's representative in Japan 
where the company 
had sponsored the establishment of a factory to 
build motor cycles under licence. See Harry Sucher's Harley- 
buv; Monn - The Milwaukee Marvel. Sparkford: Haynes Publishing 
Group, 1990, pp. 69-70. 
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speedy and agile twin cylinder Triumphs, which would be a welcome 
contrast to the bigger but less manoeuvrable American models. 68 
Child declared that he could resolve any problems the British 
might have with tariffs and currency exchange and that freight 
rates overseas would be competitive with continental rail 
charges. Best of all, because of his previous association with 
Harley-Davidson, Child possessed what he described as "wide 
personal friendships with many of the most important motor cycle 
distributors. " Child was, just the man to make the connections 
they would need in order to break into the American market. 69 
At about the same time, the Manufacturers' Union was approached 
by the SMMT, which wanted to know whether or not there was any 
interest in combining the resources of the two organisations 
together in terms of creating a cooperative arrangement for an 
export campaign. The proposed scheme was targeted at Empire and 
Dominion territories such as Australia, South Africa and India 
but also included South America and the Middle East. It seemed 
as if the industry was serious about laying the groundwork for a 
new, revamped world-wide sales and distribution network and now 
had the means before it. 
7° 
68. See memo entitled 'USA - Motor Cycle Exports', dated 6 May 
1944 and contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/54. The memo 
reports information received from the British Consul-General of 
Chicago, who had recently conducted an interview with Child. 
69. lbildt 
70. Evidently Major Watling had met with a staff member of the 
SMMT in late 1944 who wanted the Union to join with them to 
create a network of overseas representatives "who will be mainly 
employed for the purpose of market research, through contacts 
with tade associations and government departments. " The overall 
cost'was projected to be around £20,000 per year and the 
subscription rate for the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Union would 
have been £1,000. See letter, Watling to G. Smith (Norton) dated 
4 November 1944 and entitled 'Overseas Representation', contained 
in the Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/55. The Union seemingly passed 
the offer up after only 19 of 120 of its members expressed 
interest in a questionnaire. See minutes of the meeting of the 
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In late 1944, the Allied armies were crossing France and had 
begun to approach Reich territory itself. There was now little 
doubt that the war in Europe would be concluding in a matter of 
months. At this point, two specific issues came to preoccupy the 
attention of the industry. The first was how the government 
might smoothly wind up the wartime controls and disengage from 
its military contracts and so allow the manufacturers to resume 
full civilian production. The second focused on what would now 
happen to the large stocks of surplus motor cycles. Both issues 
contained plenty of potential for continued friction between the 
government and the industry. 
Industry representatives had an opportunity to put many of 
their concerns about the post-war situation to Board of Trade 
representative Captain B. H. Peters, in the course of two meetings 
held during the summer of 1944. At these meetings the 
manufacturers claimed that they would have little difficulty 
converting to peace-time production, again assuming they were 
supplied with enough labour and material. Major Watling 
recognised that exports would be "a very high priority" although 
Union President Gilbert Smith made it clear that the industry 
wanted government controls removed as soon as possible. They 
also urged the lifting of Purchase Tax on both motor cycles and 
bicycles, on the grounds that they were not a "luxury" but "an 
essential means of transport for workers. 1171 
There were matters concerning export markets which also needed 
the speedy attention of the government. Not only would the 
Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, dated 8 January 1945, 
contained in Ibid. 
71. See minutes of meeting between the Bicycle and Motor Cycle 
Industrial and Export Groups, held on 20 July and 17 August 1944, 
contained in the Union Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/18. 
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current restrictions have to be lifted, but there were certain 
aspects to international agreements which were complicating the 
industry's efforts to re-enter overseas markets. Under the Lend- 
Lease agreement, for example, Australia, Britain's most single 
important export market, had been allocated to American motor 
cycle manufacturers. This would have to be altered or removed 
altogether as soon as possible. But there were also many 
opportunities now opening to the industry. India, which held 
large sterling balances as a result of war-time financial 
arrangements, had an especially good potential. 72 
There were other problems which pressed upon the industry. The 
question of cut-backs in government orders of motor cycles first 
arose in late 1944. Watling had expressed his concern to a Board 
of Trade official about rumours flying around the industry to the 
effect that government contracts would soon be coming to an end. 
The rumours were denied, but Watling used the opportunity to make 
clear his objections to the fact that production schedules had 
been set by the Ministry of Supply without first consulting 
either the manufacturers or, for that matter, the Board. He also 
noted that some of the manufacturers were now reluctant to seek 
approval from the government to begin producing prototypes of new 
civilian models, since they feared that to do so might be 
interpreted as an admission of a labour surplus, with all that 
implied under the prevailing circumstances. 73 
72. Ib " 
73. See letter from Watling to Gilbert Smith (President of the 
Manufacturers' Union) dated 4 November 1944 and entitled '1945 
Motor Cycle Programme'. The letter described an interview 
Watling had had the day before with Sir William Palmer, who was 
chairman of an unnamed Board of Trade committee. The letter is 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/55. 
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Thereafter followed a series of meetings between the 
Manufacturers' Union and various government ministries to 
negotiate the terms of the conversion to civilian production. At 
one held during late November 1944, Watling vented his ire at 
Colonel R. Grantham, a senior representative of the Ministry of 
Supply. Although the India Office had indicated that they were 
"very anxious" to resume importing motor cycles, Watling 
complained to Grantham that his ministry would only allow the 
export of light-weights, a type that the Indians did not want. 74 
Several weeks later, at a conference at the Board of Trade, 
Grantham delivered some good news. Service requirements were 
dropping off, he announced, to such an extent that the industry 
would be able to resume peace-time production, "on a considerable 
scale, " as early as July 1945. Capacity would be released to the 
individual firms on a proportional basis and phased in over the 
forthcoming months. Edward Turner, present at the meeting on 
behalf of Triumph and Ariel, wanted to know if permitted exports 
would now include heavy-weights, his firms' specialty. This 
would be allowed, he was informed, but the priority export 
targets were to be Allied and Continental markets. 75 
In January 1945 a meeting between the Ministry of Supply and 
the Manufacturers' Union thrashed out many of the detailed 
problems. Colonel Grantham, who was chairing the meeting, 
informed industry representatives that, following a discussion 
with the Board of Trade, it. was decided that his Ministry would 
now be responsible for civilian motor cycle manufacturing, 
74. See memo dated 22 November 1944 and entitled 'Notes of 
interview between H. R. Watling and Colonel R. Grantham Ministry 
of Supply (TT2)', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/56. 
75. See note of a meeting held at the Board of Trade, dated 14 
December 1944 contained in i id. 
107 
although the Board would still continue to administer the export 
licenses. Grantham confirmed that by the end of the following 
June the current War Office delivery rates would be cut by 40 per 
cent. Moreover, the manufacturers could use their extra capacity 
to ship abroad as many motor cycles as they were able to produce; 
indeed the Ministry was "anxious that the export of motor cycles 
should be as high as the availability of labour would allow. "76 
In turn, Grantham wanted each firm to forward to his Ministry 
their estimates of the numbers and type of machines they wished 
to export. These would be examined by Ministry personnel who 
would issue material allocations accordingly. The industry was 
more or less free to chose their export destinations, subject to 
continuing service commitments and urgent orders, although Canada 
and the Middle East were two locations where "special conditions" 
prevailed (presumably because of currency or remaining Lend-Lease 
restrictions). 77 
Nonetheless, by the end of January the industry had formulated 
its own production programme which it hoped to develop, subject 
to supplies of materials, especially rubber. The programme 
envisioned a total of 35,000 machines, the majority in the 250cc 
76. See document marked as File 257/Veh/839, dated 12 January 
1945 and entitled 'Report of a meeting held at Euston House on 
Wednesday, January 10th, 1945 to Discuss arrangements to be made 
for the production of motor cycles for Export' and contained in 
PRO WO 185/224. The Union kept its own records of this meeting 
in an untitled note dated 12 January 1945, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/56. 
77. The Manufacturers' Union estimated that the firms had the 
following monthly military committments, Ariel, 450; Matchless 
(AMC), 750; BSA, 1,400; Enfield, 520; Norton, 635; Triumph, 
1,000. The balance available for civilian production after 1 
July was, in the same order, 180,310,375,210,251 and 410. 
Grantham had assured industry representatives that the Ministry 
would not be imposing any quotas, the firms could produce all 
they were capable of and materials would be forthcoming. See 
Guardbook op cit. 
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and over engine capacity class, for the remainder of 1945, 
starting at the end of hostilities. 78 At the Ministry of supply, 
staff were busy evaluating the applications from the firms who 
wished to export. The Ministry had also worked out a fairly 
detailed analysis of the industry's productive capacity and 
employment levels. 79 
However, the industry found itself becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the slow pace that restrictions, especially the 
hated Licence to Acquire, were being lifted from civilian 
production. 80 In April a telegram signed by Watling was sent to 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power which stated that, since the 
industry was about to re-commence civilian production, it was 
imperative that both the Licence to Acquire be scrapped and the 
basic petrol ration increased in order to encourage sales of 
78. The actual breakdown was as follows: 
-up to 125cc machines: 5,000 units. 
-up to 250cc machines: 10,000 units. 
-350cc and over: 20,000 units. 
See memo dated 30 January 1945 entitled '22/45.1945 Motor Cycle 
Production Programme', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/56. 
79. The ministry's estimates were as follows: 
Firm Monthly output. Workers. 
AMC 800 1,000 
Ariel 565 400 
BSA 1,300 1,600 
Enfield 600 600 
Norton 675 900 
Triumph 900 600 
See memo dated 2 March 1945, signed by J. Zinkin (Ministry of 
Supply) and entitled 'Interdepartmental Committee on the Post-War 
Resettlement of the Motor Industry. ' Attached is a report 
entitled 'Production Programme for Motor Cycles. Note by 
Ministry of Supply'. The statistics are drawn from the 
attachment. All contained in PRO WO 185/224. 
8o. Privately, civil servants admitted that, with sanction 
having been given to a limited volume of civilian production and 
with the re-introduction of the basic petrol ration, the industry 
had made a valid point about abolition of the Licence to Acquire. 
See letter from G. D. Frazer (Ministry of War Transport) to R. L. 
Bryant (Board of Trade) dated 15 May 1945 and contained in ibid. 
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motor cycles to potential customers in the Home market. Not only 
was there a growing-demand for motor cycles in the Home market 
but increased numbers of them on British roads would help take 
some pressure off overworked public transportation systems. If 
no changes were forthcoming, Watling warned, the Manufacturers' 
Union would make this a political issue. 81 
A meeting was scheduled on 11 May at the Board of Trade in 
order to resolve the industry's continuing problems. Watling 
stated at the outset that the Union was "frankly anxious and 
irritated at the delay in removing obstructions in the way of 
their civilian trade. " He firmly stated the Union's major 
requirements: the need to increase the basic petrol ration, give 
the industry the discretion to resume servicing its former export 
markets, (especially in continental Europe, now starved for 
personal transport), revise the motor cycle tax structure and, 
finally, remove the Licence to Acquire, in order to allow the 
Home market to fully develop. 82 
Industry representatives were especially angry about what they 
considered unnecessary continuation of export restrictions. W. 
Corbett, a representative from Douglas motor cycles, for example, 
told the Ministry of Supply and Board of Trade officials present 
81. See telegram from Watling to the Secretary, Ministry of Fuel 
and Power, dated 25 April 1945 entitled "1945 Motor Cycle 
Production Programme" contained in ibid. Watling's telegram 
ended on this rather confrontational note: "I want to make it 
perfectly plain that if unnecessary obstruction on the 
manufacture, sale and use is continued there will be - as the 
result of the present restrictions - considerable unemployment in 
the motor cycle industry at the beginning of July 1945 and the 
industry will have to make this situation perfectly clear to the 
public at large. " 
82. See memo dated 11 May 1945 entitled '1945 Motor Cycle 
Production Programme' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/56. 
A copy of the Ministry's own minutes of the same meeting are 
contained in PRO WO 185/224. 
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that, even though his firm had a number of outstanding orders 
from Australia and New Zealand, they could not be filled because 
of lack of cooperation from the British government. Such 
limitations would hobble the industry's ability to maintain their 
export programme. 83 
The Douglas company, like the other manufacturers, saw a strong 
correlation between an expanding Home market and a healthy export 
trade. Corbett claimed that during the pre-war period Douglas 
had sold 30 per cent of production abroad but that this figure 
could now be increased to 50 per cent under the right conditions. 
Not only did he maintain that "practically no profit is made on 
exports" but much would depend on the Home market, since foreign 
sales tended to fluctuate from year to year and the domestic 
trade absorbed production when exports were weak. 84 
W. Binney, Principal Assistant Secretary of the Board of Trade 
and chairman of the meeting, expressed some scepticism about this 
assertion of the inter-relationship between exports and the Home 
market. After all, he reminded industry representatives, "cost 
was surely related to output irrespective of the distribution 
83. A Board of Trade representative noted that in the case of 
New Zealand, such restrictions were the result of pre-war 
regulations designed to preserve Sterling balances. See minutes 
of a meeting held at the Board of Trade's London office on 11 May 
1945, contained in PRO WO 185/224. 
84. Corbett went on to say that his company would not go ahead 
with their projected production programme, (he mentioned the 
figure of 200 machines a week), unless they had "a free home 
market. " Gilbert Smith of Norton said that the industry was not 
so much worried about a labour scarcity as it was about 
unemployment caused by the Government restrictions which were 
holding up their production plans. He noted that the 1945-1946 
production programme was dependent on the manufacturers' 
estimates of the division of their output between Home and export 
markets. Watling could not say what exactly those proportions 
were, since they varied between firms. However, he did note that 
in the time before the Germans began to launch their government 
subsidised export drive it approached 50 per cent of the total 
value of production. Ibid. 
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between markets. " But he said that the officials present would 
do whatever they could to expedite matters for the motor cycle 
producers. 85 
In Watling's view, the best way to administer the Home market 
was simply to leave it all in the hands of the industry. 
Together with the existing high prices and limited petrol 
supplies, the market itself would then regulate sales. There was 
no need for the Licence to Acquire system to stay on. However, a 
Ministry of War Transport official noted that, over the past two 
years, only ten applications in total of motor cycles had been 
turned down, so "it could hardly be claimed that the system was 
restricting the Home market. "86 
Another particularly sensitive matter for the industry was the 
question of the disposal of surplus military motor cycles. 
Evidently, after the Great War, the industry had been able to 
convince the government of the day to scrap the surplus military 
stock instead of releasing it on to the open market. However, 
this seemed to be unlikely a second time. Manufacturers' Union 
President Gilbert Smith noted that both the Treasury and what he 
termed "public opinion" would not "easily be persuaded" to allow 




86. Ibid. In his report back to the Manufacturers' Union 
Management Committee, Major Watling noted that he had heard 
reference made about the government's Interdepartmental Committee 
for the Post-war Reconstruction of the Motor Industry. He had 
subsequently made enquiries and was able to inform them that "it 
appeared that this rather grandiose sounding committee was really 
nothing more or less than an occasional meeting of various 
Government Departments. " See memo entitled '1945 Motor Cycle 
Production Programme', op cit. 
87. See minutes of the General Meeting of the Manufacturers' 
Union dated 1 February 1944 contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/1/1/18. 
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For its part, the Board of Trade was beginning to find the 
growing numbers of military motor cycles, now surplus to 
requirements but under its jurisdiction, to be particularly 
irksome. Because of war-time government contracts, the 
manufacturers had produced far more motor cycles since 1939 than 
they would have ever done under normal circumstances and, as one 
memorandum noted, disposal of these machines was a time-consuming 
task. One factor which made disposal so difficult was what was 
termed the "peculiar" nature of the home motor cycle market. 
First, this was because of the decline in motor cycle sales 
before the war (attributed to the greater appeal of light motor 
cars) which might continue after the war, and, second, because 
sales would be limited by the fact that this was a "pleasure 
market", one "to some extent confined to the sporting youth 
section of the community. " Finally, continuation of petrol sales 
would hardly be an incentive for members of the public to want to 
buy personal motorised transport. 
88 
Earlier on during the war, the Board had already become 
apprehensive of what would happen to motor cycle prices after the 
end of hostilities. The problem was thought to be more acute for 
used rather than new motor cycles. Even in 1942 a Board official 
had told Watling that his Ministry feared "the likelihood of 
exorbitant prices being asked for motor cycles" and was 
investigating the possibility of the application of controls. 
However, by 1944, circumstances seem to have drastically changed. 
88. Another problem holding back sales were the fact that many 
of the surplus motor cycles were obsolete and compared poorly to 
machines built originally for the civilian market. See document 
entitled 'Communication No. M. T. 16 - Mechanical Transport 
Disposal Panel - Motor Cycles', dated 28 March 1945, contained in 
PRO BT 69/171. 
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Another Board official told Watling that they were open to the 
Union's suggestions. Indeed, as far as he was concerned, 
disposals policy was "a blank piece of paper upon which they 
could write. 1189 
Several proposals were advanced. Gilbert Smith thought that 
surplus machines could be stored in the vacant factories that 
were scattered around the countryside and could be drawn upon as 
needed and absorbed into trade channels. Edward Turner had a 
simple solution: send off as much of the surplus as possible to 
what he called "backward territories. " In fact, he believed 
this was also a shrewd marketing ploy that could pay dividends 
later on, since ownership of these motor cycles would 
subsequently "arouse in such people a desire to continue to 
acquire them. 1190 
A solution to the problem was reached in the spring of 1945. 
The whole question had become complicated by the fact that, far 
from being a sellers' market, the home market was depressed 
because of continued petrol rationing, which undercut the 
attraction of ownership, irrespective of price. The Union 
convinced the government to allow the individual firms to buy and 
re-condition used military motor cycles, at a pre-determined 
figure, and then gradually to release them onto the market. 
There does not seem to have been any wholesale scrapping of 
surplus British motor cycles nor price rises to the levels feared 
although there were to be problems regulating the flow of re- 
conditioned machines. 
91 
89. See Minutes of the General Meeting of the Manufacturers' 
Union, 1 February 1944, op cit. 
90. bbid. 
91. See minutes of the meetings of the Mechanical Transport 
Disposal Board for 28 March and 11 April 1945, op cit. 
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As the war drew to a close, it was clear that the British motor 
cycle industry had regained an undisputed position as world 
leader in the trade. Between 1939 and 1945 it had produced more 
motor cycles than any other country, in excess of 400,000 
machines by May 1945.92 [See Appendix 1, Table XII]. German 
production, in contrast, had totalled 307,436 machines of all 
types over 1940-1944. Arguably the Germans may have shown more 
innovation in their designs but with many of their factories 
destroyed by bombing and the nation now about to fall under 
Allied occupation, no one seriously thought they would pose a 
threat for some time to come. 
93 As for the other Continental 
producers, they may not have been as badly damaged as the Germans 
but they all suffered from the war to one degree or other. 
The USA, which had emerged in 1945 as an economic and military 
superpower, still lagged well behind Britain as a motor cycle 
producer. Together, the combined volume of the Harley-Davidson 
and Indian companies amounted to 130,044 machines or just barely 
over one quarter of Britain's military output. Nor had they been 
92. According to government figures, the British motor cycle 
produced 382,715 machines by the end of 1944. Exact estimates of 
production from January 1945 until the end of hostitilies are not 
available, but may have amounted to anything between 20,000 to 
50,000 machines. The 1939-1944 estimate is contained in PRO AVIA 
46/192. Davies, op cit, contains an undated photograph of 
Triumph Engineering handing over the 400,000th British war time 
motor cycle to a government representative. The photo, located 
on p. 79, is undated but most likely from early 1945. 
93. The German figures are based on production throughout the 
so-called 'Greater German Reich' which 
included motor cycle 
plants in the former Austria and part of what had been 
Czechoslovakia. It is unclear just what the breakdown was 
between the large twin cylinder and the much smaller single 
cylinder models, but if pre-war trends continued the latter 
probably outnumbered the former. By 1944, the last full year of 
production, only one firm, Auto-Union (based 
in Zschopau in what 
would become the Soviet zone) continued building motor cycles and 
then only in the 250cc and 350cc range. See US Strategic Bombing 
Survey, Report on the German Motor Vehicle Industry, Washington: 
Munitions Division, 1947, pp. 7, p. 13 and p. 19. 
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beset by the same degree of material shortages or had their 
operations disrupted by enemy action and seemed to be in a better 
condition to increase market share. However, there was no 
evident sign that they intended to extend their model range 
beyond their pre-war offering or had any plans for post-war 
marketing-94 
The British manufacturers wasted little time in introducing 
their peace-time models to the public. Triumph actually 
announced its 1945 line-up while the British army was still 
fighting its way to Berlin and this development was followed by 
one from AMC only a few weeks before VE day. However, these 
motor cycles would not be available to the public until after 
government permission had been received. Moreover, several of 
the firms had shown an interest in examining captured German 
machines for possible incorporation of their features in upcoming 
models of their own-95 
Still, at least one disquieting note was recorded. The Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader let the manufacturers know its misgivings 
about their peace-time plans. True, Britain was again back on 
top with a seemingly freer hand than before to expand into 
markets all over the world, but on what basis would this be done? 
A correspondent writing in that journal saw the potential for 
94. Indian's production was 43,044 machines and Harley-Davidson 
made 88,000 during the period in question. See Harry Sucher's 
The Iron Redskin, Sparkford: Haynes Publishing Group, 1990, 
p. 283 and his Harley-Davidson, p. 183. 
95. The story about Triumph's announcement is contained in an 
article entitled "Triumph Post-War Motor Cycles" in the Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader, 2 March 1945, p. 598. The AMC story, 
entitled "AMC War Effort and Prospects, " is covered in ibid, 13 
April 1945, p. 16. The Institution of Automobile Engineers had 
circulated a memo that contained information about a BMW 750cc 
side-car combination unit brought back from North Africa. See 
memo dated 9 December 1943 entitled '23/43: Research' contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/54. 
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growth in the small 'economy' motor cycle category and this was 
especially important if the industry wished to service the strong 
demand for cheap, basic personal transport on the Continent. 96 
Yet the British manufacturers seemed no more inclined to follow 
this advice than they had in the 1930s. The times looked good 
for almost any strategy, but how long would these happy 
circumstances last? 
96. The opinion piece was carried in the 13 April 1945 issue at 
p. 33. The correspondent, identified as 'Marcus', condemned the 
"racing and reliability trials mentality of manufacturers" and so 
long as "that mentality persists we can never hope to see the 
motor cycle develop as it should - as the cheapest form of 
powered transport for the man and woman of modest means. " He 
concluded by stating that if the industry was to survive and 
expand, "the appeal of speed must be subordinated, and in its 
place must be emphasised the handiness and economy of the motor 
cycle as the everyday transport of the man in the street. " 
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Chapter 3. 
'The Industry Reconstructs, 1945 - 1951'. 
The six years after the war provided the motor cycle industry, as 
much of British industry generally, with unparalleled opportunities 
for an expansion of sales both at home and abroad. These 
opportunities were considerable, the British manufacturers now 
being well ahead of their foreign competitors in terms of 
production and design. Yet the challenges facing them were also 
daunting. British motor cycle firms were now subject to frequent 
disruption of their supplies of labour and raw materials, a 
condition that was to be their bane for several years to come. 
Moreover, after the June 1945 General Election the industry also 
had to assess the attitude of a whole new set of ministers. There 
was now the uncertainty of discovering where the industry stood in 
relation to the Labour government's reconstruction plans. 
During the course of a series of meetings in the first half of 
1945, the Union set itself several goals to achieve in the years 
that followed the defeat of Germany: first, to convert to civilian 
production as quickly as possible; second, to reopen export 
markets, especially those that had been lost to the Germans during 
the 1930s and during the war thanks to foreign competition in 
export markets and later through the terms of the Lend-Lease 
programmel; third, to complete designs for new models and quickly 
get them into showrooms, at home and abroad, in order to maintain 
1. Union President George Wilson thought that, in terms of 
exports, there were three courses of action open to the industry. 
One, to continue trading in traditional overseas markets such as 
Australia. Second, to move into those markets in, for example, 
South America and Asia, formerly dominated by the Germans, but now 
open to the British. Third, he saw particularly good prospects in 
North America, a market where neither the British or Germans had 
much previous success. See 'Better than ever', The Export Trader, 
August 1945, pp. 12-13. 
s 
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and enlarge existing ownership; and finally, to acquire new plant 
and factories where needed, through the anticipated reparations 
programme. 2 
This final point was an especially sensitive one in light of the 
fierce rivalry that had been waged between the British and German 
motor cycle industries during the 1930s. The industry believed it 
now had the opportunity to thoroughly investigate German factories 
and pick up plant and designs, virtually, they hoped, on demand. 
British manufacturers thought they would also be able to discover 
just how the Germans had been able to launch and maintain their 
pre-war export drive which had so alarmed industry leaders. Many 
British manufacturers firmly believed that this success was less 
the result of the quality of German designs or their manufacturing 
techniques but was instead the result of state sponsored 
subsidies. 
3 
When Germany capitulated in May 1945, the motor cycle industry 
was more fortunate than other British industries. Although some of 
its factories had been bombed during the conflict, nearly all the 
damage had been repaired or replaced and, Triumph for one, actually 
emerged from the war with far better facilities than it had started 
out with in 1939. Moreover, unlike the motor car 'Big Six', who 
had been required by the war effort to drop their regular 
2. See meetings of 20 July, 14 August and 16 May 1945, all 
contained in Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/18. 
3. Not everyone associated with the British motor cycle industry 
subscribed to this critical view of German industry. E. A. Mellors, 
for example, a well known racer (who had been 'Champion of Europe' 
over 1938/1939) was much more sympathetic to the Germans, who he 
thought were far better at marketing than their British 
counterparts. Their success, in his opinion, had less to do with 
government subsidies, but was more the result of the fact that they 
"were wise enough to supply their customers with what they wanted, 
and not what we would have like to sell them. " See 'The motor 
cycles Europe needs' by E. A. Mellors, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
27 April 1945, p. 84. 
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production programmes and had become heavily committed to aircraft 
and other military work, the major British motor cycle companies 
had continued manufacture of their main line of products, albeit 
modified for the services. Hence, reconversion would likely be 
fraught with fewer problems in terms of re-tooling for peace-time 
production. 
Nonetheless, there still remained the difficulties of procuring 
sufficient quantities of materials and labour. Unlike the motor 
industry, motor cycle manufacturers were not at first subject to 
the same degree of tight export quotas although intimations to this 
effect had been received by certain manufacturers, even before the 
war had ended. In January 1945, BSA for one, had been told 
materials and labour would only be forthcoming contingent on 
production for export. 
4 However, as late as May 1946, the industry 
had yet to receive firm export guidelines from the Government. At 
that point, Triumph Chairman Jack Sangster led a Union delegation 
to the Board of Trade and concluded a verbal agreement that ensured 
50 per cent of production would go abroad. 
5 
In fact, the industry claimed its exports had consistently 
reached this target both before and after Sangster's agreement. 
Norton, for example, was already exporting 75 per cent of its 
output, mostly to Canada and various South American countries, by 
early 1946. In September 1947 a letter was received from the 
Ministry of Supply notifying the Union that, pursuant with 
guidelines put down for four wheeled motor vehicles and bicycles, 
4. During a meeting of the BSA Small Heath factory Management 
Committee, members were informed that "manufacturers will be 
permitted to recommence the production of civilian machines for 
export purposes only. " [Emphasis in the original]. See management 
Committee meeting of 20 January 1945, contained in MRC MSS 19A/1/5. 
5. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section meeting 
of 26 September 1947, contained in Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/20. 
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henceforth the motor cycle industry would have to increase its 
proportion of exports up to 75 per cent. In another communication, 
the ministry informed the industry that it had approved its 1948 
production programme at the level of 150,000 machines, assuming 
adequate supplies of materials and labour. 6 
The manufacturers unanimously agreed to meet this new export 
target, by way of a series of monthly increases of 5 per cent, 
commencing that October. Union members were also relieved to hear 
news of a recent speech made by Board of Trade President Harold 
Wilson, delivered in Birmingham, where he had promised the motor 
cycle industry priority deliveries of coal and steel. They were 
disappointed, however, to learn later in October that they would 
not qualify as a priority industry for labour supplies. 7 
British motor cycle manufacturers were mindful of the situation 
they had faced immediately prior to the war when German competition 
had eroded many previously secure overseas markets. However, now 
they faced a radically changed trading environment. It was obvious 
that, after the sustained aerial bombing and extensive ground 
fighting which had destroyed large parts of its industrial plant, 
Germany would not be in any condition to challenge Britain 
6. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' section of 26 
September 1947, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/61. The 
Ministry of Supply's 1948 programme is outlined in a Union memo 
dated 20 October 1947 and entitled '210/47. Motor Cycle Exports'. 
The author of the Ministry of Supply made his estimate of 150,000 
machines on the basis of the Union's memo to the Board of Trade in 
July 1944. However, this memo had actually said the industry could 
produce 500,000 machines after the war. All material contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/61. 
7. See the minutes of the meeting of the Group Export Management 
Committee, held on 21 October 1947. Members had been informed by 
the Ministry of Labour that "there was no priority whatsoever for 
labour for the Cycle and Motor Cycle Industries. " Complaints were 
also voiced about the poor quality of steel which had arrived. 
During that time exports had been increased to 60 per cent of total 
output. The minutes are contained minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/20. 
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industrially for some time to come. Many manufacturers hoped that 
the Germans would now face punitive limitations on production, in 
order to retard any quick recovery in overseas markets. Italy, the 
lesser pre-war competitor, was not treated as a former enemy, 
having dropped out of the Axis in 1943. Yet it would still need 
time to re-organise its battered industries. 8 Thus, the only 
conceivable potential competition would have to come from the 
Americans, whose industry had been progressively fading away in 
export markets long before 1939 and who seemed to be preoccupied 
with its own domestic market. 
9 
There had also been some changes in the structure of the British 
industry during the war years. The 'Big Six' had persisted to 1939 
but did not survive the war. It had become, for all intents and 
purposes, the 'Big Five' after BSA bought Ariel Motors from Jack 
Sangster, along with the rights to the defunct New Imperial name, 
in October 1944. '° Production continued at the Birmingham factory 
but now under the overall direction of the BSA Board of Directors. 
Although the sales agreement promised a degree of autonomy for the 
8. See editorial entitled 'Another Reason the Purchase Tax must 
Go', Motor Cycling, 5 July 1947, p. 163. 
9. Nonetheless, some suspected there was every possibility that 
the Americans might yet launch an export drive of their own and 
rumours abounded of new designs nearing completion on drawing 
boards at the Harley-Davidson and Indian companies. See memo 'USA: 
Motor Cycle Exports', dated 3 February 1947, contained in Guardbook 
MSS MRC 204/3/l/59a. For details of Harley-Davidson's post-war 
production programme, see Harry Sucher, op cit, pp. 185-212. 
10. BSA bought Ariel from Sangster in late 1944 for £310,000 cash, 
along with the rights to the name of Imperial Motor Cycle Co, which 
was another Sangster asset. Sangster must have been a tough 
bargainer. Docker was initially mandated by the Board of Directors 
to offer £80,000, yet a month later this total had more than 
tripled, albeit with the New Imperial company thrown in as a 
sweetener. See meetings of September 19, October 17 and November 
19,1944, contained in the BSA Board of Directors' Minute Books, 
No. 14, MRC MSS 19C/18. 
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firm, this would in future diminish year by year. 11 Ariel was not 
the only motor cycle firm picked up by BSA before 1945. Cash rich 
because of its numerous and lucrative military contracts, BSA had 
gone off on a wartime buying spree. Prior to the Ariel sale both 
New Hudson and Sunbeam had been purchased in 1943, the latter from 
AMC. The BSA Group, which was the largest producer before the war, 
became by 1945 the dominant and pre-eminent firm within the 
industry. l2 
Two other well known pre-war names did not survive the war. 
Rudge-Whitworth, a Coventry based quality producer, had been bought 
by music giant EMI and production moved to a new factory in Hayes, 
Middlesex. However, the planned renewal of the motor cycle 
production was disrupted by war and the factory was put to work 
with other types of manufacture. After the war EMI decided to keep 
Rudge shut down, although it would later produce a reasonably 
successful motor attachment for bicycles, the Cyclemaster. Brough- 
Superior, the low production, high quality firm favoured by riders 
such as T. E. Lawrence, was concentrated into munitions work during 
the war and simply never resumed production after 1945.13 
The 'Big Five' British motor cycle manufacturers were either in a 
position to immediately produce new or revamped models or at least 
had something moving through their development offices. 
14 Triumph 
11. See 'Ariel Motor Cycles acquired by BSA', Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader, 5 January 1945, p. 352. 
12. The New Hudson purchase, which cost £90,000, was approved at a 
Board of Directors' meeting on June 22,1943. The Sunbeam 
purchase, which cost £50,000, was approved at the September 21, 
1943 meeting. See Directors' Minute Book, op cit. 
13. See Peter Hartley, The Story of Rudge Motor Cycles, 
Wellingborough: Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1985, pp. 118-120 and Ronald 
Clark, Brough Superior - The Rolls Royce of Motor Cycles. Norwich: 
Goose and Son, 1964, p. 92. 
14. For details of the models produced in the post-war years, see 
Roy Bacon, British Motor Cycles of the 1940s and 1950s, London: 
Osprey Publishing, 1989. 
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was probably the best prepared of all British firms to move quickly 
and exploit the export market. This company had experienced great 
success with its innovative and pacesetting 500cc vertical twin 
cylinder model, the 'Speed Twin'. Introduced over the 1936/1937 
season, it had put Triumph well ahead of the pack and left the 
other firms scrambling to develop equivalent models of their own. 
In fact, none was able to do so before the commencement of the 
hostilities or even for several years after 1945. 
Thus Triumph, based since 1942 in their Meriden plant on the 
outskirts of Coventry, which was then probably the most modern 
motor cycle factory in the world, lost no time switching to 
civilian production. Not only was the Meriden works designed for 
dedicated motor cycle production but the company had, for the most 
part, been able since 1942 to stick to their regular line of 
manufacture for the British armed forces throughout the war. 
Hence, converting back to civilian based manufacturing was not too 
difficult. 15 
More important, Triumph was probably the firm best positioned to 
move into the American market, the most promising of any overseas. 
Indeed, owner Jack Sangster had shown an interest in the US before 
the war when both Sangster's Triumph and Ariel companies had begun 
to send small numbers of machines there. Moreover, Triumph 
Managing Director Edward Turner was especially keen about sales 
prospects in America, especially on the west coast. 
16 Before the 
15. See Davies, 012 c' , pp. 95-112 and Hopwood, op cit, pp. 39-68. 
16. Turner wrote a glowing account of sales prospects in the 
western US after one of his American business trips, see his 'From 
Coventry to California', Motor Cycling, 18 October 1945, pp. 436- 
437. Triumph owner and chairman Jack Sangster also made a point of 
personally visiting the USA to investigate sales opportunities, see 
'Memorandum of an Interview with Mr. J. Y. Sangster, Chairman, 
Triumph Engineering Co. Ltd. Coventry', dated 5 June 1946, op cit. 
For a broader overview of Triumph's entry into the American market, 
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war, Turner had net an American lawyer, Bill Johnson, a fellow 
motor cycle enthusiast, who was willing to set up a Triumph 
dealership in Los Angeles. This was to be the start of a foothold 
in America. It is a reflection of Triumph's commitment to the 
American market that Jack Sangster allowed Turner six months off 
every year in order to travel to the US and drum up sales. As will 
be seen, Triumph sales in the US, mostly larger displacement 
machines, started to rise continuously. 17 
Triumph's orientation to larger displacement motor cycles made 
sound business sense. For an operation of its size, producing 
approximately 10,000 units per year, profits were more related to 
charging the highest possible price on individual machines as 
opposed to turnover gained from volume production. In 1947, for 
example, the factory produced, among others, 2,288 of its 500cc 
T100 models, worth £266,904, and 3,630 of the 350cc 3T models worth 
£350,721. Notwithstanding the higher turnover gained from the 
smaller machines, Triumph actually cleared £56,985 profit on the 
T100s compared to £49,619 for the 3Ts. 
18 
Triumph may have been the first off the mark with the Speed Twin, 
but the other major firms were soon to follow with equivalents of 
their own. AMC and Royal Enfield both introduced large 
displacement twin cylinder models designed to compete directly with 
the Triumph. Norton was slower to produce a vertical twin, 
sticking to the big singles either out of loyalty or because of a 
see Lindsay Brooke and David Gaylin, Triumph Motorcycles in 
America, Osceola, USA: Motorbooks International, 1993, pp. 14-25. 
17. See Hopwood, op cit, p. 32 and p. 60 and Davies, op cit, pp. 113- 
134. In 1947, for example, Triumph built 6,343 500cc and 3,630 
350cc machines. In 1950, it built 7,427 650cc, 4,879 500cc and 
1,773 350cc machines. Information contained in MRC MSS 
123/2/3/6/15 and MSS 123/2/1/2. 
18. Financial data drawn from materials within MRC MSS 
123/2/3/6/15. 
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shortage of funds for expansion or retooling. The latter 
constraint was rectified shortly after the conclusion of the war, 
when the company applied for government authorisation to build an 
addition to its Birmingham factory. 
19 Nonetheless, thanks to their 
many racing victories, as well as much publicised patronage from 
celebrities such as entertainer George Formby, the Nortons had an 
aura of glamour that gave them a cachet over and above most other 
motor cycles. 
20 
The other larger scale manufacturer, Royal Enfield, was still 
located at its long time base at Redditch although it continued to 
have access to an underground munitions factory near Bradford-on- 
Avon, which would ultimately be used for motor cycle production. 
Although it too would produce a twin cylinder model, a proportion 
of the company's production remained the traditional larger 
displacement single cylinder machines. 21 This is not to suggest 
that all the British motor cycle industry produced were big 
displacement machines. Royal Enfield, for one, had a version of 
its 125cc lightweight machine which had been used by British 
paratroopers during the war and was introduced in 1946. Most of 
the other firms, in and out of the 'Big Five', manufactured at 
least one 250cc model and, as before the war, smaller firms such as 
James, Francis-Barnett and Cyc-Auto produced a series of smaller 
machines, starting at the 98cc displacement class. 
22 
19. Norton Motors' building application, dated 14 March 1946, is 
contained in PRO BT 208/17. See also 'British Industry gets down 
to it', by G. E. Thomas, Export Trader, August 1948, pp. 401-405. 
20. A photo of Formby and his new Norton, posed outside the 
Birmingham factory, is contained in the Motor Cycle and Cycle 
ade , 18, July 
1947, p. 480. 
21. See Peter Hartley, op cit, pp. 80-82. 
22, Details of the various models are contained in Roy Bacon, op 
cit. 
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As the industry's largest firm, it was not surprising to discover 
that BSA had the most diversified and ambitious post war 
programme. 
23 By 1945, the company had several new designs ready 
for production, although production of pre-war machines continued 
for some time after the end of the war to keep machines in the 
showroom. These models included some of use under the New Hudson 
and Ariel names, ranging from small BSA or New Hudson single 
cylinder machines to the massive Ariel four cylinder 'Square 
Four'. 24 These also included the inevitable 500cc vertical twin 
cylinder model but also an innovative 500cc shaft drive machine, 
whose features undoubtedly owed something to the captured BMWs and 
Zundapps. The 500cc vertical cylinder twin, entitled the A7, was 
targeted at a more sporting market, to compete directly against 
Triumph's 'Speed Twin'. 25 
In contrast, the shaft-drive machine, which would be badged under 
the recently acquired Sunbeam name, was given an entirely different 
image. Building on the Sunbeam marque's pre-war reputation as an 
comparatively expensive, high quality 'gentlemen's' motor cycle, it 
would enable the company to stake out the upper level of the 
market. 
26 The company also found itself with an abundance of 
23. See BSA Small Heath factory Management Committee meeting 
minutes, entitled 'Motor cycles and pedal cycles, 
immediate post- 
war models' held on 28 August 1944, contained in MRC MSS 19A/1/5. 
For details on investigations conducted on German and American 
motor cyclces, see memo dated 27 August 1945 entitled 'Research - 
Captured Enemy Motor Cycles', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/57. 
24. See Ryerson, op cit, pp. 87-110 and Bacon, op cit, pp. 32-41, 
pp. 52-64 and p. 125. 
25. See BSA Small Heath factory Management Committee meeting of 10 
September 1945, contained in op cit and Ryerson, op cit, p. 93 and 
p. 105. 
26. See BSA Chairman's Speech, delivered 31 December 1946, 
contained in the BSA Collection, Birmingham Central Library, MS 
321/A and Robert Cordon Champ, Sunbeam S7 and S8, Sparkford: 
Haynes Publishing Group, 1983, pp. 5-8. 
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manufacturing capacity. The main factory at Small Heath, 
Birmingham, may not have been as modern as Triumph's Meriden 
operation but it had been repaired and improved after the bomb 
damage of 1940 and 1941. Moreover, BSA had managed a new 'Shadow' 
munitions factory in nearby Redditch, which would be converted to 
motor cycle production. 27 
Hence, the company was able to develop a dual manufacturing 
strategy of continuing to produce pre-war models at Small Heath and 
then gradually introduce new machines over the next year as they 
became available. At Redditch in the meantime, Sunbeam manufacture 
would commence as soon as possible. These facilities were 
additionally complemented by a metal plating firm, Monochrome, 
which had been bought by the Group in 1946 along with Metal and 
Plastics Components. 28 
The one gap in BSA's plans was for a cheap lightweight machine. 
Although the company had manufactured a 150cc motor cycle during 
the 1920s and 1930s, it had been dropped from the line-up at the 
end of the decade. The company had developed a prototype autocycle 
model at the Small Heath factory just before the outbreak of the 
war, as a belated effort to re-enter the lightweight utility 
market. However, the sole copy had been destroyed in the 1940 
Blitz and engineers had been set to work devising a replacement. 
it was hoped this machine would have great potential in post-war 
27. See BSA Board of Directors' meeting of 20 March, agenda item 
9949, and 17 July 1947, agenda item 9979. BSA paid the Ministry of 
Supply £55,000 for what was called 'No. 4 Shop' in Redditch The 
minutes are in Minute Book 15, MRC MSS 19C/19. 
28. The Board voted to purchase Interchrome on 19 September 1944 
(agenda item 9744) for £14,000 and decided to purchase Monochrome 
on 19 February 1946 (agenda item 9866) for £26,000. Meetings 
contained in Minute book No. 14, MRC MSS 19C/18. 
128 
Britain, undoubtedly starved for personal transport and which would 
have need of highly efficient economy transport. 29 
BSA and Triumph were not the only firms to benefit from the 
acquisition of new war-time factories. Other Midlands motor cycle 
producers, such as James and Francis-Barnett, also suffered war 
damage and were re-located in renovated buildings. Francis-Barnett 
had even bid for a re-conditioned Ministry of Supply building in 
Kenilworth, Warwickshire. It was ultimately sited in new quarters 
just outside Coventry city centre. The Coventry-Eagle Motor 
Company had been a smaller producer of bicycles and light-weight 
motor cycles before the war. During the war its factory had also 
been knocked out by the Luftwaffe. In 1945 it acquired the use of 
a new 'shadow' factory at Tile Hill near Coventry and announced an 
ambitious production programme. In the event, Coventry-Eagle never 
did resume produce of motor cycles, deciding to concentrate on 
bicycles instead. 30 
Among the smaller firms, more specialised sales strategies 
prevailed. Vincent-HRD, for example, had been formed in the late 
1920s by Philip Vincent, a Harrow School and Cambridge University 
engineering graduate, unusual qualifications for a manager in the 
motor cycle industry. Vincent's father, who was a wealthy cattle 
rancher in Argentina, helped bankroll the company. During the 
inter-war years the company gained a reputation for building, 
29. See BSA Small Heath factory Management Meeting of 20 January 
1945, which discussed using a Villiers engine in an Auto-cycle. 
Minutes contained in MRC MSS 19A/l/5. 
30. See article entitled 'New factory allocated to Coventry 
Eagle', Export Trader, December 1945, p. 146. See also reference to 
Francis-Barnett's potential Kenilworth factory site, (undated 
memo), contained 
in PRO BT 177/1519. 
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albeit in small numbers, expensive high performance racing and 
touring machines. 31 
In early 1946, Vincent-HRD acquired a former 'shadow' aero-engine 
factory in Stevenage, which complemented an existing works. During 
the war, although the firm had been diverted into general munitions 
and non-motor cycle related work, time had been found for design 
work to revamp the existing line of large, sports and touring 
oriented 500cc and 1000cc machines. With hostilities concluded, 
Vincent was ready to produce a much improved line of high-powered, 
expensive road burners. After only a short time its 1000cc 
'Rapide' model, followed by a specially speed tuned variation, the 
'Black Shadow', put Britain far in advance of its potential 
American rivals in the top level of the market. 32 
Vincent-HRD is a good representation of what British motor cycle 
companies produced for the high end of the market, but there were a 
number of other smaller firms interested in developing the economy 
end. As during the inter-war period, these machines were mostly 
the products of firms outside the 'Big Five'. Veloce, the 
Birmingham manufacturer of Velocette motor cycles, which had made a 
reputation for its expensive sports oriented machines, startled the 
industry by debuting its 'LE' (Little Engine) machine at the 1948 
Show. In the words of company director Eugene Goodman, Veloce had 
"designed a machine that will not only make a great appeal to motor 
cyclists but one that will extend the market by attracting many 
people who want economical and trouble free transport. " In this 
31. See Roy Harper, Vincent Vee-Twins. London: Osprey Publishing 
company, 1982, pp. 18-19 and 'Building the world's fastest motor 
cycle', Export Trader, June 1946, pp. 230-233. 
32. See article entitled 'Government factory, ' contained in The 
oo cycle and Cycle Trader, 15 March 1946, p. 722. See also the 
section on the new Vincent factory, contained in PRO BT 177/304. 
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way, the company hoped to be carry on where the Francis & Barnett 
Cruiser of the 1930s had left off. 33 Other smaller companies were 
also active in this market. The James Company, which built 
machines mostly in the 125cc range using proprietary Villiers 
engines, managed to procure a large order from the American market 
in 1945, through a distribution agreement with Hambros bank. Two 
companies, Swallow and Brockhouse, built, respectively, the 
'Gadabout' and 'Gorgi', which were early versions of the scooter, 
although they were not to be remotely as successful as the Italian 
Vespa or Lambretta. 34 
Even though many of these machines were diverted to overseas 
markets, the Union did not display the same public vehemence in 
opposing Government export quotas as the SMMT. There was for 
example, little of the open hostility shown by motor car 
manufacturers when Stafford Cripps announced the details of their 
export quotas in 1947. The motor cycle industry was far more 
inclined to get down to the job of making as many motor cycles as 
possible for sale abroad without the same degree of grumbling. The 
Union was, however, quite insistent that the tax structure for 
3 
motor cycles be completely reformed. 
5 
33. See article entitled 'The New Velocette', contained in The 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 5 November 1948, pp. 172-173. In the 
opinion of one company historian, the aim of the LE was to "appeal 
to the general public, to the pedal cyclist who wanted power 
transport, to the pedestrian who could not afford a car. " See 
Kelly, op cit, p. 139. 
34. For information on the James see untitled news item ing 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 23 November 1945, p. 204. The 
American order amounted to 5,000 machines. The 'Gadabout' was 
covered in another untitled story in the Export Trader of February 
1947, pp"58-59. For information on the 'Gorgi', see article 
entitled "Paratroopers' motor cycle improved for civilian use, 
mod, p. 46. 
35. See George Maxcy and Aubrey Silberston, The Motor Industry. 
George Allen and Unwin, 1959, p. 18 and 'What future for the motor 
industry? ', Labour Research Bulletin, April 1946, p. 52. 
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This was a now familiar refrain, one which the Union had been 
repeating to various governments ever since the time when Winston 
Churchill had been Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late 1920s. 
Using much the same arguments as the SMMT, the Union adamantly 
maintained that a healthy export market must rest on a strong and 
secure home market. This, they claimed, would only come about if 
the existing tax system was changed as the industry had suggested 
during the 1930s. They remained convinced that there was a latent 
demand in the home market, which would be tapped by light-weight 
motor cycles but would only be successful if the tax were 
lowered. 36 
Not only did the government fail to heed the appeals of the motor 
cycle manufacturers but, when in 1947 the horse-power tax on motor 
cars was abolished and replaced by one based on engine capacity, 
nothing whatsoever was done to change the motor cycle tax. In 
response to petitions launched by both a Standing Joint Committee 
made up of representatives from the MAA, RAC and AA as well as one 
directly from Jack Sangster on behalf of the Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers' Section of the Manufacturers' Union, a Treasury 
representative informed them that the current tax structure would 
remain unchanged. 
37 The decision was defended on the grounds that, 
while it was true the new flat-rate scheme for the motor car 
industry was designed as an incentive to pare down the multiplicity 
of models and thus promote the export trade, there was no "close 
36. See minutes of Council meeting of 13 May 1947 and the Motor 
cycle manufacturers' Section meeting of 15 July 1947, contained in 
Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/19. 
37. See Letter from W. V. Gibson and A. W. Phillips (Joint 
Secretaries) of the Standing Joint Committee to Hugh Dalton, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, dated 27 June 1947 and entitled 'Motor 
Cycle Taxation' as well as Jack Sangster's letter to Dalton of the 
same date, entitled 'Motor Cycle Taxation', both contained in PRO 
T228/420. 
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analogy" with the motor cycle industry. As matters now stood, 
there were only two tax steps up to the 250cc engine capacity stage 
and for larger capacities there was already a flat rate. Hence, it 
could hardly "be regarded as restrictive of design. i38 
The union was angered by what was considered favouritism shown 
towards the motor car industry and the destruction of the 
historical linkages between the two industries implicit in the old 
tax system. It made dire predictions about what would happen to 
the home motor cycle market should the government not alter the tax 
laws, a development that would inevitably hurt the export trade. 39 
Why had the government not acted on the petitions of the motor 
cycle industry? The truth was mostly likely that, in contrast with 
the motor car industry, the motor cycle industry was simply not big 
enough and did not share anything approaching the same scale of 
manufacturing or employment. Although the motor car industry was a 
focus of attention in the government's export drive, their motor 
cycle counterpart was considered something of a poor sister. No 
motor cycle manufacturer, for example, was represented on the 
National Advisory Council for the Motor Manufacturing Industry nor 
was any parallel organisation created for them. In private, civil 
servants condescendingly referred to it as an "old fashioned 
Midlands industry" whose views could be more or less safely 
ignored. There also seems to have been a degree of antagonism 
between the occasionally cantankerous Union Director Major Watling 
and certain Whitehall officials. 
40 
38. See reply from the Treasury, unsigned, dated 17 July 1947, to 
Gibson and Phillips as well as Sangster. Ibid. 
39. Internal correspondence contained within PRO T228/420 backs up 
the industry's complaint with respect to distruption of cross- 
industry relationships. 
40. See, in particular, a minute prepared by 'Hunt', dated 16 
January 1946, contained in PRO BT 60/81/6. 
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An additional factor complicating the status of the motor cycle 
industry was a renewal of unfavourable press coverage of motor 
cycle accidents. Although throughout the 1940s motor cycles were 
welcomed as transport in a economy starved of motor vehicles, 
public and subsequently government opinion began to turn against 
the growing number of road fatalities. The growing death rate was 
a reflection of the fact that there were more and more machines on 
the road but also, in part, the result of the industry's continuing 
orientation towards the large, high powered motor cycles. 41 
If Britain remained loyal for the most part to these type of 
motor cycles, the same could not be said about the Continental 
manufacturers. By 1948, it was becoming increasingly obvious that, 
starting with Italy, they were well on the way to recovery and 
making rapid progress with small engined motor cycles. This was 
part of a continuing trend in Continental nations, which under 
their post-war conditions, required the cheapest possible motorised 
transport. Britain was increasingly lagging in the field of the 
small lightweight capacity motor cycles, a development that was 
symbolised when an Italian machine won the Lightweight TT race in 
1948.42 
Yet these warning signs were ignored, the attention of the 
industry being focused elsewhere. Because of the intense nature of 
Anglo-German competition before 1939, the British industry was 
keenly interested in the future state of its German counterpart. 
41. Alarmed civil servants noted how motor cycle fatalities had 
jumped from 741 to 956 between 1950 and 1951 (they had been 959 in 
1939) while injuries went from 21,466 to 30,039 during the same 
period of time. See undated memo, 'Road casualities during 12 
months of unrationed petrol, June 1950-May 1951', (no author 
indicated) contained in PRO MT 108/8. 
42. See leading article entitled, 'Lightweights for utility', 
Mni for Cycle and Cycle Trader, 2 July 1948, p. 399. 
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In fact, the question of German reparations takes up a large place 
in the immediate history of the British motor cycle industry during 
the post-war era. Despite initial optimism, the efforts of the 
British industry to benefit from the military defeat of Germany 
proved to be a story of endless frustration. After several years 
of repeated appeals to the British government, only one firm was 
able to take advantage of German technical advances. 
43 
The industry had anticipated access to Germany plants some time 
before the end of the war, and detailed planning had begun during a 
meeting at the London headquarters of the Engineering Section of 
the Foreign Office (FO). Representatives from the Union met with 
FO officials in June 1945 to discuss a number of related issues. 
The FO Section's Deputy Director General, E. Harle, explained that 
the present situation allowed "an opportunity for UK Industry to 
inform itself as to the development of German Industry - its 
production - and economic and financial methods. " Union members 
were also informed that, in future, it was to be the policy of the 
British government to control German industry and any potential 
export trade "to a very considerable extent", even to the point 
43. The Union had already expressed interest in examining captured 
German motor cycles during the war, see Union Annual Report for 
1944, MRC MSS 204/4/3/2 and memo 'Research: Captured enemy motor 
cycles', dated 27 August 1945, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/57. This interest was shared by the popular press as well. 
See 'Captured, examined and tested', The Motor Cycle, 12 April 1945 
and 'A day among captured motor cycles' by 'Torrens', = &,, 19 
April 1945, pp. 272-273. Information concerning the availability of 
German motor cycle plant was also widely circulated throughout the 
trade press, see, for example, 'BMW on Reparations List', Motor 
ryýJ and Cycle Trader, 16 August 1946, p. 590. The matter of 
captured German equipment was also discussed among various British 
industries, see, for example, 'Meeting of Committee on German 
Reparations', dated 25 April 1946, contained in MRC MSS 
200/F/3/S1/21/46, (minutes of the FBI German Reparations 
Committee). 
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where it would be maintained at what was described as "something 
above starvation standard and no more. ""44 
For its part, the FO needed the Union to identify specific 
targets among German industry, in particular which factories, 
models, technologies and financial information it wanted examined. 
The Union delegation provided three nominees to serve on joint 
government/industry investigation teams, as well as naming a number 
of firms, among them BMW, NSU, and Zundapp, for on-the-spot 
scrutiny-45 These teams were given a mandate to uncover 
information about the costs of individual factories and, more 
specifically, how they related to actual export prices in markets 
such as Holland and India, which had been so successfully 
penetrated before the war. The teams were also given direction to 
locate motor cycle models, which were to be "thoroughly examined" 
with the "patent position" in mind, and to look generally at 
tariffs, subsidies and "currency manipulation" not just for the 
motor cycle industry but for light engineering generally. 
46 
With Germany defeated and a large section of the country occupied 
by the British army, the motor cycle manufacturers must have 
thought that it would be now comparatively easy for this formerly 
secret information to be made available through the teams. 
44. See 'Notes dated 18 June 1945, of a Conference held at Foreign 
Office (Economic Division) on 14 June 1945 prepared by Major 
Watling and contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/57. 
45. After the aforemented meeting at the Foreign Office, nominees 
were initially from BSA, Villiers Engineering and Burman, a gear 
box manufacturer. However, the team consisted of A. E. Wood, a BSA 
Executive, Joe Craig, chief development engineer at Associated 
Motor cycle Company (previously in the same position at Norton 
Motors) and C. R. B. Smith of Amal, a leading carburettor 
manufacturer was selected. Team leader was Captain L. W. Farrer, a 
senior executive with Villiers Engineering. 
46. See 'Notes dated 18 June 1945 ... ' op cit. Further details on 
the industry's expectations of the reparations programme are 
outlined in memo '1/46. Germany: Economic Control', dated 1 
January 1946 contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/58. 
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However, the practical operation of reparations would become much 
more difficult - and politically charged - over the following 
years, than it appeared in the heady weeks after V-E Day. 47 
Cooperation between the British and Americans in this matter had 
commenced in 1944 in the form of the Combined Intelligence 
Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), a group that was subordinated to 
the Supreme Military Command of the western allies, SHAEF. After 
July 1945, CIOS was dissolved and replaced by the British 
Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (BIOS) and its American 
counter-part, the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT). The 
United States Strategic Bombing Survey undertook its own study as 
well. 
48 The Manufacturers' Union had nominees that were among the 
various BIOS teams which followed up behind combat units as the 
fighting progressed and commenced rummaging around the remains of 
factories throughout the western part of the Reich. They also 
sought out documentary information and arranged interviews whenever 
possible with the former managers and technicians in order to 
ascertain details of the pre-war achievements of the German motor 
cycle industry. 
49 
47. The British experience regarding post-war reparations is 
described in Tom Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, London: Paladin 
Grafton Books, 1987. See also I. Turner, 'British Occupation 
policy and Volkswagen' (unpublished Phd., University of Manchester, 
1984). 
48. See, in particular, memo entitled 'Review of BIOS activities', 
dated 17 April 1947 (no author indicated), contained in PRO AVIA 
46/410. 
49. Not all of the managers of German firms were available to meet 
with BIOS teams. For example, NSU's principal Director Von 
Falkenhayn, who had led the German motor cycle delegation at the 
March 1939 Dusseldorf trade talks, was incarcerated in a Heidelburg 
prison camp on suspicion of war crimes. There is no evidence that 
he was ever interviewed by BIOS team members. See The German Motor 
Cycle Industry (in the British and USA Zones of Occupation, BIOS 
Final Report No. 620. London: BIOS, 1946, p. 30. 
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Notwithstanding professions of inter-allied cooperation in the 
exploitation of German industry, there arose a growing rivalry not 
only between the western allies and the Soviets, but also between 
the British and American investigating teams. By early 1946 the 
Manufacturers' Union had to admit that it had so far very little to 
show for the Reparations programme thanks to the actions of its 
wartime ally. In February it expressed disappointment that certain 
motor cycle prototype models had not yet been obtained. Reference 
was made to "unaccountable delays in delivery of [the machines] due 
it was believed to the action of the US authorities. "50 
The position of the British industry with regard to German motor 
cycle manufacturers was greatly weakened by the fact that most of 
the primary factories were either in the Soviet or American 
sectors. For example, the Americans had prevented British teams 
from entering a targeted factory in Nuremberg, despite previous 
agreements allowing them access. When they finally did gain entry, 
it was only to discover that the motor cycle engines they had hoped 
to examine had already been shipped to the USA. This was not the 
only instance of obstruction. At the BMW plant 
in Munich the 
remaining German personnel refused a BIOS team entry under American 
instructions. Nor were the Soviets any more cooperative about 




50. See minutes of a meeting, entitled 'Germany: Economic 
Control', held in Birmingham of 28 February 1945 between members of 
the reparations panel and the BIOS teams, contained in Minute Book 
MRC MSS 204/1/1/19- 
51. See memo dated 9 December 1946 entitled 'Germany: Acquisition 
of Prototype Motor Cycles'. Attached to the memo 
is a letter dated 
20 November 1946 to Watling from Colonel R. H. Bright of the 
Ministry of Supply which detailed instances of American 
obstructionism. Correspondence contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/60. Notwithstanding the interference from the Americans, 
several German motor cycles did arrive in Britain. See memo 
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Still, despite much frustration, the British persisted. In 1946 
a large number of reports had been published by the BIOS covering 
its investigations into a variety of commercial sectors, including 
several on the motor cycle industry. These were supplemented by 
reports from FIAT and the US Strategic Bombing Survey. The reports 
were widely distributed throughout British industry. There was 
also a travelling exhibition of examples of representative German 
equipment, including motor cycles, which visited several British 
cities during 1947.52 
The reports provided little comfort for those in the British 
industry who wished to attribute the pre-war success of their 
rivals only to government assistance or to brush off the potential 
danger of resurgent German competition. True, the reports did 
confirm the degree to which the Reich government had subsidised 
individual firms before 1939. BMW, for one, whose pre-war racing 
successes had so alarmed British manufacturers, had been encouraged 
by government funding, on the grounds that international 
competitions were a matter of prestige, worth subsidising "at any 
cost". It also confirmed, as British manufacturers had suspected 
all along, the existence of additional subsidies which enabled 
German motor cycles to be exported at low cost. 53 
'84/47: Germany: Investigation of Germany Motor Cycles', dated 17 
April 1947, contained in ibid and memo dated 26 August 1947 
entitled 'Germany: Economic Control: Motor Cycle Components', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/61. 
52. See 'Review of the Exploitation of German Industrial Technical 
Developments' by E. R. Wood, dated 17 April 1947, contained in PRO 
AVIA 46/410. The reports ultimately also became public, indeed 
copies are still on open shelves at the Coventry Public Library. 
See also 'Supercharged BMW on Show', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
20 December 1946, p. 344. The tour visited Birmingham, Manchester 
and Leeds. 
53. See BIOS Final Report No. 654., The German Motor Cycle 
Tndus_trY Since 1938 by S. du Pont. March 1946. pp. 1-2. Although 
this report was published by the BIOS, du Pont was identified as a 
member of FIAT. 
139 
Yet the reports also documented evidence of disquieting technical 
advances on the part of the Germans, of a nature that could not 
entirely be written off as the result of surreptitious government 
subsidies. The state of some of the factories, for instance, 
elicited grudging praise from the investigators, which by 
implication, did not always reflect well on the production 
facilities back in Britain. The German works were described as 
"well equipped" and "practically all machine tools inspected being 
modern and of the latest type. " These tools were singled out for 
especial attention, and it was remarked that few of them were belt 
driven or line shafting models. The conclusion reached was that 
"as an average, [they were] considerably more modern than that in 
an average, similar factory in Great Britain. ""54 
The investigators also remarked on the presence of apprenticeship 
schools, which in many cases were attached directly to the 
factories. Moreover, what was termed an "outstanding feature" of 
the industry was the high level of standardisation adopted by the 
Germans, "which is in sharp contrast to the British Motor Cycle 
Industry". This had been accomplished as a result of a conscious 
policy of the Reich government, implemented and supervised by the 
military. This meant that the various firms, in stark contrast to 
the practice followed in Britain before and after the war, each 
manufactured a limited range of models. 
55 
It was this policy, it was suggested, that had been the 
foundation of the German export success. Standardisation had given 
54. bi . 
55. Ibid. The various reports were reviewed in some detail by the 
popular, enthusiasts' press. See, for example, 'Experts Examine 
and Analyse German Industry', The Motor Cycle, 7 November 1956, 
pp. 356-359, 'German Manufacturing Methods', ibid, 17 July 1947, 
pp. 50-51 and 'US Investigation of the German Industry', ibid, 30 
January 1947, pp. 88-90. 
140 
them "considerable manufacturing economies" allowing for a "large 
proportion" of factory equipment to be single tooled and provided 
continuous production. This was the formula which enabled them 
produce the large numbers of cheap, small capacity machines which 
had so bedevilled British exporters. 56 
The reports contained many admiring references about German 
research establishments. Especial note was made of the "close 
relationship" between the universities and the motor cycle 
industry. 57 Whether or not this was a root cause of higher German 
motor cycle sales was not stated, but the investigators did concede 
that in general, "we should judge that the 'average' German motor 
cycle was of a cleaner and more pleasing appearance than the 
average British motor cycle. " This was telling criticism, authored 
as it was by some of the leading figures in the British industry. 
58 
Despite these positive reports about the achievements of the 
German industry, which carried an implicit message that British 
56. See BIOS Final Report No. 654, op cit. 
57. In contrast, the only formal link created between the motor 
cycle industry and British academic institutions, for the purposes 
of promoting general research, was a scholarship in motor cycle 
engineering which had been created in 1925 at the University of 
Birmingham in memory of the recently deceased James Norton, founder 
of Norton Motors. A copy of the Trust Deed for the Fund is 
attached to memo 'James L. Norton Memorial Fund', dated 18 August 
1926, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/14. Little, however, 
is known about the activities of this scholarship after its 
establishment. 
58. See BIOS Final Report No. 620, op cit. However, a dissenting 
view of the German industry was prepared by R. B. Douglas, a 
Canadian on secondment to the BIOS. He thought that German 
manufacturing techniques were between five and eight years behind 
those practiced in Canada or the US. See BIOS Final Report No. 
1318. Item No. 19. Manufacturing Methods in the German Motor 
cycle industry. London: BIOS, 1946. Douglas' analysis is backed 
up by J. M. West, a member of BMW's British sales staff, who had 
visited the company's factory before the war. West found some 
German motor cycle engineering practices "primitive" compared to 
the British. He considered the factory to be highly labour 
intensive, with work conducted at a leisurely pace: "no one seemed 
to hurry. " See J. M. West interview, 23 November 1994. 
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manufacturers would have much to gain from the reparations 
programme, the Union's leadership ultimately arrived at a very 
different conclusion. In April 1946, Union Director Major Watling 
wrote to manufacturing members informing them that, from what he 
could gather from the BIOS reports, there was not any plant or 
machinery in Germany worth acquiring. No explanation was provided 
for this interpretation, which appeared be so at variance with what 
the reports concluded, nor is it easy to understand why Watling so 
easily dismissed these reports. It may well have been, in light of 
the lack of cooperation from the other two occupying forces, there 
was little else Watling or the industry could have done. He did, 
however, agree that there were "a number" of new and/or 
experimental motor cycle engines that should be examined. He also 
expressed hope that BMW's factory research and racing records would 
be open for perusal by Union members. 59 
There is another possible explanation for the failure of the 
British motor cycle industry to fully exploit the possibilities 
offered by the Reparations Programme. According to Ministry of 
Supply personnel, upon querying the industry about its lack of 
interest in acquiring the latest in German motor cycle technology, 
the Union had replied that it had no future plans to make any "bids 
for plants. " Under current circumstances, the Ministry had been 
informed, the industry "considers there is adequate capacity 
already in the UK for production needs. ""60 
59. See Watling's memo of 11 April 1946 entitled '82/46: Germany 
- Economic Control', contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/58. 
60. See 'Summary of Ministry of Supply approaches to Trade 
Associaton regarding Reparations', (no date but probably late 
1946], contained in PRO BT 211/504. According to J. M. West, who 
was AMC's Sales Manager at the time, his company did not place any 
reparation bids on the grounds that the Board of Directors believed 
there was simply nothing of interest worth obtaining from Germany. 
See J. M. West interview, 23 November 1994. 
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Shortly thereafter, Major Watling produced an unpleasant surprise 
to those manufacturers who had hoped that German competition was 
now a thing of the past. Watling wrote that he had been recently 
informed that the Allied Control Commission was now considering the 
"resuscitation of the German motor cycle industry", albeit only to 
the total of 10,000 machines per year and even then with capacities 
restricted to no more than 250cc. Watling further reported that 
when he had questioned the policy, he had been informed by an 
unnamed Board of Trade official that this was a decision based on 
hard headed practicality. If left de-industrialised, he had been 
told, Germany was in danger of becoming "a 'slum' nation in the 
midst of plenty". Limited production, on the other hand, would 
"allow Germany to earn sufficient foreign exchange to keep her in a 
reasonably contented frame of mind. " Hence, the reparations 
61 
programme would be cut back. 
As it was, only BSA was to benefit from German technological 
advance to any appreciable extent. Thanks to the reparations 
programme this company gained the rights to the design as well as 
the tooling for a DKW 125cc model. This machine was thereupon 
renamed the 'Bantam' and proved to be the cheap lightweight machine 
the company had earlier sought to produce on its own. Moreover, it 
was acquired virtually without any research and development 
costs. 
62 The circumstances under which BSA acquired the Bantam are 
unclear, if not mysterious. No mention of the sale 
is contained in 
61. See Watling's memo of 24 April 1946 entitled 'Germany: 
Economic Control' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/58. See 
also 'Report for 
the Directorate' (nd), contained in MRC MSS 
200/F/3/S1/21/46. 
62. See Ryerson, op cit, pp. 93-94 and Jeff Clew, BSA Bantam, 
Sparkford: Haynes Publishing Group, 1983, pp. 5-9. According to 
John Balder, then in BSA's Service Department, the company only 
used the DKW engine. See Balder 
interview, 18 November 1994. 
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either the Board of Directors Minute Books or in any other 
surviving company documents. 63 Nor is there any explanations to be 
found in government records. Nonetheless, after 1948, when the 
'Bantam' was first available for export, BSA enjoyed a big 
advantage over other manufacturers. In fact, this model would 
subsequently become the single most successful 'British' motor 
cycle of all time. 
64 
In the meantime other plans went ahead. Foremost among them was 
the direction of the export drive. It would be determined by, 
firstly, the ability of consumers in a particular market to afford 
to buy British made motor cycles and, secondly, to the inclination 
of various foreign governments to accept the free import of these 
machines into their countries. By the end of the decade the 
British motor cycle export drive had scored some notable successes 
although disturbing signs were appearing of a repetition of the 
closure of markets that had so disrupted the export trade in the 
1930s, a development to be examined in a future chapter. 
The problems did not always originate overseas. In early 1946, 
the Union was informed that domestic control over the industry had 
passed from the Board of Trade to the Ministry of Supply 
(Engineering Industries Division). For Union Director Major 
63. By contrast, there is mention made of BSA's purchase of the 
plant and equipment of the German machine tool maker Index-Werke, 
procured through the Ministry of Supply in March 1947. See agenda 
item 9953, Board of Directors meeting of 20 march 1947, contained 
in Directors' Minute Book No. 14., contained in MRC MSS 19C/19. 
The Index-Werke acquisition is also mentioned several times in 
correpondence contained in the surviving papers of 'Paddy' Hannon, 
then BSA's Deputy Chairman. See, for example, Hannon-Docker, 10 
December 1948 (Box 32, Folder 1) and Hannon-Docker, 20 August 1947, 
MacLaren-Hannon, 5 September 1947, and MacLaren-Lord Woolton, 31 
January 1947 (Box 32, Folder 2), all contained in Hannon Papers. 
64. Harley-Davidson also used the same design for its so-called 
lightweight 'Hummer', similiar in many respects to the Bantam. See 
Sucher, opcit, p. 194 and 'Harley-Davidson 125cc' The Motor Cycle, 
8 January 1948, pp. 32-33. 
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Watling, who had, among other things, represented the industry with 
government departments since 1919, this was an unwelcome 
development. He feared that the new supervision would be "more 
rigid and inelastic" than the Board of Trade's had been and that 
greater demands would now be placed on individual firms with 
respect to producing statistical information relating to their 
manufacturing programmes and development plant for both home and 
export markets. This information, Watling had been informed by the 
Ministry, was necessary to enable it to help with "bottle-necks" in 
labour and materials supplies. Government officials had also told 
Watling that, now the Essential Works orders were abolished, new 
methods would have to be developed for directing labour into the 
industry. 65 
Watling was not alone in this jaundiced view of the Ministry. 
BSA's Brotherton, for example, was equally unhappy over the 
transfer of jurisdiction from the Board of Trade to the Ministry of 
Supply. He did not relish having to deal with it over supplies of 
materials such as chrome. He also expressed scepticism over its 
ability to reconcile the differing needs of small, medium and large 
firms, whose interests he observed, were "somewhat at variance. " 
In his opinion, labour, or rather the lack of it, was identified as 
the chief "stumbling block", preventing the production outputs 
which would satisfy Chancellor of the Exchequer Cripps' export 
targets. Brotherton noted, in common with other industry 
executives, that the first priority should be the expansion of the 
home market, which would then be the foundation of a successful 
export trade. It would be, however, as he sourly observed, "too 
65. See letter, Watling to Sangster, dated 19 February 1946 
entitled 'Bicycle and Motor Cycle Industry: Government Control', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/58. 
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much to expect some of the academically-minded gentlemen in the 
government to understand this very salient point. ""66 
Nonetheless, the industry was willing to continue to cooperate 
with the government's export targets but, as they informed an FBI 
Special Conference held during the spring of 1946, certain problems 
would first have to be addressed. Three in particular exercised 
Major Watling: difficulties calling up key workers, especially 
tool makers, complications involved in getting licences to extend 
existing buildings and, what Watling called the generation of 
"unnecessary statistics" should all be sorted out without delay. 67 
The materials situation not only failed to improve but began to 
seriously deteriorate at this time. At a meeting of the Group 
Management Committee for the Bicycle and Motor Cycle Industrial and 
Export Groups (a carry over from the wartime organisations) members 
heard a glum assessment from Major Watling about the prospects for 
1947. A report had been received from the Ministry of Supply which 
envisioned a 50 per cent reduction in the manufacture of steel 
products. 
68 
This bad news was quickly followed by word that the steel 
shortages which had been plaguing the industry for all of 1946 
would continue and would "seriously affect" distribution, forcing 
the ministry of Supply to much reduce existing materials 
allocations. 
69 At this rate, the industry's self-imposed target of 
500,000 machines a year was not going to be achieved for some time 
66. See memo from Brotherton, distributed to all members of the 
Bicycle and Motor Cycle Industrial and Export Groups, dated 4 March 
1946, contained in ibid. 
67. See memo from Watling dated 5 April 1946, entitled 
'Development of Overseas Trade', contained in ibid. 
68 See agenda for the Council meeting of 18 December 1946, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/60. 
69. See memo entitled 'E. G. 2/47: Rationing of Material - Period 
11/1947', dated 1 January 1947, contained in ibid. 
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to come, if ever. Then came the power cuts over the winter of 
1947, which shut several factories down completely and put severe 
restraints on those which were able to keep operating. 70 
The continuous shortages experienced by the industry, which cut 
across all manufacturers in Britain that year, caused the Union to 
consider whether or not to stage a Show that autumn. Because 
conditions had been so unsettled since 1945, there had yet to be a 
post-war Show (the last had been held in 1938) and many looked 
forward to an opportunity to get the widest possible publicity for 
the various new lines of motor cycles which would be symbolic of 
British recovery. 
A meeting of the Union's Council dealt with this question. Most 
of the industry's senior managers, including Donald Heather, Eric 
Barnett, Bertram Marians and Jack Sangster among others, were 
present. Those in favour noted that, even if the materials 
shortages meant they could not supply their distributors, the Show 
would still give them an opportunity to explain their problems 
personally. Far better, it was said, to meet the trade face to 
face rather than "continually send out letters of regret. "71 
Manufacturers could also renew their overseas contacts, disrupted. 
by the many years of war, and the presence of different marques 
could only stimulate manufacturers to improve their quality and 
specifications. Not the least, it was argued, the Show was a 
prestige event and, after all, the current 'sellers' market' would 
not last forever. The Show would proclaim the fact that, despite 
70. There was a great deal of interest in how the industry was 
faring under the crisis conditions caused by the fuel shortages. 
See for example, 'The Industry Restarts', 14 February 1947, The 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, pp. 662-663 and 'At the Factories' The 
Motor Cycle, 6 March 1947, p. 151. 
71. See minutes of Council meeting of 21 October 1947, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/60. 
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all the problems, "Great Britain is getting on her feet again, and 
is not falling behind other countries. i72 The arguments against 
were that, given the inability to deliver orders, staging the Show 
would be potentially "embarrassing" for the manufacturers. 
Moreover, members were reminded that at present, none of them had 
anything new to display. Hence better to delay another year when 
circumstances would probably improve. The Council voted closely 
not to proceed. 
73 
There was to be no abandonment of general publicity. Overseas 
distributors were informed that the Show had been cancelled for 
what were tactfully termed "production difficulties". However, 
they were assured, the much anticipated TT races would go ahead on 
schedule. As one trade journal put it: "No other motor cycle 
races have ever captured the heart of the enthusiast like the TT, 
and successes in them have made the names of British machines known 
wherever motor cycles are ridden. "74 
Several months later, the steel situation had further 
deteriorated. Manufacturers were bitter over the fact that, 
although they claimed to be willing and able to expand production, 
material shortages were blocking the way. In a brief to the 
Minister of Supply, the Union stated that they should receive 
"special consideration" because of their high export potential and 
the fact that they could earn a disproportionately higher return of 
foreign currency than other steel consuming industries. The 
Minister was reminded that, if in the past British motor cycles 
were "pre-eminent" in the post-war era they were now "supreme" and 
72. . b" 
73. mod. It was remarked that most of the 'no' votes came mainly 
from motor cycle makers, although Gilbert Smith (Norton) and Frank 
Smith (Royal Enfield) did vote 'yes'. 
74. See 'No show this year', Export Trader, Feburary 1947, p. 11. 
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that demand "from all over the world was enormous. ii75 Even having 
suffered from the materials cuts, the Union insisted, British motor 
cycle production increases were remarkable, especially when 
compared with pre-war figures. On a best monthly basis, they 
argued, the optimum total the industry had achieved before 1939 was 
2,120 during 1937. This had jumped to 6,650 in May 1946, the best 
post-war month so far. 
76 This performance could be easily outdone 
if only the industry was given sufficient supplies. 
The worst was yet to come. In the summer of 1947 the government, 
in the interests of preserving scarce dollar reserves, abolished 
the basic petrol ration. This decision appalled members of the 
Union. True, Britain had to protect its economy and international 
position, but this measure, they insisted, was far too draconian. 
The manufacturers deplored the fact that the ration cut would now 
prevent the conduct of motor cycle sports such as racing and trials 
events. These, they stated, were essential for maintaining public 
interest in the industry at home and also out in the export 
markets. Not only would removal of the basic petrol ration 
strangle the Home market but it would cut to nothing the industry's 
beloved sports programme. One member went so far as to stress its 
importance to the industry by way of a parallel between the racing 
machines and horse racing as well as "the exports of blood 
stock. "77 
75. See memo from Watling to members of the Group Management 
Committee, dated 12 February 1947, attached to which is a second 
memo entitled '1947 Production Programme - Case against a Steel Cut 
for the Bicycle and Motor Cycle Industries', contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/59a. 
76. Although not stated, presumably this would only apply to 
production totals after 1930. See ibid. 
77. Minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section meeting of 
26 September 1947, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/61. See 
also editorial entitled 
'Petrol cut may increase export prices', 
The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 12 September 1947, p. 722 and 
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In mid-September, Norton Motors Managing Director Gilbert Smith 
led a delegation on behalf of the MAA (Motor Cycle Section) and 
related organisations to meet Prime Minister Attlee and protest the 
petrol ration cut. The Prime Minister was warned of the disruptive 
effect of the move on the home market, not only among consumers but 
the retail trade as well. The critical importance of motor cycle 
sport was emphasised yet again. C. A. Lewis, secretary of the 
British Motor Cycle Racing Club, told Attlee that the industry's 
exports were "to a surprising extent" based upon race track 
victory, primarily as publicity. "Our successes", Lewis said, 
"have demonstrated in a way that no catalogue could, the good 
qualities built into these British machines. Racing and 
competitive events", he added, "are the backbone of the motor cycle 
industry and the backbone of these events is the basic petrol 
allowance. " Attlee's response was not recorded. 
78 
Continuing sporting events were not the only reason why motor 
cyclists should continue to receive petrol. After all, the 
industry claimed, once personal motorised transport was put out of 
action, unbearable pressure would be placed on bus and tram service 
as well as the railways. With their higher fuel efficiency, 
especially with the light weight machines, surely motor cycle use 
for regular commuters should be maintained not eliminated? The 
Union resolved to enlist the help of the RAC and to lobby Labour 
Party MPs. Prudently, it was agreed to petition the government to 
at least allow "a general and modest" basic ration for all motor 
'Manufacturers condemn petrol cut', The Motor Cycle, 4 September 
1947, pp. 178--179. 
78. See 'Petrol cut may last for nine months', The Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader, 26 September 1947, p. 788. 
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cyclists, rather than make a case for a special allocation for 
sports events. 79 
As it had before the war, the industry played on the theme of the 
contribution of motor cycles to the general well-being of the 
nation, as cheap and efficient personal transport, which 
particularly benefited working people. However, its inclination to 
emphasise the use of the big sports machines was never really side- 
lined. When the occasion demanded, the industry insisted over and 
over that its products were designed for everyday use, and indeed 
this argument was the essential premise of its case for tax reform. 
Yet, enormous energies were spent to protect and promote 
professional racing events. In the final analysis the industry 
always seemed to fight the hardest, and to place the greatest 
emphasis in its dealings with the government, on issues that 
touched on the use of their cherished high powered sports motor 
cycles. As one critic noted at the time, the result was a major 
diversion of resources away from developing small, utility oriented 
machines. 80 
This predilection can be illustrated by the campaign the industry 
waged over 1947/1948 for the re-opening of the Donington Park race 
track. Prior to the war it and Brooklands (the latter, a track 
near London, was taken over for military purposes after 1939 and 
was never restored to its original use) were the prime locales for 
racing in England. After 1945 Donington continued to be used by 
the armed forces as a storage depot, much to the chagrin of the 
motor cycle industry, who claimed that there was now no proper 
79. See ibid. The petrol ration was partially resumed in April 
1948, see 'Petrol ration restored' ibid, 23 April 1948, p. 84. 
80. See 'The Motor Cycling Outlook' by Francis Jones, ibid, 2 
January 1948, pp. 382-383. 
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facilities for race testing. This was, it was maintained, not 
simply a matter of the industry indulging the whims of enthusiasts. 
At issue, so Major Watling explained in a letter to the 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of War, were solid 
commercial interests, specifically the continuing ability of the 
industry to maintain the export trade. According to Watling, 
future success in world markets was contingent on maintaining 
Britain's reputation as the leading manufacturer of the big 
displacement-sports motor cycles. 81 
Watling warned those in government circles that it was "not 
always appreciated" that this success "can only be based on ... 
[the] unique record of successes against the best machines which 
the Continent can produce. " As usual, the government was cautioned 
that the export trade was sustained by a "satisfactory Home Trade. " 
This, in turn, could only be as good as there were "models produced 
of a character approved both by Home and overseas riders. " If they 
were to remain competitive, the machines in question needed to be 
properly tested on a track like Donington, which would allow them 
to be pushed to their full potential-82 
This letter was followed up by a brief sent out on 11 February 
1948 to the interdepartmental Committee on Services' Land 
Requirements. The value of Donington was hammered home yet again. 
It was an ideal track since it incorporated sections with "suitable 
high speed stretches, followed by abrupt turns and changes of 
gradient where it is possible to test almost to destruction every 
important element which goes into the design of the modern motor 
81. See Watling's letter to the Parliamentary Private Secretary, 
dated 22 December 1947, entitled 'Donington Park', contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/62. 
82. Ibid. The letter was also copied to the editors of The Motor 
Cycle and Motor Cycling as well as to the RAC and the MAA. 
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cycle. " Without Donington reopened, there was simply nowhere else 
in Great Britain for testing and the manufacturers would be forced 
to seek alternatives on the Continent. Nor was the Motor Industry 
Research Association (MIRA) track at Nuneaton suitable. What 
overseas buyers wanted was "an exceptionally high efficiency 
engine" and what might be sufficient for motor car testing was not 
enough for the kind of performance and high speed required by the 
typical motor cycle. The MIRA track might be suitable for the 
requirements of the motor car industry but only Donington fully met 
the necessary specifications of motor cycle manufacturers. 83 
At great effort, the Union was ultimately successful in having 
Donington restored to its original function, thanks in part to the 
intervention of BSA Deputy Chairman Patrick Hannon, who was also an 
Mp. 84 The episode does raise some questions about the consistency 
of their stance on other related matters. It seems to fly in the 
face of the arguments they used with the Treasury about taxation, 
specifically the point made about revising rates to encourage the 
use of cheaper, small displacement motor cycles. It is unclear how 
use of the Donington track, used almost exclusively for the larger 
racing machines, could do anything to promote the use of smaller, 
less powerful motor cycles. 
When it came to issues like enlarging the export trade and 
seeking to open up new markets, the government and the industry 
worked in reasonable harmony, without an undue degree of 
83. See brief entitled 'Donnington: The Motor 
Case', dated 11 February 1947, contained in Gua: 
204/3/1/62. 
84. Mention of Hannon's intervention on behalf 
with the Ministry of Supply is mentioned in the 
Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section meeting of 9 
contained in ibid. 
Cycle Industry's 
rdbook MRC MSS 
of the industry 
minutes of the 
April 1948, 
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friction. 85 There may have been frustration over steel allocation 
cuts and petrol rations but, once restored, the industry's 
production rose and the tension abated. In two areas, however, 
retail price maintenance and production efficiency, the Labour 
government's initiatives created a serious breach between it and 
the manufacturers as well as stirring up considerable debate within 
the industry. 
The industry was very sensitive about retaining its ability to 
control the minimum price level at which motor cycles could be sold 
to the public. It lay at the heart of the Union's complex network 
of trading agreements which have already been summarised in chapter 
one. In late 1947 the Board of Trade created a Committee on Resale 
Price maintenance (popularly known as the 'Jacob Committee' after 
its chairman) to investigate the status of such arrangements 
throughout British industry. 86 
Alarmed, the Union's Council discussed this development during 
its first meeting of 1948. Major Watling informed members that he 
had been told that the purpose of the Committee was to determine 
whether or not resale price maintenance should be either prevented 
or regulated, in the interests of the "maximum economy and 
efficiency in the production and distribution of goods. " As far as 
85. In fact Stanford Cripps had been invited by the Manufacturers' 
Union to open the 1948 Show, although he declined the opportunity 
and was replaced by Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery. See minutes 
of the Show Catalogue Committee of 23 July 1948, contained Union 
Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/2. The Union Council subsequently 
invited Minister of Supply G. R. Strauss, President of the Board of 
Trade Harold Wilson, Minister of Transport T. Barnes and, no doubt 
to ensure the appearance of political evenhandedness, former 
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. However, only Eden seems to have 
actually attended the Show. See minutes of the Council meeting of 
28 September 1948, contained in ibid. 
86. The issue is touched upon by Helen Mercer, 'The Monopolies and 
Restrictive Practices Commission, 1949-1956: a study in regulatory 
failure', contained in G. Jones and M. Kirby (eds) Competitiveness 
and the State, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991. 
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Watling was concerned, this issue had already been thoroughly 
examined by the Board of Trade Committee on Restraint of Trade (the 
'Greene Committee') in 1930.87 Indeed, he had appeared before that 
committee and believed its findings had vindicated the Union's 
trading agreements. Watling thought that the intent of the Jacob 
Committee was to examine "whether unnecessary numbers of people 
were being attracted into the Retail Trade and its high profit 
margins. " The Council thereupon gave a mandate to Watling to 
defend the Union before the Committee. 88 
In July 1948 Major Watling appeared before the Jacob Committee to 
answer questions about the Union's policies regarding prices and 
other internal matters, an experience which led to occasionally 
acrimonious exchanges between the parties. In a wide-ranging 
enquiry, committee members probed a variety of aspects of the 
relationship between the manufacturers and their distribution 
network. Under pressure, Watling was adamant in his defence of the 
Union's Trading Agreements and their importance in underpining the 
prosperity of the entire trade. 
89 
In a reply to a question from Jacob himself, which queried 
whether, failing the manufacturers' control, if prices were left to 
freely find "an economic level", this would necessarily lead to 
disaster throughout the industry, Watling was unequivocal. He 
87. See Council meeting minutes for 20 January 1948, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/62. The Greene Report, officially 
entitled Restraint of Trade. Report of the Committee appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor and the President of the Board of Trade to 
answer certain Trade Questions, London: HMSO, 1931 (Chairman, 
Wilfred A. Greene, KC) mentions price maintenance schemes in 
practice in the motor cycle industry on p. 7. and p. 9. 
88. See Council meeting minutes of 20 January 1948, op cit. 
89. A copy of the full verbatim transcript of this hearing, 
entitled 'Minutes of evidence taken before the Committee on Resale 
Price Maintenance, July 1948', is contained in BT 64/540, file 
376/1949. 
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stated that resale price maintenance "was the best method of 
ensuring equity for all sections of the trade, and for the public. " 
There was, he insisted, no "price ring" in place. Quite the 
contrary, the trading agreements were necessary, to protect prices, 
in times of what he termed both "excess" supply and demand. 90 
Under relentless questioning from Jacob, Watling conceded that, 
although he claimed the discount provided to dealers was 
negotiable, in fact it was fixed at 20 per cent. This was 
administered irrespective of the number of motor cycles sold, on 
the grounds that it promoted fairness among the dealers 
geographically dispersed throughout Britain. 91 
Asked to provide an example of how the industry's trading 
agreements directly benefited the public, Watling suggested the 
manufacturers' newly instituted free after sales service was a good 
example of good corporate citizenship. Provided by dealers after 
500 miles use, Watling claimed this had been created in the public 
interest and was covered by existing profit margins. Jacob was 
sceptical. In his mind, it "applies a standard to the purchasing 
public which comes as a surprise to me. " Nor, under further 
questioning, could Watling document instances of owner misuse that 
would justify the service. Instead, he stressed the importance of 
the good name of the industry, "the finest reputation in the 
world. "92 Jacob was equally sceptical about Watling's repeated 
claim that the agreements benefited all concerned. The fact that 
they were administered by manufacturers and retailers did not 
appear to work in the common interest. It was a case, he 
commented, that "if only the public were represented, it would 
90. mod, pp. 5-6. 
91. ice, p. 6. 
92. aß PP"8-9. 
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include everybody. " Whi 
in the agreements which 
public, " Jacob retorted 
matter of opinion. i93 
The Committee's final 
an Watling protested that there was nothing 
"adversely affects the interests of the 
that "I suppose that must be really a 
report outlined the factual circumstances 
of these trading arrangements. 
94 No action on behalf of the 
government followed, perhaps because it was already pre-occupied 
enough elsewhere and wished to avoid a full-blown battle with 
industry over the issue of prices and internal agreements. At 
around the same time, the Union responded to a query from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to the FBI about a programme to limit 
prices and profits. The FBI had, in turn, begun to contact its 
members to ascertain their views on the subject. The Union's 
Council adopted a firm position in opposition to this initiative, 
on the grounds that it was simply impracticable to control retail 
prices. The Council did, however, say that it was prepared to 
advise its members to fix their prices at the current levels, so 
long as production and distribution costs outside of their control 
remained unchanged. 
95 
Indeed, the Council proceeded to formulate counter-proposals of 
its own. The industry might cooperate with a government prices and 
profits programme, but only if it also addressed some other, 
purportedly related issues. These included a general increase of 
working hours throughout industry, a reduction of government 
expenditure and the subsequent release of redundant civil service 
93. mod. P-9- 
94. A copy of the Jacob Committee's report was published in the 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader,, see 'Price Maintenance Criticised', 
17 June 1949, pp. 446-449. 
95. See memo, dated 4 March 1948 and entitled '68/48: Prices and 
Profits', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/62. 
157 
workers to industry, as well as sponsorship of a campaign against 
"damage, theft and pilferage" in the workplace, although the latter 
had not been previously referred to as a major problem faced by the 
industry-96 
The prices and profits campaign may never have reached fruition, 
but it was to be followed shortly by another initiative. In the 
autumn of 1947, the Union heard of a government proposal that 
threatened to seriously compromise what the motor cycle 
manufacturers considered to be their untrammelled right to manage 
their enterprises as they best saw fit. 97 Watling had been advised 
by the employer members of the Ministry of Supply's Engineering 
Advisory Council that the Minister was concerned that every effort 
to ensure maximum production efficiency be exercised. He was 
convinced, Watling was told, that there was currently "scope for 
improvement". As the Major reminded Union Council members, if not 
enough progress was attained, the Ministry had the power to create 
a Development Council to see that it was. 
98 
96. Ibid 
97. As late as September 1947 Watling had reported to the Union's 
Motor Cycle Manufacturing Section that, although he was aware of 
negotiations between the government and the motor car industry with 
respect to a programme to standardise automobile models, he did not 
think there would be any plans "to interfere with the production 
plans of the motor cycle industry. " See minutes of the Motor Cycle 
Manufacturing Section of 26 September 1947, contained in Minute 
Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/20- 
98. Memo from Watling to manufacturing members, dated 2 October 
1948, entitled '320/48: Production Efficiency', contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/164. Some time earlier, Sir Godfrey Ince, 
Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Labour, had given a speech 
to the Institute of the Motor Industry. He had called for higher 
productivity, despite the general labour shortage. The trade 
journal which reported the speech, drew its own conclusions for the 
motor cycle industry: "in order to ensure maximum production ... 
manufacturers must use every possible aid to production in the 
direction of equipping their factories with the latest in machine 
tools, brazing and welding apparatus and plant. " The journal was 
certain that what it termed as the "wiser executives" were already 
aware of this fact and would act accordingly. See editorial 
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The Union's leadership resented this level of examination of the 
inner workings of its members' factories. There was, it claimed, 
already a high level of cooperation within its ranks, not only 
among top level managers when the Union's Council and the Motor 
Cycle Manufacturers' Section convened, but also through proceedings 
of the Technical Committee-99 This Committee thought its work 
would stand well in comparison to its motor car industry 
counterpart. It had, it was claimed, been active for over 20 years 
and in that time "undoubtedly eased production problems by the 
issue of numerous recommended Data Sheets. ""100 
Later in the month, the Union's Assistant Director Hugh Palin, 
reported to the Council that he had met with employer members of 
the Engineering Advisory council, who had assured him that, failing 
more productivity from the industry, the threat of an imposed 
Development Council was a definite prospect. This may or may not 
have been a realistic assessment of ministerial intentions, but the 
Government's initiative precipitated the most wide ranging debate 
from within the motor cycle industry that had ever taken place, or 
would occur prior to the final collapse in 1975.101 
entitled 'Modernising the Industry', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader 
17 January 1947, p. 469. 
99. See ibid. Evidently, there were still war-time type Joint 
Production Councils functioning in at least one motor cycle 
factory. In late 1948 G. R. Strauss, Minister of supply, went to 
AMC's Woolwich factory and met with with members of its Council. 
See 'Minister of Supply at AMC", Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 8 
October 1948, p. 21. 
100. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Technical Committee meeting of 
8 December 1948, contained in the Minute Book MRC MSS 204/1/1/21. 
101. See minutes of the Council meeting of 28 October 1948, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/64. The larger question of 
the Labour Government's efforts to reform British industry during 
the late 1940s is covered Nick Tiratsoo and Jim Tomlinson, 
indctr; al Efficiency and State Intervention. Labour 1939-1951, 
London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 144-145 and pp. 167-168 and Jim 
Tomlinson, 'A missed opportunity? Labour and the productivity 
problem, 1945-51' contained 
in G. Jones and M. Kirby (eds), 
Competitiveness and the State, Manchester University Press, 1991. 
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The Union's line, that it was already doing enough to promote 
production efficiency without additional governmental prodding, did 
not take long to fray. Major Watling reported to the Council that 
he had attended a meeting sponsored by the FBI, which had been 
addressed by motor car manufacturer William Rootes, who had 
explained how the SMMT had been promoting production efficiency in 
his industry. Not only did they encourage managers to visit each 
others' factories, but there were plans maturing to ensure a 
greater interchangeability of accessories and components. 
102 
This news provoked further debate during the Union's governing 
Council meeting of December 1948. President George Wilson asked 
members what action they should take in response to the Minister's 
initiative, in case they were asked to account for their actions 
later on. The responses to his query showed that not everyone 
thought the industry was doing enough. Donald Heather, Managing 
Director of AMC, spoke out first in what would turn out to be the 
majority view. He dismissed Rootes' advice as irrelevant to their 
industry. There was, in his mind, a "fundamental difference" 
between the two industries. In particular, Heather noted the 
"complete contrast" in their relative international standings: the 
American motor car industry dominated the world yet American motor 
cycle makers looked to Britain for new designs and lagged far 
behind in terms of production. 
103 
BSA's Cycle Division Managing Director James Leek did not 
directly dispute Heather's assertion. He did, however, say that 
there was some aspects of the SMMT's programme that could be 
See also Scott Newton and Dilwyn Porter, Modernisation Frustrated, 
London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, pp. 101-119. 
102. See minutes of the Council meeting of 14 December 1948, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/64. 
103. Ibid. 
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emulated to their own benefit. He observed that its internal 
committees were composed of fairly high level staff - often the 
heads of firms. The Union's Standardisation Committee, in 
contrast, was made up of designers and drafting room personnel, who 
did not have any substantial influence over company policy. 
Triumph Chairman Jack Sangster agreed with Leek and explained that 
he did not believe the Union's committees really touched on what he 
termed the industry's "real problem". It might be true that the 
industry operated reasonably well, yet "we must be prepared to do 
everything possible to make ourselves even more efficient. " 
Sangster and Leek, however, did not represent majority opinion 
among the industry's leadership. 104 
Still, this was not an issue that could be sidestepped by the 
Union for very much longer. Looming behind the rhetoric was the 
danger of direct government intervention. In late January 1949, 
the union issued an internal position paper which outlined a 
possible strategy. There were, it said, two aspects to the 
problem: first, the matter of production efficiency at the level 
of the individual factory; and second, improvements which could be 
gained at the industry level through more inter-firm cooperation 
and general standardisation. Yet, in terms of concrete action, the 
Union does not seem to have done much to encourage such internal 
cooperation amongst its membership. Indeed, its virtually sole 
accomplishment in this matter was to have distributed an FBI 
booklet on 'Standardisation'. By January 1949, only one member had 
104. Ibid. 
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made an enquiry on the subject and that had already been referred 
back to an outside research group. 105 
Despite earlier scepticism expressed about following the example 
of the SMMT, attention was drawn to the continuing achievements of 
its Production Efficiency and Standardisation Committee. Much 
useful information, it was claimed, had been exchanged during its 
regular monthly meetings. These meetings also facilitated 
discussions to further the use of common accessories and components 
and the pooling of technical information such as blueprints and the 
peculiarities of jigs and tools. The committee sponsored factory 
tours and encouraged the secondment of technical staff to help out 
suppliers. Surely the motor cycle industry could learn something 
from what the motor car industry was doing. 
106 
At the January 1949 Council meeting, Union President Wilson 
commenced discussion on the necessity of forming a special 
committee having had the benefit of attending an FBI Conference on 
Production Efficiency held the previous month. He was convinced 
that the government expected "some positive action by the Industry" 
and it was not enough to simply expand the 
jurisdiction of their 
existing Standardisation Committee. What was now needed was an 
entirely new committee, with a membership drawn from the highest 
levels of the industry. In this he was supported by BSA's James 
Leek who believed it was now "essential" to take quick action. 
In Leek's opinion, although it might be true that the industry 
was currently the unchallenged world leader, this condition could 
not last forever. Now, "everything must be done to preserve this 
105. See memo authored by Union Assistant Director Hugh Palin, 
dated 20 January 1949, entitled 'Production Efficiency' contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/64. 
106. Ibia 
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position as there would undoubtedly be difficult days ahead" as 
their overseas competitors recovered from war damage. He 
implicitly agreed with the Minister in thinking that the industry 
"offered considerable scope for work to eliminate unnecessary 
overlapping. ""107 
Wilson and Leek received further support from Jack Sangster but 
it was soon apparent that the majority of the Council did not share 
their enthusiasm for this project. Not only was there considerable 
disagreement about what exactly needed to be improved but there 
existed a strong sentiment that, after all, their industry was 
internationally supreme, had been for as long as any of them could 
remember, and there was no reason to suppose that it would not 
remain so well into the future. Moreover, it was evident that the 
majority of those present were irritated that the government should 
implicitly question their competence and skill as managers and 
business men. Who were they to criticise those who oversaw such a 
successful export industry? 108 
Nonetheless, members bowed to the inevitable by forming a 
Production Efficiency Committee of their own. It was composed of 
the most senior members of the industry, including George Wilson (a 
bicycle company executive), Jack Sangster, Gilbert Smith, James 
Leek and Donald Heather among others. There were also senior 
representatives from component makers such as Villiers Engineering 
and Dunlop Tyres. Yet, this decision was in a sense a deceptive 
sign of the industry's resolution to face up to the vital questions 
of how to improve its overall efficiency. In fact, the Union's 
107. See Minutes of the Council Meeting of 18 January 1949, 
contained in ibid. 
108. Ibid. 
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Council as well as the newly formed Production Efficiency Committee 
remained deeply divided on the issue. 109 
With this lack of common purpose, the potential effectiveness of 
the Committee was already seriously compromised even before its 
first meeting on 7 February 1949. At the top of the agenda for the 
Committee's consideration was an invitation to the Union from the 
Anglo-American Council on Productivity to send teams to the US in 
order to study the latest production methods. During the meeting, 
the invitation was rejected out of hand, although BSA's James Leek 
again spoke out in favour of more preparation on the part of the 
motor cycle industry and stressed the need to modernize and 
anticipate resurgent foreign competition. 
11° For Leek, the status 
quo was not good enough any more. He warned the Council that "it 
was dangerous for the Industry to be complacent about their 
efficiency. " He also advocated industry standardisation with 
respect to certain components such as hubs and front forks. 
111 
However, Leek again represented a minority viewpoint. AMC 
Managing Director Donald Heather, speaking for the majority, 
thought that launching a rationalisation drive within the industry 
was actually a threat to the continued prosperity of the industry. 
Too much standardisation, for example, would he said "prejudice the 
individuality of each manufacturer, and would undermine the present 
proper competition" among them. It was the need for robust 
109. IIA-d. 
no. See memo prepared by Hugh Palin to the members of the 
Production Efficiency Committee, dated 26 January 1949, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/64. The minutes of the Production 
Efficiency Committee are contained in Minute Book, MRC MSS 
204/1/1/21. For a short general history of the Anglo-American 
Productivity Council, see Jim Tomlinson, 'The Failure of the Anglo- 
American Council on Productity', Business History, No. 1,1991, 
pp. 82-92. 
111. See minutes of Council meeting of 18 January 1949, Og cit. 
164 
internal competition that must preclude "too close a consultation" 
between the various firms. 1-2 
Subsequently, other members made known their objection to 
information exchange with the Americans. It was stressed that "the 
UK product and the UK production methods were considerably ahead of 
the US. " Thus, there should be no exchange of teams between the 
British and American motor cycle factories. In conclusion, the 
Committee agreed that "a visit to the USA would produce nothing of 
any great value. " The Government was informed accordingly. 
113 
As far as the other recommendations of the Minister of Supply 
were concerned, the Committee curtly disposed of them. Union 
Director Watling was instructed to prepare a press release which 
informed all and sundry of "the high degree of efficiency already 
achieved in the Industry" as well as its dominance in world export 
markets. Hence, the industry's leaders saw no need to implement 
any searching evaluation of their factories and production 
facilities. 
Instead, any improvements in what the Government termed 
Production Efficiency would rest with each firm and any technical 
problems could be forwarded to the Committee for reference to the 
appropriate outside agency. The Union, they agreed, would 
undertake to inform its membership of the work of their Production 
Efficiency Committee and to disseminate relevant information 
received from the FBI, SMMT, MIRA and the British Standards 
Institute. As far as the Union was concerned, that was that. 
There was nothing more to be done about either Production 





The following year Watling reported on a recent meeting with the 
Minister of Supply. The Minister had stressed his anxiety that the 
engineering industries "should do everything possible to increase 
their production efficiency by means of standardisation and 
simplification. " In their reply, members of the Union's Council 
declared that, in their collective minds they had done all they 
could to bring these issues to the attention of their membership. 
Moreover, "it is felt that the Industry generally has gone as far 
as it possibly can along the road to Standardisation. " For the 
British motor cycle industry, the book was closed on production 
efficiency. 
115 
Nothing lasting was to come out of this episode. In a short 
space of time, the newly formed Standardisation Committee went back 
to dealing with the comparatively minor technical issues that its 
predecessor had been addressing before the Government raised their 
concerns. Yet the manner in which the Union reacted to this 
question was highly significant for the future of the industry. 
Surely if there was ever a time after the war when the industry 
could have made a collective effort to prepare for the future, this 
was it. Instead, an unparalleled opportunity was allowed to slip 
away. 
As far as the majority of the Union's Council was concerned, the 
fact was that British motor cycles remained superior to all others, 
in terms of performance, especially at sports events. Moreover, 
115. See minutes of the Union Council meeting of 28 March 1950, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/68. See also memo, Watling 
to all manufactures, dated 15 February 1949, entitled '160/49: 
Production Efficiency', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/65. 
The motor cycle industry's aversion to standardisation or 
rationalisation of components was also shared by British sports car 
companies. See Timothy R. Whistler, 'Niche Products in the British 
Motor Industry: A History of MG and Triumph Sports Cars', 
unpublished PhD. dissertation (LSE 1991), p. 151. 
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British factories continued to outperform all others and the export 
trade continued to be dominated by their products. There seemed no 
reason for the industry to think it would be forced to change its 
ways. Yet, in 1949, the signs of change were there for those who 
bothered to look. Germany had resumed production, however limited 
for the time being. In Italy, production was well underway to re- 
introduce what had been originally a British invention, the motor 
scooter. Even the year before, British motor cycle firms had 
observed lightweight Italian motor cycles storm back to victory at 
the Isle of Man TT. One trade journal warned the industry that it 
was making a serious error neglecting the development of smaller 
machines. These were of "vital importance" to the long term 
prospects of motor cycle use in Britain. Otherwise there was a 
danger that the motor cycle could slip back in public perception to 
the pre-war situation of "being regarded almost entirely as a 
sporting [machine] for the young and adventurous. ""116 
Unlike their British counterparts, Italian companies such as 
Innocenti (maker of the Vespa) and Lambretta had produced machines 
of their own design which were both technically sound and 
financially successful. Indeed, they had become so popular on the 
Continent that in 1949 the Douglas company bought the rights to 
manufacture the Vespa at its Bristol motor cycle factory. The 
move, which did not receive much notice at the time, was to be 
portentous of shifts in consumer tastes after 1950.117 
116. See 'Lightweights for Utility', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader 
2 July 1948, p. 399. 
117. For a general history of the scooter in Britain, see 'Object 
as Image: the Italian Scooter Cycle', contained in Dick Hebdige, 
ý, na ýn the Liaht, London: Routledge, 1988, pp. 77-115 and 
'Scooter Mania', in Gary Johnson, op cit, pp. 73-85. In the spring 
of 1949, London dealer Pride and Clark were reported as bringing in 
a ship of French Motobecane autocycles. See minutes of the Motor 
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As the Reconstruction period drew to a close in 1951, the British 
motor cycle industry could look back at a mixed record of 
accomplishment. It had, considering the constraints of the time, 
done a reasonable job of recovery. The manufacturers' annual 
output had fallen far short of what they had predicted during the 
war, but this was a combination of unrealistic expectations as well 
as the result of conditions, such as materials supply, over which 
they had little control. Other than the BSA Bantam, the benefits 
of the Reparations programme had also fallen well below 
expectation. Moreover, little had been gained from their 
examination of German production methods and acquisition of plant. 
After 1948 the Germans were free to develop new models without fear 
of appropriation by the occupying western Allies. In light of the 
politics of the reparations programme, the disappointing results 
could not be blamed entirely on lack of initiative on the part of 
the motor cycle industry. 
Ironically, the era ended as it had begun at the conclusion of 
the war, with a surprise acquisition by BSA. Again, this involved 
a firm owned by Jack Sangster, who, convinced he was in poor 
health, decided to sell off Triumph Engineering in order to spare 
his family death duties. 118 The industry's structure was now 
further narrowed. Although the news was not widely disseminated to 
the public, the shock of Sangster's sale of Triumph to its greatest 
rival must have been considerable. Once more, Sangster screwed 
every possible penny he could from BSA. The buy-out cost 
£2,450,000 cash (Sangster had paid approximately £50,000 for 
Cycle Manufacturers Section meeting of 11 April 1949, contained in 
Minute book MRC MSS 204/1/1/21. 
118. Sangster's forebodings were premature. He was to live until 
1977. See his entry in the Dictionary of Business Biography. 
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Triumph in 1936), and the deal also included a seat on the BSA 
Group board for Sangster himself. 119 
One might be tempted to draw a parallel between the Triumph sale 
and the Morris-Austin merger, creating the British Motor Car 
Company, which was to take place the following year. Superficially 
there appears to be some justification to think there was. All the 
firms concerned were major forces in their respective fields and 
the consolidation of assets was widely thought to be a positive 
development for the future of their industries. 120 
However, there the similarities end. While, in the motor car 
industry, several strong competitors remained, not only American 
owned Ford and Vauxhall, but also Rootes and Standard, the motor 
cycle industry was different. The BSA/Triumph combine, along with 
subsidiaries Ariel and Sunbeam, now had a clearly dominant position 
among British motor cycle manufacturers. Although firm and 
reliable production figures are always difficult to determine, it 
is likely that total BSA Group production amounted to at least 60 
per cent of the industry's total output. Between them, AMC and 
Norton probably accounted for a large portion of what remained. In 
future, the other firms were to be pushed further and further to 
the margins of the industry or bought out in turn themselves. From 
119. The sale was approved at a BSA Board of Directors meeting 
held in January 1951. Evidently the negotiations were carried out 
between Sangster and Board member Lord Woolton and the decision to 
buy was based on the belief, according to the Board minutes, that 
Triumph was "a desirable asset to acquire. " The money was paid to 
Sangster in the form of a lump sum, payable by 31 March. See 
minutes of the Board meeting held on 11 January 1951, agenda item 
10246, contained in Minute Book No. 15, MRC MSS 19C/19. 
120. After 1955, following the merger of Austin and Morris in 1952 
to create BMC, the so-called 'Big Five' motor car manufacturers 
accounted for 90 per cent of industry output. In 1946, the so- 
called 'Big Six' had manufacturered 90 per cent of output. See 
Maxcy and Silberston, o cit, p. 19 and p. 22. See also Rhys, pR 
cit, pp. 21-22 and Church, op cit, p. 78. 
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now on whatever happened to BSA would determine the future of the 
entire British motor cycle industry. 
170 
Chapter 4. 
'The Window of Opportunity: 1951-1956'. 
Having emerged from the difficulties of the immediate post-war 
years, British motor cycle manufacturers now appeared poised for 
a period of vast and sustained expansion. With no foreign 
competition as yet evident, the industry was in a highly 
advantageous position from which to supply cheap motorised 
transport for a world well on the way to full economic recovery. 
The way was now cleared to realise its highly ambitious and self- 
imposed post-war production goals. Although there was a short 
period of material shortages brought about by the Korean War and 
rearmament programme which restricted production between 1950 and 
1952, thereafter the industry was generally able to procure most 
of its requirements. 1 
The sales situation in the Home market was rapidly improving. 
Increasing affluence assisted greater levels of motor vehicle 
ownership, to which many in the working classes now aspired. 
This was reflected in Churchill's appeal, made during the 1950 
General Election campaign in reply to an earlier remark made by 
Labour Cabinet Minister Aneurin Bevan, which insisted that voters 
were not necessarily, "'lower than vermin' because by their skill 
and thrift they have earned and saved enough money to buy a car 
or motor cycle. "2 The sense of optimism was also boosted by 
1. For shortages caused by the Korean War and rearmament, 
especially chrome and steel, see a series of minutes and 
memorandum from the Minute Books and Guardbooks contained in the 
Guardbooks from MRC MSS 204/31/69 to MSS 204/3/1/72. In its 1953 
Report, the Manufacturers' Union claimed that the materials 
shortages had ended. See 1953 Annual Report, p. 4, contained in 
MRC MSS 204/4/3/2. 
2. Churchill's quote comes from William Plowden's The Motor Car 
and politics, London: The Bodely Head, 1971, p. 318. 
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production levels which had increased from 49,000 units in 1945 
to 171,700 in 1951. During the same period motor cycle 
registrations had jumped from 312,844 to 859,034 and exports, 
which brought in badly needed hard currency, had gone from 4,000 
to 91,000. The industry remained the world's largest producer 
and although former rivals might be steadily recovering, none of 
them were as yet strong enough to directly challenge the British. 
Indeed, one could suggest that during this period there was a 
'window of opportunity' to allow for the consolidation of world- 
wide primacy. The years 1951 to 1956 were arguably a time when 
the industry had the resources and the time to prepare for the 
onslaught of overseas competitors, as its rivals fully recovered 
from war-time damage. 3 This was a period bounded on one side by 
BSA's purchase of Triumph Engineering and on the other by the 
1956 sales recession, the first of the post-war era. 
Nonetheless, during this time three substantial problems emerged 
to plague the industry. These cumulatively prevented it from 
taking full advantage of the favourable conditions to expand in 
the way its leadership had hoped. 
The first of these, growing public concern about increased 
levels of motor cycle accidents, became a serious sales deterrent 
and also complicated the industry's efforts to convince the 
government to relax tax and regulations. The second was the 
gradual loss of export markets, a result of factors both within 
and without the manufacturers' control. Third, and most 
important, was a shift in the character of the British home 
market, a factor which the collective leadership of the industry 
was slow to appreciate. 
3. A point also made by Barbara Smith, op cit, p. 21 and p. 25. 
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In 1951, these problems were still easy to overlook. For most 
of the manufacturers, the major problem was still that of trying 
to meet the incessant demands from their customers at home and 
abroad. If any single firm was representative of the potential 
of the industry at this time, it was BSA. This was certainly the 
judgement of Chairman Sir Bernard Docker, who was convinced that 
the future for his company was full of boundless promise. During 
an address to shareholders at the 1951 Annual General Meeting, he 
commented on the booming state of trade which faced his 
corporation in markets around the world. He defined the primary 
challenge facing the company and its various subsidiaries as 
achieving "production and still more production. "4 
Docker's remarks were more than mere rhetoric and, on one level 
at least, his optimism seemed well founded. This was a company 
which employed 20,000 workers in a number of locations around 
Britain and abroad, including an armaments factory in South 
Africa and a Canadian machine tool subsidiary. Its various 
interests had for many years spanned a wide range of engineering 
products, diverse but complementary, covering steel, machine 
tools, firearms and earth moving equipment. 5 
Indeed, BSA was able to supply many of the goods that were in 
demand during this period of economic recovery. Among other 
things, it produced utilitarian bicycles, some of the most 
expensive and luxurious limousines available in Britain, along 
4. See Chairman's speech for the 1951 Annual General Meeting, 
p. 2, contained in the BSA Collection, Birmingham Central Library, 
MS 321/A. 
5. The figure of 20,000 employees is cited in Docker's speech to 
the shareholders of 1954, pp. 3-5, see MS 321/A. Details about 
the South African and Canadian factories are provided in the BSA 
Directors' Minute Book No. 16, meeting of 27 September 1951, 
agenda items 10292 and 10293 respectively, contained in MRC MSS 
19C/19. 
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with a range of buses (supplied to metropolitan fleets at home 
and abroad) and armoured fighting vehicles, allowing it to cater 
to the whole spectrum of motor transport. Everything was 
manufactured, in fact, except for cheaper, economy class motor 
cars. Nor was the motor cycle side of BSA neglected and the 
company continued to account for nearly 50 per cent of the total 
British production. 6 
Indeed, BSA had maintained its position as the world's largest 
motor cycle manufacturer, offering what was undeniably still the 
most extensive and comprehensive product range of motorised two 
wheelers anywhere. In 1951 BSA and its subsidiaries manufactured 
over 20 individual models, an even more varied range than during 
the pre-war period. Its output included everything from the 98cc 
auto-cycle made under the New Hudson name, the 175cc Bantam entry 
level motor cycle, acquired from the Germans through the wartime 
Reparations Programme, to the four cylinder 1000cc Ariel 'Square 
Four'. These machines were diverse, mostly well engineered and 
covered virtually the entire market spectrum.? 
Among the other models produced was the highly successful 650cc 
twin cylinder machine, the 'Golden Flash', introduced after 1945 
to counter the big Triumph models. Derivatives of this model 
would continue to be built until 1972. BSA also manufactured the 
6. BSA dropped manufacture of its light car during the war and 
did not resume production after 1945. There is a report that the 
company, along with much of the British motor industry, turned 
down the Volkswagen 'Beetle', offered via the Reparations 
Programme. See Owen Wright, BSA - The Complete Story, Ramsbury: 
The Crowood Press, 1992, p. 40. Wright's statement about the VW 
is made without substantiation and there is no mention in the 
surviving BSA archives of the company ever showing any interest 
in the VW design. For the market share estimate, see the 
F&onomist, 'More Power to the Pedal', 30 April 1955, pp. 399-401. 
7. See Roy Bacon, British Motorcycles of the 1940s and 1950s, 
pp. 32-41, pp. 52-64 and p. 125 for details of this range. 
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highly successful single cylinder 500cc 'Gold Star' which swept 
race tracks around the world. In between the company produced a 
number of machines in varying configurations, built up around 
engine capacities of the 250cc, 350cc and 500cc classes. 8 In 
1953, as recognition of the relative importance of motor cycles 
within the BSA Group, they were split away from BSA Cycles (which 
included bicycles) and BSA Motor Cycles Ltd. was created. The 
other motor cycle subsidiaries, Ariel, Triumph and Sunbeam, 
continued to operate with varying degrees of autonomy. 9 
Moreover, BSA was well equipped with factory and plant in order 
to produce this extensive range of motor cycles. The main 
factory on Armoury Road at Small Heath, Birmingham, manufactured 
most of the motor cycles, along with a diminishing amount of 
rifles, and also performed some general engineering work. This 
capacity was complemented by a former 'Shadow Factory' at nearby 
Redditch, which produced the engine for the Bantam, the high- 
priced Sunbeam models as well as sundry subcontracting work. 
10 
After 1944 BSA also owned the Ariel Motors plant at Selly Oak 
Birmingham, which produced a smaller but still comprehensive line 
of models, including the giant 'Square Four'. In 1953, 
8. Barry Ryerson, op cit. See chapter nine for a review of the 
post-war range, pp. 87-110. 
9. See BSA Directors' Minute Book, meeting of 30 April 1953, 
item 10455, Minute Book 15, contained in MRC MSS 19C/19. See 
also 'Separation of Motor Cycle and Bicycle Interests. New 
company formed', BSA News, August 1953, p. 3. 
10. According to John Balder, BSA's Service Manager at the time, 
the Small Heath plant ran three assembly lines simultaneously, 
one for the Bantam, one for the 'B' series of single cylinder 
models and another for the twin cylinder machines. See Balder 
interview of 18 November 1994. The Sunbeam had been the star of 
the first post-war Show in 1948, one being presented to Field 
Marshall Montgomery who had been invited by the Union as its 
special guest and who had opened the proceedings. See Show 
Ca ogue for 1948, MRC MSS 204/4/1/29. There was a follow up on 
how the Field Marshall was enjoying his motor cycle in BSA News 
for Autumn 1952, p. 31. 
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responding to expanding demand for the so-called 'clip-on' (a 
small engine which could be attached to a bicycle frame as an 
auxiliary power unit) BSA introduced the 'Winged Wheel'. This 
unit, which extended BSA's two-wheeled range even further, was 
manufactured at its bicycle factory at Montgomery St. in 
Birmingham. ll 
After 1951, BSA's most important subsidiary was Triumph 
Engineering Co. BSA included Triumph's highly successful range 
of big capacity twin cylinder models as part of the overall line- 
up, although Triumph continued to maintain its previous separate 
identity. Indeed, BSA deliberately downplayed this purchase with 
the general public in the interests of fostering competition 
between the subsidiaries, an important sales factor amongst 
enthusiasts who were often fiercely loyal to individual marques. 
As he had before 1951, Triumph's Managing Director Edward Turner 
continued to run his enterprise with virtually a free hand. 
12 
Moreover, Triumph continued as a manufacturer of large 
displacement motor cycles, although two smaller models, one 150cc 
and the other 199cc, were also introduced in the early 1950s. 
Indeed, the 199cc model would become increasingly important after 
1956, although later on Triumph's production would consist mostly 
of machines in the 500cc and larger displacement category. 
13 
During the early 1950s, the BSA was working close to full 
productive capacity, now well in excess of the best pre-war 
il. The so-called 'Winged Wheel' was a single cylinder 35cc 
engine, which was fitted on to the rear wheel of a bicycle. It 
cost £25 and could return 200 miles per gallon. See "The Winged 
Wheel" in the August 1953 issue of BSA News, p. 5. 
12. See Hopwood, op cit, pp. 127-128. 
13. See Ivor Davies, op cit, p. 111. See also an untitled 
feature article on Triumph lightweight range, contained in The 
Motor Cycle and Cycle-Export Trader, November 1952, p. 177. 
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figures. During the 1951/52 season the Small Heath factory alone 
churned out at least 65,000 machines of various types, a total 
never again surpassed by it or any other British motor cycle 
company. The subsidiaries probably accounted for another 30,000 
to 35,000 units. According to its surviving records, Triumph 
alone produced on average between 20,000 to 22,000 machines 
throughout most of the 1950s. 14 
Yet, beyond the slick, flashy covers of the company reports and 
prospectuses, at a deeper, less evident level, the BSA Group was 
a troubled organisation. The sources of this malaise, which were 
remarked upon privately by certain Board members, had very little 
to do with motor cycle production. 15 The crucial underlying 
weakness was that the top management of BSA was simply not up to 
the job of directing and coordinating the activities of such a 
vast and sprawling enterprise. At the time, much evidence about 
the true state of the company was submerged by the acrimony 
surrounding Chairman Docker and his wife Norah's eccentric 
behaviour and personal excesses. Lacking either the talent or 
the dynamism of his late father, Dudley Docker, a man closely 
associated with BSA for many years and who had manoeuvred his son 
into the chairman's office, Sir Bernard was unable to achieve the 
14. The figure of 65,000 motor cycles produced is drawn from the 
BSA Management Minutes, meeting of 23 Febuary 1951, agenda item 
9258. This total probably includes all motor cycles and New 
Hudson autocycles made at the Small Heath factory, along with the 
Sunbeams made at Redditch. According to John Balder, then BSA's 
Service Manager, the Small Heath factory never ran at 100 per 
cent capacity. See Balder interview, 18 November 1994. No 
archive material at all remains for Ariel Motors and it is 
extremely difficult to estimate its output for virtually any 
period of time, although after 1945 it probably fluctuated 
between 10,000 to 15,000 units. 
15. See the series of correspondence between BSA Deputy Chairman 
Patrick ('Paddy') Hannon and various personnel, in particular 
James Leek and Sir Bernard Docker, during 1947-1951, in the 
Hannon Papers, Box 31/Folders 1-3 and Box 36/Folder 4. 
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harmonious workings of the company's many parts. Still, in the 
years after the war it must have been easy to overlook these 
weaknesses when the BSA Group's products were in such demand. 
This was especially true for the special alloy steels made by its 
subsidiaries Jessops and Saville. These were a key component in 
the manufacture of the turbines needed for one of Britain's 
newest industries, jet engines, used on high-profile aircraft 
such as the Comet. This product placed BSA in the forefront 
among some of the most promising developments in British 
engineering. 16 
So what went wrong? The most obvious and intractable of all 
BSA's difficulties was the Daimler motor car subsidiary. This 
key division had not flourished after 1945. It had enormous 
difficulties finding a place in the Home market and had a dismal 
export record-17 For his part, Docker blamed the Attlee 
government's "vicious" Double Purchase Tax on 'luxury' motor 
cars. This tax, he complained, was a "monstrous handicap to the 
sales of such cars" and had prevented Daimler from becoming a 
going concern. 
18 
16. See Davenport-Hines, op cit, pp. 231-232. At one point, 
Docker claimed that 90 per cent of the jet engines built in 
Britain used BSA turbine discs. See Chairman's Speech, 9 
December 1948, p. 6, MS 321/A, Birmingham Central Reference 
Library. The cover of the BSA News issue for Summer 1956 had a 
photo of a de Havilland Comet 3 jet airliner, which used jet 
turbine discs made by BSA's Special Steel Group. 
17. A point remarked upon by Ministry of Supply officials in 
their private correspondence, see, for example, SUPP 14/328, 
specifically a memorandum entitled 'Note of Meeting at the 
Daimler Company on 12th October 1949' and SUPP 14/331, in 
particular Minute Sheet, dated 16 February 1951, prepared by H. 
Bailey. See also the minute of 3 September 1951, contained in 
SUPP 14/332. 
18. See Chairman's Speech delivered on 9 December 1948, 
contained in MS 321/A . 
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The fact was, however, that Daimler's main product line, 
largely old fashioned and expensive limousines, simply did not 
have sufficient appeal to allow the company to operate its 
factory on an economic basis. In 1950, the BSA Group'Board 
decided to break out of this impasse by adopting a new 
manufacturing strategy-19 This committed Daimler to a range of 
smaller, less expensive models in a determined bid for Britain's 
growing numbers of middle-class motorists. Even though 
considerable resources were spent re-equipping Daimler's Coventry 
factory to produce the new models, the results were 
disappointing. By 1956, Daimler's continuing losses threatened 
the entire BSA Group and Chairman Docker's position with his 
fellow Board members became increasingly tenuous. 20 
Although far more successful than Daimler motor cars, the motor 
cycle division produced its share of disappointments. Sunbeam, 
the 'Gentleman's motor cycle', upon which such high hopes had 
been placed, was not only high-priced but was also plagued by 
serious quality control problems, the result of a badly flawed 
design. It never lived up to the standard of its German BMW 
inspiration. In consequence, far fewer machines were sold than 
hoped and this model was ultimately killed off in 1956.21 The 
19. In the opinion of Board members, this strategy was the "only 
one likely to enable the company to establish itself in the motor 
car field. " See Board meeting for 28 March 1950, item 10187, QR 
git- 
20. In June 1950 BSA spent £1,000,000 on re-equipping the 
Daimler factory and subsequently another £1,000,000 on purchasing 
Carbodies, in order to gain a secure source of this vital 
component. See agenda item 10202, Board meeting of 22 June 1950, 
contained in minute Book M15, MRC MSS 19C/19 and agenda item 
10552, Board meeting of 20 May 1954, contained in Minute Book 16, 
MRC MSS 19C/20. 
21. Troubles with the Sunbeam had begun even before it went into 
production, a point indicative of serious design flaws. See, for 
example, BSA Small Heath factory Management Minutes, meeting of 
10 September 1945, agenda item 7821, MRC MSS 19A/1/5. A 
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Ariel Square Four had a far longer production life than the ill- 
fated Sunbeam, but it was an aged design, dating from the early 
1930s, and had its own inherent design problems. The Square Four 
also suffered from its relatively high cost which restricted its 
appeal. It would be finally dropped from the factory's 
production programme in 1959.22 
On the other extremity of the product range, the bicycle motor 
attachment also failed to live up to expectations. Begun as a 
response to changing consumer tastes for lightweight power units, 
the 'Winged Wheel' was produced too late to really exploit the 
cycle attachment market. 23 One the other hand, the lightweight 
Bantam, the big capacity twins and the more traditional single 
cylinder machines (the 500cc 'Gold Star' was a particularly 
successful race track machine) were consistent money-spinners 
which would continue to earn the revenue for years to come. 
If the state of the industry's leader was not as good as 
surface appearances suggested, what remained of the one-time 'Big 
Six' of motor cycle manufacturers? By 1953 this had shrunk to 
the 'Big Four', itself a highly misleading concept since BSA and 
Associated Motor Cycles (AMC) together accounted for between 65 
technical description of this model is contained in Robert Corden 
Champ, op cit, pp. 9-10 and his The Sunbeam Motor Cycle, 
Sparkford: Haynes Publications, 1980, pp. 157-1965. Designer 
Bert Hopwood's assessment of the Sunbeam is highly critical: 
"The early reputation of difficult maintenance and unreliability 
stuck with the bike and hampered its sales. " See Hopwood, Qp 
Q1-t, pp. 90-91. 
22. See Peter Watson, 'Rise and Fall of the Square Fours', 
classic Bike, Autumn, 1978, pp. 10-13, Steve Wilson, op cit, 
volume 1, pp. 97-102 and Peter Hartley, The Ariel Story, Watford, 
Herts: Argus Books, 1980, pp. 194-209. 
23. Owen Wright notes that this motor unit was introduced too 
late to really capitalise on the boom years of the 'clip-on'. 
Nor did it appear to have captured the affections of its owners, 
evidently it was known widely as the 'Stink Wheel'. It faded 
away after BSA sold its bicycle interests to Raleigh Industries 
in 1957. See Wright, op cit, p. 155. 
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to 75 per cent of the industry's output and made the motor cycle 
industry one of the most concentrated in Britain. 24 Now firmly 
established as the industry's number two producer, AMC had 
followed BSA's example by diversifying production through the 
acquisition of smaller firms. Unlike BSA, it remained a 
dedicated motor cycle producer. During this time AMC launched 
several important take-overs that enabled it to extend its 
limited model range without having to add to its existing 
facilities. This was important since AMC's output consisted 
mostly of the big capacity Matchless and AJS models, either the 
traditional single or the newer twin cylinder machines. 25 
In 1947 AMC picked up the Coventry based Francis-Barnett, 
another medium sized producer of smaller machines. Acquisition 
of this firm enabled AMC, in the words the Chairman, to take "an 
active interest in the lightweight motor cycle field, with 
particular regard to export markets which were largely supplied 
by Germany in pre-war days. " The pattern was continued in 1950 
when AMC acquired James Cycle, another medium sized producer of 
lightweight models, based in Birmingham. Both these companies 
gave the parent company a presence in the lightweight market 
which hitherto it had not participated in. 
26 
24. See Richard Evely and I. M. D. Little, Concentration in 
British Industry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 
p. 52 and p. 123. The Economist estimated that AMC, including its 
subsidiaries, accounted for about 30% of total British output. 
See 'More power to the Pedal', op cit. 
25. For a general overview of AMC's activities during this time, 
see Gregor Grant, op cit, pp. 80-83 and Peter Hartley, Matchless - 
once the Largest British Motor Cycle Manufacturer, pp. 139-170. 
26. The Francis-Barnett acquisition was described in an untitled 
feature in the Export Trader, June 1947, p. 213. This purchase 
also included a subsidiary, Clarendon Pressings and Welding, a 
company which produced a variety of accessory items for both the 
motor cycle and motor car industry. Chairman Hogg's quote comes 
from a letter to AMC Shareholders, dated 4 July 1947, on file at 
the Guildhall Library. The James' purchase was covered in a news 
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The management of the Woolwich factory, the core of AMC, had an 
intensely conservative conception of both motor cycles and motor 
cyclists, which was manifested in the manufacturing programmes. 
This consisted of the larger displacement single and twin 
cylinder Matchless and AJS models which were largely built for 
the traditional segment of the market. This conception was also 
reflected in the outlook of Managing Director Donald Heather. In 
his opinion, the majority of people who bought motor cycles were 
dedicated enthusiasts, many of whom were oriented towards 
sporting events. According to fellow executive Bert Hopwood, 
Heather refused to believe that substantive technical 
improvements were necessary. Indeed, Heather was evidently 
sceptical of the goal of a trouble-free motor cycle, having once 
commented that "most motor cyclists love to spend their Sunday 
mornings taking off the cylinder head and re-seating the 
valves. i27 For a time, his strategy seemed vindicated by the 
fact the company worked at full capacity during this period, 
barely able to meet either Home or Export demand. This was a 
point the company Chairman often reminded shareholders of at 
AMC's Annual Meetings. The policy was also reinforced by a high 
item entitled 'Attention to Detail' contained in British Cycles 
and Motor Cycles Overseas, August/September 1950, p. 369. The 
James company also manufactured bicycles, although that part of 
the business was later sold off to Tube Investments, see 'James 
Pedal Cycle Interests sold', Times 21 August 1954, contained in 
File 12913, Trade Union Congress news clipping collection, MRC. 
According to J. M. West, AMC Sales manager at the time, James and 
Francis-Barnett were purchased very cheaply, for even less than 
the estimated cost of their assets. See J. M. West interview, 23 
November 1994. 
27. Donald Heather's view of motor cyclists is described in 
Hopwood, op cit, p. 143. This viewpoint was criticised at the 
time by columnist Francis Jones: "Extraordinary as it may seem, 
the belief is still current that a motor cyclist must be somthing 
of an engineer if he is to get satisfactory service out of his 
machine. " See 'Motor Cycle Matters', Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Trader, 20 April 1951, pp. 50-51. 
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rate of return on capital and a series of generous dividend pay- 
outs. 28 
The most important single post-war acquisition AMC made was its 
1953 purchase of Norton Motors, along with its sister firm R. T. 
Shelley, an automobile accessory maker, for a reported sum of 
£900,000. Like the earlier purchases, this Birmingham based firm 
was only loosely integrated within AMC's corporate structure. 
S. R. Hogg, AMC's chairman, explained the Board's strategy of 
diversification to the shareholders at the subsequent Annual 
General Meeting: 
The great reputation which is attached to the names of 
Matchless, AJS and Norton, in the field of high grade 
sporting motor cycles, and to the names of Francis- 
Barnett and James, in the lightweight motor cycle 
markets, will give our Group a strength and prestige 
which cannot be matched by that of any other 
organisation in the motor cycle industry. 
Hogg went on to declare that the addition of Norton would 
"greatly strengthen the group in dealing with the competition we 
will have to face in the future, not merely from other British 
manufacturers, but also competition from the European motor cycle 
industry. "29 
Norton had continued to produce a limited range of mostly 
larger (350cc to 600cc) single cylinder models in its antiquated, 
28. AMC's output was discussed in 'Greater Attendance,. more 
Publicity, and Improved Display Standards', 28 November 1952, 
pp. 176-179. For details of AMC's financial performance at this 
time, see Barbara Smith, op cit, p. 31. 
29. See the 'Chairman's Speech' to the Annual General Meeting, 
delivered on 25 February 1953, on deposit at the Guildhall 
Library, London. Chairman Hogg's remarks were also given 
detailed coverage in an article entitled 'Norton Acquisition', 7 
March 1953, p. 366, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader. AMC's purchase 
of Norton Motors included its subsidiary, R. T. Shelley, a 
manufacturer of motor cycle and motor car accessories. 
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almost Dickensian, factory in Birmingham. 30 These sold in 
consistent if unspectacular numbers, largely because of the 
company's continuing race-track success. Following the lead of 
Triumph and BSA, Norton also introduced a 500cc twin cylinder 
model, the 'Dominator', which became one of the company's best 
sellers. In fact, later variants of this model would 
subsequently become its sole product. 
31 Norton was also unique 
in the industry because it was affected by a lengthy labour 
dispute. Indeed, there is no record of labour unrest among the 
other manufacturers, there being only one recorded strike in the 
industry from the late 1920s to 1956, that at Ariel Motors in 
1944, which occurred as a protest against Sangster's sale of the 
firm to BSA. 32 
In May 1956, a strike was begun by AEU members at Norton over 
the issue of redundancies, which was in turn part of a wave of 
labour unrest sweeping through the automotive engineering 
industry, most prominently at Coventry's Standard Motor Company. 
30. When Bert Hopwood first went to work at Norton Motors in 
1947, he noted that never "even during the war time blitzes did I 
have to work under such difficult conditions. " He described the 
factory as follows: "... the whole Norton bulding was such a 
slummy shambles sandwiched with machines and parts, and men and 
vermin, in a noisy and dirty conglomeration. " Hopwood, op cit, 
p. 69. 
31. Mick Woollett, Norton, London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 
1992, pp. 197-218. See also Roy Bacon, British Motor Cycles of 
the 1940s and 1950s, pp. 130-137. 
32. See PRO LAB 10/132, 'Trade Stoppages, weekly return to the 
Minister, November 1940 - December 1944. Return for 21 December 
1944'. As during the interwar period, there is the occasional 
remark about strikes among component makers, but not any actual 
motor cycle manufacturer. There is no mention in the Motor Cycle 
and Cycle Trader, or in the special TUC newsclipping file on the 
cycle and motor cycle industry, of any strike between 1944 to 
1962 other than the Norton dispute. There was, however, a short 
unreported strike at Triumph Engineering during June 1959, the 
first since the 1920s. There is no record of any other labour 
dispute at the company for several years thereafter. See 
Koerner, 'Trade Unionism and Collective Bargaining', op cit, 
p. 104. 
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The Norton strike ran for over 6 months and caused much 
bitterness between the company and its workforce. There was also 
an element of political involvement in the Norton strike, through 
the active participation of a group which was subsequently known 
as the Socialist Labour League. 33 The dispute was ultimately 
settled without significant concession on the part of the company 
in late November, even after a disruption of that year's Show, 
when AMC and its subsidiaries had their stands 'blacked' by the 
building staff, acting in support of the AEU. 34 
The industry's two remaining larger companies struggled along 
with varying degrees of success. Neither came anywhere near BSA 
or AMC in terms of production levels although they did try to 
adopt various innovative production strategies in order to 
maintain sales. 
Royal Enfield remained committed to motor cycle and bicycle 
production but had also branched out to manufacture diesel 
engines and small engines for motorised bicycles. It continued 
to fill specialised Government armament contracts at its old war- 
33. Several booklets and some correspondence relating to the 
Norton strike can be found within MRC MSS 309, Box 6, entitled 
'Solidarity file'. Among them is a pamphlet published by the 
Norton Motors Strike Committee entitled The Fight-Against 
Redundancy, (September 1956). There are several newspaper 
clippings concerning the Norton strike contained at in LAB 
10/1445, 'Engineering - Standard Motor Car Co. Ltd., Coventry and 
the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. 
Strikes over redundancy'. Harry Finch, who was the Norton shop 
stewards' convenor during the strike, was later listed as a 
leader of the Socialist Labour League in Patterns of Trotskyism - 
A new form of subversion in Industry. London: The Economic 
League Ltd. (no date but problably 1960), which is contained in 
MRC MSS 200/F/5/53/5. A more reliable source, Bert Hopwood, who 
had been appointed a Director of Norton just as the strike broke 
out, provides a brief description of the dispute in Hopwood, gp 
ct, pp. 136-137. 
34. The 'blacking' incident at the Show was described by 
Industry Association Director Hugh Palin in a memo dated 26 
November 1956, entitled '367/56 - Director's Personal Report', 
contained in MRC MSS 204/3/1/84. 
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time underground factory near Bradford-on-Avon. From its main 
factory at Redditch the company built its mainly large (350cc to 
500cc) traditional single cylinder machines, although it did also 
have a smaller displacement (125cc) model to rival the BSA Bantam 
along with a popular 250cc sports machine. Royal Enfield also 
built several large twin cylinder models, although these never 
sold in great numbers. In response to tariff walls and import 
quotas, it was the only British motor cycle firm to establish an 
overseas manufacturing facility by way of a licensing agreement 
with an Indian company based at Madras. 35 
The second company, Douglas, suffered from a period of upheaval 
and was put under receivership in 1948. It was later bought by 
Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company in 1956. Nonetheless, it 
maintained a limited line-up of motor cycles although its real 
'bread and butter' was a licensing arrangement negotiated with 
the Italian Piaggio company to manufacture the 'Vespa' scooter. 
The latter proved to be a profitable venture and one which kept 
the firm abreast of changing consumer tastes in the Home market 
and probably saved it from earlier financial problems. Scooter 
35. For an outline of Royal Enfield's post-war range, See Steve 
Wilson, on cit, Vol. 4., pp. 53-81 and Peter Hartley, The story of 
Royal Enfield Motor Cycles, Cambridge: Patrick Stephens, 1981, 
pp. 92-110. The motorised bicycle engine was an Italian design, 
the 'Cucciolo', which Enfield built under licence for the Britax 
company. See 'Britax Bicycle available for Cucciolo Engine 
unit', in the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader 22 August, 1953, 
p. 287. The Madras India factory assembled its first 350cc single 
cylinder model in 1957 and continues to produce much the same 
machines to the present. See photo story in The Export Trader, 
January/February 1957, p. 13. In 1948 Norton announced its 
intention to build an assembly plant in Canada but no action was 
ever taken. See 'Post-war sales of motor cycles in Canada', 19 
November 1948, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, p. 289. 
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production continued into the 1960s, while orthodox motor cycle 
production ended in 1957.36 
Two of the well-established smaller specialist firms, Veloce 
(Velocette) and Vincent, had shown considerable design flair in 
their post-war models. Yet, they, too, performed below their own 
expectations and experienced serious troubles, sufficient to 
cause one of them to go out of business during the period in 
question. 
Vincent continued to produce the big 1000cc twin cylinder 
models which regularly broke speed records around the world. 
These machines are still considered to be benchmarks of 
engineering and design excellence. Nonetheless, the Vincent 
company found that it had boxed itself into a very limited market 
consisting of well-heeled enthusiasts. There were simply not 
enough of them willing to pay the steep prices, some £366 for a 
1000cc 'Rapide' model in 1954, necessary to keep the factory 
going on an economic basis. 
37 
In 1948 the company suffered a major and ultimately fatal 
reverse when Argentina adopted stringent import quotas and higher 
tariffs. This was a disaster for Vincent as it had become highly 
committed to the Argentine market with much business having been 
developed in, among other things, supplying motor cycles to the 
36. See Jeff Clew, The Douglas Motorcycle, Sparkford: Haynes 
Publishing Group, 1981, especially pp. 153-172. For more detail 
on the scooter licensing scheme, see 'First British Vespa on 
March 15', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 9 March 1951, p. 492. 
37. Vincent was also involved in Britain's rearmament programme, 
which may have distrupted its production programmes after 1950. 
See 'Fewer Vincent Motor Cycles', 12 January 1951, p. 387., Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader. The price for the 'Rapide' is derived 
from the 'Buyers' Guide', contained in The Motor Cycle, 18 March 
1954. That same year, the price of a Ford Anglia and Popular 
motor car was, respectively, £541 and £413, see 'Buyers' Guide', 
The Autocar, 11 November 1955. 
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that country's military and police forces. From then on the 
company limped along as best it could. 38 
Vincent did not give up without a fight. It tried an 
imaginative, flexible response to falling sales of the big twin 
cylinder models and to changes in the market. It produced a 48cc 
cyclemotor (the 'Firefly') and later went into a partnership with 
the German NSU company. This involved importing and assembling 
NSU's lightweight motor cycles and along with its popular 
'Quickly' moped, using at least 51 per cent British content thus 
enabling them to be badged and sold as 'Vincents' throughout 
Britain and the Commonwealth. Ultimately the company also tried 
building three-wheeler cars, engines for pilotless target 
aircraft, lawn-mowers and even a water scooter. This was all to 
no avail and in 1955 Vincent ceased production of motorised two- 
wheelers. After the company went out of business, owner Philip 
Vincent blamed competition from smaller, cheaply priced cars for 
the decline of his firm. 39 
38. So determined was the company to develop the Argentine 
market, that in 1946 one of its 1000cc models was actually air- 
freighted to Buenos Aires in order to be displayed in a trade 
exhibition. See untitled news item, The Motor Cycle, 26 
September 1946, p. 241. According to owner Philip Vincent 
himself, the loss of the Argentine market badly damaged the 
company and was a major factor in its demise. Vincent's remarks 
are contained in his preface to Roy Harper, op cit, pp. 8-10. A 
later history of the company claims that poorly focused and 
ineffective management was another significant factor in its 
decline. See Duncan Wherrett, Vincent, London: Osprey, 1994, 
pp-103-105- 
39. See Peter Carick, Vincent-HRD, Cambridge: Patrick Stephens 
Ltd., 1982, p. 21, pp. 35-36 and p. 72. Owner Philip Vincent was 
also quoted as saying that his company had closed because of 
"intense competition from small cars. ... There is no longer the 
same demand for our high quality models. " He went on to 
elaborate that, "prices have reached a ceiling. With small cars 
available at such cheap low cost, people are turning away from 
motor cycles. " See Evening Standard (no date but probably 
September 1955), story entitled 'Motor Cycle Firm is to Stop 
Production' contained in the Manufacturers' Union press clippings 
book, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
188 
The other specialised company, Velocette, continued to build 
its larger capacity single cylinder models, primarily catering to 
a sports oriented market of enthusiasts. The 1948 launch of its 
utilitarian 'LE' model was planned as a breakthrough into a 
larger market of commuters. Although designed and manufactured 
to a very high standard, the LE never lived up to the hopes of 
its designers. The problems were essentially twofold. First, 
because of the LE's demanding specifications, which required 
expensive materials and manufacturing, it was priced beyond the 
pockets of the everyday commuter. In 1952, for example, the 
192cc LE cost £173 15s, compared to Ambassador's 197cc 'Popular' 
(£102), the BSA 249cc C10 (£125 4s) and the 125cc Vespa scooter 
(£149 16s). 40 
Secondly, even though the LE was supposed to appeal to non- 
traditional consumers (its advertising slogan was 'car-like in 
conception'), the approach to marketing was very orthodox. 
Although designer Phil Irving had urged the company to take out 
advertisements in publications such as te, Hoof and Horns and 
The Illustrated London News, in the interests of reaching 
potential customers who would not read the established 
enthusiasts' journals, he was unsuccessful. Instead, he was told 
"that it was not my job to sell the machine but to design it. ""41 
Such handicaps, combined with its novel appearance, seriously 
undercut any hopes of mass appeal. In 1950, for example, 
although the company had predicted sales of 14,500, actual 
40. Prices from 'Buyers' Guide', The Motor Cycle, 3 March 1952. 
41. See Phil Irving, An Autobiography, Wahroongo, Australia: 
Turton and Armstrong, 1992, p. 292. (Thanks to Dennis Frost for 
drawing this reference to my attention). The LE was, however, 
subject to a test evaluation in the Daily Herald. See Wilson, gR 
c, Vol. 6, pp. 191-200. 
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production was only 2,800. Indeed, far from being a big seller, 
it may have actually been produced at an overall loss to the 
company. As it was, instead of tapping a pool of non-traditional 
consumers, as its designers had originally hoped it would do, 
some of the LE's biggest sales were to various British police 
forces. 42 
As before, there continued to be a number of smaller firms 
catering to various market segments which used proprietary two- 
stroke engine units, particularly those made by Villiers 
Engineering. Access to these power units enabled such companies 
to stay in business and complement the mainly large capacity 
machines produced by the major firms. These lower output 
companies built models in batches and targeted a variety of 
consumers, including commuters but also those participating in 
scrambles, trials and other sporting events. 43 One of them, 
Greeves, was virtually the only notable new market entry after 
1945. Some of the others would later commence scooter 
manufacture. 
44 
42. See John Kelly, op cit, pp. 223, p. 512, p. 518. 
43. For a comprehensive listing of these models, see Roy Bacon, 
Villiers Singles and Twins the Post-War British Two-Stroke Light 
Weight Motor Cycles. London: Osprey Publishing Co., 1983. Most 
of the smaller scale British producers, such as Excelsior, AJW, 
Bond, Cotton and Sun, continued to use proprietary engines, 
virtually all originating from the Villiers Engineering Co. As 
no reliable statistical information is available it is difficult 
to estimate what their output was although it was unlikely to 
have been more than 10 per cent to 15 per cent of total British 
production. 
44. At least one firm, Walsall based Helliwell Ltd. (which had 
been building aircraft components along with side cars and sports 
cars), entered the utility market soon after the war with its so- 
called Swallow 'Gadabout'. See feature on the Gadabout in the 
6 port Trader, February 1947, pp. 58-59 and also 'New British Two 
Wheeler for Mr. and Mrs. Everyman', The Motor Cycle, 28 November 
1946, pp. 412-414. Another entry to this market was the General 
Steel and Iron Company, which introduced two small motor cycles 
(122cc and 98cc respectively) along with an autocycle (98cc) in 
1952. All these models used proprietary engines supplied by 
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Smaller sized, slower motor cycles might have implied less 
problems in terms of accidents on British roads, yet instead the 
exact opposite occurred. During these years public opinion was 
increasingly inflamed over what was perceived as carnage on the 
highways as numbers of motor cycle accidents and deaths steadily 
mounted. 
45 Public concern about road safety focused mainly on 
riders, primarily young men and their mainly female pillion 
passengers, but also extended to the general behaviour of motor 
cyclists towards other road users. 
46 
As they had twenty years before, growing numbers of motor 
cycles equalled more accidents. Initially, in the years after 
the war, this had not been a pressing problem. Motor cycles were 
seen as just another form of transport at a time when there was 
only limited access to personal motorised transport. In fact, it 
was not until 1953 that there were more motor cycles on the road 
than there had been during the pre-war peak of 1929. The lesser 
number of motor cycles, compared to motor cars, resulted in a 
correspondingly lower accident rate. 
47 
[See Appendix 1, Table XIII]. 
Villiers. See 'Revolutionary Lightweights' Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Export Trader, November 1952, p. 175. 
45. Columnist Francis Jones had warned the industry of the 
dangers of mounting public hostility about motor cycle accidents 
soon after the war. See 'Red Light Showing for the Motor Cycle 
Trade', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 30 August 1946, pp. 667-668. 
46. In the 'Undergraduate Page' of a leading journal, motor 
cyclist John W. Crawford admitted that public opinion was 
mounting against higher levels of motor cycle accidents. Rider 
behavior was a problem, he agreed, and "who can resist the 
temptation to show that attractive girl on the pillion what the 
bike, and incidentally yourself, are capable of doing?. " See 'As 
to motor-Cycles' The Spectator, 6 June 1952, p. 741. 
47. For example, when the Times published a collection of 
letters to the editor in 1951 on the topic of road accidents, 
only two of the entries related to motor cycles. See Accidents 
the Road, London: The Times Publishing Company, 1951. 
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Public indifference began to erode as motor cycle registrations 
and accident levels gradually built up. While indications are 
that many of these motor cycles were probably used largely for 
commuting purposes, the sporting aspect remained as strong as it 
had been before 1939.48 During the summer of 1951, Francis 
Jones, the influential columnist with the industry's journal, The 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, warned that public opinion was 
beginning to shift against motor cycles and motor cyclists. 
Jones opined that the "gravest problem facing the industry at 
present" was the "continuing increase in motor cycle accidents., ' 
He also passed on information that he had picked up from a 
contact with the Metropolitan Police that, in the face of a 90 
per cent increase of motor cycle accidents, the manufacturers 
might be confronted with "repressive" legislation such as the 
compulsory use of helmets. 49 
Yet, in spite of the growing number of accidents and 
fatalities, many in the upper ranks of the industry along with 
workers on the factory shop floor, remained stubbornly loyal to 
48. As one popular motor cycle journalist put it: "For surely 
sport is very near the heart of most of us. Although tens of 
thousands use their motor cycles solely for pleasure and 
transport, there is scarcely a rider whose thoughts do not turn 
towards the Isle of Man TT when June comes round. " See Motor 
yQling Year Book 1951, compiled by Peter Chamberlain and the 
staff of Motor Cycling. London: Temple Press Ltd., 1953, p. vii. 
J. M. West noted that many motor cycles could be used for 
commuting purposes during the week and then easily modified for 
sports use on the weekends. See J. M. West interview, 23 November 
1994. 
49. See Francis Jones, 'Motor Cycle Matters', Motor Cycle and 
Qyp e Trader, 27 July 1951, pp. 273-274; the Manufacturers' Union 
was not blind to the threat either. During the summer of 1951, 
some of the leading executives discussed what improvements could 
be made on their machines to make them safer to use, although 
they were reluctant to adopt any which were too costly or might 
impair the speed or performance of their motor cycles. See memo 
prepared by Major Watling, dated 10 August 1951, entitled 297/51: 
Committee on Road Safety: Investigation of Motor Cycle 
Accidents, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/71. 
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the primacy of racing, with the emphasis on fast, powerful motor 
cycles of between 350cc and 500cc engine capacity, as the 
underlying criteria of success. Although criticism was building 
in the press about the high level of accidents that occurred 
during the Isle of Man TT races, others viewed the hazards of 
competitive sport as an unavoidable evil. 
50 In 1953 recently 
retired Union Director Major Watling, for one, took a decidedly 
philosophical approach to these deaths. They were regrettable, 
he agreed, but in the end were a "grievous burden that had to be 
shared by all as the price of progress. ""51 
The fact was that the sports ethos continued to permeate the 
industry at virtually every level. Each June, as they had for 
years before, senior management would make their regular 
pilgrimage to the Isle of Man to attend the TT races. It seemed 
to be almost an obligation for the managers to see and be seen at 
Britain's premier race track. 52 Nor was it only Board room 
members who cheered on the racers from the grandstands. Not only 
were racing results often broadcast over the Woolwich factory's 
public address system, but, on at least one occasion, AMC gave 
nearly 200 of its employees the day off to allow them to go up to 
'The Island' and attend the Senior TT race. By its own account, 
50. For critical press coverage, see the Manufacturers' Union 
Newspaper Clipping book, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3, particularly a story 
from The Sketch, (no date but almost certainly June 1954) 
entitled 'This TT is Madness. Death and Fear end Island Race' by 
Len Smith. 
51. Watling had retired as Director of the Manufacturers' Union 
in January 1953. His comments about racing fatalities were 
reported in the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 13 June 1953, 
p. 153. 
52. For details of Managing Directors and other senior 
executives who attended the Isle of Man races, see for example, 
'Norton's TT Double', 15 June 1951, p. 146, 'TT Coverage', 25 June 
1955, pp. 154-155, and 'Personalities seen on 'TT' Island', 23 
June 1956, p. 149, all from ibid. 
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the company even gave preference to enthusiasts in its shop floor 
hiring policies. Managing Director Donald Heather was once 
quoted as saying that he believed "firmly that as motor cycles 
are sold to enthusiasts they can only be built successfully by 
enthusiasts, so other things being equal motor cyclists get 
preference for jobs at Woolwich. ""53 
Nor was it unusual for company chairmen to explain the 
importance of racing to their shareholders. At the 1955 Annual 
General Meeting, for example, AMC chairman S. R. Hogg proudly 
announced further victories of the Group's motor cycles at the 
TT. He assured his audience that these successes "have 
undoubtedly helped greatly to maintain the prestige of our 
products, while the knowledge which we obtain of the performance 
of our machines under the strenuous conditions of open 
competitions, is of great benefit to our Technical Staff in their 
constant efforts to improve the quality of our products. ""54 
Other industry leaders made a point of regularly stressing the 
importance of motor cycle racing as a form of research and 
development. Gilbert Smith, then Managing Director of Norton 
Motors, speaking in 1951 at a luncheon sponsored by the 
Manchester Motor Trades, left no doubt about the central place of 
racing for his firm and, by implication, for much of the rest of 
the industry: 
53. See The Motor Cycle, 13 May 1948, untitled story on p. 384. 
The employees, however, had to pay their own expenses. Heather's 
quote on AMC hiring practices is from a biographical feature 
about him, contained in the Export Trader, June 1948, pp. 243-45. 
54. See AMC Chairman's speech of 4 February 1955, on deposit at 
the Guildhall Library. Racing successes were also mentioned by 
BSA Chairman Bernard Docker in his speeches to the shareholders 
in 1953. He also praised the Triumph subsidiary for winning the 
world speed record in 1955. See the Chairman's Speech delivered 
on 5 December 1955, contained in MS 321/A. 
194 
We do not race for fun, or merely for publicity. Our 
racing machines are travelling laboratories and our 
riders are, in fact, research workers. All these 
activities help to improve the standard machines. 55 
Others repeated this theme. For example, one article published 
in a journal circulated amongst overseas distributors of British 
motor cycles, put strong emphasis on the close correlation 
between success on the race track and continuing high sales 
levels. Moreover, it was maintained that British motor cycle 
design had been in essence created by racing and this in turn 
affected the way it was seen and appreciated by motor cycle 
buyers around the world: 
There is usually something distinctive in the feel and 
handling of a British machine, something that has 
resulted from the years of development and experience 
gained through a continuous series of sporting 
successes at home and aboard, as well as through 
factory testing and experiment. 56 
The manufacturers' orientation to motor cycling sports activity 
found other ways of expression. Not only did they produce movies 
highlighting this theme - BSA released two alone in 1955 ('Stars 
in Action' and 'Gold Star') - but petroleum and accessory 
companies also made their contributions. Castrol produced two 
colour movies in 1952 ('Motor Cycle World Championships' and 
'European Motor Racing') and another ('Round the TT Course with 
55. Smith went on to declare that the Norton racing team "really 
embraced everyone in the factory, for all the workers were 'back- 
room boys'. " His remarks were reported in 'Concern at low-priced 
exports from Europe', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 29 June 1951, 
p. 173. 
56. See 'Sport and Speed', British Cycles and Motor Cycles 
overseas, June/July 1950, pp. 234-247. See also ibid, 'Improving 
the Breed' June/July 1952, pp. 70-74. In an article published in 
BSA's house journal, Competitions Manager Dennis Hardwicke 
endorsed Norton Motors Managing Director Gilbert Smith's earlier 
remarks, declaring that the "competition machine has been proved 
invaluable as a mobile laboratory. " See 'Improving the Breed', 
RSA News, spring 1954-1955, pp. 8-il. 
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Geoff Duke') in 1953. Dunlop Tyre Co. released their own 
production ('Twistgrip') in 1952. 
As before the war, the pages of virtually every issue of the 
two main popular motor cycle journals, The Motor Cycle and 
Motorcycling, continued to be full of coverage of sporting 
events, everything from grass track, speedway and scrambling to 
road racing. There were also other forms of literature devoted 
to sports. BP, for example, produced an annual review of the 
Isle of Man TT races in a popular paperback book format, Shell 
produced a guide to European Motor Cycle Racing and BSA 
distributed a review of its own racing victories. 57 
Even the British government played its part in promoting motor 
cycle sports. In 1955, the Central Office of Information 
produced a fourteen minute feature about various forms of motor 
cycle sport entitled 'Tough on two wheels' which was released to 
cinemas throughout Britain in cooperation with MGM. There is no 
evidence that movies were ever released dealing with non-sports 
themes - stressing the advantages of commuting, for example. 58 
Nor did these films lack appreciative audiences. In one 
instance, a motor cycle dealer in Cambridge arranged a showing of 
several films on the Isle of Man TT races, which had been loaned 
57. The series on the TT races was produced annually by BP and 
contained biographical sketches of the racers along with a brief 
historical background and racing statistics dating from 1907. 
The Shell Guide and the BSA review are on deposit at the BP 
Archives at the University of Warwick. Other books published 
during this period catering to motor cycle sports enthusiasts 
included A. St. J. Masters, Motor Cycle Sport, London: C. Arthus 
Pearson Ltd., 1958, G. S. Davidson, Racing Through the Century, 
Coventry: W. W. Curtis, 1951, Ted Mellors, Continental Circus, 
Coventry: W. W. Curtis, 1949 and Phil Drackett, Speedway, London: 
W. & G. Foyle Ltd., 1951. 
58. News of the films was reported in the Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Trader, 2 April 1955, p. 5,11 January 1952, p. 258,30 May 1953, 
p. 135,21 September 1951, p. 344. The story about the COI film 
appeared in the 20 August 1955 issue at p. 276. 
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to him by Shell-Mex and BP. The hall where the movies played was 
packed for two days running with hundreds of attentive 
enthusiasts. 
59 
Such expressions of loyalty to sport were not shared by all 
within the industry. Francis Jones warned again of the possible 
repercussions from what he called "the high performance 
obsession" as well as "the belief that motor cycling is 
essentially a form of sport. " Success on the race track probably 
did have a positive impact on sales figures, at least among 
dedicated motor cyclists and enthusiasts generally. It is more 
debatable whether or not race track prowess directly assisted in 
the design of better commuter machines or attracted non- 
enthusiasts. There was, however, little doubt that this emphasis 
on sport exacted a high price in terms of public opinion. 
60 
Such was the case when a correspondent for an insurance 
industry trade journal visited the 1951 Motor Cycle Show. He was 
clearly impressed with quality of the machines on display, but 
was doubtful about how safely they would be operated. It was 
true, he noted, that they were well built and "are perfectly 
'safe' in themselves - just like razor blades, gun-powder, 
matches and atom bombs are 'safe'. " From the perspective of the 
insurance industry, he concluded there were "far too many 
youngish fellows who buy powerful solos and promptly set out to 
test, on public roads, whether their machines will really clock 
loo mph and more. t1 
61 
59. Ibjd, 'Cambridge Film Show', 6 April 1951, p. 8. 
60. Ibid, 'Motor Cycle Matters', 18 April 1952, p. 65. 
61. See 'The Motor Cycle Show' by 'Spero', Post Magazine and 
risurance Monitor, 1 December 1951, pp. 1279-1281, contained in 
PRO MT 108/8. Emphasis in the original. 
197 
Were the claims that British motor cyclists were as sports 
oriented and 'speed mad' as the industry leaders and their 
critics seemed to believe, or were they simply exaggerated? This 
is a difficult question to answer since the industry did not 
commission professional marketing surveys at this time. However, 
in early 1954, a Gallop Poll was conducted which provides an 
informative profile of British motor cyclists, even if it does 
not completely resolve the question of the primacy of sport 
during the 1950s. 
Among other things, the survey reported that there was close to 
a 50/50 split between those who claimed they used their motorised 
two wheelers (the survey included moped and scooter users as well 
as motor cyclists) for transport, as against those who used them 
for pleasure or as a hobby. In terms of sports orientation, 40 
per cent indicated that the Isle of Man TT was the main focus of, 
their interest, followed by scrambles (22 per cent), other road 
races (13 per cent), dirt track racing (11 per cent), reliability 
trials (7 per cent), grass track racing (6 per cent) and speed 
record attempts (1 per cent). 
62 
But the most revealing aspect of the poll was the answers to 
the questions put to the respondents about whether their next 
purchase would be either another motor cycle or a motor car. 
some 36 per cent of current motor cycle owners indicated they 
would buy a motor car, 48 per cent another motor cycle of 
indeterminate size and only 1 per cent a moped or scooter. The 
62. The results of the Gallop Poll were published in the Motor 
cycle and Cycle Trader, see 'Cycles and motor cycles for business 
and pleasure', 9 January 1954, pp. 276-278. No details of the 
methodology followed by the Poll takers, including the size of 
the sample or the geographic location of respondents, was 
provided. 
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poll clearly showed that a large proportion of Britain's motor 
cyclists saw themselves in a temporary 'half-way house' on the 
way to motor car ownership. 
63 
More reliable data about motor cycle owners appeared several 
years later in an academic study. This work, based on a recent 
social survey, reinforced what more impressionistic observers had 
discovered much earlier. According to the survey, owners tended 
to be male (95 per cent) and mostly under 35 years of age (very 
few motor cycles were owned by people over 55). These owners 
were mainly in skilled manual labour occupations, with total 
incomes between £200-£399. By contrast, motor car ownership 
tended to increase proportionate with income, rising steeply 
among those with total incomes over £600.64 
Whatever their income level or social class, it is likely that 
many, possibly a majority of motor cyclists, had some interest in 
motor cycle sports, and this in turn might have had some effect 
on riding behaviour. It 
is also likely that rising levels of 
aggravation and accidents with other road users resulted, at 
least to some extent. More significantly there had been a vast 
63. The low interest expressed by some of the respondents in 
buying another moped suggests that many current owners were first 
time buyers. This poll seems to have been unusual for its time, 
since shortly afterwards, columnist Francis Jones urged the 
Manufacturers' Union to commission market research on behalf of 
the entire industry. See 'Motor Cycle Matters', ibid, 23 January 
1956, pp. 320-21. 
64. See R. F. F. Dawson, 'Ownership of cars and certain durable 
household goods', Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of 
etatistics, May 1953, p. 181, pp. 185-187 and p. 191. According to 
figures published several years later, only 12 per cent of 
working class homes had a motor car, compared to 41 per cent of 
middle class homes. For motor cycles, 7 per cent of working 
class homes had one compared to 6 per cent of their middle class 
counterparts, leading one to suspect that many working class 
persons commuted either by foot, bicycle or public transport. 
See 'Service without a smile', The Economist, 14 December 1957, 
pp. 934-935. Thanks to Hideo Ichihashi for providing these two 
references. 
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increase of all road vehicles on a road system that was incapable 
of handling the volume of traffic. There were many in the 
industry who agreed that this was a problem which they would soon 
have to address. 
65 
As highly vulnerable road users, motor cyclists naturally 
suffered a correspondingly higher accident rate. In the words of 
one consulting surgeon, J. S. Horn, "how many motorists can drive 
for five years without having a slight bump hard enough to dent a 
mud wing? They get away without injury - but the same bump to 
the more vulnerable motor cyclist is enough to kill him and his 
passenger. X166 
The Government became so alarmed that details about the extent 
of these accidents were provided directly to Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden. In fact, as early as 1951 the accident rate had 
attracted sufficient attention that the Ministry of Transport had 
set up a special Sub-Committee of the Road Safety Committee to 
study the motor cycle accidents. 
67 At one of its meetings, Major 
Watling vigorously defended the industry's record in the area of 
safety and refused to concede that there was anything wrong with 
British built motor cycles. Although he insisted they were not 
inherently dangerous, the manufacturers had already taken 
65. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, 23 
November 1951, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/72. 
66. See document entitled 'Committee on Road Safety, meeting at 
BSH on 19 July 1951. Matters arising out of previous minutes. ' 
Contained in PRO MT 108/8. Presumably, although it was not 
explicitly stated, the same vulnerability would apply to 
bicyclists as well. 
67. Among other things, the Prime Minister was told: "The 
increase of accidents to motor cyclists is especially serious. 
If you ride a motor cycle, your chance of being killed is 40 
times, and your chance of being injured 20 times, higher than if 
you are in a car. " See document signed by the Minister of 
Transport and Civil Aviation', dated 6 March 1956 and entitled 
'Road Safety', p. 4., point 16, contained in PRO PREM 11/1047. 
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measures on their own initiative to improve them. He gave the 
example of further standardisation, such as handle bar control 
levers, as proof of their commitment to this goal. Motor cycles, 
Watling maintained, "were quite safe if properly handled. "68 
There was one aspect of motor cycle safety which was 
particularly sensitive. The manufacturers were highly defensive 
about the question of helmet use, which they perceived as an 
implicit admission that motor cycle accidents could result in 
serious head injury. In fact, they went so far as to ban a 
poster designed for the 1955 Show, which depicted a motor cyclist 
wearing a helmet, on the grounds that it was-"undesirable. " 
Ministry of Transport personnel discovered that many motor 
cyclists were very resistant to measures designed to protect 
their health. This was particularly true of helmet use. 
Ministry officials noted that, despite the fact that 50 per cent 
of all motor cycle accidents involved head injuries, there was "a 
psychological difficulty in that young men (who form a 
substantial part of the motor cycling public) tend to regard 
crash helmets as something effeminate. i69 
68. Watling's remarks are recorded in the Committee minutes of 
the meeting of 29 October 1951. During the meeting, Watling 
argued against a proposed requirement for manufacturers to 
provide instructions along with their motor cycles on the grounds 
that it was "unreasonable. " He also opposed the compulsory use 
of direction indicators on the grounds that while they might be 
helpful they were too unreliable for regular use. He went on to 
criticise the possible requirement of rear view mirrors as being 
"more of a danger than an aid to safety. " See 'Minutes of 
meeting of 29 October 1951', contained in MT 108/8. Watling's 
remarks were subsequently supported by Graham Walker, editor of 
Motor Cyclina, who was invited to appear at the Sub-Committee 
meeting of 20 November 1951. I bid. 
69. See Minutes of Council meeting of 4 October 1955, contained 
in Manufacturers' Union Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/81. The 
Ministry's opinion is found in document No. 23, entitled 'Crash 
Helmets', contained in PRO MT 108/11, "Committee on Road Safety. 
Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Accidents to Motor Cyclists, 
1951-1954. " 
201 
Nor did everyone share Major Watling's confidence in the safety 
of contemporary motor cycles, or more specifically the competence 
of the riders. For example, C. B. Hewitt, Deputy Secretary of the 
Institute of Automobile Assessors, wrote to the Sub-Committee and 
specifically criticised the riders as the root cause of the high 
accident rate. 
7° And some civil servants had become so 
exasperated by the safety problems surrounding motor cycle use 
that they actually contemplated distributing free of cost a 
number of side-cars as a way of slowing down solo motor 
cyclists. 71 
The government's concerns about levels of motor cycle accidents 
were set out in the Sub-Committee's Rebort to the Minister of 
Transport on Motor Cycle Accidents, published in 1952. The 
Report made a number of observations about the hazards of 
operating motor cycles on British roads. Because of the inherent 
lack of protection for either rider or pillion passenger, the 
70. Hewitt noted that the mechanical condition of the vehicles 
concerned would have some effect on accident rates. He added: 
"The Committee, however, takes the view that the real trouble is 
that machines capable of very high performance are, for the most 
part, placed in the hands of youths whose main idea is speed and 
who do not realise the dangers involved. Broadly speaking, it 
seems to them that it is not so much the machine but the 
circumstances surrounding its use at a particular moment which 
matter. In other words, the power to produce speed is there, but 
not always the ability to control it.,, See C. B. Hewitt to S. G. 
Griffin, Secretary of the Committee on Road Safety, 1 November 
1951, contained in ibid. 
71. W. H. Glanville, an official with the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research, called for all motor cycles 
to be fitted with compulsory side cars, supplied free of charge. 
He claimed that recent accident statistics demonstrated that 
motor cycle/sidecar combinations were one of the safest types of 
motor vehicles on the road. Glanville did, however, concede that 
as many motor cyclists considered top mechanical performance a 
major priority and they might not want the sidecars, free of not. 
See untitled clipping from the News Chronicle, 3 July 1953, 
contained in T228/42, entitled 'Motor cycle taxation'. 
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danger was termed "extremely serious. i72 As evidence, it was 
noted that during 1950 some 37,390 motor cyclists and their 
passengers had been either injured or killed, compared with 
32,771 in 1938. The Report did, however, note that at least a 
part of the rising toll of motor cyclists was a reflection of 
higher levels of motor vehicle traffic on congested roads. 73 It 
was also observed that close to 50 per cent of accident victims 
were young men between the ages of 19 and 27. The Report stated 
that many of these young male riders had female pillion 
passengers and may have yielded to the "temptation" to "show off 
by driving at excessive speed" and this was yet a further hazard 
contributing to these high accident rates. 
74 
The numbers of motor cycle accident fatalities, especially 
amongst young men, continued to mount throughout the following 
years. In 1951, the year petrol rationing ended, some 117 motor 
cyclists aged between 15 and 19 were killed in accidents 
(compared to a total of 887 killed by all causes in the same age 
group). According to a survey conducted in 1958, motor cycle 
accident fatalities had climbed to 298 (compared to 835 in the 
same age group killed of all causes). Even more significantly, 
another study commissioned in 1957 noted that motor cyclists 
riding machines of less than 250cc had a lower accident rate than 
72. See Report to the Minister of Transport on Motor Cycle 
Accidents, London: HMSO, 1952, p. 4. 
73. id, pp. 4-5. 
74, Ibid, P. 5. It was estimated that 50 per cent of the motor 
cyclists injured were under 27 years of age and that 75 per cent 
were under 35. See also 'A Review of Information on Motor Cycle 
Accidents', dated December 1951, prepared by H. J. H. Starks, 
contained in PRO MT 108/8. 
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those using larger sized models. Scooterists, it was noted, also 
had a lower accident rate. 75 
All this had a considerable impact on press coverage, now more 
negative and sensationalist than ever before, of the perils of 
motor cycle riding, especially with respect to the larger, more 
powerful models. As during the late 1920s, motor cyclists again 
believed themselves to have become a beleaguered species. One 
motor cycle dealer reported that he had been dismayed to hear an 
episode from the popular BBC radio programme 'The Archers' which 
contained critical comments about motor cycles. In Bournemouth 
the local police chief was reported as calling motor cyclists 
"perfect pests". In his mind, the problem seemed to be related 
to the age of the riders and the nature of their machines: "Many 
of the young riders are on high-powered machines which they 
cannot handle and don't understand and they will gad about the 
town on them instead of going off into the country. i76 
The effect of the bad publicity did more than simply give motor 
cyclists a bad name on radio serials or around sea-side resorts. 
The primary result of this negative press coverage was the 
75. See 'Motor cycle accidents to male teenagers: A 
conptemporary epidemic' by J. A. H. Lee, Proceedings of the Royal 
ociety of Medicine, May 1963, pp. 365-367. 
76. The dealer in question, John Hall, of Clarks (Oxford), wrote 
in to the industry's trade journal, declaring that for him "the 
last straw" in all the anti-motor cycling sentiment he had heard 
happened while listening to the 'Archers' when one of the 
principal characters, Phillip Archer, mentioned to his family 
that he was about to exchange his motor cycle for a car, "because 
his mother says 'she gets a funny feeling every time he puts his 
leg across the saddle ... they are pretty dangerous things aren't 
they? ... they are awful 
in bad weather, ' and several other 
remarks, all in the same strain. " See letter to the editor, 
'Unfavourable motor cycle propaganda', Motor Cycle and Cycle 
rader, 14 November 1952, pp. 133-134; see "Motor cycles becoming 
a 'perfect pest'', Bournemouth Daily Echo, 15 September 1955, 
contained 
in the Manufacturers' Union press clipping book, MRC 
MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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creation of ill-will among politicians and civil servants, the 
very people the industry would increasingly depend upon for 
cooperation in issues such as the export trade and the revision 
of legislation. Equally important, it also had the effect of 
once more antagonising parents of potential motor cyclists, which 
the industry itself had already identified as an important damper 
on sales in the home market. 
77 
The industry did not stand by passively amid this barrage of 
criticism. The Union hired a full time Public Relations Officer 
(PRO) in order to try and influence press coverage or at least 
refute the negative coverage, when possible. The Union worked 
together with the RAC and the ACU to set up motor cycle training 
programmes around the country to defuse some of the concern about 
young riders buying powerful motor cycles without adequate 
preparation. Moreover, as evidence of their commitment to safer 
motor cycling, the Manufacturers' Union decided to arrange for 
the publication of a booklet entitled Road Craft, which would 
accompany each new motor cycle sold. 
78 
The Union even sponsored the production of a feature movie, 
which was released throughout Britain and later Australia and 
North America. Made at the cost of £12,000 and entitled 
Black Rider, it attempted to depict motor cyclists in a positive 
light, to soften the image often highlighted in the press 
reports. 
79 The Manufacturers' Union also sponsored a pavilion at 
77. See Publicity Committee minutes, 31 August 1955, contained 
in the Manufacturers' Union Guardbooks, MRC MSS 204/3/1/81. 
78. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 12 March 1953, contained in Manufacturers' Union 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/75. The Union provided, free of 
charge, a number of motor cycles for the use of the RAC/ACU 
Training Scheme. 
79. Heavily influenced by Cold War politics, the movie depicted 
a group of motor cyclists who foil the plans of foreign agents to 
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a number of events designed to attract large numbers of young 
people. For example, it displayed a wide range of models, from 
mopeds to large displacement sports machines, at both the Hulton 
Exhibition (a show organised for British youth) and at the Boy 
Scouts Jubilee Jamboree. 80 
The safety issue created severe problems for the manufacturers, 
but far more ominous was a longer term trend only just becoming 
discernible in the early 1950s. This was a far-reaching shift in 
consumer tastes, which began several years before, away from the 
traditional medium and heavyweight machines to lighter weight 
models. The significance of this development, amounting to a 
fundamental re-alignment of buying habits, was one that most of 
the major manufacturers failed to grasp until it was too late. 
One factor in particular underlay this shift in public tastes. 
Although living standards had improved since 1945, there was 
still a shortage of personal motorised transport aggravated by 
the motor car industry's inability to fully satisfy home market 
demand because of its high export quotas. There were also those 
consumers who wanted more than a bicycle, may not have wanted a 
full-sized motor cycle but could not afford a motor car. The 
steal Britain's atomic secrets. According to the Manufacturers' 
Union Publicity Committee, the object of the Black Rider was to 
show motor cyclists "in the most favourable light, providing 
entertainment and, at the same time, valuable propaganda for the 
motor cycling movement. " See minutes of the Publicity Committee, 
26 June 1957, contained in the Industry Association Guardbooks, 
MSS 204/3/1/86. The film enjoyed modest financial success as 
well, and by 1955 had already recovered £5,000 of 
its costs. See 
Industry Association Council meeting of 24 May 1955, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/80. Two years later, the Association 
was informed that "millions of people had now seen 
it. " See 
Minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, meeting of 9 
May 1957, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. 
80. See Minutes of the Publicity Committee, 14 May 1956, and 
memo entitled '342/57 Boy Scouts' Jubilee Jamboree', dated 23 
July 1957, contained in Guardbooks MRC MSS 204/3/1/83 and MSS 
204/3/1/86 respectively. 
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trend was reflected in changes in the type of motor cycles being 
registered for road use. In 1948, for example, there had been 
210,688 machines with engine displacements up to 250cc and 
another 245,121 machines in the larger capacity classes. By 
1952, however, the machines under 250cc had grown to 465,151, 
compared to 314,871 of the larger models. By 1956 there were 
778,659 of the smaller machines and only 352,788 machines over 
250cc registered. The growth in machines of the lightest weight 
category, those with engines of less than 60cc displacement 
(mopeds and cyclemotors) was particularly marked. In 1950, there 
were 29,297 of this type on the road. Two years later the 
numbers had swollen to 120,472 and in 1956 they reached 246,443. 
[See Appendix 1, Table XIV]. 
This growing demand created an opening for the motor cycle 
industry. During the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, some 
of the smaller, more dedicated producers, made many, albeit 
clumsy and tardy, efforts to respond to changing public tastes in 
motorised two wheelers. 
81 As described earlier, at the end of 
the 1930s, a number of smaller British firms from outside the 
established industry had tried to develop what was then known as 
the 'ultra-lightweight' market. The pre-war 'autocycles' (an 
early form of moped) were replaced after 1945 with the so-called 
, clip-ons', small engine units which could be attached to 
81. Unlike motor cars, motor cycles were not covered by the so- 
called 'Covenant Scheme' which in the interests of holding down 
the price of used cars in a sellers' market, prevented motor car 
owners from re-selling their machines for a stated period of 
time. The subject came up for discussion during the course of a 
meeting of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, in the general 
context of black market selling of motor cycles. The Section 
opposed the extension of the Covenant Scheme to their trade. See 
Section Minutes for 23 November 1951, contained in the Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/72. 
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bicycles. This was a shift in production that one trade journal 
called the "most interesting development" in the motorised two- 
wheeled industry that had been seen for years. 82 
EMI, for example, had purchased Rudge-Whitworth just before the 
war and built a new factory in Hayes, Middlesex. Although it 
never resumed production of the traditional, large capacity 
Rudges, it did enjoy considerable success with the 'Cyclemaster' 
-a clip-on variant, well known by its motto, 'The magic wheel 
that wings your heel'. 83 By 1950 there were ten firms building 
these units, many of them small scale producers, some all-British 
in construction, others using foreign components. Still, it was 
remarked that the British were still far behind Continental 
manufacturers in the lightweight field. 
84 
The basic 'cyclemotor' and 'clip-on' were familiar concepts to 
the British industry. However, the more sophisticated imports 
which began to flow in from the Continent after 1950 were a 
82. For an overview of these 'ultra-lightweight' machines, see 
Peter Watson, 'Permanent Attachment', Classic Bike, August 1984, 
pp. 22-26. The trade journal was British Cycles and Motor Cycles 
overseas, which also noted that these attachments were distinct 
from the old autocycles and that they had been available on the 
continent much earlier than in Britain. See the December 1951 
issue, feature entitled 'Auxiliary Power Units', pp. 190-191. For 
a contemporaneous article, see 'Why not a cyclemotor? ' by 
'Nitor', The Motor Cycle, 16 April 1953, pp. 460-461. 
83. At first the 'Cyclemaster' was sold not through cycle or 
motor cycle retailers but through the motor car trade. See 
untitled news item contained in British Cycles and Motor Cycles 
Ove_ rseas, August/September 1950, p. 357. A Cyclemaster company 
brochure outlining the various features of the unit is contained 
in FBI archives, MRC MSS 200/DEC/3/3/C149. 
84. The Motor Cycle and Cycle-Trader ran a series of articles on 
these 'clip ons', such as 'The Cyclemaster is here' 16 June 1950, 
p. 418 and 'Auxiliary motor units' 15 December 1950, p. 290. These 
units ranged in price from £18 to £40. Most of the companies 
were small, such as Bantomoto, Cyclaid, Montgomite, Mosquito and 
power Pak. However, Tube Investments subsequently joined EMI 
with its 4occ rotary engine unit called the 'Power Wheel'. 
British bicycle companies were also slow to enter the moped 
trade. 
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different matter altogether. These were purpose built motorised 
(50cc or less engine) bicycles, which became known as 'mopeds'. 
By 1955 one trade journal noted that British manufacturers had 
fallen behind their Continental rivals, having failed to react 
quickly enough and come out with their own domestically produced 
mopeds. As early as 1953 there were already 500,000 of these 
units in use in Italy while only an estimated 175,000 were found 
on British roads-85 
Nor, in the immediate post-war years, had British bicycle firms 
entered the moped market. Initially, they believed that 
increased moped sales would not necessarily shrink the bicycle 
market. Instead, the dominant opinion among bicycle industry 
managers was that mopeds "seem to have appealed to an entirely 
new public who have not hitherto been attracted to two wheeled 
transport. " Like their motor cycle counterparts, within a few 
years the bicycle industry would also come to revise this 
judgement on the moped. 86 
The real threat, however, arose from the growing levels of 
imported scooters. This machine, which differed in several 
significant ways from the orthodox motor cycle, was created 
amongst the economic shambles of post-1945 Italy, where much 
manufacturing industry had been destroyed during the war. 
85. The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader remarked: "Two or three 
years ago, it was perhaps permissible to regard the growing 
popularity of the cyclemotor as being possibly no more than a 
flash in the pan. We had seen these things come before - and go. 
History might repeat, or so it was argued. " See 'The Cyclemotor 
Situation', 30 May 1953, pp. 134-35. See also, for example, the 
leading article 'Is British Cyclemotor design now lagging? ', 
Via, 16 April 1955, p. 43. Information of British production and 
Italian usage contained in 17 October 1952 and 2 May 1953 issues 
of jhja 
86. See 'Bicycles face the future', Financial Times, 28 January 
1956, contained in newspaper clipping volume MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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Ironically, the scooter which had been invented and then 
abandoned by the British during the 1920s, had been vastly 
refined by Italian engineers and subsequently by their German 
counterparts-87 It had been designed and manufactured by non- 
traditional firms, particularly those emerging from the Italian 
aeronautics industry. These firms had been forced to find new 
uses for their factories, and cheap personal transport held 
particular potential-88 
Scooter use in Italy grew rapidly after its introduction in 
1946. It became a social phenomenon, virtually unprecedented in 
motorised transportation. Production increased dramatically and 
scooters were soon seen on streets and roads all over Europe. 
89. 
To many, it may have seemed to be the realisation of what critics 
in Britain during the inter-war period had been urging for so 
long and unsuccessfully, a true 'Everyman's' motorised two- 
wheeler. 
90 
87. The scooter is particularly distinguished from the orthodox 
motor cycle by, among other things, the rearward siting of 
its 
engine, its small wheels, seating arrangement and extensive 
bodywork. See C. F. Caunter, Motor Cycles, A Technical History. 
London: HMSO, 1982, pp. 81-82. For a brief, general history, see 
Michael Webster, Motor Scooters, Aylesbury, Bucks: Shire 
Publications Ltd., 1986. Significantly, many British scooter 
manufacturers during the 1920s, such as ABC and Sopwith, had 
built aircraft during World War One. After 1945, the first 
attempts by British firms to again 
build scooter-like machines 
originated from aeronautics firms such as Bond Aircraft and 
Engineering (which made the 'Minibyke') and Swallow (producer of 
the "Gadabout'). 
88. Vespa's chief designer, Corradino d'Ascanio, was a man who 
had little previous contact with motor cycles and had worked in 
the aeronautics industry during the war. See 'Italy - Where the 
Scooters come from', Scooter and Three Wheeler Yearbook, 1957, 
pp. 14-18. 
89. Vespa scooter production was only 2,484 in 1946 but had 
grown to 10,000 units during 1948. By 1955 this total had shot 
to 250,000 units (including machines built outside of Italy under 
licence). Figures are from ibid. 
90. See 'Italy being changed by scooters', Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Tom, 19 September 1952, p. 361 and also 'Object as Image: the 
Italian Scooter Cycle' contained in Dick Hebdige, Op cit, pp. 77- 
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Much of the popularisation of the scooter was helped by 
imaginative promotion by continental manufacturers such as the 
German NSU company (who built Italian machines under licence for 
several years), which, among other things, organised special 
summer camps for scooterists. 
91 Perhaps the strongest point 
about the scooter was precisely that it was not a motor cycle, 
making it especially popular with women and the middle classes. 92 
In other words its appearance created an entirely new stratum of 
consumers, a point certainly well recognised in the beginning by 
the British producer of the Vespa if not by the rest of the 
industry. 93 
Although they had been long aware of developments in Italy, the 
initial response of British motor cycle manufacturers to the 
115 and Gary Johnson, op cit. For a more contemporaneous 
analysis, see 'Scooters for the Millions', Financial Times, (no 
date, but probably late 1954) contained in the Manufacturers 
Union's newspaper clipping book, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
91. According to a report commissioned by the Manufacturers 
Union, the NSU company maintained an Adriatic camping site, which 
was open to all riders using their scooters at either minimal or 
no charge at all. The report termed this a "publicity coup" 
which had been widely covered by the European press. See 
Confidential Bulletin No. 22, dated May 1955 and entitled 
'Developments in the German Cycle, Motor Cycle and Accessories 
Industry', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/80. One 
British newspaper, The Daily Sketch, carried a story dated 2 July 
1955 about an unnamed (but almost certainly NSU) scooter 
company's holiday camp, entitled 'They camp for 14 pence a day - 
if they arrive on a scooter. ' The clipping is contained in the 
newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
92. Several years later, Hugh Palin, Director of the Industries 
Association, noted that there was "no doubt that there is a great 
future in this market [scooters]. But most people feel that it 
has introduced an entirely new class of rider to motor cycling 
and has not in fact taken away from the motor cycle industry. " 
See memo dated 7 August 1958, entitled '300/58. Director's 
personal Report, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/88. 
93. See Hebdige, on cit. See also 'Scooters in Britain', 
Financial Times, 2 July 1955 and 'The Motor Cycle Export Battle', 
published on 28 May 1956. The latter noted that "the scooter, 
with its enclosed motor and quite high degree of weather 
protection, 
is both replacing the motor cycle and attracting a 
new class of motoring public. " Both articles are contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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growing popularity of these unorthodox, lightweight machines, 
which began to appear in the Home market around 1950, was amused 
interest quickly followed by frustration and anger. 94 In 1956, 
for example, Claud McCormack, Managing Director of Douglas, 
recalled the reaction of the industry several years before to the 
announcement that his firm would be manufacturing Vespa scooter 
under licence. They had, he said, laughed at his prediction of 
the coming popularity of the scooter amongst British consumers. 
Instead, he claimed, the "the motor scooter proved to have a 
remarkable 'boy meets girl' appeal. It created an entirely new 
market - safety and economy on two wheels. i95 
This attitude was mirrored elsewhere in the industry. Many 
established motor cycle dealers displayed overt hostility to 
scooters and refused to service them. Indeed, the market began 
to split into two discrete parts, one made up of 'conventional' 
motor cyclists, both enthusiasts and commuters, many of whom were 
prepared to put up with comparatively poor quality control and 
perform their own mechanical work and the other consisting of the 
new 'scooterists' who were less likely to be mechanically 
inclined and willing to perform their own servicing. 
96 
94. One popular motor journal had actually reviewed a Vespa 
scooter years before it appeared on the British market. The 
article applauded its "many novel and interesting features" with 
an overall design that made it "especially attractive for town 
and short distance work. " See 'The Italian Vespa', The Motor 
cycle, 31 October 1946, p. 343. Ironically, BSA had a scooter 
design prepared as early as 1944 but never acted upon it. There 
is a copy of this scooter patent in the BSA Collection at 
Solihull Public Library, item 245. 
95. See '6/- shock swells the scooter boom', Daily Mail, 6 
December 1956, contained in newspaper clipping volume MRC MSS 
204/10/1/3. 
96. For example, Peter Agg, British Lambretta concessionaire, 
criticised the "poor standard of service generally obtaining in 
the motor cycle industry" during a Manufacturers and 
Concessionaires conference on 25 February 1959. At the same 
meeting Vespa maker Claude McCormack observed that as a rule most 
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For several vital years, the majority of the industry's top 
managers simply did not appreciate the implications arising from 
the growing popularity of scooters and other lightweight models. 
To men like Donald Heather, Gilbert Smith and Jack Sangster, who 
had moved into executive positions in the industry during the 
inter-war period, the scooter must have brought back memories of 
the sales fiasco during the early 1920s. Now, once again, their 
inclination was to write it off as another passing fashion. As 
before, there would be a short period of experimentation followed 
by inevitable disillusionment, and consumers would go back to the 
traditional larger displacement, orthodox motor cycles. There 
was no pressing need to change manufacturing programmes. 97 
There were those at the time who did realise what was happening 
and'who tried to draw it to the attention of the manufacturers. 
In 1953 Francis Jones, the industry's long time gadfly, wrote 
that they had not been "quick off the mark with cyclemotors" and 
was "still more dilatory about motor scooters. " Jones was not 
alone in his assessment. Several months later, in a well- 
publicised paper he read before a meeting of the South Birmingham 
Motor Cycle Club, George Beresford, a commercial artist, 
criticised the industry for design conservativism. Had the 
scooter buyers are "largely newcomers with no mechanical 
knowledge. " Minutes of this conference are contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/90. 
97. Criticism on the tardiness of British motor cycle 
manufacturers to enter the scooter market were evidently wide- 
spread enough for Edward Turner, by then Managing Director of 
BSA's Automotive Division, to reply via an article published in 
the Financial Times. Turner implicitly criticised the past 
complacency of the industry's leadership (presumably including 
himself) when he wrote, "we must disabuse ouselves from the 
thought that the scooter has only a limited period of 
marketability. It is here to stay and I cannot conceive of it 
ever dying out. " See 'Scooters: A British Challenge to the 
Continentals', Financial Times, 20 October 1958, contained in the 
newspaper clippings book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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manufacturers, he claimed, been more receptive to developments on 
the Continent, "there would now be at least twice as many motor 
cycles registered in this country as at present. "198 Similar 
judgements, moreover, were also being made in the broadsheets and 
the business press. 99 
While there were those who criticised the industry for its 
inaction, there were others in the technical and popular motor 
cycle press who supported the position of industry leaders. Bob 
Holliday, an editor of the popular journal Motor Cycling, made it 
clear he was not impressed with the "tissue-paper-wrapped brick- 
bats thrown at our manufacturers for their alleged conservative 
nature. " He believed that, far from being detrimental, the fact 
that British motor cycle makers had failed to copy some of the 
features of these best selling Continental imports or to alter 
their production programmes was a sound decision under the 
circumstances. 
100 
Holliday went on to describe what he thought was the overall 
strategy of the British industry: 
There are features on foreign machines which are good, 
and which we could very well copy, but in the main I 
would say that the British methods of making haste 
98. See Francis Jones, 'Room for new ideas', 13 June 1953, for 
rycie and Cycle Trader, pp. 162-163 and 'Is design in the 
doldrums?, The Motor Cycle, 25 February 1954, pp. 242-243. See 
also, 'Are our designs too conservative? ' by 'Dominator', ibid, 
11 December 1952, p-738- 
99. For critical commentary in the business press, see 
'Expansion in UK cycle exports' Financial Times, 28 August 1954, 
'UK Scooters enter fight for markets' Observer, 13 November, 
1955 and 'Now Cycle firms are Worried', Manchester Guardian, 7 
March 1956 all contained in the Trade Union Congress news 
clipping collection, file 12913. See also 'Scooters in Britain' 
Ei ancial Times, 2 July 1955, contained in the Manufacturers' 
Union newspaper clipping volume, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
100. See 'Motorcycle Trends and Tendencies' by R. B. Holliday. 
Contained in The Motor Cycling Year Book 1953, compiled by Peter 
Chamberlain and the Staff of Motor Cycling. London: Temple 
press Ltd., 1953. pp. 3-4. 
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slowly is to our advantage in the long run. In this 
country we make motor cycles to sell, and if possible, 
to sell for hard currency. We are well aware that we 
have growing competition abroad, but our factory 
directors must know what they are doing for their own 
sales' returns tell them what is wanted throughout the 
world and, judging by the general reception given to 
their machines at Earls Court, they cannot be so far 
off the beam. 101 
In the event, as during the late 1930s, it was the smaller 
firms, such as Excelsior, Mercury and Norman, which first tried 
to respond to changing consumer tastes. However, their small 
production runs must have hampered their ability to compete on 
the basis of price. There were also problems with design, and 
the British-made products were manifestly not as attractive as 
the foreign machines. In contrast, Douglas, which built the 
Vespa under licence, and the Lambretta Concessionaires thrived. 
Indeed, by 1957 it was estimated that most of the estimated 
115,000 scooters in use were foreign made and Britain had become 
one of Lambretta's best export markets. 
102 
Higher levels of imports were not the only problem facing 
British motor cycle manufacturers. In the early 1950s, a new 
threat re-emerged, one which was to destroy the industry's 
carefully constructed home market trading scheme. The 
Government's Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance, 
released in 1951, did not recommend substantive changes to the 
Manufacturers Union's trading agreements, nor were they ever 
101. Ibid. 
102. An editorial in the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, written 
in the context of the introduction of the British built DKR 
'Dove' scooter noted defensively that "[t]oo often - and 
sometimes quite unfairly - the makers of conventional British 
motor cycles have been challenged for their alleged backwardnesss 
in not acquiring quickly the Continental tastes that have 
developed since the end of the war, and have been exemplified in 
the scooter. " Editorial entitled 'Eggs in several baskets', 
p. 227. The estimate of foreign scooters comes from 'Burdens on 
an industry', mod, 31 August 1957, p. 277. 
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investigated by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission. Nonetheless, the industry remained apprehensive of 
any move to change its well-entrenched trading system, which they 
doggedly maintained was best for everyone, manufacturers, 
retailers and consumers alike. The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
for example, claimed that if the then Labour government 
implemented its plans to abolish price maintenance, it would 
result in a reversion "to the law of the jungle. ""103 
The subsequent publication of a White Paper on Retail Price 
Maintenance, which suggested that the Government might challenge 
their trading agreements, caused great consternation amongst 
industry leaders. Major Watling had warned Union members that 
the Government "proposes to abolish both individual and 
collective minimum Price maintenance, giving the Manufacturer 
only the sole right to state his maximum retail price and leaving 
Dealers free, if they so wish, to sell the product at a lower 
price. ""104 That, Watling continued, was not all. He understood 
that the Government also wanted to "control other types of 
trading arrangement which now discipline the Retail Trader and 
which might result in a restriction of competition. " Watling 
suggested that the Union follow the lead of the motor industry 
and ask for a special exclusion from the proposed legislation on 
103. For an overview of the Commission's activities, see Helen 
Mercer, 'The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, 
1949-56: a study in regulatory failure', contained in G. Jones 
and M. Kirby (eds), Competitiveness and the State, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991; see leading article, '" Free- 
for-all' Price scramble", Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 29 June 
1951, p. 169. 
104. See letter, A. C. Hill to Watling dated 25 July 1951, 
contained in PRO SUPP 14/351, emphasis in the original. See also 
memo dated 12 July 1951, entitled '258/51 - Retail Price 
Maintenance', contained in Guardbook MRC. MSS 204/3/1/71. 
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the basis of a promise of better after sales service to 
consumers. 
105 
The Union took the position that its trading rules benefited 
the community at large. In a brief to the Board of Trade, 
Watling claimed that should the Bill currently before Parliament 
become law, the real victims would not be the manufacturers but 
rather British consumers. Watling maintained that one of the 
keystones of the Union's campaign to make motor cycles safer was 
its free after sales service, which was an obligation agreed to 
by all retailers party to the Resale Price Maintenance scheme. 
Abolishing resale price maintenance would endanger this campaign 
and make for more dangerous traffic conditions. 
106 Moreover, if 
enacted, the legislation "would inevitably lead to price 
competition amongst dealers which could only be at the expense of 
the standard of service laid down by the Manufacturer, and 
expected by the public. " This would also result "in the entry 
into the Trade of what are often described as 'kerb-side dealers' 
who offer no service to the public, who frequently deal in notes, 
and who have been a major factor in seeking to undermine the 
Covenant Scheme in the Motor Car Industry. ""107 
A year and a half later, the Union replied to an official query 
from the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission (MRPC) 
about its price maintenance scheme. Although the Union tried to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the Commission and stall for time, by 
July 1955, following a report by the MRPC the month before, Union 
Director Hugh Palin realised that their trading agreements would 
105. Ibid. 
106. See memo dated 10 August 1951, '299/51: Retail Price 
Maintenance', contained in ibid. 
107. ibid: Watling's draft letter was subsequently approved by 
the Council during its meeting of 2 October 1951. 
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have to be changed. Palin was especially concerned about 
critical press reports that had recently appeared on what was 
termed the "Star Chamber" proceedings of the CTU, the Union's 
enforcement body. In early 1956, the Union was faced with the 
likely passage in Parliament of the Restrictive Trade Practices 
Bill and reluctantly proceeded to wind up the CTU, which was 
certain to be made illegal, and to modify the existing agreements 
to avoid any inconsistency with the legislation. Thereafter, 
manufacturers would find it more difficult than before to control 
retail prices, discounts and other trade terms. 108 
Whatever its troubles in the Home market, the industry could 
always congratulate itself on mounting export earnings. 
109 For 
many years after 1945, these had been a consistent success story. 
From only 4,000 units in 1945, the industry sent abroad 74,000 
machines in 1950. The following year a peak of 91,700 units 
motor cycles left Britain, an all-time record never again 
exceeded [see Appendix 1, Table XV]. Thereafter, exports 
progressively declined until the 1960s. There were several 
reasons why British motor cycles had become more difficult to 
sell overseas. 
108. See memo to the Union Council, dated 27 May 1953, entitled 
'195/53: The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices commission', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/75; memo dated 15 July 
1955, entitled '317/55: Monopolies and Retail Price Commission', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/81; memo dated 23 March 
1956 to the Proprietary Articles Manufacturers Committee, 
entitled '128/56. Restrictive Trade Practices Bill', contained 
in Union Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/82; memo dated 22 October 
1956, entitled 'Restrictive Trade Practices Act - Proposed Line 
of Action to be Followed by the Association and (where 
appropriate Individual Members)', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/84. 
109. See, for example, 'Advance of the British Motor Cycle 
Industry', 12 August 1952, Financial Times. Written by BSA's 
Export Manager, S. F. Digby, who claimed the "phenomenal growth" 
of the industry "could well be maintained steadily for many 
years, given free markets and a steady flow of raw materials. " 
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It was true that the rearmament programme that accompanied the 
Korean War created scarcities of certain critical materials, 
especially steel, which hampered production albeit only for two 
to three years. 110 There were also problems increasingly 
encountered with protectionism in hitherto favourable markets. 
For example, Argentina had been targeted in 1948 as a prime motor 
cycle export market. 
lll At first these hopes seemed to be 
realised and motor cycle shipments rose sharply during this 
period. Only 271 machines had been sent in 1938, a total which 
jumped to 1,956 in 1947 and then reached a staggering 9,410 (or 
close to 20 per cent of total motor cycle exports) the following 
year. In 1949 Argentina had agreed to issue least 10,000 import 
licences and the future looked secure. 112 
Then this highly promising market abruptly crashed shortly 
afterwards when the Argentine government abruptly withdrew most 
of the licences. According to the Argentines, the cancellation 
of agreed-to quotas was caused by internal financial 
difficulties, especially their fast sinking sterling balances. 
However, as Major Watling sourly noted to manufacturers 
110. The Manufacturers' Union Annual Report for 1952 noted 
"severe cuts" in their steel allocations along with those for 
nickel and other non-ferrous materials. See p. 4. of the Report, 
contained in MRC MSS 204/4/3/2. 
ill. A lengthy report, based on information forwarded from the 
British Commercial Secretariat in both countries, was circulated 
by the Manufacturers' Union to a number of members. See memo 
dated 8 June 1948, entitled '172/48. USA and Argentina: Motor 
Cycle Exports', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/63. As 
far as significance of British motor vehicle exports were 
concerned, it was noted that the Argentines still drove on the 
left side of the road until 1945. See news item in The Motor 
Cce, 12 April 1945, p. 261. 
112. See 'Brief No. 3. Bicycles and motor cycles' contained in 
PRO SUPP 14/393. The British government negotiated import 
licences for 10,000 motor cycles worth £800,000 along with 
£50,000 worth of spare parts. 
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afterwards, there did not seem to be shortage of either French or 
Italian currency. 113 
In the years to follow, Argentine imports never reached 
anything like the 1947-1948 levels; in 1956 they had dropped to a 
miserly 5 machines. 114 Subsequently, other nations began to 
accept fewer motor cycles than they had before. Once again, 
sterling shortages were blamed. Egypt, Denmark, Brazil and 
Finland - previously good markets - all clamped down on imports 
during the early 1950s. 
115 
The most dramatic example of the problems facing the industry 
in world markets was the Australian market, which had 
consistently been the single most important destination for 
British motor cycles since long before the war. On average it 
had absorbed up to a quarter of the industry's exports on a 
113. According to Ministry of Supply officials, the problem was 
that the Argentines had "spent wildly, over a billion dollars 
having been expended in the United States and apart from a few 
cars, they had little to show for it. " Moreover, the Argentines 
were "desperately short of sterling and so it was more than 
likely that we would commence to purchase from them first, thus 
putting them in possession of sterling with which they could 
begin to trade. " See 'Notes on informal meeting held at the 
Ministry of Supply, Room 736, Shell-Mex House, Strand, London, 
WC2 on Tuesday, 26th July, 1948, at 3 PM' contained in ibid. For 
the Union's reaction to the situation, see memo dated 13 December 
1949, entitled '442/49: Argentina: Bicycle and Motor Cycle 
Exports' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/67. 
114. See memo dated 13 December 1949, entitled 442/49. 
Argentina: Bicycle and Motor Cycle Exports, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/67 and draft memo dated 25 November 
1957, entitled 'Bicycle and Motor Cycle Export Trade', contained 
in Guardbook MSS 204/3/1/87. The memo also resentfully noted 
that in 1956 Germany had sent 1,000 motor cycles to Argentina. 
115. See memo dated 26 September 1952 entitled '285/52. Egypt - 
Exports' contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/74, memo dated 13 
October 1955 entitled '426/55. Finland - Exports' contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/81, memo dated 5 October 1950 entitled 
'339/50: Brazil: Export of Cycles and Motor Cycle Goods', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/69 and memo dated 28 
December 1955, entitled '507/55. Denmark - Exports', contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/82. 
220 
regular basis. 
116 Then in 1951 this lucrative market suddenly 
closed down. Shocked British motor cycle manufacturers were 
informed that Australia had its own sterling crisis and would be 
severely limiting imports. After July, the flow of British motor 
cycles to Australia, which had until then averaged 1,000 per 
month, had sunk to a mere 100. The following year the 
Manufacturers' Union estimated that the closure of the Australian 
market had cost them 18,000 machines, all of which had to be 
absorbed, with great difficulty, elsewhere [see Appendix 1, Table 
XVI]. These restrictions were later eased off but Australia 
never again would be as significant an export market as it had 
been previously. 
117 
Some senior members of the industry now realised that the easy 
selling of the post-war era had now ended. During 1952, Gilbert 
Smith, Managing Director of Norton, claimed in an article 
entitled "The Honeymoon's Over", that export sales would be much 
more difficult to sustain. 
118 His views were followed by an 
116. Between 1945 and 1950 Britain exported a total of 105,000 
machines worth £9,500,000 to Australia, making it the best single 
overseas market for British motor cycles. See 'Australia Reduces 
Exports', British Cycles and Motor Cycles Overseas, April/May 
1952, p. 41. 
117. During a meeting of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 21 March 1952, the Australian restrictions were called 
a "very serious blow" to the British motor cycle 
industry. The 
minutes are contained in the Manufacturers' Union Guardbook MSS 
204/3/1/73. In his speech to AMC shareholders on 25 February 
1953, Chairman Hogg noted that the closing of the Australian 
market, which had been the company's largest single export 
outlet, had "seriously embarrassed the industry. " See AMC Annual 
Report for 1952. See also memo dated 13 March 1952, entitled 
'88/52: Australia - Import Restrictions', contained in 
Manufacturers' Union Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/72 and the 
Manufacturers' Union 1952 and 1953 Annual Reports, page 4 and 3 
respectively, contained in MRC MSS 204/4/3/2. 
118. Smith was quoted in a story entitled 'Greater attendance, 
more publicity, and improved display standards' contained in the 
Mýtnr Cycle and Cycle Trader, 28 November 1952, pp. 176-179. AMC 
Chairman Hogg noted that "our industry swung with great rapidity 
from a sellers' market to a buyers' market. " See Chairman's 
221 
editorial in The Motor Cycle and Cycle Export Trader entitled 
'Return to normal'. The journal warned manufacturers that the 
"postwar wave of unrestricted buying is over. " Consumer spending 
would now be less plentiful and value for money was essential. 
Henceforth, they would have to work harder for their sales. 119 
Nonetheless, many industry leaders believed that the shrinking 
export markets were actually a reflection of poor representation 
on the part of the British government. The manufacturers were 
convinced that the industry was losing out in the series of 
bilateral negotiations that been concluded for a number of key 
markets since 1945.120 What particularly incensed them was their 
conviction that Board of Trade negotiators were agreeing far too 
easily to restrictive quotas and tariffs. A tougher set of 
negotiators, they insisted, might have saved them valuable 
sales. 
121 
speech to the shareholders, contained in the 1953 AMC Annual 
Report. Hogg's remarks were echoed by those of Enfield Cycle 
(Royal Enfield) Chairman Frank W. Smith in his speech to 
shareholders on 30 January 1953, contained in the company's 1953 
Annual Report. Smith reported that motor cycle sales had become 
seasonal as they had been before 1939 and that the closing of 
export markets meant having to sell more machines on the Home 
market. 
119. The editorial in The Motor Cycle and Cycle Export Trader, 
appeared in the March 1953 issue, pp. 35-36. See also BSA 
Managing Director James Leek's remarks about export problems, 
noted in the BSA Management Minutes, meeting of 20 June 1952, 
agenda item 9305 and 'Maintaining the lead', BSA News, Spring 
1952, pp. 6-7. 
120. In his speech to the shareholders made on 24 February 1949, 
Chairman Frank W. Smith of Enfield Cycles criticised the British 
government's handling of these bilateral trade negotiations, 
which he thought had resulted in higher tariffs and low quotas. 
His speech is contained in the Enfield Cycle Annual Report for 
1948. During the meeting of the Manufacturers' Union Council 
held on 3 July 1951, mention was made of the "deplorable results 
of recent trade negotiations, particularly in the case of 
Holland. " Other markets noted were Denmark and Belgium. See 
minutes of meeting contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/71. 
121. During a meeting with the Minister of Overseas Trade at the 
1951 Motor Cycle Show Manufacturers' Union President Kimberley 
and Director Watling took the opportunity to explain the 
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There were also concerns about their declining status among 
Whitehall officials and their Ministers. This conviction was re- 
enforced when motor cycle manufacturers discovered, to their 
intense irritation, during a meeting with the Dollar Export Board 
in May 1950, that they had been lumped into the same category as 
perambulator makers, a seemingly less critical industry. 122 Nor 
was the Federation of British Industries (FBI) much help. Major 
Watling was convinced that the FBI "seemed anxious not to be too 
critical of the Board of Trade and other Government departments" 
and would not effectively stand up for their members. 123 
Increasingly, the industry seemed friendless in the corridors of 
power. 
A stiff letter summarising the industry's grievances on the 
trade negotiations had already been sent to then President of the 
Board of Trade, Harold Wilson, via Federation of British 
Industries Director-General Norman Kipping, in 1949.124 However, 
as Board personnel told Wilson, after he had asked for an 
investigation into the Union's complaint, these quotas and other 
situation in export markets. Kimberley expressed the industry's 
concern "at the way in which their traditional markets in Western 
European countries were being closed one after the other; he felt 
this was mainly due to barter agreements being signed by these 
foreign governments which present the trade to others. " He also 
suggested that British trade negotiatiors "had not realised the 
importance of getting import quotas for bicycles and motor cycles 
and their parts or had not taken a stiff enough attitude on this 
question. " Kimberley also complained that the industry had not 
been consulted before the conclusion of trade agreements. See 
Document #38, entitled 'Export of bicycles and motor cycles, 
prepared by D. Simpson, dated 14 November 1951 and contained in 
BT 11/4452, entitled 'Japan/UK - Japanese Export Competition in 
relation to UK Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry'. 
122. See memo dated 27 May 1950, entitled '191/50: Dollar 
Export Board', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/68. 
123. See Minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 26 August 1952, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/73. 
124. The Watling-Wilson letter is contained in PRO BT 11/3996. 
223 
import restrictions were difficult to alter since the countries 
involved were either anxious to protect their own domestic 
industries or wanted to preserve sterling balances. There was 
only so much British government negotiators could do in order to 
convince their foreign counterparts to make any significant 
concessions-125 
Growing foreign competition was another factor which began to 
complicate British motor cycle exports. The manufacturers 
worried about incursions by Continental rivals, such as the 
Italian Moto Guzzi and Austrian Puch firms (albeit in the 
lightweight motor cycle class), into British export markets. The 
British were convinced that these competitors had unduly 
benefited from American aid programmes such as the Marshall Plan; 
they now had an unfair advantage. Thanks to this generous 
largesse, so they claimed, their factories had been rebuilt and 
re-equipped, "to an extent which would be quite impracticable and 
uneconomic for a British firm. "126 Another foreign rival, 
Czechoslovakia, exported lightweights into Australia, directly 
competing with the BSA Bantam. The Czech machine was much 
cheaper, even after taking into account a 17 1/2% import duty on 
non-British motor cycles. 
127 
125. See, for example, a memo from S. S. Holmes to various Board 
of Trade personnel, dated 16 August 1948 and a minute prepared by 
E. J. Halford-Streuens, dated 6 September 1949, both contained in 
bi . 
126. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 26 August 1952, contained in Manufacturers' Union 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/73. In his speech to the Shareholders 
at the Annual General meeting held on 20 January 1954, Enfield 
Cycle Chairman Frank W. Smith specifically singled out foreign 
competition from Germany, Italy and Czechoslovakia as being of 
particular concern to his company. The speech is contained in 
the Enfield Cycle Company Annual Report for 1953, on deposit at 
the Guildhall Library. 
127. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, 
dated 4 June 1949, contained in Guardbook MSS 204/3/1/66. 
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There were other less obvious problems slowing the sale of 
British motor cycles overseas which the industry was aware of but 
had not mentioned in their briefs to the government. One 
enthusiasts' journal complained, for example, about how the poor 
appearance of displays of British motor cycles at a show on the 
Continent had hurt the reputation of the industry generally. 128 
Overseas retailers continually complained of shipping delays, 
sloppy paperwork, badly packed motor cycles, poor servicing and a 
general shortage of spare parts. British manufacturers were also 
slow to provide their service manuals in languages other than 
English, even after repeated requests to do so. 
129 More 
significantly, market reports prepared by the Union's own 
representatives highlighted factors which had little connection 
with either the effectiveness or determination of British trade 
negotiators. In fact, the biggest obstacle to sales was the fact 
that foreign tastes in motorised two wheeled transport had been 
steadily shifting away from the kind of products British 
factories produced. 
The Dutch market is one example of how these changes in 
consumer preference adversely affected British exports. For 
example, during 1953 a highly critical article published in the 
128. See leading article, 'British Cinderellas. Machines at 
Salons imperfectly displayed. ' The Motor Cycle, 5 February 1953, 
p. 163. 
129. See, for example, memo '157/50: Canada: Motor Cycle 
Exports', dated 28 April 1950, and '192/50: Visit to USA and 
Canada', dated 29 May 1950, wherein Major Watling, during a sales 
tour noted reported he was "distressed" to discover that dealers 
were "grievously short" of both motor cycles and spares. The 
memos are contained in Guardbooks MRC MSS 204/3/1/67 and MSS 
204/3/1/68 respectively. The problem existed elsewhere too, see 
'Germany: motor cycle exports', dated 2 December 1952, contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/74. For criticism about English 
only service manuals, see '3/53 - Belgium - motor cycle exports', 
dated 1 January 1953, contained in ibid and '23/55. Germany', 
dated 20 January 1955, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/79. 
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Dutch motor cycle enthusiasts' journal, Motor Kampioen, had been 
drawn to the attention of the Manufacturers' Union. It declared 
that, while it may have once been true that British motor cycles 
were supreme, this was no longer the case. German and Italian 
machines were now more and more successful, especially on 
European race-tracks, not just in the lightweight classes but 
even in the 350cc to 500cc engine classes, normally the preserve 
of British machines. This had made a considerable impact on 
Dutch consumers. But instead of trying to improve their 
products, the article concluded, British manufacturers seemed 
content to rest on past laurels and had not developed more 
competitive models. 
130 
Several years later a report prepared for the Union observed 
that the demand for the heavy weight British motor cycles in 
Holland was declining in favour of the mopeds and lightweight 
models manufactured by its continental rivals. A number of 
causes were responsible for the decline. The report noted 
"changes in the standard of living of the section of the public 
interested in this type of transport, but more especially ... the 
fact that insurance rates for such motor cycles have increased 
considerably ... whilst prices in the second hand car market have 
considerably declined" and thus "the operating costs of a heavy- 
weight motor cycle and a small second hand car do not differ 
appreciably. " Sales to Holland, which had reached 3,642 in 1946, 
had dropped to 343 in 1958.131 
130. The article was referred to in a memo dated 7 December 
1953, entitled '377/53: Motor Cycles - Propaganda', contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/76. 
131. See 'Special Report on the Amsterdam Cycle and Motor Cycle 
Show', no date or author indicated but it was probably prepared 
by Director Hugh Palin in early 1957. Contained in Industry 
Association Guardbook series, MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. 
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Switzerland, another key British export market, was also buying 
fewer of the heavyweight motor cycles. One of Europe's few 
remaining hard currency markets that for many years had no import 
quotas, Switzerland had previously been well disposed to British 
motor cycles. 
132 However, by 1951, this too had changed. In 
part this was the result of new import restrictions, designed to 
protect Swiss currency reserves, but there was also an increased 
consumer interest in lightweight machines, particularly Czech 
Jawas and Austrian Puch models in the 125cc to 250cc classes. 
These, British manufacturers were warned, were not only cheaper 
than their machines but were better designed as well. 133 
Moreover, they had been also cautioned that the Swiss were 
becoming impatient with the poor mechanical reliability of 
British motor cycles. For example, at a dinner sponsored by 
Triumph Engineering for its overseas agents held in November 
1951, Managing Director Edward Turner heard sharp criticism 
132. A letter from the President of the Swiss Motor Cycle 
Importers' Association to the Manufacturers' Union warned that 
British machines, particularly in the 350cc to 500cc classes, 
were losing out in popularity to Italian scooters, thanks to a 
combination of higher prices and design conservativism. See memo 
dated 26 November 1952, entitled '341/52: Switzerland - Motor 
Cycle Exports', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/74. 
133. The importance of the Swiss market was well recognised in 
the British trade press: see for example a story on the Geneva 
cycle and motor cycle show, contained in British Cycles and Motor 
Cycles Overseas, April 1949, pp. 160-161. Switzerland was an open 
market until early 1951 when quotas were instituted. See memo 
dated 6 March 1951, entitled 'Switzerland: Export of Bicycle and 
Motor Cycle Goods', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/70. 
An earlier report noted that British motor cycles were well 
established in Switzerland, having "an excellent reputation and 
considerable popularity. " The same report also noted the 
ominious growth in sales of the Czech and Austrian machines. 
These models had design features such as chrome plating and a 
foot gear changer which came as standard equipment and were much 
appreciated by Swiss consumers. Evidently, British machines 
suffered badly in comparison. See memo dated 10 November 1948, 
entitled '356/48. -Switzerland: Motor Cycle Market Report', 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/64. 
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voiced by a Swiss retailer. In future, Turner was told, motor 
cycles dispatched to Switzerland must be "trouble-free, neater 
and cleaner. " In his reply, however, Turner airily dismissed 
these disquieting words. Swiss retailers, he said, had to 
understand that "there was a wide gap between the conceptions of 
a model and the delivery thereof in quantity. " While foreign 
competitors might promise more, only his company exhibited what 
they could actually deliver. 134 
Notwithstanding Turner's confidence, several years later 
another market report noted that there had been a continued 
decline in Swiss motor cycle registrations, the most serious drop 
being for models larger than 250cc engine capacity, the mainstay 
of British exports. Higher insurance premiums were blamed and it 
now cost as much to insure a 500cc motor cycle as a small car. 
Moreover, like their Dutch counter-parts, Swiss consumers were 
also buying greater numbers of mopeds and other lightweights, 
models which did not constitute a significant part of British 
exports to that market. Swiss sales, which had peaked in 1950 at 
4,448 units, slumped to 164 eight years later. 135 
[See Appendix 1, Table XVII]. 
134. See news item, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 16 November 
1951, p. 137. Triumph was not the only British company so 
criticised. In 1949 BSA had received a number of complaints from 
Switzerland about their A7 500cc models, which had a 
disconcerting tendency of catching fire. Moreover, the 
electrical equipment on the lightweight Bantams was notoriously 
unreliable. See BSA Management Minutes, meeting of 9 September 
1949, agenda item 9146, MRC MSS 19A/1/5. 
135. See 'Switzerland: A Brief Market Report and Summary of 
Impressions of the Geneva Cycle and Motor Cycle Show, 1958', no 
date, prepared by Industry Association Director Hugh Palin. It 
is contained in Industry Association Guardbook, MRC MSS 
204/3/1/88. See also 'Swiss motor cycle market drops in favour 
of small cars', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 31 March 1956, 
p. 436. 
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As the industry began to readjust to the unhappy combination of 
more difficult trading conditions at home and abroad, British 
motor cycle manufacturers were increasingly vexed with the 
growing flood of imports, which began after 1952. Even though 
the foreign machines did not directly challenge the domestic 
producers, being mostly lightweight models and scooters, it was 
nevertheless galling to see the inroads imports were making in 
British showrooms, hitherto the exclusive preserves of domestic 
producers since before 1914. 
The manufacturers were acutely aware of these rising numbers of 
imports, coming at a time when domestic sales had begun to lag. 
In April 1956, Manufacturers' Union Director Hugh Palin wrote a 
confidential memo to members of the Manufacturers' Union Council 
and expressed his alarm over the industry's trading conditions. 
comparing 1954 production totals with those of 1955, he noted a 
slight decline in output, from 184,057 to 182,603 units, although 
exports had slumped from 70,254 to 60,473 units. During the same 
period there had been a dramatic increase in imports, which had 
jumped from 7,057 to 46,277 units. Most of these were mopeds and 
scooters, indeed 41,457 of them had an engine capacity of less 
than 50cc. 136 (See Appendix 1, Table XVIII]. 
The imports kept on flowing into Britain. In 1956 some 18,500 
foreign mopeds and 24,000 scooters entered the Home market which 
meant that around two-thirds of the up-to-150cc engine capacity 
class now originated from overseas manufacturers. In 1955 one 
half of these units had been imported. Yet, at the same time 
136. By place of origin, 37,994 of the imports were West German, 
16,200 Italian and 2,608 French. See memo dated 26 April 1956, 
entitled '173/56: Director's Personal Report', contained in 
Union Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/83. 
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domestic production (including exports) dropped to 126,700 units 
and overall sales slumped to 150,228.137 The industry was now in 
the worst sales recession since the war. The lower sales caused 
substantial redundancies through the industry. During the spring 
of 1956, AMC sacked 200 workers, followed by 300 at BSA and 
another 400 at proprietary engine maker Villiers Engineering. ' 
Managers attributed their cut-backs directly to the Government's 
credit squeeze. 
138 
This situation greatly disturbed the industry which now turned 
to the Government for help. A submission to the President of the 
Board of Trade made in 1955 blamed legislative and fiscal 
measures for restricting the manufacturers' competitiveness at 
home and abroad. First, they attacked the "crippling" effect of 
the Purchase Tax on sales and asked that it be reduced if not 
eliminated completely. Not only would this improve the state of 
their industry, but it would be in the greater public good by 
easing traffic congestion and reducing the nation's consumption 
of expensive imported petrol. 
139 
137. The figures for 1955/56 are quoted in an undated memo [but 
probably spring of 1957] entitled '164/57. Director's Personal 
Report', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. 
138. For reports on the redundancies, see 'Motor cycle firm to 
sack 200 workers' Daily Herald, 26 April 1956 (contained in the 
Trade Union Congress news clipping archive, file 12915, MRC), 
'More dismissals in Midlands', Financial Times, 2 June 1956 and 
'Report for July and August 1956' prepared by A. N. Hall and dated 
7 September 1956, contained in PRO BT 177/634. Overall industry 
employment in October 1955 was estimated at 16,500. Among the 
firms, BSA employed 5,100, AMC 1,350 and Villiers 3,500 (not all 
these workers, however, were necessarily engaged exclusively in 
motor cycle manufacturing). See 'Notes on the location of 
manufacturing industries - No. 10 Motor Cycles, ' particularly 
Appendix 4, dated October 1956 and contained in PRO BT 177/621. 
139. The letter, dated 27 September 1955, addressed to Peter 
Thorneycroft, the President of the Board of Trade, is attached to 
a memo entitled '405/55: Purchase Tax Etc', contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/81. A letter, dated 4 July 1956, from 
AMC Chairman Hogg to the company shareholders, blamed the 
imposition of higher Hire/Purchase restrictions (the minimum 
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Secondly, no doubt mindful of growing public hostility towards 
the higher powered motor cycles, the Union asked that legislative 
concessions apply only to the lightweight models, particularly 
the mopeds. As they had before the war, the manufacturers drew 
attention to the far greater use of mopeds on the continent, 
especially in Germany. This, they insisted, was the result of 
the active encouragement of moped use by foreign governments. 
German moped riders, for example, did not have to carry licences 
or even take tests and paid much lower insurance premiums. They 
even received an income tax concession if they used their 
machines for commuting to work. 
140 
In contrast, British laws treated mopeds on the same basis as 
the larger motor cycles, making them far more expensive to 
operate and so dampening consumer interest. The Government could 
both improve accessibility to a cheaper means of motorised 
personal transport for a larger number of people as well as help 
the industry by stimulating more sales, if only it would adopt 
laws of a Continental type. On the other hand, if the present 
situation continued, the manufacturers warned, the industry would 
go on declining and foreign rivals, particularly Germany, would 
overtake Britain as the world's leading motor cycle producers. 
141 
These arguments were subsequently pressed during meetings held 
between industry officials and civil servants. The advice that 
Ministers received from civil servants was largely unresponsive 
to the case made by industry representatives. These views seemed 
deposit on both new and used motor cycles had gone up from 33 1/3 
per cent to 50 per cent) for a 40 per cent drop in sales over 
1955. The letter, attached to the 1955 Annual Report, is on 
deposit in the Guildhall Library. 
140. See letter to Thorneycroft, op cit. 
141. Ibid. 
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well established by 1951. It may not have been said openly at 
the meetings, but a strong bias against motor cycles and motor 
cyclists had re-emerged in private correspondence between 
Ministry officials. This attitude was very detrimental to the 
industry's case for legislative reform. The civil servants' 
judgement had become deeply coloured by the industry's reputation 
for building fast, high performance motor cycles, which were 
considered hazardous for the riders themselves and the public at 
large-142 
No matter how often the manufacturers insisted that they only 
called for the relaxation of these laws solely to provide the 
public with cheap and low speed mopeds, the civil servants 
suspected an ulterior motive. This stiffened their resolve 
against any concessions being made to the industry. As one 
department official, who favoured continuing to cover mopeds by 
existing legislation, minuted his Parliamentary Secretary: 
I think it would be fair to summarise the departmental 
view as being that this is right because any departure 
from the strict rule might result, through the 
ingenuity of scientists and engineers, in the 
production of a vehicle which, while technically 
entitled to exemption, would, in fact, be highly lethal 
and at the same time have an unfair advantage against 
the ordinary motor vehicle. It is possible to imagine, 
for example, the production of an extremely powerful 
small engine, to be attached to a bicycle, capable of 
very high speeds and of being as great a potential 
danger to life and limb as the most powerful motor 
cycle. 143 
Once more, the manufacturers had placed themselves in a dilemma 
of their own making. Emphasis on the heavy-weights models, along 
with the cultivation of a market that consisted essentially of 
142. See, for example, minute No. 5 from 'C. J. ', dated 14 
November 1950 and report entitled 'Pedal cycles with motor 
attachments', prepared by G. F. Stedman, dated 9 May 1951, both 
contained in PRO MT 34/468. 
143. Ibid. 
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enthusiasts may have provided a firm bedrock of consumers but it 
was, by definition, self-limiting. Now it again thwarted their 
efforts to enlist the support of the government. 
If the industry was unsuccessful in attempting to change moped 
legislation, at least one firm appeared to be dealing effectively 
with its internal problems. In 1956 BSA's leadership question 
had been resolved. At a Board meeting held on 31 May, a majority 
of his fellow directors stripped Sir Bernard Docker of his status 
as managing Director and chairman, forcing him off the Board. 
The official explanation was that Sir Bernard's scandalous 
personal behaviour, combined with chronic and seemingly endless 
losses at Daimler, made his continued tenure undesirable. 
144 The 
real reasons, never made public, were the Board's disquiet at the 
Group's failure to occupy a central position in the advanced 
sectors of British engineering, particularly nuclear power and 
aeronautics, which they blamed on Docker's undue pre-occupation 
with Daimler. Because of poor leadership, during the critical 
years after the war, they believed that BSA had failed to press 
home its advantages. 
145 
144. There was extensive press coverage of Docker's dismissal 
from the BSA Board. See, for example, 'Sir B. Docker and BSA', 1 
June 1956, 'BSA Dispute: Appeal to Shareholders' 2 June 1956 and 
'BSA Board Dispute' 1 August 1956, all in the Financial Times. 
145. The official account of the 31 May 1956 meeting is briefly 
explained in the Minute Book for that date. No agenda 
item 
number was provided. For the post-Docker Board's side of the 
problems prevalent before 1956 see 'Statement by the Board of 
Directors to the Ordinary Stockholders', dated 16 July 1956 and 
'Reasons why Sir Bernard Docker's attempt for Secure Re- 
Appointment Should be Opposed'. These were prepared for 
distribution to shareholders at an Extraordinary General Meeting 
called by Sir Bernard in an unsuccessful attempt to regain his 
place on the Board of Directors. All these are contained 
in BSA 
Directors' Minute Book No. 16, MSS 19C/20. A separate and much 
lengthier account of the 31 May Board meeting, prepared by the 
Company Secretary, the so-called 'Secret Minutes', are contained 
in MSS 19C/30. A copy of Sir Bernard's defence of his 
chairmanship of the company, entitled 'To the Shareholders of the 
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Although he had not shown much interest in motor cycle 
production, during March 1954 Docker had set up a permanent Motor 
Cycle Policy Committee which was charged with examining the 
activities of the various subsidiaries. There is no evidence 
that the Committee ever actually met, but after May 1956 Docker 
was succeeded as Chairman by Jack Sangster, a motor cycle 
specialist nearly all his working life. The way was now open for 
a thorough re-evaluation of the BSA Group's direction. 146 
In spite of changes at BSA, the industry faced daunting 
problems at the end of 1956. Production and exports had dropped 
to their 1948 levels and imports had grown from virtually nothing 
to alarming levels. The 'window of opportunity' that existed in 
1951 may not have closed entirely but was certainly not as open 
as it had been before. The high hopes of earlier years were 
quickly ebbing away. If the industry was going to maintain its 
position, a new manufacturing strategy was necessary to meet 
increased foreign competition and the changing expectations of 
the market. Failing such positive action, the promises which 
opened the era were very likely to remain unfulfilled. 
Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd. ' (no date but probably July 1956) 
is contained in Box 31/Folder 1 of the Hannon Papers. Another, 
albeit highly partisan, defence of Sir Bernard's leadership of 
BSA was subsequently made by his wife Norah. See Norah Docker 
rah - the Autobiography of Lady Docker, London: W. H. Allen, 
1969, p. 92 and pp. 214-228. 
146. The Policy Committee was created at a Board meeting held on 
13 March 1954. See agenda item 10539 contained'in Director's 
Minute Book No. 16, on cit. 
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Chapter 5. 
' The Window Closes: 1956 to 1961'. 
The 1956 sales recession provided an incentive for 
manufacturers to enter the expanding lightweight field. However, 
they remained puzzled by the fact that, while overall sales of 
motorised two wheelers had generally declined, imports actually 
continued to increase. During the period 1956 to 1961, sales did 
gradually improve overall and 1959 would become the best year 
ever for British motor cycle sales. Thereafter, a more severe 
long term decline commenced. At the end of this period, the 
British motor cycle industry faced the prospect of the most 
dangerous threat it had ever faced from a foreign competitor. 
For the first time, this did not originate from either the 
Continent or, as it had before 1919, the United States but 
instead from Japan. 
The impact of the market changes on the industry's 
manufacturing programmes, particularly the growing popularity of 
mopeds, scooters and smaller motor cycles, was evident as early 
as the 1955 Show, where there was an unprecedented number of 
lightweight models on display, including over 40 different types 
of auto-cycles and mopeds, along with as many scooters. Most of 
these were either imported or the products of smaller British 
companies, although, most important, they included two 
lightweight scooters from BSA. Several of the British mopeds 
originated from bicycle companies, such as the Phillips 
'Gadabout', the Norman 'Nippy' and the Hercules company's 
incongruously named 'Grey Wolf' (later retitled the 'Her-cu- 
Motor'). Nearly all of these models had 49cc power units, 
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because no British proprietary engine maker catered for this 
engine class. 
' 
The first all-British designed and manufactured scooters also 
made their belated debut. These likewise originated from smaller 
dedicated firms or non-traditional manufacturers. The DKR 
company, for example, proudly advertised its 150cc 'Dove' as the 
"All British Scooter" and other entries included the DMW 98cc 
'Bambi' and Dayton Cycle's 224cc 'Albatross'. Two new entries 
were from BSA. One, the 70cc 'Dandy', was promoted as a 
'scooterette', though it was really more of a moped but with a 
modest degree of bodywork. The other, a large size scooter, the 
so-called 'Beesa', was by contemporary scooter standards both 
large and expensive. It had an 200cc engine (compared to the 
best-selling Vespa's 145cc model) along with electric start. The 
design reflected the proposed price (it was not yet in 
production), £204 compared to £188 for the Vespa. 
2 
The business press was particularly optimistic about the 
implications of BSA's entry into the scooter market. The 
Financial Times noted that up until then, with the exception of 
Douglas' licensing agreement with Vespa, the imports had this 
market for themselves. In view of developments on the Continent, 
"many in Britain have expressed surprise that the UK motor cycle 
manufacturing industry has not as yet seriously entered the 
scooter field. " This had now changed because, among all British 
manufacturers, "BSA is perhaps in the best position of any 
1. See 'Buyers' Guide' included in the 18 November 1954 edition 
of ire Motor Cycle. 
2. See 'BSA Scooter and Revolutionary 70cc Ultra-Lightweight', 
Mot Cycle and Cycle Trader, 12 November 1955, p. 146. Prices 
are from the 1956 'Buyers' Guide', enclosed in the same issue. 
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company to bring out a scooter for the British market at a really 
competitive price. 113 
Besides the mopeds and scooters, British manufacturers had 
already introduced a new range of lightweight motor cycles. 
These machines were in the 98cc engine class and again produced 
by smaller firms such as Excelsior, James, Norman and Sun. Many 
catered for commuters, prompting one newspaper to dub them 'Volks 
Bikes. " One new model, the 'Ambassador', even came equipped with 
an electric starter, a highly unusual feature to be found on a 
British model at this time. 4 Other companies, such as Francis- 
Barnett, produced two 147cc models, the 'Plover' roadster and the 
sportier 'Falcon 77', and Royal Enfield had the 148cc 'Ensign'. 
Among the larger manufacturers, both BSA and Triumph had revamped 
editions of their existing 150cc and 250cc models and even the 
most traditional firms, Norton and Matchless, made changes to 
their 350cc models, the smallest machines then manufactured in 
their factories. The Board of Trade, which had a correspondent 
at the Show, was much impressed with this new interest in the 
light weight class and used its journal to publicise the motor 
cycle industry's long-awaited 'Counter-attack on Continental 
Competition'. 5 
3. See 'Scooters in Britain', Financial Times, 2 July 1955, 
contained in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3 and 'British 
Scooters Appear', The Economist, 19 November 1955, p. 683. 
4. The Ambassador's electric start was included, one report 
claimed, to attract women, who it was hoped, were now moving from 
the pillion seat to the saddle: "how do you expect a girl with 
high-heel shoes to operate a kick starter? .... the answer is 
that with the Ambassador - you don't. " See Daily Sketch, 
untitled feature about the 1954 Show, 13 November 1956, contained 
in the Manufacturers' Union clipping book, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
5. See 'Cycle and Motor Cycle Show stages a Counter-attack on 
Continental Competition', Board of Trade Journal, 19 November 
1955. 
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Indeed, the trade press took great pride in the sheer diversity 
of British motor cycle production. The 1955 Show, it was said, 
demonstrated just how strong they remained, even in the face of 
burgeoning foreign competition. While the Continentals put their 
resources into mopeds, scooters and lightweight (under 250cc 
engine capacity) motor cycles, British manufacturers continued to 
offer a range extending from 50cc auto-cycles to the four 
cylinder 1000cc heavy-weights. No other industry came even 
anywhere close to matching the British for variety. One trade 
journal proudly claimed that the British industry "today 
dominates the markets of the world, and has few rivals in the 
production and marketing of orthodox motor cycles. " Moreover, 
the Show served warning on foreign competitors that British firms 
were now "prepared to challenge the Continent of Europe in these 
fields in which hitherto our foreign competitors held a virtual 
monopoly. i26 The journal was especially enthusiastic about the 
new British made 'ultra-lightweights' and scooters, which not 
only challenged the "foreign invaders, but far outstripped them 
in appearance and specification. "7 [See Appendix 1, Table IXX]. 
Yet, only several months later, columnist Francis Jones noted 
the lackadaisical manner in which British manufacturers had 
marketed their new mopeds and scooters. At the Brussels Show, he 
observed, the BSA 'Dandy' and 'Beeza' were the only British made 
light weights on display and Jones was not at all pleased about 
the failure of other firms to participate: "The blunt fact of it 
6. See leading article, 'World's Leading Producer', p. 171, 
'Motor cycle and Scooters for All Markets', pp. 180-184 and 
'Motorised Cycles and Power Units', pp. 193-194, all contained in 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Export Trader, December 1955. See also an 
untitled feature on the 1955 Show in the Motor Cycle and Cycle 
ade, 12 November 1955, pp. 134-135. 
7. See feature entitled 'Comment', Ibid, p. 141. 
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is that Britain is not, as yet, putting up any strong competition 
- or, really, any serious competition, in the moped/scooter 
market. " Britain might still be the major producer of orthodox 
motor cycles, but in Jones' opinion that "does not alter the fact 
that we were late in grasping the possibilities of the 
unconventional type of machine. " This criticism was shared by 
one Sunday paper, which commented on how the new British made 
mopeds were a "belated attempt" to stem the "invasion by 
Continental scooters. " It was these types of lightweights which 
consumers now wanted, not the "fast and almost exclusively 
masculine motor cycles so favoured by British manufacturers. 
8 
Sales during the 1956 season did nothing to deflect the 
critics. These continued to decline, except in the lightweight 
class. True, British built mopeds and scooters sold, but in 
fewer numbers than the imports. Even the two new heavily 
promoted BSA models failed to make much of a dent in either Home 
or export markets. The 'Beesa' scooter, for example, never even 
went into production. It was cancelled by the BSA Board of 
Directors on the grounds of high projected manufacturing costs, 
price and inappropriate design. The 'Dandy', on the other hand, 
did go into production but was plagued with numerous troubles. 
S. See 'Motor Cycle Matters' by Francis Jones, Motor Cycle and 
Cygl-e Trader, 4 February 1956, p. 329. See also 'UK scooters enter 
fight for markets', The Observer, 13 November 1955. Other 
similar opinions were expressed elsewhere in the broadsheet 
press, see, for example, 'Now Cycle Firms are Worried', 
Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1956 and 'Export Challenge to UK 
cycles', Financial Times, 16 March 1956, all contained in TUC 
press clipping file 12913, at the MRC. The concept of the larger 
motor cycles as 'masculine' was not simply theoretical. In 1954, 
the manufacturers' Union protested at the participation of a 
German sidecar rider, Inge Stoll-LaFarge, in that year's TT 
races. Their resolution informed the ACU that they were 
"appalled" at the decision to allow Stoll-Farge to race. See 
minutes of the Manfufacturers' Section meeting of 12 May 1954, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/77. 
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According to Bert Hopwood, then BSA's Chief Designer, this was 
the result of it being rushed into production without adequate 
development work. One particular design flaw was the use of cast 
iron, instead of light alloy, in the cylinder material, which 
caused considerable problems for its owners. Ironically, one of 
BSA's subsidiaries had pioneered a process of coating cylinder 
bores with a hard chrome surface, which would have easily cured 
this particular difficulty, but this was unavailable to the motor 
cycle division. 9 
As sales fell, British manufacturers again blamed government 
credit policies for their problems in the Home market. AMC 
Chairman Samuel Hogg, in a letter to shareholders in mid-1956 
attributed the poor performance of their company and its 
subsidiaries to Hire-Purchase restrictions imposed in late 1955, 
which had caused dealers to slow up their factory orders during 
the winter. This, in turn, meant they held low stocks for the 
critical spring selling season, which traditionally opened at 
Easter. The weak state of the economy also played its part. As 
reports of redundancies and short-time working circulated, Hogg 
claimed, this "increased the lack of confidence amongst 
prospective motor cycle buyers, who are in the main young 
craftsmen and artisans, who naturally feared that they might 
themselves be out of work or on short-time, in the comparatively 
near future. ""10 
Motor cycle manufacturers were furious about the decision of 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer in February 1956 to push up the 
9. See BSA Directors' Minute Book, MRC MSS 19C/20, meeting of 18 
October 1956, agenda item 10881. See also Hopwood, op cit, 
pp. 131-134. 
10. See letter to Shareholders, dated 4 July 1956, on deposit at 
the Guildhall Library, London. 
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minimum deposit for Hire-Purchase sales by 50 per cent. One 
trade journal went so far as to accuse the government of 
diverting British consumers away from the more expensive medium 
and heavy weight motor cycles in favour of cheaper, mostly 
foreign, lightweights. The implications of this policy, it was 
maintained, would only aggravate sales difficulties, "because of 
the established nature of the British motor cycle industry", and 
so lead inevitably to the "dampening down of business in 
traditional British machines while at the same time encouraging 
sales of low-capacity imported ... scooter and ultra- 
lightweights. ""11 
Yet, it remained difficult for the manufacturers to explain how 
these restrictions, which did not distinguish between British or 
imported motorised two-wheelers, always seemed to have less 
impact on the latter. As the 1956 season got under way this 
point was noted in an article published in the Financial Times, 
which reported that the British motor cycle industry appeared to 
be now caught in a two-way squeeze. First, exports in 1956 had 
not recovered to their 1951 levels (58,800 compared to 91,700 
units). Second, the British manufacturers' share of the Home 
market had continued to slip. There was little doubt why this 
was so: "British styling has failed to keep abreast of fashion. " 
In contrast, the industry's rivals "were setting new fashions 
which have come not only to dominate many European markets but 
have, it is being said, become the unmistaken beginning of a 
world fashion. "12 
11. See leading article, 'Motor Cycle Sales', Motor Cycle and 
cycle Trader, 23 June 1956, p. 145. 
12. See 'The Motor Cycle Export Battle', Financial Times, 28 May 
1956, contained in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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There was considerable difference in the manner with which the 
British and Continental manufacturers approached the question of 
design. For the former, virtually all firms were heavily reliant 
on in-house factory trained talent. 13 Some senior managers, such 
as Triumph's Edward Turner, who took an active interest in 
matters of design and styling, were self-taught. Others, such as 
Bert Hopwood, had received a measure of formal training, but were 
often frustrated by the unwillingness of higher management to 
listen to their advice. 14 It was also true that, being a smaller 
industry which was at a disadvantage in terms of pay rates, 
skilled designers were frequently tempted away by more lucrative 
offers from the aeronautics and motor car industries. 
15 
The situation with regard to design work was very different on 
the Continent, particularly in Germany. In that country motor 
cycle and scooter manufacturers placed great emphasis on making 
their machines as attractive as possible. As a report 
13. In 1958, the FBI conducted an inquiry in conjunction with 
the Council of Industrial Design, about what measures were 
followed by manufacturers for product design. In response, a 
Director with AMC replied that, in general terms, "appearance 
only enters into our products in the sense that good technical 
geometry produces the desired appearance, and to a degree even 
this is secondary to technical performance, road holding etc. 
What few embellishments are needed to bring about design 
attractiveness, arise from the opinions of higher management 
generally, with the occasional help of a consultant and even this 
help would usually be forth coming from manufacturers of badges 
and motifs etc. " See letter, A. A. Sugar to E. W. Goodale, FBI, 
dated 2 June 1958, contained in MRC MSS 200/F/3/Ts/12/15. 
14. For Edward Turner's background, see Barbara Smith entry in 
the Dictionary of Business Biography, David Jeremy (ed). London: 
Butterworths, 1986, pp. 565-570. A full account of Bert Hopwood's 
struggles to convince the Boards of various motor cycle companies 
to revamp design are in Hopwood, op cit, pp. 77-81 and pp. 194-196. 
15. During a management meeting at BSA's Small Heath factory 
during 1951, note was made about draughtsmen leaving the company 
for higher pay elsewhere, especially in the aeronautics industry. 
See minutes of BSA Management meeting held on 25 June 1951, 
agenda item 9272, contained in MRC MSS 19A/l/5. AMC also had 
great difficulties holding on to skilled design staff, see J. M. 
West interview, 23 November 1994. 
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commissioned by the union noted, the larger firms employed 
"styling experts, who are the links between the design and sales 
departments. " While most of these stylists were also "highly 
qualified engineers" some firms were in addition using personnel 
who had been trained as commercial artists. The aim of this 
concern, British manufacturers were told, was to broaden the 
appeal of their machines to non-motor cyclists and scooterists, 
especially women. 
16 
Irrespective of their beliefs in the significance of design, 
the industry was very sensitive to criticism that it had fallen 
behind the competition. As early as 1952, Triumph Managing 
Director Edward Turner felt compelled to respond in the pages of 
an enthusiasts' journal. If, Turner retorted, the industry had 
failed to produce "much that is fresh", it was for good reason. 
The strong demand for their orthodox motor cycles had caused the 
manufacturers to adopt conservative policies which understandably 
discouraged what he described as "excursions into difficult 
design projects and the accompanying expensive tooling. " Turner 
noted that the very dedicated nature of the industry was itself 
an obstacle to new ventures: "A rapid changeover to the 
manufacture of an entirely different machine is more difficult 
nowadays than ever before. " Turner dismissed any notion of 
abandoning what had been, up until then, very successful orthodox 
motor cycle production programmes: "there is no point 
in 
radically changing design unless the resulting machine 
is going 
16. See memo entitled '23/55: Germany', dated 20 January 1955, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/79. 
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to be a marked improvement on the orthodox type evolved after 
years of painstaking development. ii17 
By 1956 Industries Association Director Hugh Palin was provoked 
sufficiently by the continuing criticism to respond himself in 
the business press. He defended the record of the industry and 
offered an explanation for the gains made by imports on the Home 
market. In Palin's view, the rise of Continental manufacturers 
was the result of their new factories combined with a favourable 
geographical position close to large concentrations of consumers. 
Like Turner, Palin denied that the British industry had been 
caught unawares by the rapid growth of the moped and scooter 
markets. On the contrary, he claimed that British manufacturers 
were fully informed of changing tastes on the Continent. The 
reason why they had been so slow to react was two-fold. First, 
the British industry had been entirely committed to their main 
product, orthodox motor cycles, and were "working to capacity to 
meet the world-wide demand. " Under those circumstances, until 
very recently the industry was unable to divert factory space for 
the manufacture of either scooters or mopeds in any number, as 
they were "quite separate and distinct from orthodox motor cycles 
from both the sales and production point of view. "118 
Second, Palin claimed, the industry had suffered from 
persistent shortages of labour, factory space and raw materials 
such as steel. These restrictions had also "made it impractical 
to lay down new plants for scooter and moped production. " In any 
case, it would have been "foolish indeed" for British 
17. See 'Design and Development' by Edward Turner, The Motor 
Cygjge, 9 October 1952, pp. 406-408. 
18. See 'British Motor Cycles' by Hugh Palin, Financial Times, 
15 October 1956, contained in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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manufacturers to have shifted their resources towards the 
lightweights at a time when demand for their traditional products 
was so high. In fact, Palin added, the British industry's very 
supremacy had created an opening for its foreign rivals: "It 
would not be fanciful to suggest that the domination of the 
world's markets for orthodox machines [especially in the over 
250cc classes] ... has perhaps led at least in part to the 
concentration of Continental motor cycle manufacturers in the 
production of machines not hitherto built in Britain. 1119 
Palin's explanation for the industry's failure to meet growing 
demand for motorised two-wheelers does leave one unanswered 
question. Why after 1955, in the face of the rapid and sustained 
expansion in the post-war motor cycle market, (albeit in the 
lightweight classes), did the British industry fail to increase 
capacity in order to meet demand? In fact, there was some 
expenditure of new plant and factory expansion on the part of the 
larger firms during this period. 
The largest firm, BSA, is a case in point. In late 1953 the 
BSA Board sanctioned a capital expenditure of £500,000 over the 
next three years at the Small Heath factory. This was a 
substantial figure, although it probably also included 
expenditures on non-motor cycle plant, and is still far less than 
the £1 million alone the company spent on purchasing Carbodies in 
1954, in order to guarantee a secure source of components for the 
Daimler motor car division. There were a series of improvements 
made to Triumph's Meriden factory, although this was done mainly 
to increase production of the big displacement twin cylinder 
models which were so popular overseas. Moreover, the Small Heath 
19. Ibid. 
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factory always operated at less than 100 per cent capacity. Nor 
did BSA's motor cycle production ever again reach its peak annual 
output of 65-70,000 machines achieved over 1951/52, at a time 
moreover when labour and materials shortages were acute. 20 
Instead the most ambitious expansion programme originated from 
the industry's number two producer. In contrast to BSA, AMC not 
only moved into lightweight production by way of its acquisition 
of James and Francis-Barnett, but also made a large investment at 
its Woolwich factory. This project was intended to both improve 
motor cycle production and reduce the company's reliance on 
certain components from outside suppliers. The work began in 
1954 and by February 1956 company chairman S. R. Hogg estimated 
that it had already cost nearly £500,000 in new tooling and 
21 
additional factory space. AMC Managing Director Donald Heather 
20. The £500,000 was voted during a Board meeting held on 18 
December 1953. See entry for that date, agenda item 10519. For 
the decision to buy Carbodies, see the Board meeting of 20 May 
1954, agenda item 10552. The following year, BSA bought Hobbs 
Transmission at the cost of £150,000, again for the benefit of 
Daimler. See Board meeting of 24 March 1955, agenda item 10645. 
Expenditures at Triumph included a capital outlay of £116,916 for 
the period 1953 to 1956 and a special allowance of £94,000 for 
1956. See Board meetings held on 22 January 1954 and 2 May 1956, 
agenda items 10529 and 10748 respectively. All references 
contained in BSA Directors' Minute Book No. 16, contained in MRC 
MSS 19C/20. The BSA output figures are contained in the BSA 
Management Committee Minutes, BSA Management Meeting Minutes, MRC 
MSS 19A/1/5. According to BSA's Service Manager John Balder, at 
no time after 1950 did the BSA factory utilise 100 per cent of 
productive capacity. See Balder interview, 18 November 1994. 
21. See Chairman Hogg's speech at the Annual General Meeting of 
7 February 1956, on deposit at the Guildhall Library. According 
to a circular sent out to shareholders dated November 1955, the 
entire building project was projected to cost "over £900,000". 
The initial £750,000 was raised through AMC's banks, a further 
£500,000 would be provided through a Convertible Debenture stock 
issue. See circular dated 25 November 1955, signed by company 
secretary W. A. Hildeth, copy kindly provided by J. M. West. 
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claimed that this project was the "largest single investment" in 
the history of the industry. 22 
The heart of the investment programme was an ambitious plan to 
enlarge and re-equip the Woolwich factory, enabling the company 
to compete more effectively both in the Home and export markets. 
One part of the programme was the development of a new 250cc two- 
stroke engine which could be used to power the lightweight models 
produced by its subsidiaries. Although previously AMC had 
obtained these engine units from a proprietary supplier, friction 
between Villiers and AMC caused the latter to seek self- 
sufficiency. The second part of the investment was the creation 
of facilities to manufacture a new gearbox. Like Villiers, the 
company had become disillusioned with 
its existing supplier, 
Burman. 23 
Both ventures were expensive failures. The two-stroke engine, 
which was designed by an Italian contractor, there being no 
available British talent, was disappointing. Nor did the gearbox 
project fare any better. Although the design was sound, it cost 
significantly more than the ones supplied previously by Burman. 
Bert Hopwood, by that time Managing Director of Norton Motors, 
22. See 'New Type Light Engine Made', Daily Telegraph and 'New 
two-stroke engine' Times, both from 8 November 1956, and 
contained in TUC clipping file 12913, on deposit at the MRC. 
23. See British Cycles and Motor Cycles Overseas, 
August/September 1951, 'Extension at Woolwich', p. 140. The 
general press also covered the work, see 'New type Light Engine 
Made. European Markets' Daily Telegraph, 8 November 1956 and 
'New Two-Stroke Engine', Times, 8 November 1956, both articles 
contained in the TUC's industrial news clipping file 12913, 
entitled 'Cycle and Motor Cycling', on deposit at the MRC. J. M. 
West, confirms the dissatisfaction with Villiers and noted that 
problems continued even after AMC had purchased 25 per cent of 
this supplier in an effort to improve delivery. The money for 
the expansion work would have been better spent, in his opinion, 
had it been used to purchase outright either Villiers or gearbox 
maker Burman. See J. M. West interview, 23 November 1994. 
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was greatly aggravated to be forced to use the new unit, 
especially as it added appreciably to the retail cost of his 
factory's motor cycles. ' According to him, such a "costly 
upheaval of this fundamental change in commercial tactics" 
neither "improved the products nor reduced costs. " The stage was 
set for far more serious problems for the entire AMC group. 24 
During this period, a greater threat was coming from a familiar 
source. As motor cycle sales fluctuated, the gap between motor 
car and motor cycle sales continued to grow throughout this 
period. Although the number of automobiles on British roads had 
long exceeded the number of motorised two wheelers, the 
differential between the two widened dramatically after 1950, 
even though, in general, motor cycles were still cheaper to 
operate than motor cars. 
25 The fact that the gap was initially 
slow to increase after 1945 was, in part, a reflection of the 
relative scarcity of motor cars on the home market. By 1955, 
with a burgeoning manufacturing capacity combined with the 
introduction of cheaper family vehicles, motor car registrations 
began to pull far ahead of motor cycles. Models such as the Ford 
Anglia and Popular, along with the Austin A30 and A40 models 
followed up the initial success of the Morris Minor in the 
economy leagues. These, and similar models produced by other 
manufacturers, combined with an expanding pool of second hand 
vehicles, opened up motor car ownership to a vastly larger 
segment of the population. Prices of cars increased at a lesser 
24. See Hopwood, op cit, p. 155. 
25. A survey in 1958, comparing the running costs of a Austin 
A40 motor car and a Velocette 'LE' light weight motor cycle 
revealed that, on average, the Velocette cost 2s 26d per mile 
compared to the Austin's 7s 61d. See 'Costs per mile', Motor 
Cvcýe and Cycle Trader, 1 March 1958, pp. 304-305. 
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rate than those for large orthodox motor cycles. 26 For example, 
over the period 1955 to 1960 the price of a Ford Popular 
increased from £413 to £494 and an Anglia went from £541 to £589. 
At the same time, the price of a Norton 500cc twin cylinder 
machine went from £438 to £533 and a BSA 650cc twin cylinder 
machine went from £216 to £345.27 (See Appendix 1, Table XX]. 
The attractions of cheaper motors cars over motor cycles was 
even reflected in popular music. One song, for example, which 
was played on British juke-boxes during the late 1950s, had a 
verse purportedly sung by a female motor cycle pillion-rider. It 
recounted how she was "tired of looking at the back of your head" 
and urged her boyfriend to "trade in your motor cycle and get an 
automobile. "28 Judging from the rapid increase of car ownership 
compared to the much smaller rise in motor cycles during this 
time, many others shared her sentiments, a point which was 
reflected in press reports at the time. 
29 
Consumers of motorised two wheelers showed similar buying 
patterns as motor car owners with respect towards smaller economy 
models. This trend was represented in the growing levels of 
moped and scooter sales which suggested that there were many 
26. See Jonathan Wood, Wheels of Misfortune, chapter 5, pp. 95- 
133 and Martin Adeney, The Motor Makers, chapter 10, pp. 194-220. 
27. Prices derived from the 'Buyers' Guide' contained in TIM 
Autocar, 11 November 1955 and 11 November 1960 and from the 
'Buyers' Guide' contained in The Motor Cycle, 18 November 1954 
and 17 November 1960. 
28. The song is featured in a radio documentary entitled 'Hell 
for Leather', which was broadcast on BBC Radio 1 on 31 July 1993. 
Thanks to presenter John Peel and producer Wendy Pilmer for 
making a copy of this audio tape available, which is now on 
deposit at the MRC. 
29. See, for example, 'Heavy going for Cycles', Financial Times, 
6 June 1957 and 'Downhill drift in cycling', Manchester Guardian, 
29 November 1958. See also 'Drift to cars hits cycle makers', 
_Coventry Evening Telegr aph, 29 January 1959. All citations 
contained in clipping volume MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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consumers who wanted more than a bicycle but could not yet afford 
a motor car. Indeed, bicycle sales began to drop during this 
time, along with those of heavyweight orthodox motor cycles, 
while mopeds and scooters were sold in increasingly larger 
numbers. 
The fact that a large proportion of the lightweight motorised 
two wheelers on the home market were imported, combined with a 
trend of declining British exports, reinforced the conviction of 
manufacturers that poor government representation at trade talks 
was again the cause of their difficulties abroad. As before, 
their accusations did not always take into account all the 
factors faced by British trade negotiators. Perhaps the most 
illustrative example of the problems faced by British exporters 
during the late 1950s was to be found in the Italian market. In 
this instance the inherent weakness of the British industry's 
criticism of Government trade negotiators was most apparent. 
Throughout the 1950s British motor cycle manufacturers had been 
infuriated by the fact that, while thousands of Italian scooters 
flooded into their home market, it was extremely difficult for 
them to export to Italy. In 1955, for example, some 16,200 
motorised two-wheelers (mostly scooters) had been exported from 
Italy to Britain. Yet, over the same period, only 234 British 
machines had entered Italy. Although the Italians were subject 
to a British import duty they were not affected by any quotas. 
In Italy, on the other hand, high tariffs and quotas kept out all 
but a token number of British exports, or so the manufacturers 
claimed. 
30 
30. See memo entitled '280/56: Director's Personal Report' 
dated 20 August 1956, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/83. 
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During the following year, this unequal trading relationship 
worsened. In the first six months of 1957, the Italians exported 
a total of 24,299 motorised two wheelers, nearly all lightweights 
and most of those scooters. By contrast, over the same period of 
time, a grand total of twenty-nine British machines went to 
Italy. In light of these statistics, it was about time, the 
British industry complained to the Board of Trade, to force the 
Italians to trade more fairly. 
31 
Motor cycle manufacturers adamantly believed that the cause of 
poor exports to Italy, and elsewhere, was not their fault but was 
the result the irresolute government trade negotiators. In late 
1957, Industries Association Director Hugh Palin summed up the 
situation in a confidential internal memo distributed to 
manufacturers: 
British negotiators approach these meetings [the Bi- 
lateral trade conferences] in a very different frame of 
mind to that of the negotiators from competing 
countries. This is a complaint that has been 
frequently made over the years and as frequently 
rebutted, but having recently met some of the 
negotiators who conducted a particular series of trade 
talks, I cannot help expressing the personal view that 
they are not at all the kind of people who would likely 
drive a hard bargain, or to get 'tough' if necessity 
arose. 
32 
However, upon closer examination, the question of government 
representation was again far less straightforward than British 
manufacturers insisted. As with the Dutch and Swiss markets 
several years before, the fact remained that demand in Italy was 
31. See memo '357/57: Director's Personal Report', dated 7 
August 1957. The statistics concerning Anglo-Italian trade were 
drawn from a letter Industry Association Director Hugh Palin had 
written to the Minister of State for the Board of Trade and is 
attached to the memo. Both documents are contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/86. 
32. See draft memorandum, 'Bicycle and Motor Cycle Export 
Trade', dated 26 November 1957, contained in Industries 
Association Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/87. 
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oriented towards lightweight scooters and mopeds, not the larger 
orthodox motor cycles the British industry specialised in making. 
This point was confirmed in an analysis of the Italian market 
which was prepared for the Industries Association that same year. 
The report stated that the continuing popularity of the 
lightweight models had affected the manufacturing programmes of 
the domestic producers. It also noted that "demand for machines 
over 200cc is now so small" as to be almost insignificant and 
concluded that it was "doubtful whether Italian firms will devote 
any further capital to new development of this type of machines 
other than racing models. " Indeed, under these circumstances, 
with Italian demand so heavily in favour of the kind of models 
not made in any volume by British factories, it was questionable 
whether this was even a market worth fighting about at all. 33 
Nevertheless, in 1958 Industries Association Director Hugh 
Palin was able to inform members that the Italians had finally 
liberalised their import regulations to allow in the larger 
British machines. He claimed that "great pressure has been put 
on HMG to secure this concession", which he had to admit "has 
only be obtained at a price. " The price paid, Palin continued, 
was that, in order to facilitate greater motor cycle exports, 
"the UK has had to make certain concessions outside our 
Industry's interests. " Several months later members of the Motor 
33. See 'Special Report: Milan Cycle and Motor Cycle Show' 
dated December 1957, prepared by H. Palin and contained in the 
Industries Association Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/87. It was also 
noted elsewhere that the Italians had a high tax placed on 
machines over 200cc engine capacity, making demand for heavy 
weight models unlikely to be more than 1,000 per year. See memo 
(no date, but probably January 1957), entitled '127/57& Special 
Report, Milan Cycle and Motor Cycle Show, December 1956', pp. 9- 
10, contained in MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. See also 'Liberalising 
Trade', Motor Cycle and Cycle-Trader, 12 April 1958, p. 2. 
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Cycle Manufacturers' Section had to concede that the successful 
effort at dismantling the Italian import barriers had been a 
costly victory. Even though Italy's import regulations were now 
even more liberal than those of Britain, exports to that country 
had still not improved. In future, it was predicted, this 
embarrassing development would make the Industries Association's 
position with the Board of Trade regarding other trade matters 
"particularly weak. ""34 
British motor cycle manufacturers were in trouble in other 
important markets because of changed consumer tastes. In Sweden, 
for example, AMC Sales Director J. M. West discovered that the 
market for heavy-weight motor cycles had become so poor that the 
main Stockholm dealer wanted to get out of the business 
altogether. After visiting Sweden and other Scandinavian 
countries, West reported that sales of motor cycles over 250cc 
displacement had "fallen catastrophically" and that "such models 
are now rarely seen on the streets. Swedish youths are now to be 
seen in quantity in early post-war cars that can be purchased for 
but a fraction of the cost of a 500cc motor cycle. " What sales 
could be made were to either the police or armed forces. By 
contrast, sales of mopeds boomed. However, instead of trading up 
to motor cycles, he noted that "moped riders tend to progress to 
cheap light cars. ""35 
34. See Minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, 9 
October 1958. Contained in Industry Association Guardbook 
series, MRC MSS 204/3/1/89. 
35. See Scandivanian sales report, dated 17 July 1961, J. M. West 
personal papers. According to West, another cause of the decline 
of Nordic motor cycle sales was that "the nights are long and 
cold in Sweden [and] you can't go courting on a motor cycle. " 
See West interview, 23 November 1994. 
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Conditions in Australia, formerly Britain's best export market, 
were not much better [see Appendix 1, Table XVII]. As early as 
1952 manufacturers were warned by their Australian dealers about 
changed public opinion. One report referred to "violent and 
abusive propaganda" against motor cycles and motor cyclists 
circulating in the national press and radio. One Australian 
government official had gone so far as to call for the banning of 
motor cycles from public roads. Scooter sales, on the contrary, 
had increased, a development the dealers attributed to the influx 
of immigrants from Continental Europe, people who "had no ties 
with the Mother Country" and hence, they believed, were less 
likely to buy the big British motor cycles. 36 The biggest 
problem, however, was competition from four-wheeled vehicles. A 
report received in 1955 noted that it "would appear that many 
members of the public here prefer to purchase a car rather than a 
motor cycle. "37 
Although sales in traditional export markets had deteriorated, 
the losses had been largely offset through the development of an 
entirely new region. An insignificant market before 1945, North 
America was the big export success story of the post-war era. 
This was largely the result of a combination of liberal import 
policies and the peculiar nature of this market, especially its 
predilection towards larger displacement, sports oriented motor 
cycles. 
38 
36. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, held 
on 21 March 1952, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/73. 
37. See memo entitled '247/55: Australia', dated 2 June 1955, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/80. This trend continued 
afterwards, see memo entitled '267/58: Australia: Motor Cycle 
Exports', dated 15 July 1958, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1//88. 
38. According to Managing Director Edward Turner, when Triumph 
began exporting to the US in 1936, the initial reception by 
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The post-war North American market had several obvious 
attractions to British manufacturers. This area had escaped 
damage during the war and contained a vast pool of potential 
consumers, the single most affluent group in the world at this 
time. Perhaps most important, both the USA and Canada were hard 
currency markets without significant tariff barriers and other 
trading impediments. It was not surprising that during this time 
British industry generally had come under heavy government 
pressure to export there as much as possible. 
39 In fact, British 
motor cycle makers did not need much prompting from the 
government to commence a North American export drive. This 
market held enormous sales potential, which was an irresistible 
attraction to British motor cycle manufacturers. 
In 1951, having just returned from the USA, Triumph's Edward 
Turner gleefully reported to fellow Managing Directors that there 
was "a bottomless pool of American dollars waiting for British 
motor cycles. " He was especially excited about the sports 
orientation of many American consumers: "It is heart-warming to 
see the enthusiasm for the sport which exists in America today, 
and in a nation of 142 million people, a large proportion of whom 
are tough, sporting young men, the potentialities are 
Amerian consumers was not entirely favourable. There was 
resentment about imports. Indeed, "there were times when certain 
of the rougher elements were inclined to be quite militant about 
the situation. " See 'Through Edward Turner's Eyes', The Motor 
rvý cle, 20 March 1947, pp. 180-181. 
39. See, for example, Watling's report to the Manufacturers' 
Union council, which expressed concern that government pressure 
to export to North America might be at the expense of trade in 
other areas, especially South America. However, Watling did not 
explain how they should deal with South American tariff barriers 
and import quotas. See report dated 23 December 1949, entitled 
'458/49. The Dollar Drive', contained in MRC MSS 204/3/167. 
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remarkable. i40 At about the same time, Norton's Gilbert Smith 
observed that, unlike his British counter-part, the average young 
American "goes almost straight from pram to a car and becomes 
interested in owning a motor cycle only when he gets bitten by 
the 'sporting bug'. " Indeed, most Nortons were sold to "young 
men who regard them as part of their sports kit. ""41 
An entirely new strata of consumers, mostly sports oriented 
riders, had discovered the advantages of British machines. 42 
These new riders were not disturbed by the social disadvantages 
of riding a motor cycle and used their machines far more for 
leisure pursuits than as basic transport. As it had in Britain, 
sporting success often translated into increased sales. 43 Bill 
Johnson, Triumph's Los Angeles based west coast distributor, 
observed: "motor cycling in America is essentially a sport and 
40. See untitled news story Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 20 
April 1951, p. 36, and 'Through the Eyes of Edward Turner', off 
cit. Turner had written earlier in a popular motor cycle journal 
extolling the the potential of the American market. See "From 
Coventry to California", Motor Cycling, October 18,1945, p. 436- 
437. - 
41. See 'We must 'sell motor cycling" by Gilbert Smith, Motor 
Cycle and Cycle Trader, 5 May 1950, p. 174. 
42. When he met with the Minister of Overseas Trade in 1951, 
Manufacturers' Union President F. Kimberley stressed the 
importance of British imports of the medium weight machines 
(350cc to 650cc engine displacement) the industry was sending to 
the USA: "This type of machine was not previously made in the 
United States and British manufacturers felt that they had opened 
up a market for what was, to the Americans, an entirely new 
product. " See Document #38, entitled 'Export of bicycles and 
motor cycles', prepared by D. Simpson, 14 November 1951, PRO BT 
11/4452. See also 'US Light Weights Sales Rise', New York Times, 
6 January 1949, p. 39. 
43. Gilbert Smith, Managing Director of Norton Motors, noted 
that "the success of British motor cycles in the United States 
results in part from members of the American Forces getting to 
like them when over in Britain. " 'Through a manufacturers' 
eyes', The Motor Cycle, 18 December 1947, pp. 478-479. This 
observation is confirmed in the Times, 8 July 1948, 'Motor 
Cycling Boom in America'. For details on the importance of 
sporting activities among American motor cyclists, see Ivor 
Davies, on cit, p. 126 and Brooke and Gaylin, op cit, pp. 14-25. 
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this is particularly true with machines of the British type ... 
There are the few who buy motor cycles for transport, but I do 
believe that even these are only kidding themselves, for actually 
they enjoy riding the motor cycle. "44 Johnson's statement was 
confirmed by AMC's Sales Director J. M. West, who noted that the 
"majority of motor cycles sold in the USA are used for 
competition work and few are used on the road. ""45 
The sporting aspect of the American market was well understood 
by British motor cycle manufacturers generally. During a meeting 
with the Union held in 1949, Alfred Child, BSA's distributor on 
the American east coast, was quite emphatic on this point. 
Singling out Norton, which had scored a series of victories on 
American race-tracks, Child assured the British manufacturers 
that these had been of "the greatest value" for the sale of all 
their motor cycles. 46 
BSA's Export Manager, S. F. Digby, also emphasised the 
importance of participation in American sporting events, such as 
the Daytona Florida races. In his opinion, "prestige in the 
competitive sphere has a considerable effect on sales" and he 
advised active participation by British manufacturers in these 
activities. Digby also remarked on the striking contrast in 
performance between many of the British and American motor cycle 
models. He noted how the "highly developed British machines, 
44. See 'Johnson Motors in California', British Motor Cycle and 
rvcles Export Trader, May 1953, pp. 90-93. Triumph's development 
of the American market is given a detailed account in Ivor 
Davies, op cit, pp. 113-135. 
45. West also expressed concern about the activities of the so- 
called "milk bar cowboys" whose riding style, he claimed "deters 
others from normal riding in view of the stigma they create. " 
See 'American Report', prepared by J. M. West, dated 17 December 
1957, contained in J. M. West, personal papers. 
46. See Minutes of the Manufacturers' Section, 24 September 
1949, Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/66. 
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with their severely functional design and remarkable power-weight 
ratios" came as a "revelation to the American public" when they 
were first displayed. 47 Although, by American standards, British 
machines were in the 'middle-weight' category (350cc to 650cc 
engine capacity) they frequently outperformed the more powerful 
but less agile 1000cc to 1250cc Harley-Davidsons. 8 4 
Still, however rich, British manufacturers discovered that the 
North American market was not an easy one to develop. The sheer 
physical size of both the USA and Canada was daunting and 
distribution networks had to be created virtually from scratch. 
In the US, domestic manufacturers began a campaign of harassment 
against the entry of British machines into American sports 
activities. 
49 They also shut them out of existing distribution 
networks by forbidding their dealers from handling imported 
products. 
50 
47. See S. F. Digby, 'Advance of the British Motor Cycle 
Industry', Financial Times, 12 August 1952. See also 'Europe 
Puts Its Best Wheels Forward', by R. Stevenson, Business Week, 
August 1947, pp. 138-142, 'Motor Cycle Renaissance', 18 September 
1949, ibid, and 'In the United States' by Emmett Moore, The Motor 
ycle, 13 November 1952, pp. 593-594. 
48. In Hawaii, for example, formerly a strong hold for Harley- 
Davidson, British models such as the 650cc BSA 'Golden Flash' had 
become a favourite of local motor cycle enthusiasts. The 
popularity had been at the expense of Harley. See 'Hawaiian 
Enterprise', Motor Cycle and Cycle Export Trader, March 1953, 
pp. 47-49. 
49. See memo dated 26 January 1949, entitled '31/49 - USA: 
Motor Cycle Exports and the AMA', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/64. When visiting the US in 1947, Norton Managing 
Director Gilbert Smith noted that "trade and industry in the 
United States do not entirely welcome the importation of British 
motor cycles, especially when these machines are successful in 
competitions. " See also 'Through a Manufacturer's Eyes' by 
Gilbert Smith, The Motor Cycle, 18 December 1947, pp. 478-479. 
There is no record of similar activities being used against 
British machines in Canada. 
50. See the minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 24 September 1949, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/66 and Ivor Davies, op cit, p. 119 and p. 123. 
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The biggest obstacle to overcome was the fact that, despite or 
perhaps because of their affluence, neither Canada or the US were 
natural motor cycling nations. The social stigma which persisted 
from the 1920s, especially the widely held conviction that motor 
cycles were inferior to motor cars and motor cycle ownership 
reflected poorly on one's social standing, made sales a hard 
struggle. This situation was greatly aggravated by a series of 
incidents in the late 1940s and afterwards between marginal 
groups of American motor cyclists, self-styled 'outlaws', and the 
police. The most notorious confrontation occurred during 1947 in 
Hollister, California, and generated much unwelcome nation-wide 
publicity for motor cyclists in general. 
51 This incident 
ultimately became the basis of a popular and controversial motion 
picture, The wild one, which featured Marlon Brando as the leader 
of a motor cycle gang (all mounted on British machines) who 
terrorised the inhabitants of a small California town. 
52 Whether 
accurate or not, the negative depiction of American motor 
cyclists contained in this film, one of shiftless and violent 
hooligans rampaging around small town America, created a highly 
53 
emotive image which continues to the present. 
British manufacturers encountered other more mundane problems 
in their efforts to expand this market. The severe climatic 
conditions and the relatively low cost of second-hand cars also 
created serious sales barriers. Such was the experience of F. G. 
51. For background on the so-called 'outlaw' motor cycle gangs, 
particularly the 'Hells' Angels' motor cycle club, see Hunter 
Thompson, The Hells' Angels, New York: Bantam Books, 1965. 
52. The film The Wild one was considered so unsuitable for 
British film goers that it was only approved by the British Board 
of Film Censors for general release in 1968. See Maz Harris, 
'es, London: Faber and Faber, 1985, p. 23. 
53. See, for example, 'Forty hours in Hollister' by John 
Durrance, Cycle, August 1987, pp. 39-44. 
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Norman, Managing Director of Norman Cycles, a lower volume maker 
of lightweight models, which was trying to break into the 
Canadian market. He conceded that the long and cold Canadian 
winters, combined with the availability of cheap cars, "acted as 
deterrents to motor cycle ownership". Another firm, Douglas, 
also discovered it was not at all easy to sell its lighter weight 
motor cycles in Canada. The company admitted it had trouble 
attracting consumers, since the Douglas models were "not large 
enough for the Canadian taste, which is all for the big machines 
as manufactured in the USA. , t54 
By the mid-1950s three major conduits brought British motor 
cycles into the rich American market. The first and most 
sophisticated, was organised by Triumph, and originated as a 
distributorship run by Johnson Motors in Los Angeles, California. 
Ultimately, Triumph's organisation grew into two fully owned 
factory distributorships, one in Los Angeles, the other in New 
Jersey, which would service hundreds of dealerships around the 
US. 55 BSA's presence in America, by contrast, started with an 
agreement with former Harley-Davidson executive Alfred Child, who 
operated his New York based Rich Child Cycle Co. to cover much of 
the eastern part of the country. The west coast was managed 
separately through a distribution agreement with former Indian 
54. For F. G. Norman quote, see British Motor Cycle and Cycle 
EXRgrt Trader, July/August 1954, 'Continental Competition in 
American markets', p. 103. The information on Douglas is from the 
FBI file 'Dollar Exports Board, June 1949 to June 1950', document 
entitled 'Canada - current enquiries in the market and dossier fo 
'follow-up' letters', entry for Douglas (Sales and Service) dated 
17 August 1949, contained in MRC MSS 200/F/3/DD1/42(1). 
55. See Ivor Davies, op cit, pp. 113-134 and FBI Exports Report 
on motor cycle sales, dated August 1950, contained in MRC MSS 
200/DEC/3/3/C149. 
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motor cycle dealer Hap Alzina. 56 Following Triumph's 
example, BSA took over Child's organisation as a fully owned 
factory distributorship in 1954.57 
The third conduit was created by Brockhouse Engineering when it 
bought into the dealer network of the ailing Indian Motor Cycle 
Co., in 1949.58 This convenient arrangement not only allowed 
Brockhouse to market its own very limited range of machines, but 
also those of a number of other British manufacturers such as 
AMC, Royal Enfield, Vincent and Douglas, through a ready-made 
distribution network. 59 Known as the Indian Company, it was 
later the distribution agent for Royal Enfield (which had been 
badging its own models as 'Indians' for sale in the USA). Later 
on it was purchased by AMC, although it never really achieved 
much commercial success. Finally, some small manufacturers, like 
James Cycle, chose to work through export brokers such as Hambros 
Bank, and Veloce (Velocette), for one, worked out a separate 
arrangement with a dealer in Los Angeles for limited regional 
distribution. 60 
56. Sales in Canada were handled by distributors in Quebec and 
New Brunswick and elsewhere on a regional basis by individual 
dealers. See 'BSA Expansion in North America', British cycles 
and Motor Cycles overseas, December 1949, p. 592. 
57. See 'BSA factory branch in America', Motor Cycle and Cycle 
import Trader, July/August 1954, p. 101. 
58. Colonel Grantham, formerly of the Ministry of Supply and now 
on the staff of Brockhouse Engineering, represented the firm at a 
meeting of the Manufacturers' Union Motor Cycle Manufacturers' 
Section held on 24 September 1949 and outlined his company's 
plans for the American market. The minutes are contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/66. 
59. See Peter Watson, 'Brockhouse: Why the British closed 
Indian', Classic Bike, June 1987, pp. 30-31 and 'Indian sales 
corporation, Named American Distributor of British Motorcycles', 
New York Times, 22 October 1949, p. 24. The arrangment, from 
Enfield's perspective, was outlined in the Chairman's speech to 
the Annual General Meeting, held on 30 January 1956. Copy of the 
speech is on deposit at the Guildhall Library, London. 
60. See 'British Motor Cycles Fill Out US Maker's Line', 
Business Week, 5 November 1949, pp. 89-90, and a memo entitled 
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Its sales severely damaged, the sole remaining American motor 
cycle manufacturer, Harley-Davidson, launched an application 
before the US Tariff Commission in 1951. This sought the 
imposition of quotas and higher duties as the remedy for its 
failure to compete successfully against British imports. The 
stakes on the outcome of this application were high, with 
individual British manufacturers as well as the Union helping to 
fund the legal costs. 61 At home, the Board of Trade also showed 
considerable interest in the course of the proceedings. As far 
as it was concerned, Harley-Davidson's attempt to close off motor 
cycle imports represented "the spearhead of the American attack" 
on British imports generally. 
62 Should Harley-Davidson succeed, 
it was believed there might be serious implications for other 
British exporters, especially motor cars. A dangerous precedent 
could be set for future applications to the Tariff Commission. 63 
'Hambros Trading Corporation', dated 17 September 1949, contained 
in MRC MSS 200/F/3/4/8/83. For general information on 
distribution in the US see, British Cycles and Motor Cycles - 
Interesting Facts and Figures and Some Useful Information, 
published by the Manufacturers' Union in 1950, copy contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/68. 
61. In-total, the cost of opposing Harley-Davidson's application 
to the Tariff Commission cost £11,075. The Manufacturers' Union 
agreed to pay £5,536, see Minutes of the Council meeting of 3 
July 1951, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/71 and minutes 
of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section meeting of 23 November 
1951, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/72. The balance was 
made up by individual manufacturers: BSA (£1,522), Ariel (£166), 
Brockhouse Engineering (£1,993) and Triumph Engineering (£1,858). 
See Triumph Engineering, Accounts Analysis books for 1952/1953, 
p. 102/31, contained in MRC MSS 123/2/1/2. 
62. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 17 June 1952, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/173. The case been also discussed during the Section 
meetings of 16 December 1949 and 23 November 1951, minutes 
contained in Guardbooks MRC MSS 204/3/1/67 and MSS 204/3/172 
respectively. 
63. Harley-Davidson's application to the US Tariff Commission 
received nationwide press coverage, see for example, 'Motorcycles 
bump into trade amity', New York Times, 8 October 1951, p. 33. 
Ironically, the British employed the same tactics the Americans 
had used against them in order to stem the rising numbers of 
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During the hearings evidence was presented to the Commission 
which showed that post-war American motor cycle sales had peaked 
at 54,000 sales in 1948, but had subsequently averaged around 
26,000 machines annually. This was a substantially higher total 
than pre-war figures, which the commission later attributed to a 
growth in overall population, a three-fold increase in national 
income and the growing popularity of motor cycle sport. 
significantly, it was noted that British motor cycles, 
particularly those in the 500cc to 650cc class, especially 
benefited from the Americans' devotion to sporting activities. 64 
The Commission also heard that numbers of British imports jumped 
from under 3 per cent of total sales before 1939 to 40 per cent 
between 1949 and 1951, thanks in part to a 30 per cent 
devaluation of sterling in 1949.65 In the event, the Commission 
turned down Harley-Davidson's application. It reasoned that 
since, "to a very considerable extent, middleweight importers' 
machines have created their own demand" they could not be held 
responsible for the decline in Harley-Davidson's sales. The 
Commission referred to evidence put before it which demonstrated 
that these consumers "doubtless would not have bought any 
Czech and German imports into Australia. The Australian dealers 
protested, but evidently there was nothing illegal against this 
in Australian law. See 'Minutes of the Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers' Section', 16 December 1949, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/67. 
64. US Tariff Commission, Motorcycles and Parts. Report on the 
Fscace-Clause Investigation. Report No. 180.2nd Series. 
Washington D. C.: Government Printing office, 1953, p. 3. The 
Commission also remarked on the role played by US service 
personnel stationed in Britain during the war, who later helped 
to popularise British motor cycles when they returned home after 
1945. 
65. Jbid, pp. 4-5. 
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motorcycle if the middleweight machines had not been 
available. 66 
This decision had a profound effect on British export patterns 
for the next twenty years. In the face of protectionism 
elsewhere, North America became a critical market. During the 
following years, a greater and greater proportion of British 
motor cycle exports would go to North America [see Appendix 1, 
Table XVI]. In turn, because of the sporting tastes of these 
consumers, the accent was increasingly put on performance, 
reinforcing the traditional inclination of British manufacturers 
to mostly produce larger displacement motor cycles. 67 
The very nature of the North American market was an important 
factor in distracting the British from considering the large- 
scale manufacture of lightweight models. Under the conditions of 
world trading, they had little choice with so many other markets 
closed to them. This was a point well understood by Edward 
Turner. America, he declared at the opening of Triumph's new 
distribution centre in Maryland, was "the richest country in the 
world and a fair amount of its wealth was in the hands of young 
men who were interested in the larger and more powerful machines, 
whereas the rest of the world wanted smaller, simpler motor 
cycles for utility transport. " The problem with the 'rest of the 
66. Jbid, pp. 5-6. 
67. See 'US market opening favourable', 29 May 1954, p. 120., 
Motor Cvcle and Cycle Trader, 29 May 1954. British sports car 
manufacturers also exported a high proportion of output to North 
America at this time. Between 1945 and 1959 MG, for example, 
sent 85.4 per cent of its production there. Less than 10 per 
cent was sold in the British market. See whistler, op cit, 
p. 259. 
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world' was that by then much of it was closed to British exports 
because of import restrictions. 68 
Success in North America did not blind British motor cycle 
manufacturers to competitive threats elsewhere. Their fears of a 
resurgence by their old trade adversary, the German industry, 
seemed to have been realised. 
69 In 1948 annual German motor 
cycle production was only 14,000 units, yet only four years 
later, after the Allied occupation authorities had lifted their 
controls, this soared to a total of 292,000 motor cycles, 
scooters and mopeds, most of which had less than*250cc engine 
capacity. By 1953, DKW, the major producer during the pre-war 
era, had already manufactured 100,000 of its 125cc lightweight 
models. 
70 Nor were their fears soothed by assurances from German 
producers that they were currently too absorbed with supplying 
their home market and therefore had no intention of competing in 
British export markets. 
71 Triumph chief Edward Turner was also 
worried. He too had seen the reports of new German motor cycle 
68. Turner's remarks were reported in 'Triumph Corporation's New 
Premises in Baltimore', The Motor Cycle and Cycle Export Trader, 
May/June 1956, p. 67. 
69. Despite their longstanding anxiety about the Germans, the 
British industry evidently turned down an opportunity to 
cooperate with a group of German 
industrialists to manufacture 
motor cycles of German design. Although Major Watling termed 
the 
offer "genuine" evidently no British manufacturer ever 
followed 
it up. See Memo sent to AMC, BSA, Royal Enfield, Norton et al, 
entitled '116/50: Germany - Motor Cycle Manufacture', 
dated 28 
March 1950, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/67. 
70. Further details of the German motor cycle industry during 
1953 are outlined in memos '178/53: Germany - Information' dated 
15 May 1953 ', Confidential Bulletin #4, dated 28 July 1953, both 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/75 and Confidential 
Bulletins #5 and #8 dated 18 September and 16 November 1953 
respectively, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/76. 
71. In early 1949 Major Watling met with a Mr. Nieztsch, a 
Director of the NSU company and the current President of the 
German Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Association. The substance of 
their discussions is outlined in a memo entitled '83/49: 
Germany: Motor Cycle Exports', dated 8 March 1949, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/65. 
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factories which greatly impressed him with "the modernity and 
excellence of the plants, equipped probably with American lease- 
lend [sic] money. " He concluded that there was a distinct danger 
of the British being "handicapped right out of the running. i72 
British manufacturers closely followed the growth of the re- 
emerging German industry. This interest extended beyond the 
trade press to the popular enthusiasts' publications, whose 
reporters visited Germany and prepared stories on the activities 
73 
of their struggling factories. Furthermore, beginning in may 
1953 the Union received the first of a long series of 
confidential assessments of developments among their German 
rivals. These reports detailed production levels, the state of 
their factories, anticipated changes in design and other 
important commercial information. 
74 
The reports all confirmed the alarming increases in levels of 
production and exports. In 1953, one such report warned there 
were now nearly two million motorised two wheelers registered on 
German roads (compared to slightly over one million in Britain) 
and "owing to the continuously improving living standards, there 
was no immediate danger of saturation in the German home market. " 
The German Society of Cycle and Motor Cycle Manufacturers (VFM) 
claimed that 70 per cent of all motor cycle registrations were 
used for "daily transport by manual and office workers of the low 
income group. "75 The following year, the growth of the German 
72. See 'Comment on Prices' by Edward Turner, The motor Cycle, 
18 September 1952, p. 333. 
73. See, for example, 'The Factories in Germany' by Arthur 
Bourne, jbid, 5 May 1949, pp. 352-355 and 'German Motor Cycle 
Design' by Bert Hopwood, ibid, 13 December 1952, pp. 630-632. 
74. These reports, 34 in total, commenced in May 1953 and were 
received regularly until October 1959. 
75. See 'Confidential Bulletin No. 8, Developments in the German 
Cycle, Motor Cycle and Accessories Industries' dated 16 November 
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industry was such that it was widely reported that the NSU 
company alone produced 110,855 machines, as many as the entire 
British industry, albeit nearly all in the lightweight class, and 
its products were being described in the business press as the 
motor cycle equivalent of the Volkswagen motor car. 76 For 
British manufacturers, it now seemed possible that a resurgent 
German industry might again threaten their hard won hegemony. 
The Union was especially concerned about the role of the German 
government in promoting exports. In mid-1955 Union Director Hugh 
Palin wrote to manufacturers and bitterly contrasted the way 
Britain and Germany represented their respective industries: 
There have been numerous occasions where we have found 
that arrangements have been made for German machines to 
be imported into a particular market under much more 
favourable terms than those accorded to the British. I 
have felt that German negotiators put German bicycles 
and motor cycles very high on their list of goods which 
they desire to export, whereas in the case of our 
negotiators they are seldom willing to 'push' any 
particular product. The results for us have already 
been unfortunate in a number of instances and could be 
dangerous. 77 
In the event, despite state assistance, the German 'threat' 
never materialised in the form the British feared it would. 
Instead, thanks to changes in their home market, by late 1956 
1953, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/76 and 'Confidential 
Bulletin No. 3, Developments in the German Motor Cycle Industry', 
dated 15 June 1953, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/75. 
The President of the German Association of Cycle and Motor Cycle 
Manufacturers said that his industry's production programme was 
"mainly influenced by the need of the working classes to obtain 
cheap and efficient transport facilities. " See article entitled 
'Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry', Statist, 23 June 1951, p. 21. 
76. See 'UK Motor Cycles Abroad', Financial Times, 14 September 
1955, contained in clipping volume MRC MSS 204/10/1/3 and 'Know 
your Competitors, XXV - Von Heydekampf', ibid, 16 May 1956, both 
contained in TUC clipping file 12913 and 'Confidential Bulletin 
#9', dated 8 January 1954, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/76. 
77. See memo entitled '193/55: Directors' Personal Report', 
dated 20 April 1955, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/80. 
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German motorised two wheel manufacturers faced a severe crisis of 
over-production. 
78 Moreover, like their British counterparts, 
the Germans also suffered from a press campaign which focused on 
the high rate of motor cycle accidents. As early as 1954, the 
German government responded by beginning to tighten up 
regulations covering motor cycle use. A riding test was mandated 
for all machines over 50cc and the following year there was 
public agitation for a riding test for mopeds and there were more 
and more complaints from the German public about noise emitted by 
motorised two-wheelers. 
79 
The German industry's most serious problem was the public's 
rapidly rising levels of personal income, which led to greater 
levels of motor car ownership and caused motor cycle 
manufacturers to reconsider their future plans. 
80 Indeed, the 
78. When he visited a trade exhibition in October 1956, AMC 
Sales Director J. M. West observed a major change in the attitude 
of his German rivals: "The smug satisfaction of a few years ago 
is conspicuous by its absence, open depression reigns. " In 
West's opinion, "the current position of the German industry [is 
the] equivalent to someone in the middle of the Sahara without a 
compass. " The report, entitled 'The Frankfurt Motor Cycle 
Exhibition, October 1956', dated 21 October 1956, is contained in 
J. M. West's personal papers. For a general account of post-war 
German industry, especially motor manufacturing, see Simon Reich, 
The Fruits of Fascism. London: Cornell University Press, 1990. 
79. See 'Confidential Bulletin No. 17 - Developments in the 
German Cycle, Motor Cycle and Accessory Industries', dated 
December 1954, and 'Confidential Bulletin No. 25 Developments 
... 
', dated August 1955, contained in Guardbooks MRC MSS 
204/3/1/79 and MSS 204/3/1/81 respectively. See also 'German 
Motor Cycle Setback', Financial Times, 26 October 1957, contained 
in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
80 See memos dated 20 January 1955 entitled '23/55: Germany', 
contained in 204/3/1/79 and '357/57: Director's Personal Report' 
dated 7 August 1957, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/86. 
After visiting the 1956 German motor cycle show, Industries 
Association Director Palin identified a "rapid increase in the 
standards of living" as well as bad weather as the main causes 
for declining motor cycle sales. He also noted hostile German 
press coverage, which had "waged a systematic campaign against 
the motor cycle. " See 'Special Report. German Cycle and Motor 
Cycle Show - Frankfort 1956', dated December 1956, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/84. 
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rapid changes in German society forced a fundamental realignment 
in the direction of the German motor cycle industry. During 
NSU's Annual General meeting held in early 1957, Managing 
Director Dr. von Heydekampf reported to the shareholders that, 
such was the state of the domestic motor cycle market, it had 
become "an economic necessity" for the company to diversify its 
product line and commence manufacture of a small motor car. His 
was a dour commentary on the future of motor cycle use in 
Germany: 
After careful market research it has become evident 
that the demand for motor cycles will decline further, 
while scooters and mopeds will retain their popularity, 
although in the foreseeable future demand for them will 
tend to decrease. 81 
Later von Heydekampf described the financial year 1956/57 as "a 
catastrophe" for the entire German motor cycle industry. His 
company alone suffered from a 25 per cent drop in overall 
turnover and the severe slump in demand for motor cycles meant 
that it had diverted nearly 50 per cent of its productive 
capacity to manufacturing small cars. 
82 
NSU was not the only German motor cycle firm to commence 
diversification into four wheeled vehicles because of the falling 
demand for motor cycles. Firms such as BMW, Horex and Zundapp 
soon followed its lead while other firms such as Adler and 
Triumph (no relation to the British firm of the same name) were 
bought up by electrical giant Grundig and ultimately ceased motor 
cycle production altogether. There was another major 
consolidation in 1958 when motor car manufacturers Mercedes Benz 
81. See Bulletin No. 32, 'Report on the German Cycle and Motor 




purchased the Auto-Union combine which included DKW. Finally, in 
1959 the two remaining large producers, Victoria and Express, 
joined DKW to create the so-called 'Zweirad Union'. Like its 
British counterpart, the German industry had became more and more 
concentrated. 
83 
Because of their intense pre-occupation with the perceived 
threat posed by the German industry, British manufacturers were 
largely oblivious to developments in the Far East. In view of 
the outstanding success of the Japanese motor cycle industry only 
ten years later, it is ironic that for most of the 1950s the 
British industry saw Japan nearly exclusively as a potential 
market, not as a possible rival. Although British motor cycle 
manufacturers had a modest export trade with Japan during the 
1920s, this had virtually ceased after 1930 when Japan became 
dominated by militarists, who clamped down on imports of foreign 
manufactured goods. After the war, the British again looked to 
Japan, now under American occupation. As Japan rebuilt its 
devastated economy, there was much demand for cheap personal 
transport, which British motor cycle manufacturers believed they 
were well placed to provide. This belief was reinforced by 
reports from the British embassy in Tokyo which described a 
strong upsurge in motor cycle usage, albeit virtually all in the 
lightweight class. It also stressed that there was much interest 
in imported machines, especially those from Britain. 84 
83. See Confidential Bulletin No. 3, 'Report on the German Cycle 
and Motor Cycle Industry', dated 29 May 1953, contained in MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/88 and memo '59/59 - Bulletin No. 33 - Report on the 
German Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry' dated 18 Feburary 1959, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/90. For details on BMW at 
this time, see 'Shocked into Excellence', Independent on Sunday, 
business section, 28 June 1992, pp. 12-13. 
84. See memo entitled '326/52: Japan - Motor Cycle Exports', 
dated 5 November 1952, which noted the popularity of foreign 
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The Japanese motor cycle industry, insignificant before the 
war, grew rapidly after 1948. As in Germany, this growth was in 
large part the result of American economic aid. British motor 
cycle manufacturers were well aware of the heavy emphasis 
American policy makers put on a speedy Japanese economic 
recovery. The US Congress had, the Union was informed by a 
reliable source, told the Occupation Authorities that their top 
priority was to "get the Japanese on their feet, solvent and able 
to pay their way without American aid. This is almost a 
'religion', and nothing else matters. " Such an attitude did not 
bode well for future British exports to Japan. 85 
Indeed, Japan's desire to protect its nascent industries was 
not at all conducive to encouraging imports. Despite the 
continuing demand from consumers for imported motorised two 
wheelers, the Japanese government was singularly uncooperative to 
requests from British manufacturers for increased import quotas. 
Instead, imports were restricted to a small trickle. 86 Repeated 
protests from the Embassy on behalf of British manufacturers to 
increase import quotas were fruitless. The Japanese claimed the 
restrictions, which included high tariffs, were necessary because 
of their low sterling balances, although one Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) official, writing in 
response to a query from the British Embassy, offered another 
machines. The memo is contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/74. 
See also Document 47a, dated 30 September 1952 and entitled 
'Motor Cycles' and document 47b, letter from N. S. Roberts, 
Minister, British Embassy Tokyo, to Nobuhiko Ushiba, dated 30 
September 1952. Both documents are contained in PRO BT 11/4452. 
85. See memo, 'Japanese Competition', dated 19 April 1950, 
Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/68. 
86. For the popularity of foreign motor cycles on the Japanese 
market, see memo entitled '326/52: Japan - Motor Cycle Exports', 
dated 5 November 1952, contained in MRC MSS 204/3/1/74. 
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explanation. The import restrictions, he baldly stated, were 
protectionist in nature and those few British motor cycles being 
allowed in were strictly for inspection by Japanese 
manufacturers, not for the general use of consumers. 
87 Later 
there were small increases in the British import quota, although 
the Japanese refused to allow entry of British motor cycles with 
more than a 250cc engine displacement size, on the grounds that, 
other than for police and military forces, there was very little 
consumer demand for the larger machines. 
88 
By the mid-1950s, British manufacturers had become as concerned 
about the influx of lightweight machines from the Continent as 
they were about restricted export markets. However, Industries 
Association Director Palin was reluctant to recommend an appeal 
to the Government for increased tariffs. He urged caution on the 
grounds that, "in view of our world-wide interests it would not 
be wise to make any official move for a restriction of imports by 
quotas, or by an increase in import duties. " Several months 
later, Palin again wrote to the Council reporting a further 
deterioration of trade. For the first six months of 1956, 
87. See memo entitled '171/53: Japan - Motor Cycle Exports', 
dated 11 May 1953, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/75. 
According to W. Rawson, BSA's Export Manager, "In Japan there is 
a tremendous demand for motor cycles both domestic and 
imported, 
and the domestic manufactures far from being hurt by 
imported 
machines, are not able to fill more than a fraction of the 
total 
market. We ourselves could easily sell one hundred BSA motor 
cycles per month, judging from our waiting list, but the 
last 
allocation, which was only one tenth of our previous allocation, 
permitted us to bring in only 20 or 30 machines per month. 
" See 
Document 54, letter from W. Rawson to the Board of Trade, dated 
31 October 1952. For the Japanese position, see Document 51a, N. 
Ushiba, Chief of International Trade Bureau, MITI, to N. S. 
Roberts, Minister, British Embassy Tokyo, dated 8 October 1952. 
Both documents are contained in PRO BT 11/4452. 
88. See memo entitled '61/56: Japan - Motor Cycle Exports', 
dated 7 February 1956, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/82 
and memo '61/56: Japan - Motor Cycle Exports', dated 7 February 
1956, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/82. 
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production was down nearly 25 per cent on the comparable period 
in 1955. Imports, however, had continued to rise. As before, 
these were mainly in the under 49cc engine capacity category. 89 
The higher levels of imports caused a split in the ranks of 
British motor cycle manufacturers. While there continued to be 
consensus about the need to maintain, if not to increase, 
existing tariffs and import quotas, some manufacturers wanted to 
petition the Board of Trade to reduce the current duty of 30 per 
cent on imported moped components. In the absence of a domestic 
manufacturer providing 49cc engine units, they, claimed a 
reduction was necessary to allow them "to compete more favourably 
with foreign machines both at home and abroad. " The Industries 
Association's governing council, however, turned their motion 
down. 90 
Tariffs and import duties also created friction among 
manufacturers and certain retailers. In 1958 the Industry 
Association council debated a motion which would have restricted 
its membership only to manufacturers with a total commitment to 
British products. The motion was not adopted but the following 
year the Council did create a membership category for 
Concessionaires and defined a 'British' manufacturer as one whose 
wages and materials were at least 75 per cent British origin. 
Another successful motion forbade manufacturing members from 
89. Domestic production was 105,191 in 1955, and 79,870 in mid- 
1956. By contrast, imports were 13,855 in 1955 and had already 
reached 25,121 in mid-1956. See memo to the Council, dated 20 
August 1956, entitled '280/56: Director's Personal Report', 
contained in ibid. 
90. =-d- Later that October, the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' 
Section unanimously voted against the same motion once more. 
See, minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section, 25 
October 1956, contained in Industry Association Guardbook, MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/84. 
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exhibiting foreign machines on their pavilions at the annual 
Show-91 
Although sales of all motorised two wheelers declined between 
1956 and 1958, lightweight models were affected proportionately 
far less and the market share of the under 150cc machines 
continued to gain relative to the heavier weight, orthodox motor 
cycles. The former now held two-thirds of total new sales, 
compared to one half in 1955. The trend was vividly illustrated 
in sales to various governmental and service organisations. 
While it was disappointing that British consumers were buying 
more and more foreign machines, the manufacturers were outraged 
to discover that formerly loyal fleet purchasers had also begun 
to stray. Not only did police forces begin to buy foreign 
machines, mainly scooters, but so did high profile commercial 
users such as BOAC. Even the RAC began to use Vespas (albeit 
British built models) for its patrol vehicles. Protests were 
made, phrased as patriotic exhortations, but without success. 
92 
91. The initial debate about membership took place on at a 
Council meeting conducted on 1 October 1958, see minutes 
contained Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/89. The new membership 
category was adapted during a subsequent Council meeting held on 
24 March 1959, while the Show rules were amended during a meeting 
on 26 May 1959. Both minutes are contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/59. 
92. See memo (no date but probably autumn 1957) entitled 
'165/57: Director's Personal Report', contained in Industry 
Association Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. For reports of sales 
of imported foreign scooters see, for example, a Industry 
Association memo, dated 21 March 1958, which contains a protest 
to the Blackburn Police, who had recently bought Italian 
scooters, entitled '139/58: Director's Personal Report', 
contained in Industry Association Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/87. 
See "More British motor scooters on way "' a story about the 
Birmingham Police using Vespas, built under licence by Douglas, 
published in the Birmingham Post, (no date, summer 1956) 
contained in the Industry Association news clipping book, MRC MSS 
204/10/1/3. See also memo entitled '323/57: BOAC - Supply of 
Motor Cycles', dated 15 July 1957, which described how the 
airline was using German scooters for transporting aircrew and a 
series of stories in the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, about the 
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Moreover, the motor cycle press, or at least the technical 
publications, were becoming less obedient than they had before in 
toeing the manufacturers' line. For example, in a memo written 
in 1959 Industry Association Director Hugh Palin expressed his 
"complete frustration" with the editor of the Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader who, despite having been warned on several 
occasions, had given prominent coverage to the expansion of the 
premises of a leading importer. This editor had subsequently 
compounded his disloyalty by providing what was described as 
"extensive and enthusiastic" coverage of foreign machines. Such 
reporting, Palin told the miscreant, was simply not acceptable. 
Industries Association members were "extremely annoyed" by this 
editorial policy and it was the Trader's duty, "as a British 
trade paper [that] the emphasis should always be first and 
foremost on British products. " If it insisted on carrying 
stories about overseas rivals they "must be included ... [in] 
much less prominent positions towards the back. 1193 
Yet, Palin had to concede, British manufacturers really had 
only themselves to blame for the fact that press coverage was 
shifting to the imports. As the editors of the technical press 
had pointed out to him, they would have provided more coverage of 
British-made models but the manufacturers had failed to provide 
them with test machines. As Hugh Palin noted, neither did the 
manufacturers "exert [themselves] very much to provide 
interesting copy, which they [the press] urgently need. " If they 
Liverpool Police buying Vespas (19 February 1955), the Cambridge 
police doing the same (15 October 1955, p. 32) and the RAC using 
foreign scooters (15 March 1958). 
93. See memo dated 24 September 1959 entitled '380/59. 
Director's Personal Report', p. 4. and letter from Palin to F. G. 
Bebb, editor Trader Publishing Co., dated 13 October 1959, both 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/91. 
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wanted better coverage, there would have to be more 
cooperation. 94 
By 1958, the lightweight market, particularly that for 
scooters, finally began to settle down. The manufacturers had 
still to produce a scooter of their own to successful challenge 
the imports. Writing in the Financial Times the following year, 
Edward Turner mounted his own defence of the industry's failure 
to make an entry into the scooter market. He agreed with the 
industry's critics that the type of people who bought scooters 
was quite different from the kind of consumers the industry had 
catered to in the past: 
The scooter owner is not an ex-motor cyclist, he or 
she, is a new class of motor vehicle owner who is in 
many ways parallel to the average car owner who buys 
his vehicle to tour, to shop, to go to work, and is not 
technically interested in the vehicle as such. This is 
in contrast to the motor cyclist who is usually an 
enthusiast for motor cycles and motor cycling, and is 
ready to discuss technicalities of design and 
performance at the drop of a spanner. 95 
True, the Italians may have gained a strong hold of the British 
scooter market, but Turner claimed it did not have to be 
permanent. This was now about to change, since BSA/Triumph were 
planning to make their first serious incursion into the scooter 
market since the abortive 1956 'Beeza' project. Despite the fact 
that most scooters were powered by engines in the 98cc to 175cc 
engine displacement class, Turner's firm intended to manufacture 
94. See memo entitled '32/56. Motor Cycle Publicity - The 
Technical Press', dated 17 January 1956, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/82. 
95. Turner also admitted that most British scooter manufacturers 
originated from smaller firms, which because of their relatively 
higher costs, were unable to compete with their Continental 
rivals' lower prices. See 'Scooters: A British Challenge to the 
Continentals', Financial Times, 20 October 1958, contained in 
clipping volume MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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what he called a 'super-scooter' in the 250cc class, although 
this would be priced competitively against a Vespa. The new 
model (badged as either the Triumph 'Tigress' or BSA 'Sunbeam'), 
Turner was convinced, would establish a strong British presence 
in the domestic scooter market. 96 
Such confidence notwithstanding, the trading patterns continued 
to work against British motor cycle manufacturers. During 1957 
and 1958, the flow of imports had grown even larger. By the late 
summer of 1958 they had actually exceeded Britain's motor cycle 
exports in volume, if not value, an "unprecedented situation" in 
the words of Hugh Palin. 
97 The composition of the imports 
continued to be overwhelmingly in the under 150cc category and 
were mostly Italian in origin. Industries Association Director 
Palin was convinced this situation, which he said was "causing us 
considerable concern, " was actually the result of the "great 
pressure" being put on British concessionaires by Italian 
factories. Palin further noted that Britain had become the 
Italian scooter industry's "biggest and most important market. " 
In a review of domestic sales over the past twelve months that he 
prepared in mid-1957, Palin reported the good news that, for the 
first time, over 200,000 new machines had been sold on the Home 
market. Unfortunately, more than 100,000 of these were now 
foreign made. The British industry still seemed incapable of 
winning back the loyalty of their own consumers, no matter how 
96. Ibid. The BSA/Triumph scooter was priced at between £220 
and £250 (depending on specification) compared to between £195 
and £230 for a Vespa. 
97. See memo entitled '357/57: Director's Personal Report', 
dated 7 August 1957, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/86. 
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many different types of new lightweight machines they 
introduced. 98 
Moreover, sales of the traditional large displacement motor 
cycles slumped. In 1958, after 200 workers at the AMC Woolwich 
factory had been made redundant, an official stated that "home 
demand had fallen off to such an extent that they could be said 
to be living on export orders. " He also expressed apprehension 
about the contents of the upcoming Budget, which was believed to 
contain further credit restrictions. 
99 
Again the industry blamed government policy for its problems. 
The official briefs dating back to the 1920s and 1930s were 
dusted off and re-cycled, as the manufacturers travelled down 
from Coventry to London to again seek concessions from Ministers 
in Whitehall. These were necessary, they adamantly maintained, 
to resuscitate the industry's fortunes, both at home and abroad. 
The industry insisted that the solution to improving its economic 
health was simple. They must expand production at home, 
especially in the lightweights and scooters, in order to lower 
their costs and so remain competitive in export markets. In 
time, presumably, this would result in healthier sales of the 
larger, orthodox motor cycles. 
100 
98. In mid-1957, there had already been 24,000 Italian, 14,000 
German and 6,000 French motorised two-wheeled imports. See memo 
dated 7 August 1957, entitled '357/57: Director's Personal 
Report', contained in Industry Association Guardbook, MRC MSS 
204/3/1/86; see memo dated 21 March 1958, entitled '139/58: 
Director's Personal Report', contained in Industry Association 
Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/88. See also, 'Only Scooters 
prosper', Economist, 14 August 1957, p. 577. 
99. See '200 motor cycle men given notice', Times, 12 April 
1958, contained in TUC clipping collection, file 12915, on 
deposit at the MRC. 
100. This view was expounded by Hugh Palin in an article 
published in 1957. Palin accused the government of continuing to 
"strangle the production and sales" of mopeds by treating them as 
the larger, more powerful motor cycles. Moreover, requiring 
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The best way the government could help boost domestic sales was 
to follow the manufacturers' four fold policy: it must reduce 
Purchase Tax, stabilize fluctuating hire purchase terms, lessen 
regulations (ie lower or maintain the riders' age, and not 
require safety devices such as compulsory helmets or turning 
indicators), and copy their Continental rivals by removing tax 
and drivers' licences and tests for mopeds. 101 Once more, the 
industry trid to shift responsibility onto the government to 
create a more favourable environment for greater motor cycle 
sales. The lightweights and scooters did not have to be foreign 
made; the British industry could supply the Home market, if given 
the proper incentives. The fact that the legislative concessions 
sought by the industry would also benefit imported machines 
equally did not seem to greatly trouble British manufacturers. 
Moreover, the industry's arguments still rested on what was 
essentially an article of faith. Their case contained little 
factual information to convince sceptical ministry of 
Transportation and Board of Trade officials to change their 
policies. And the industry's problems were now vastly aggravated 
drivers' licences and test were not only a deterrent to 
prospective consumers but also undermined "the efforts of the 
manufacturers to found a moped industry on anything but a small 
scale. " See 'Two Wheeled Transport', FBI Review, October 1957, 
pp. 57-64. The union's position was also produced in a popular 
format designed for wide distribution through retailers, see 
Vehicle Legislation and the Moped, dated March 1957. A copy of 
this pamphlet is contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/85. 
101. This is the substance of remarks made by Industry 
Association Director Hugh Palin when he met E. I. R. MacGregor, an 
official at the Ministry of Transport's Road Safety Division, 
during a meeting of 27 February 1958, see MacGregor's report, 
dated 28 February 1958, contained in sub-file RS2/15/00, PRO MT 
92/63, entitled 'Accidents. Mopeds. Licensing and Accidents 
rates. ' Compulsory helmet use was not adopted at that time, on 
the grounds that such a law could not be effectively enforced. 
See draft letter dated 11 June 1956, Minister of Transport to 
Godfrey Nicolson MP, contained in PRO MT 92/33. 
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because of growing public reaction against its products, 
reflected in even more sensationalist press coverage of motor 
cycle accidents. 
In April 1957, a delegation from the Industries Association met 
with Harold Watkinson, Minister of Transport, in order to press 
their arguments that, in the interest of stimulating sales of 
mopeds, the government should drop the minimum riding age from 16 
to 15 and waive the requirement for riding tests and licences. 
During their presentation, the delegation showed some sensitivity 
of public disapproval of how motorised two wheelers had been 
operated on British roads. Their brief defended the skills of 
both motor cyclists and scooterists, explaining that "young men 
of today handle with competence complex machinery that their 
fathers ... only dreamed of. " They admitted, however, that there 
"will always be so-called reckless young men. Some will ride 
motor cycles, some drive sports cars ... and in wartime pilot 
aircraft, command tanks or submarines. " The manufacturers 
claimed that government regulations were "strangling output" and 
maintained that prospective moped buyers were "put off because 
they fear the test or regard it as too much of a nuisance. " Yet, 
they insisted, greater moped sales would ultimately stimulate 
sales of the larger orthodox models. 
102 
Shortly afterwards, Director Hugh Palin and another delegation 
met with Richard Nugent MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation. During this meeting 
102. See 'Ride that moped at 16 ... and no L-tests', News 0j=nj-c2-e-, 2 April 1957, contained in clipping volume MRC MSS 
204/10/1/3 and memo from E. W. McCallum, Engineering Industries 
Division, Board of Trade, to C. P. F. North, Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, dated 17 April 1957 and contained in PRO MT 
92/63. 
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they were told that there was little likelihood of any change in 
existing legislation, because of the high motor cycle accident 
rate. As the minutes of the meeting record, Nugent left the 
delegation little room for doubt about the government's position. 
Because of the "high density of traffic" on British roads which 
made motor vehicle operation so demanding, "he saw little chance 
of public opinion, or of opinion in Parliament, accepting the 
idea of abolishing the requirement that young riders of low 
powered cycles [hold] driving licences and'pass a driving test. " 
Moreover, the "motor cycle was shown by accident records to be 
the most dangerous type of vehicle" and Parliament simply would 
not agree with any measure lowering the age limit for riding 
one. 
103 
Nor were Ministry officials convinced by the industry's 
argument that it was desirable, from the perspective of reducing 
road congestion, to promote greater use of mopeds through removal 
of these regulatory impediments. Again, privately they remained 
suspicious of the industry's motives: 
Mr. Palin's arguments about the relative safety of the 
moped are open to some doubt and his argument that 
increased use of mopeds would reduce the use of motor 
cycles and so assist road safety is inconsistent with 
his point that the manufacturers wished to appeal to a 
new class of user. It is more likely that increased 
use of mopeds would, in fact, result in decreased use 
of pedal cycles and therefore bring additions to the 
numbers of mechanically propelled vehicles on the roads 
and so add in some degree to accidents figures unless 
the moped were safer than the pedal cycle which even 
Mr. Palin does not claim. 1 4 
103. See 'Note of meeting with a Deputation from the British 
Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry Association', dated 29 May 1957, 
contained in PRO MT 92/63. 
104. See brief prepared by E. I. R. MacGregor, Road Safety 
Division, Ministry of Transport, dated 28 February 1958, 
contained in ibid. 
281 
There were also instances when the industry failed to prevent 
the indiscretions of its own members, which reinforced the 
prejudices of its critics. In 1960, for example, after a bill 
which would have liberalised existing moped regulations died in 
Parliament, Palin wrote to manufacturers to explain why they had 
been unable to muster a sufficient number of sympathetic MPs to 
carry the Bill. The problem, Palin claimed, was that the 
Association's lobbying effort had been "sabotaged" from within. 
The finger of blame was pointed at the "ill-advised publicity" 
generated by a certain importer, who had widely advertised that 
he had mopeds in stock which could easily reach 50 miles per 
hour. This had occurred at a time when the Association was 
trying to convince Parliamentarians that the moped was 
essentially a powered bicycle and not capable of speeds in excess 
of 30 miles per hour! 
105 
The industry's complaints that legislative burdens hobbled 
their competitive position with Continental rivals fell on 
equally unsympathetic ears. As one Board of Trade official noted 
in 1957, the real issue was the fact that the industry was trying 
to shift the responsibility of its own tardy reaction to market 
changes on to the government. Noting that there were peculiar 
circumstances prevailing on the Continent which had created their 
robust home markets for such machines, he made the following 
observation: 
105. See memo 253/60: Director's Confidential Report' dated 13 
May 1960, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/93. Columnist 
Francis Jones believed the Bill had been "torpedoed [because of] 
the accident panic ... and nothing else, [combined with] the 
apparent inability of some MPs to see any difference between a 
motorised bicycle and a 100 mph road-burner. " See 'Motor Cycle 
Matters', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 8 April 1960, p. 12. 
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.I think it would be true to say that in 1949, had the UK Industry been asked then whether the mopeds 
which were just beginning to be thought about in 
European production circles would become the popular 
vehicles they have, the answer would have been to the 
effect that the demand was bound to be a temporary one, 
and that the vogue would die away as quickly as it 
appeared. The UK Industry now accepts that in this 
assessment of the situation in 1949 manufacturers made 
an error of judgement. Belatedly, they have tried, and 
are still trying hard, to catch up with their European 
competitors, but they are some four years behind, and 
their efforts must at first be concentrated on the home 
market for technical and commercial reasons. 106 
Once more, the Ministry refused to bail the British motor cycle 
industry out of a problem of its own making. 
Despite their failure to move either politicians or Whitehall 
officials, the industry seemed by 1959 to be improving its hold 
on the home market, at least in orthodox heavyweight motor cycle 
sales and was believed to have even begun to make inroads in the 
moped and scooter markets. More significantly, two large 
manufacturers who had hitherto not committed substantial 
resources to the lightweight machines now entered into the 
marketplace. Raleigh Industries, Britain's largest bicycle 
producer, came out with a moped in 1958. This was followed by a 
much anticipated announcement by Villiers Engineering, the 
country's dominant producer of proprietary engines, that it was 
finally going to produce a 49cc unit for mopeds. This would 
place the smaller independent manufacturers in a far better 
competitive position relative to overseas rivals. 107 
106. See memo from E. W. MacCallum, Engineering Industries 
Division, Board of Trade, to C. P. F. North, Ministry of Transport 
and Civil Aviation, dated 17 April 1957, contained in op cit. 
107. According to Francis Jones, the reason that Villiers had 
not previously produced a moped engine was insufficient 
manufacturing capacity. Villiers had, however, absorbed its 
chief rival JAP in 1945. See 'Motor Cycle Matters', Motor Cycle 
-nd Cycle Trader, 7 December 1957, p. 134. 
283 
One event subject to great publicity was the launch of the new 
BSA/Triumph scooter, conducted in London at a Park Lane location, 
attended by, among others, motor car racer Stirling Moss and 
entertainer Harry Secombe. Managing Director Edward Turner had 
to admit that, although there were an estimated quarter million 
scooters on British roads, "so far, however, only a relatively 
small proportion" were made in British factories. That, he 
predicted, would soon change, especially as both AMC and 
Velocette were also near to introducing their own scooters as 
well-108 
The vitality of the German industry might have flagged but the 
British on the other hand, so the trade press claimed, were 
stronger than ever. The proof was to be found in the new models, 
mainly in the lightweight category, which continued to be 
developed by the British firms. Not only did the domestic 
scooters have good designs and "contemporary styling" but they 
were manufactured with "the traditional quality in workmanship 
and finish for which British motor cycle factories are renowned. " 
New models in the 250cc category included the Ariel 'Leader', 
which was heavily influenced by scooter design, with the 
extensive use of fibreglass bodywork. In fact, many of the more 
traditional models produced by Triumph, Norton and Royal Enfield 
featured scooter-type styling. 109 The influx of foreign scooters 
and mopeds continued, but they now had more determined domestic 
108. The BSA/Triumph gala took place at Grosvenor House, while 
the new Raleigh moped was unveiled at the Savoy Hotel. See 
'Blare of Publicity Follows Pre-Show Presentations of New 
Models', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 8 November 1958, pp. 66-68. 
See also 'The Lightweight Trend', The Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Export Trader, January/February 1958, p. l. 
109. See 'Motor Cycle Industry's strong position', Export 
ade , January/February 1959, pp. 14-16. 
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competition. Even the columnist Francis Jones, reviewing the 
1958 Show, expressed the belief that the industry had finally got 
it right and was producing the kind of machines that British 
consumers wanted. 
110 
Not all, however, was well on the race-track. As in the 
marketplace, British competitive success in sporting events was 
declining. Yet, for some years after the war their position had 
seemed secure. Unlike their football and cricket teams, British 
motor cycles kept on winning race after race, particularly in 
road racing venues such the Isle of Man TT. In contrast with the 
defeat of the British national football team by the Hungarians in 
1953 (the first time a foreign football team had won a major 
match on a home pitch), British motor cycles stayed on top, at 
least in the medium and heavy weight categories. 111 However, 
starting in 1947 (the first post-war TT) Italian machines scored 
victories in the lightweight (under 250cc) category, although as 
late as 1954, British machines still maintained a strong presence 
at the Senior and Junior TTS. As one trade journal commented, 
such victories demonstrated "once again that while British 
manufacturers have been content to leave to the Continental 
makers the development of the lightweight as a speed machine, in 
the 350cc and 500cc classes British reliability remains 
unsurpassed. ""112 
no. In Jones' words, "some makers are getting nearer to the 
original idea of the powered cycle, instead of trying to develop 
their products into super-lightweights. See "A Show that 
inspires confidence", Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 22 November 
1958, pp. 155-57. 
111. In 1953 the top two positions in both the Senior and Junior 
TT were won by British machines (Norton) and riders. See Matthew 
Freudenberg, The Isle of Man, op cit, pp. 165-166. 
112. See 'A Memorable TT', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 26 June 
1954, p. 173. 
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British supremacy in the 'Senior' and 'Junior' categories, 
(500cc and 350cc engine displacement respectively) lasted until 
the mid-1950s, when the Italian Gilera and Moto Guzzi teams 
started to take the top prizes. The greater technical 
sophistication of the foreign competition, especially the more 
advanced multi-cylinder engine designs, gave them an increasing 
edge in performance. Then, in 1955, a four cylinder Gilera model 
won the prestigious Senior TT race (with a British rider, Geoff 
Duke). Company owner Giuseppe Gilera had no doubt about the 
significance of this victory: "We race to win. It brings 
prestige. That sells motor cycles. ""113 
The single cylinder Nortons, once so formidable, had become 
dated and unable to maintain the pace now set by the 
opposition. 
114 The tone of press coverage reflected a sense of 
dismay that this traditionally British dominated sport was 
slipping into foreign hands-115 Finally, in late 1956 Norton 
Motors Managing Director Gilbert Smith and Sales Director J. M. 
West made a "surprise announcement" which shocked many in the 
motor cycle racing world. Henceforth AJS and Norton, both AMC 
i 
113. Ironically, most of the Gilera factory output was in the 
150cc class and its largest production model was only 300cc. The 
machine that won the Senior TT was specially built for the race. 
See 'Britain must race to win', Daily Sketch, 2 July 1955, 
contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
114. See Massimo Clarke, 100 Years of Motorcycles, New York: 
Portland House, 1988, pp. 82-92. 
115. According to one national daily: "It is not only in 
football that Britain is suffering a sporting eclipse. In the 
one field in which this country has for so long been supreme the 
foreigners are now setting the pace - motorcycling. [Except for 
a period during the 1930s]... motor cycles made in Britain, 
ridden almost without exception by British riders, were better 
than anything any other country could produce. " See 'Britain no 
longer leaders world motorcycling', Evening Standard, [no date, 
but probably October 1954], contained in the Manufacturers' Union 
newspaper clipping book, MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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subsidiaries, would no longer sponsor an official factory race 
team. 
Smith and West stated that their firms could no longer compete 
successfully with foreign entries, which like the Gilera, were 
now highly developed, special purpose 'one off' models. The two 
British managers maintained that, unlike the foreigners, their 
machines were essentially production models modified for the race 
track. AMC had neither the resources nor the desire to try and 
match the achievements of the foreign machines. In the words of 
AMC Managing Director Donald Heather, they would withdraw "to 
enable the companies to devote all their technical knowledge and 
experience to standard products. vt116 
The following year, Hugh Palin responded to criticism that the 
industry had been lax in allowing foreign motor cycles to wrest 
away race track supremacy. He stated that the Italian victors at 
the TT were "specialised products bearing no relation at all to 
what the manufacturers concerned normally produce". The British, 
by contrast, used "virtually standard production models. " Palin 
drew a parallel between the race track and the showroom. While 
it was true that the Italians and Germans had scored successes in 
both areas, but Britain was still the world's major supplier of 
orthodox motor cycles above 350cc capacity. Moreover, Palin 
116. Gilbert Smith also commented on the great expense required 
to hire top class riders. He calculated that it would cost 
Norton £156,000 alone just to maintain three first class riders. 
See 'Norton and AJS quit racing', Daily Herald, 8 November 1956, 
contained in TUC clippings file 12913, on deposit at the MRC. 
For Heather's remark, see 'No Norton or AJS works entries', 
Manchester Guardian, 8 November 1956, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
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argued, for all the criticism the industry had suffered, it "has 
remained on a sound economic basis, unlike its German rivals-11117 
The industry may have been in a stronger position than before, 
but it was also in a state of transition, as far as the character 
of higher management was concerned. From the mid-1950s and for 
several years afterwards, a number of senior managers, who had 
come into office during the 1930s or before, left the scene. One 
of the first to go was Charles Collier, who died at age 69 while 
at work in the factory during 1954. Together with his brother 
Harry (who had died in a motor cycle accident in 1943) and then 
subsequently Donald Heather, he had managed AMC for many years. 
His obituary noted that "throughout a lifetime devoted to the 
production of motor cycles, he never lost his deep interest in 
motor cycling. " The same could not be said of his successors, 
Alan Sugar and J. F. Kelleher (who was Harry Collier's son-in- 
law), who were more interested in the financial side of the 
enterprise than the technical. Indeed, J. M. West, a fellow Board 
member, doubted whether either of them were able to "tell the 
difference between a two stroke and a four stroke engine. ""118 
Gilbert Smith had begun work at Norton Motors as a boy and had 
been appointed Managing Director in 1945. Largely under his 
direction the company built up a reputation of manufacturing 
Britain's finest racing machines. In 1958 Smith had a falling 
out with the AMC Board, which had bought Norton several years 
earlier, causing him to tender his resignation. He subsequently 
117. See 'Why Foreign Machines Won TT Victories', Coventry 
Evening Telegraph, 27 June 1957, contained in newspaper clipping 
book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
118. See Collier's obituary, The Motor Cycle, 2 September 1954, 
p. 311, Peter Hartley, Matchless - Once the Largest British Motor 
Cycle Manufacturer, p. 152 and J. M. West interview, 23 November 
1994. 
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became a Director of Raleigh Industries, responsible for its 
Motor Division. Smith died in 1964.119 
Also during 1958, Eric Walker, long-time Chairman and Managing 
Director of the Excelsior Motor Company, died at age 74. Walker 
was described as a "life-long [motor cycle] enthusiast" who had 
received an MBE during the war for designing a paratroopers' 
motor cycle. 
120 Several years later, Eric Barnett, long-standing 
Managing Director of Francis-Barnett even after it had been 
bought up by AMC, was killed in a traffic accident. Son of the 
company's founder, Barnett was a dedicated enthusiast who enjoyed 
personally testing his firm's motor cycles whenever possible, on 
the grounds that he believed in "manufacturers riding their own 
machines and knowing their products. '"121 The following year 
another major management figure from the inter-war era, Frank 
Smith, who had been Chairman and Managing Director of Enfield 
Cycles since 1935 (having succeeded his father), died of a 
lengthy illness. Smith, another dedicated enthusiast, had also 
been, among other things, President of the Redditch Motor Cycle 
Club. 122 
The passing of these men did not necessarily mean a radical 
change of orientation in their firms. In some cases, these did 
not long outlast their former managers. It was BSA, however, 
where the change-over was particularly marked. In 1956, James 
Leek, who had become Managing Director of BSA Small Heath 
119. See Woollett, op cit, p. 264 and obituary, Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader, 7 August 1964. 
120. See obituary, ibid, 29 March 1958, p. 374. 
121. See biographical piece prepared by R. H. Thomas, The Export 
ceder, June 1946, p. 332 and obituary, Motor Cycle and Cycle 
Trader, 15 December 1961. 
122. See biographical piece prepared by R. H. Thomas, The Export 
T der, December 1946, pp. 466-468 and obituary, Motor Cycle and 
CCM e Trader, 4 May 1962, p. 62. 
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operations during the war, retired at age 64 because of ill- 
health. It was noted that as late as 1946, he had remained a 
keen motor cycle enthusiast. One report claimed that there was 
"nothing he loves better than 'hitting it up' to 80 mph or more 
in a car or a motor cycle on a road which lends itself to such 
speed. " It was also true that, at least until shortly after the 
war, he used to come to the factory riding a motor cycle side car 
combination. The following year, it was announced that Edward 
Turner, Managing Director of Triumph Engineering since 1936, 
would become head of BSA's newly formed Automotive Division, 
which covered the motor cycle subsidiaries along with the Daimler 
motor car operation. 
123 
Turner should have been an ideal choice to manage BSA's motor 
transport interests, particularly the motor cycle end. During 
his long career in the industry he had been involved in virtually 
all aspects of design work and factory management while at Ariel 
Motors and then Triumph Engineering. Often a difficult person to 
work with (Hopwood recalled him as "the most egotistical man that 
I have ever met" although also praised his "down to earth 
business common-sense and ... his ingenuity") he nonetheless 
succeeded in making it a highly profitable company. 124 His 
tenure at BSA was less successful. Triumph's operation was small 
in comparison to BSA and Turner may well have been overwhelmed 
with the task of coordinating a much larger enterprise. 125 
123. See biographical piece prepared by G. E. Thomas, Export 
Trader, August 1946, pp. 395-396 and Ryerson, on cit, pp. 59-60. 
124. See Hopwood, op cit, p. 15 and p. 25. 
125. So is the opinion of John Balder, who was BSA's Service 
Manager during Turner's stint as Managing Director. Balder 
interview, 18 November 1994. 
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In fact, Turner refused to even move his office from Coventry 
to Birmingham. On one occasion, Neile Shilton, a Triumph sales 
representative, once saw him move his desk from one side of his 
Meriden office to the other, declaring that he intended to get no 
closer to the main Small Heath headquarters. Hopwood recalled 
that he seemed "to hibernate at Meriden with rare visits indeed 
to Selly Oak [the Ariel factory] and Small Heath. " Worse yet, 
Turner, at heart always a Triumph partisan, did little to 
encourage the smooth coordination of the three motor cycle 
subsidiaries, and instead "greatly encouraged the animosity 
between the three operations. "126 He also began to suffer from 
health problems, which may have been the cause of his 
occasionally eccentric public statements and that would 
ultimately cause him to retire in several years time. In 
practical terms, all this meant that during the period between 
1956, when James Leek retired and 1964, when a new Managing 
Director was appointed, BSA's motor cycle operations functioned 
virtually without any central direction or purpose. 
127 
126. Hopwood noted that Turner "flatly refused to allow any 
movement towards inter-company management collaboration and it is 
not surprising that, given this sort of encouragement, a barrier 
of mistrust grew which was, much later, almost impossible to 
remove. " See Hopwood, op cit, p. 128 and p. 132. See also 
Shilton, on cit, p. 147, Ryerson, o c' , pp. 153-158 and the entry 
on Edward Turner, prepared by Barbara Smith, contained in the 
Dictionary-of-Business Biography, pp. 564-569. 
127. In early 1961, Turner wrote a journal article wherein he 
predicted that in 50 years time motor cycles would be powered by 
thermo-nuclear generators. In fairness to Turner, the article 
may have been written in less than perfect seriousness. See 'A 
Turner forecast - the motor cycle of AD 20101, Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader, 13 January 1961, pp. 258-259; in John Balder's 
opinion, during the Turner years as Division Managing Director, 
there was little or no direction received by the subsidiaries. 
One manifestation of this lack of leadership was the fact that 
almost no new product development occurred under the Turner 
Directorship. See Balder interview, 18 November 1994. 
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Sangster himself, after years as the dominating figure of the 
industry, was now coming to the end of his active career. Having 
taken over the BSA Chairmanship after the turmoil following the 
removal of Bernard Docker, he had been able to stabilise the 
firm. BSA underwent a period of retrenchment, selling off 
various subsidiaries, such as the bicycle and earth-moving 
equipment divisions, and substantially reduced the debt passed on 
from the Docker era. 128 Yet, among all this activity, Sangster 
himself retained his earlier interest in motor cycling and motor 
cycle sports. Shilton, for example, recalled an incident during 
this time when Sangster arrived at the Mallory Park race circuit 
in his Bentley motor car, but "within a few minutes [he] had put 
on his riding kit and was enjoying himself round the circuit on 
my Tiger. i129 However, Sangster never made any secret of the 
fact that he had only taken over from Docker as a short term 
measure until a more permanent replacement could be found. 
130 
In 1959 he found his successor. Eric Turner (no relation to 
Edward), an accountant who was Managing Director of Blackburn 
Aircraft and barely 40 years old, was recruited onto the BSA 
board. Unlike either Sangster or Leek, Eric Turner was not an 
enthusiast. When Shilton first met him, his immediate impression 
was that he "did not like motor cycles" and was inclined to see 
them as just another 'consumer durable'. Still the new era 
started off well. Sangster delivered his final Chairman's speech 
128. The sale of the bicycle subsidiary was especially 
significant, insofar that its Montgomery St. factory had built 
the Group's clip-on bicycle engine unit, the 'Winged Wheel. ' 
After the sale, BSA would do little development in this 
lightweight engine category for years to come. 
129. Shilton, on cit, p. 88. 
130. See the entry on John (Jack) Young Sangster, prepared by 
Barbara Smith, contained in op cit, pp. 55-59. 
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at the 1960 Annual General Meeting, proudly informing 
shareholders of a profit of £3,418,548, compared to the 
£1,604,941 declared in 1956. He then retired as chairman and 
although still on the board appeared to play little active role 
in the running of the company. He is remembered by one senior 
executive at this time as a 'dapper man' who "lived in some style 
in his Park Lane apartments. ""131 
BSA's improved position was reflected throughout the industry 
generally. Indeed, 1959 had been the best sales year ever for 
the British motor cycle industry, with a grand total of some 
250,000 machines sold, of which 127,500 were orthodox motor 
cycles. There were a number of factors responsible for the high 
sales. The weather was exceptionally good that spring and 
summer. The government, with an eye to an impending General 
Election, had relaxed Hire-Purchase regulations and lowered 
Purchase Tax. 132 Many Managing Directors must have thought that 
this development vindicated their many briefs to Ministers and, 
at last, they had cleared the hard times and entered a period of 
increased sales which would be more than temporary [see Appendix 
1, Tables XXI and XXII]. However, these were deceptive 
statistics. For example, many of the machines listed as part of 
British production were actually foreign designed units, such as 
the Douglas 'Vespa' built under licence in the UK. Out of the 
estimated 500,000 lightweights on British roads, only a small 
proportion were believed to be domestically produced. 
133 
131. See Shilton, o3t, p. 88, Chairman's Statement, contained 
in the 1960 BSA Annual Report, p. 14, MSS 1OA/4/38 and Balder 
interview, 18 November 1994. 
132. See 'In the Summer of '59', by Peter Watson, Classic Bike, 
December 1986, pp. 32-36. 
133. Total motorised two wheeled production for 1959 was 
actually recorded as 248,900 units, however, 108,000 of these 
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In fact, it was estimated that British lightweight and scooter 
producers had a total annual manufacturing capacity of only 
75,000 units and that the size of the average company was still 
small scale -a case of too many firms producing too few 
machines. 134 This hampered the competitiveness of the industry, 
as one industry executive noted, the "principal trouble with the 
British powered two-wheeled industry is that very largely it is 
composed of a number of small manufacturing units which tend to 
be at a disadvantage against the large Continental concerns. ""135 
Nor was the situation in export markets really much improved. 
In early 1959 Industries Association Director Hugh Palin prepared 
a confidential report that showed that Britain's share of world 
motor cycle sales had been steadily declining. From 60 per cent 
of all exports in 1935, the British proportion had dropped to 
19.3 per cent in 1955 and reached 12.4 per cent in 1957. It was 
small comfort that Germany's share, 61 per cent in 1938, had been 
34 per cent in 1955 but 23 per cent in 1957. The difference had 
been made up by the Italians and Czechoslovakia (34 and 20 per 
cent respectively in 1957). 
136 
Even if the 1959 season had been exceptionally good, the 
industry's higher sales were purchased at the price of even 
were mopeds and scooters of mostly Italian origin built under 
licence in Britain. A further 13,500 were three wheeled 
machines. See Business Monitor. Production Series, Motor Cycles, 
Three-Wheeled Vehicles. Pedal Cycles and Parts. (1968). See also 
'Half a million extra customers', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
13 March 1959, p. 385. 
134. The estimate of lightweight and scooter output was made by 
Ronald Price, a senior executive with Villiers Engineering, the 
company which supplied power units to most of the smaller British 
motor cycle and scooter firms. See 'How the British Motor 
Scooter Industry is Expanding', by Ronald Price, Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader, 11 March 1960, pp. 344-346. 
135. Ibid. 
136. See memo '4/59 - Director's Personal Report' dated 5 
January 1959, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/89. 
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greater public hostility, a fact that was reflected by press 
coverage of young British motor cyclists. 137 During that summer, 
one reporter visited a transport cafe which was frequented by 
motor cyclists, curious to discover the character of these dare- 
devils who so enjoyed racing on British roads. He interviewed 
one motor cyclist who commented on the public opprobrium directed 
at him and his colleagues: 
Lets face it. We are regarded as Teddy Boys on wheels. 
If we hang around street corners we get into trouble. 
So we buy a pair of wheels to get away from it. But 
still we are in trouble because we are motor cyclists. 
You can't please some people. 138 
Later on, another reporter visited the 'Busy Bee' cafe in North 
London and met a group of youthful motor cyclists who complained 
about their low public standing: 
People in cars, even old Blokes on motor bikes, shake 
their fists at us as we go past. The police try to 
pull us in for the smallest things. I don't know what 
they're trying to prove when they do that, but their 
attitude doesn't help anybody. When people see a 
teenager on a motor bike, they think he must be mad. 
They'll believe anything about us, so long as its bad 
enough. 139 
137. Referring to the high accident rate, one newspaper put it: 
"It is a -horrifying record. 
If this is the price we pay for a 
long, fine summer - and the boom in a drive-yourself community - 
we wonder if its worth it. " [Emphasis in the original]. See 
'SOS', The Sketch, 10 November 1959, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/3. 
138. See 'I spend a night with the 'Wild Ones' of Britain', 
Reynolds News, 16 August 1959, contained in the BSA Collection, 
MS 321/F, file entitled 'Anti-motor cycling comments', Birmingham 
Central Reference Library, Local History Archive. 
139. See 'The Night Riders', by Martin Page, The Guardian, 11 
March 1961. See also 'Dicing with Death' by Keith Waterhouse and 
John Edwards, contained in the Daily Mirror 'Shock Issue' of 9 
February 1961. Both articles are contained in the BSA 
Collection, MS 321/F, Birmingham Central Library. The Daily 
Mirror article was especially galling to the manufacturers. Hugh 
Palin was irritated sufficiently to make a reply to it in the 
trade. See 'Creating favourable publicity for motor cyclists', 
by H. Palin, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 7 April 1961, pp. 8-9. 
295 
Such stories were hardly unique. It and the others always 
stressed the extreme danger of operating high-powered motor 
cycles on public highways. 140 In fact, the Ministry of 
Transport, convinced that publicity used by motor cycle companies 
which focused on its racing successes, was a contributing factor 
in the higher accident rates, actually asked that they be toned 
down in the interests of road safety. 141 
The press coverage may have been grotesque exaggeration of what 
was really happening on Britain's roads, but it obviously tapped 
into public concern about the behaviour of at least some motor 
cyclists and was thus the cause of great anxiety by the 
manufacturers. The negative state of public opinion was 
symbolised in an incident that Palin unhappily recounted to 
manufacturers during a Council meeting in 1959. Palin was 
"appalled" to hear that a North London magistrate had "severely 
criticised" a school master for running a motor cycling class on 
the school playing field during his spare time for the benefit of 
his pupils. The magistrate had gone on to denounce this activity 
as "a most undesirable practice" which he insisted should cease 
forthwith. 142 By 1960 Palin was virtually in a state of despair 
about such press coverage. In a confidential memo to 
manufacturers he conceded that there had been "much adverse 
140. See, for example, 'A grim new spectre stalks into the road 
casualty returns: Death on two wheels', The sketch, 10 November 
1959, 'Crash ... Crash ... Crash went motor cyclists. Nightmare 
night on A20', Chronicle, 19 November 1959 and Pillion girls hit 
100 along murder mile', News Chroncle, November [no day 
indicated] 1959, all contained in clippings volume MRC MSS 
204/10/1/3. 
141. See memo entitled 'Motor cycle competitions and the FIM 
'sports' motor cycle', dated 17 September 1957, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/86. 
142. See memo dated 24 September 1959, entitled '380/59: 
Director's Personal Report', contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/91. 
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publicity [against motor cycles] and frankly [we] have not been 
too successful in countering it. ""143 
This detrimental coverage manifested itself in the changed 
public attitude of politicians to the industry. Since early in 
the inter-war period virtually every one of the Union's annual 
motor cycle shows had been opened 
the Government. As late as 1953, 
of the Cabinet, Foreign Secretary 
the ceremony and gave a speech of 
fulsome in his praises of the indi 
confided that he had once been an 
by a senior representative of 
for example, a prominent member 
Anthony Eden, was present for 
welcome. Not only was he 
istry's accomplishments, he even 
enthusiast himself, having 
owned a Douglas motor cycle for a time in his younger days. 144 
Increasingly, the tone of the opening speeches given by visiting 
dignitaries had become distinctly cooler, with fewer words of 
praise. For example, when Minister of Transport Ernest Marples 
opened the 1960 Show, his speech was not well received by the 
audience. He had followed, one trade journal reported, what was 
"becoming the standard formula for elderly official persons 
addressing riders of two-wheeled vehicles - in other words he 
began to preach. ""145 
In 1959, when the Industry Association sought a senior 
Government representative to open their new headquarters building 
in Coventry, they encountered an open reluctance on the part of 
senior politicians to be associated with the industry. 146 
143. See memo entitled '253/60: Director's Confidential 
Report', dated 13 May 1960, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/93. 
144. See 'Anthony Eden opens the 1953 Show', 21 November 1953, 
p. 155. Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader. 
145. See 'All this at Earls Court', oR cit, 18 November 1960, 
p. 141. 
146. In 1956, Palin had conceded to the Council that the 
industry did not have much support amongst MPs. See memo 
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Although the comparatively junior Minister of State for the Board 
of Trade, John Rodgers MP, did agree to attend the dedication of 
the building, privately the manufacturers were keenly 
disappointed that someone more prominent could not have been 
present instead. Their disappointment was compounded when, 
during his speech, Rodgers criticised the industry for their 
declining exports. 
147 In future, the Shows would be opened more 
often by racing personalities than by those who frequented the 
corridors of power in Whitehall. 
148 
Most important, there was no indication that the leading 
executives had really learnt anything at all about changing 
tastes among consumers either at home or abroad. The views of 
Edward Turner, now arguably the single most influential person in 
the entire industry, on the continuing primacy of large 
displacement models in the manufacturers' production programmes, 
despite the major shift in consumer demand since 1951, is a case 
in point. Speaking at a banquet laid on for Triumph's overseas 
distributors in late 1958, Turner reflected on his firm's 
accomplishments over the past year: 
entitled '173/56: Director's Personal Report', dated 26 April 
1956, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/83. 
147. Palin noted that he had agreed to invite Rodgers only after 
two more senior Ministers turned him down. See Minutes of the 
Council for 24 March 1959, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/90. Rodgers' remarks at the opening were reported in 
'New IA headquarters at Coventry opened by J. C. Rodgers, MP'. 29 
April 1959, pp. 36-37, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader. 
148. In 1962, the Industries Association approached Prime 
Minister MacMillan and Princess Margaret to see whether either of 
them would do the honours at that year's show. After they had 
been rebuffed, Palin advised Association members that, in his 
opinion, "we need to find a public figure who whilst not being a 
politician would appeal to the crowds, without in any sense 
lowering the dignity of the occasion. " See memo entitled "229/62 
- Director's Report', dated 9 July 1962, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/99. 
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Triumph was making more sports motor cycles than ever 
before and last year was the best year in the history 
of the company. Deep in our hearts of hearts we are 
interested in highly developed sport motor cycles that 
give so much pleasure to young men all over the world. 
Turner concluded with the assurance that, "Triumph knew the man 
and the market and would go on pleasing him. ""149 
There seemed no doubt in the minds of those in the top echelons 
on the industry that they had continued to read their market 
correctly and that their policies were essentially sound. Not 
everything, however, was quite as rosy as some may have wished. 
One trade journal noted how the Show was more and more dominated 
by foreign machines. In 1953, for example, 33 of 35 motor 
cycles, 2 of 3 scooters and 6 of 13 cyclemotors (or 80 per cent 
of the total) were British built. By 1960, however, only 17 of 
32 motor cycles, 11 of 25 scooters and 4 of 25 mopeds (or 39 per 
cent) came from British factories. 
150 While superficially the 
position of the industry may have seemed secure, in reality it 
was resting on a shaky foundation. 
This foundation would soon come under far heavier pressure than 
ever before. During mid-1960 trade discussions had commenced 
with the Japanese government, which some in the industry 
suspected might result in liberalisation of imports into Britain. 
Two years earlier, responding to rumours of a new treaty, 
Industries Association Director Palin had informed the British 
government "in no uncertain terms that the Industry would be 
violently opposed to the unrestricted entry of Japanese products 
into the UK market. " However, the manufacturers were resigned to 
149. Turner's remarks were reported in 'Triumph export dinner', 
op cit, 22 November 1958, p. 162. 
150. See 'Motor Cycle Matters' by Francis Jones, Motor Cycle and 
Cycle Trader 4 January 1958, p. 186 and 'As modern as the moment' 
by Francis Jones, op cit, 18 November 1960, pp. 153-156. 
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the fact they would have to deal with the possibilities of at 
least quotas being set for Japanese imports. 151 As will be seen, 
beyond this protest, no other action seems to have been taken. 
Nor were they appreciably alarmed by the report of a lightweight 
Honda 'Dream' motor cycle, the first time a Japanese model had 
appeared in a European motor cycle show. It was a model they 
would all soon become quite used to seeing in showrooms across 
Britain. 152 
151. See memo '323/60: Confidential Report', dated 28 June 
1960, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/94. 
152. See 'Confidential Report on the 41st Amsterdam Cycle and 
Motor Cycle Show, 26 February-8 March 1959', prepared by Hugh 
Palin, no date but probably March/April 1959. Contained in 
Industry Association Guardbook, MRC MSS 204/3/1/90. 
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Chapter 6. 
'The Final Phase, 1961-1975'. 
The optimism with which the industry began 1960 was quickly 
dissipated. The following year the manufacturers were deep 
into its worst ever sales recession since 1945. This 
situation was seriously worsened when, at the end of 1962, a 
treaty was signed between Britain and Japan which threw open 
the home market to foreign competition of unprecedented 
intensity. Several years later, most remaining British motor 
cycle manufacturers were either out of business or in serious 
trouble. In 1971, the BSA/Triumph combine remained unsteadily 
on its feet, in the company of a newer firm, Norton-Villiers, 
representing the rump of the old AMC concern. However, 
instead of trying to consolidate its tenuous position in the 
home and export markets, BSA launched a risky counter-attack 
to regain market share, especially in the lightweight 
category. The programme was both badly misjudged and 
executed, resulting 
in the eventual collapse of the industry. 
Although sales and registrations of motorised two-wheelers 
had been growing, albeit gradually, throughout the 1950s, by 
1961 there was a sharp downturn. Total registrations, which 
had gone from 1,519,935 in 1958,1,733,342 in 1959 peaked at 
1,795,555 in 1960. The following year they slipped back to 
1,790,200, a decline which represented the first stage of a 
long run trend that would persist for the next decade. By 
1975 registrations had dropped to 1,282,576 and sales had 
dropped to 50 per cent of their 1959 level. Most disturbing 
was the sluggish 
Home market demand for models of 500cc and 
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over displacement. Between 1956 and 1960, registrations in 
this class had climbed from 46,271 to 67,089 per year, only to 
drop to 66,700 the following year. In contrast, sales of 
lightweight machines in the 150cc and under category had been 
continually improving. While there had been 567,956 of these 
registered in 1956, by 1961 there were some 986,000 of the 
smaller machines on the road. This was another trend which 
would persist for years to come [see Appendix 1, Tables XXIII 
and XXIV]. 
These figures deeply troubled industry leaders, who blamed 
the sales recession on increased hire/purchase restrictions 
that had been introduced in the 1960 Budget. These had been 
followed by large increases in insurance premiums, some up to 
30 per cent. The situation was worsened early in 1961, when 
the Budget increased the rate of Purchase Tax. Such measures 
did little to encourage motor cycle sales although they did 
not seem to have had the same affect on sales of motor cars. 
l 
The recession inevitably effected employment levels. 
Alarmed by redundancies at the nearby Triumph factory, 
Coventry Labour MP Maurice Edelman demanded the Government 
help the industry. In response, Keith Joseph, Minister of 
State for the Board of Trade, expressed his sympathy for the 
plight of motor cycle manufacturers but cautioned that "the 
outcome would depend primarily on the 
industry. "2 On 1 
December, thanks to Edelman, Parliament experienced a rare if 
1. See 'Gloom among the motor cycles', Financial Times, 30 
August 1961, contained in TUC clipping file 12913 and 'Motor 
cycles and 'Unhappy prospects', The Economist, 25 November 
1961, p. 834. 
2. See 'Triumph workers to be dismissed early next month', 
Coventry Standard, 1 December 1961, p. 1, contained in MRC MSs 
123X/10/1/3. 
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only brief exchange on the state of the British motor cycle 
industry. 3 
Edelman noted that the 18.5 per cent drop in production and 
sales from 1960 meant that the manufacturers had been forced 
to cut back on their labour force. While it was true that the 
credit restrictions were dampening demand, Edelman believed 
that the industry's biggest problems were those of its own 
making. It was a case, he said, of "too many producers and 
far, far too many models. " Take, for example, industry 
leaders BSA and Triumph, who, despite common ownership, each 
carried a completely separate model line, albeit with a number 
of similarities; twelve for BSA, ranging between 123cc to 
650cc and ten for Triumph, ranging from 199cc to 650cc. 4 
Moreover, because of its stubborn dedication towards 
traditional heavyweight motor cycles, the industry "had 
produced its own nemesis. " They might be "attractive to young 
men who want to show their capacity for speed, " but were now 
"become dead weight in the stock of most of the leading 
companies. "5 The motor cycle had, Edelman said, "come to be 
regarded as a sort of lethal weapon, and, indeed, it can be 
so, because the emphasis on high speeds, the fact that these 
vehicles can be put into the hands of the very young who have 
not the temperament to control them properly. " The 
manufacturers must, he concluded, "bear some blame for 
neglecting the social implications of their products. "6 
3. See sa , [vol 650], 1 December 1961, cols 890-900. 
4. cols 891-892. 
5. col 893. 
6. id plus cols 895-898 and 900. 
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The business press also saw room for improvement. One 
reporter remarked that the 1961 recession demonstrated how the 
industry had "been brought to its knees by a combination of 
social and economic factors. " He noted that the "constant 
criticism of the British industry has been that it lives too 
much in the past in matters of design and building what 
today's customer wants. " Nor was the poor image that motor 
cycles and motor cycling had with the general public doing 
much to help. The reporter noted that "most people associate 
them [motor cycles] with accidents, youthful irresponsibility 
and the esoteric games of 'coffee bar cowboys. "'7 
Another business journal, examining the state of the 
industry shortly afterwards, stressed that the industry's poor 
sales was a reflection of its inability to react effectively 
to changing consumer tastes - witness its tardy entry into the 
scooter market during the 1950s. The industry was still 
incapable of producing a truly competitive popular lightweight 
model. BSA, for example, had dawdled over introducing the 
70cc 'Dandy', which in any case "proved largely abortive. " 
Furthermore, the industry's manufacturing plant had been 
allowed to decay. It was out of date and "too much craft- 
based and too little acquainted with modern engineering. " If 
it were to survive, the industry had to rethink its future 
strategy. 
8 
The combined criticism from Parliamentarians and the 
business press generated both interest and resentment from 
7. See 'Motor cycles look for markets' by David Jenkins, The 
atatjst, 16 February 1962, pp. 516-517. 
8. 'Recession on two wheels', The Economist, 14 July 
1962, pp. 172-173. 
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within the industry. The Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, for 
example, was receptive to Edelman's remarks and ran a leading 
article entitled 'The Motor Cycle Industry should put its 
house in order' only a few days later. In early January 1962 
the journal was instrumental in creating a Motor Cycle Design 
Commission to try and address some of the failings identified 
by Edelman and others-9 While the trade press recognised the 
need for change, the same could not be said of the 
manufacturers. During a press conference in early 1962 
arranged to launch the new line of 500cc and 650cc 'Star' twin 
cylinder models, BSA Sales Director Bill Rawson took the 
opportunity to lash out at the industry's critics. 
These detractors, he argued, had misunderstood the 
industry's many accomplishments, most particularly the fact 
that its output had vastly increased since the 1930s and it 
was a particularly successful exporter, especially to the USA. 
As for why fewer motor cycles were sold in the home market, 
Rawson pointed a finger of blame at the industry's favourite 
villains. Credit restrictions, high Purchase Tax, 
#, outrageously high insurance premiums", and the continued bad 
publicity caused by an "overemphasis on motor cycle accidents 
in the daily press" were the main causes for the poor sales. 10 
9. The leading article is contained in the Motor Cycle and 
Qycle Trader, 15 December 1961, pp. 143-144. The Design 
Commission was announced in an article entitled 'Comment', 
mod, 12 January 1962, pp. 192-193. A letter to the editor 
from Maurice Edelman was published on page 281 of the 21 
February 1962 issue of ibid, which urged that the commission 
also include consumers and worker representatives. 
Thereafter, no further mention of the Commission was 
published, either in the trade press or in the surviving 
archives of the Industries Association, leading one to suspect 
it had become defunct very quickly. 
10. See 'Slamming the Critics', The Motor Cycle, 11 January 
1962. Rawson was particularly incensed over sensationalist 
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Despite the angry public defiance, in private many in the 
industry acknowledged that there were problems and they were 
not going to be easy to resolve. In late 1961 a meeting of 
the Industry Association's Publicity Committee was held to 
consider the 20 per cent drop in the sales of motor cycles and 
scooters. During the course of the proceedings, Industry 
Association Director Hugh Palin noted that "most people seemed 
to be of the opinion that the main cause of the present 
recession was public antipathy to motor cycling. " Committee 
members pin-pointed "parental objection" as a major and 
persistent deterrent to sales to younger consumers. 11 This 
was a theme that Palin subsequently expanded upon in a memo, 
which analysed why the British public had turned so decidedly 
against motor cycles and motor cyclists. He insisted that 
opinion had been "distorted by adverse, sometimes hostile 
publicity. " Yet, he admitted, this was aggravated by "an 
implication lurking in the public mind that manufacturers are 
irresponsible in placing high-powered machines in the hands of 
young boys untrained to manage them. " It was up to the 
industry itself to correct this impression, a job which could 
take a long time to achieve. 
12 
press coverage of motor cyclists: "The motor cyclist appears 
to be fair game for everyone. " 
11. See minutes of the Publicity Committee held on 19 
December 1961, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/98. 
12. See memo entitled '27/62: Motor Cycle and Scooter 
publicity' by Hugh Palin, dated 9 January 1962, attached to 
the minutes of the Motor Cycle Publicity Committee of the same 
date, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/93. In 1966 an 
unnamed sales director was quoted bemoaning the fact that 
"people got the impression our job was selling lethal 
projectiles to morons. " See 'After ton-up kids, a labour 
shortage', The Guardian, 15 February 1966, contained in TUC 
clipping file 12913, on deposit at the MRC 
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Material improvements in British society created their own 
problems for motor cycle manufacturers. There were some, such 
as BSA's motor cycle chief Edward Turner, who still thought 
the industry could increase sales by presenting itself as an 
alternative to public transport. During a speech at the 1962 
Earls Court Show, he stressed how regular motor cycle 
commuting was far better than catching "winter colds in germ- 
laden trains and buses. i13 Others, however, saw matters 
differently. In July 1962, at a meeting of the Joint Advisory 
Committee, made up of representatives of both manufacturers 
and retailers, another lengthy discussion was held to consider 
the causes of declining sales. Committee members focused far 
more on changes in British society than on levels of Purchase 
Tax and credit restrictions. For them, the main problem was 
the fact that contemporary Britain had become "an affluent 
society", with the consequence that "a large section of the 
public who, but for this, would otherwise be potential 
customers, can now afford and 
in fact are buying cars. thl4 
No doubt the safety issue was a major factor in the lower 
motor cycle sales. Yet there was a continuing paradox among 
the overall figures which puzzled motor cycle makers. True, 
13. Turner, who was President of the Industries Association 
that year, was speaking at the Show on 8 November 1962. The 
text of his speech is contained in MRC MSS 204/3/T41. 
14. The Committee also recognised that many traditional 
customers were now marrying and starting families earlier than 
before, "which again struck a blow at our market" since "the 
younger element of the public formed a substantial proportion" 
of sales. See minutes of the meeting of the Joint Advisory 
Committee, held on 3 July 1962. The minutes are held in the 
offices of the Motor Cycle Retailers' Association. The 
Eggljo m sit observed that higher personal income among the 
British population now tempted "potential [motor cycle] buyers 
to get a car instead - which bring more comfort as well as, 
perhaps, higher social esteem. " See 'Recession on two 
wheels', op cit. 
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sales of all motorised two wheelers were declining, but those 
of smaller displacement motor cycles still sold well. One 
business journal noted that teenagers and twenty year olds had 
been "reluctant to spend upwards of £250 on a 500 to 650cc 
motor cycle" and had "turned instead to a lower powered and 
cheaper product. "15 This was not always an economic decision. 
The Road Traffic (Driving of Motor Cycles) Act 1960, which had 
been passed in reaction to the high accident rates of younger 
riders, restricted all prospective motor cyclists to machines 
of no more than 250cc engine displacement while they were in 
their probationary period. This may have promoted safety but 
did little to help sales of the larger displacement motor 
cycles-16 
In fact, to the manufacturers, the biggest threat to motor 
cycle ownership, one that was very difficult for them to 
counter, remained four wheeled competition [see Appendix 1, 
Tables XVIII and XX]. This too, one report noted, was the 
result of increasing living standards, as bigger "wage 
packets" combined with what was described as an "insidious 
status seeking. " While advertising copywriters could "purr 
that you can 'get out of the ordinary' by getting into a 
particular make of car - no such claim can be made for the 
humble motor cycle. i17 Hugh Palin admitted that "our main 
problem is that much of the public is antagonistic to the 
motor cycle" compounded by the fact that "everybody buys a car 
15. See 'Gloom among the motor cycles', op cit. 
16. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Committee 
meeting of 19 January 1960, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/95. 
17. Ibid. See also 'Motor cycles look for markets' by David 
Jenkins, oA cit. 
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if they can afford it. " In contrast with the motor car 
industry, whose "only problem is to persuade the customer that 
his is the best buy" the motor cycle industry "first (has] to 
persuade people that [a motor cycle] is a good thing in 
itself. i18 
Family pressures on young, would-be motor cyclists was often 
critical. Hugh Palin remarked these were so intense that 
"many parents would rather buy their son a clapped-out second- 
hand car with no brakes than a motor cycle. 1119 Price was 
moreover, a crucial factor. The average 500cc and larger 
motor cycle cost between £250 and £350, or about the same 
price as a second hand car. Add roughly another £50 per year 
insurance and the traditional heavy weight motor cycle was 
less and less competitive to all but the most dedicated 
enthusiasts. 
20 In late 1965, one long term dealer decided he 
had enough of declining sales and closed his business down. 
His explanation was simple: "There's no point in going on any 
longer. Young people are no longer interested in motor 
cycling - not the way we were. Nowadays they would rather 
save up and buy a car. "21 
In light of these problems, what kind of measures did the 
industry undertake to try and improve its standing with 
18. See 'The management skid in the two wheeled business', 
Business, May 1965, pp. 22-32. 
19. According to a poll conducted by the Birmingham Mail at 
about the same time, parental opposition was identified as the 
major obstacle to motor cycle sales to young people. See 
'Motor cycle survey', Birmingham Mail, 11 December 1963, 
contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/4. 
20. See 'The Management skid in the two wheeled business', Qp 
21. See 'Tenterden trader must quit', Kent Messenger, 26 
November 1965, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 
204/10/1/6. 
309 
potential consumers? In 1962 the Industries Association 
decided to sponsor a publicity campaign design to improve its 
image. It funded a number of projects which were financed by 
a levy of 2s on each machine sold by members. These projects 
included a rider training programme at a number of schools 
across the country, the provision of motor cycles to the 
ACU/RAC training programme, the donation of spare equipment 
for the 'engines for schools' initiative and cooperation with 
the ministry of Transport on research on motor cycle safety, 
along with the underwriting of a special research unit at 
Birmingham University. The Association even sponsored a 
'National Essay Contest' for school children (a "surprising 
number of girls" had also participated) which was designed to 
stimulate an interest in motor cycling. The question posed in 
the 1967 contest, for instance, was 'Does motor cycle racing 
help to improve road safety? '22 
But it was precisely the issue of road safety which again 
prevented the industry from convincing civil servants and 
politicians to offer the kind of legislative relief that the 
industry so badly wanted. This was especially the case in its 
attempts to convince the ministry of Transport to relax 
regulations affecting mopeds. In one 
instance, an importer 
22. The levy was expected to raise approximately £10,000. 
See memo '445/63: The Motor Cycle and Scooter Publicity 
Campaign' dated December 1963, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/102. A subsequent report, 'A memorandum on public 
relations' dated 4 July 1968 outlined the various programmes 
initiated by the Industries Association over the past several 
years and is contained 
in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/113. The 
information on the 'National Essay Contest' is drawn from the 
minutes of the Joint Motor Cycle and Scooter Publicity 
Committee meetings of 6 February 1963 and 22 January 1967, 
contained 
in Guardbooks MRC MSS 204/3/1/113 and MSS 
204/3/1/110 respectively. 
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claimed that the "bulk of people who are potential buyers of 
mopeds will not buy them if there is any degree of paperwork 
attached", but this too failed to move Ministry officials. 23 
As far as they were concerned, the existing regulations should 
continue to be applied in the public interest. The 
registration system was necessary for larger enforcement 
purposes and abolishing tax would "involve a considerable 
sacrifice in revenue. "24 
The industry's central argument for a change in regulations, 
that their removal would stimulate demand of mopeds, was also 
poorly received by Ministry staff. Their conclusions, after 
reviewing a brief sent in by Hugh Palin, was that the 
"abolition of licences [for mopeds] would certainly involve a 
risk to someone or other. The question is really whether any 
additional risk to-road safety is justified on what amounts to 
commercial grounds. i25 Transport Minister Ernest Marples was 
more diplomatic in a letter he wrote to P. T. Bolton, an 
importer of German mopeds. "I must face the fact, " he stated, 
"that these ... [safety] statistics show that, for the same 
distance travelled, the risk of the moped rider being killed 
is eight times higher than the risk of the car driver and that 
23. See letter, J. D. Richards (Solex Ltd) to D. O'Neill 
(Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry of Transport), 27 July 
1961, contained in PRO MT 92/63. 
24. See minute dated 28 July 1961, prepared by C. North and 
letter, C. C. Nicholas (Board of Trade) to J. D. Richards, dated 
18 December 1961, both contained in ibid. One estimate of the 
potential revenue loss should the tax be lifted on mopeds was 
thought to be approximately £450,000. See note prepared by J. 
Garlick (Road Safety Division, Ministry of Transport), 
contained in ibid. 
25. See memo, P. A. Walker to Whipp, dated 4 January 1963, 
ibid. 
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the risk of the moped rider being seriously injured is nine 
times higher. "26 
How did the various firms react to the downturn in the motor 
market and the deep seated shift in consumer demand? In his 
speech to the shareholders during late 1962, Chairman Eric 
Turner announced that, because of commercial difficulties, the 
Group Board had decided to shut down the Ariel factory at 
Selly Oak, Birmingham, and transfer production of its 
reasonably successful 250cc model to the main Small Heath 
factory, which was now underutilised. There were, Turner 
insisted, still some bright spots in this otherwise gloomy 
picture. A Triumph had just set another world speed record 
and the company had introduced a new lighter weight scooter, a 
100cc machine called the 'Tina'. 
27 
In fact, the situation was actually much worse than Chairman 
Eric Turner was willing to inform the shareholders. He 
admitted as much in a letter written in September 1961 to 
former Board Deputy Chairman 'Paddy' Hannon, who had earlier 
asked permission to arrange for a tour of the Small Heath 
factory on behalf of a group of visiting Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers. Turner declined to provide an invitation, on the 
grounds that it would have been too embarrassing for the 
company to have drawn public attention to their obviously 
under-used facilities. Turner also offered the following 
explanation for the poor showing of BSA's Motor Cycle 
Division: 
26. See letter, Marples to Bolton, dated 17 December 1962, 
contained in ibid. 
27. See Chairman's speech to the Annual General Meeting, held 
on 13 December 1962, contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/40. 
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The hard facts are that the organisation has not had 
a sufficiently vigorous development policy which 
would ensure that new products were constantly 
coming along to provide expansion or to take the 
place of products with falling demands. 28 
The state of Ariel, a BSA subsidiary since 1944, is 
illustrative of the problems of the entire Group, as it had 
tried to respond to changed market conditions. The company 
had severely pared down its line-up of models in the late 
1950s. Gone were the traditional large capacity single 
cylinder models, along with the venerable 1000cc 'Square 
Four', replaced by a new 250cc model, the 'Leader'. Launched 
in 1959, the machine was planned as a means of stemming 
foreign incursions in the lightweight market. Sharing many 
stylistic features with the scooter, particularly bodywork 
which provided some weather protection to the rider, it was 
priced at £209 ils 7d, which was not extravagant but was still 
more than the £174 19s 6d for a Lambretta LI 150 or even the 
£228 5s lld for a 350cc Triumph, an orthodox motor cycle. 
29 
Although innovative, sales of the 'Leader', like the 
Velocette LE, never approached expectations. The problem was 
that dyed-in-the-wool motor cyclists were apparently put off 
by its unusual design while scooterists preferred to stick to 
the genuine article. One assessment of the 'Leader' was that 
it was "a bold, often effective concept, indifferently styled, 
betrayed by inadequate lights, brakes and finish. " Production 
was ended in 1965, with a total of only 17,000 units built. 
30 
28. See letter, Turner to Hannon, dated 10 September 1962, 
contained in Box 35, Folder 1, Hannon Collection. 
29. See Peter Hartley, The Ariel Story, Watford: Argus 
Books, 1980, p. 199, p. 209 and p. 230 and Wilson, op cit, volume 
6, pp. 120-124. See also 'Buyers' Guide 1961', The Motor 
ycle, 17 November 1960, pp. 665-671. 
30. See Wilson, ibid. 
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If BSA was faltering, the situation at the number two 
producer, AMC, was far worse. The company had been especially 
hard hit by the shift to lightweight models over the past 
decade and one manifestation of its declining fortunes were 
two shareholders' revolts. The first, which occurred in 1959, 
focused on the failure of the AMC Board to anticipate the 
surge in demand during the 1959 boom season. In late 1958 the 
company had predicted a slow year and had reduced production, 
with the result that it had insufficient machines ready to 
meet the much higher demand that spring and summer. The 
'rebels' were able to force a postponement of the 1960 Annual 
General Meeting, when the re-election of two directors, which 
was expected to be routine, was opposed from the floor. 31 
The following year, a far more dangerous threat developed 
for the Board, precipitated by the two-stroke engine fiasco 
and reports of losses at the Indian Sales Corporation, AMC's 
American distributor. A Shareholders' Committee had been 
formed which sought to remove Managing Director Heather along 
with two other directors, Alan Sugar and J. F. Kelleher, and 
replace them with nominees of the Committee. 
32 An 
Extraordinary General Meeting was forced by the Committee in 
August 1961 and although the rebel shareholders' motions were 
31. See 'Letter to the Shareholders' written by Managing 
Director Donald Heather in response to a circular sent out by 
a group of disgruntled shareholders, dated 10 September 1959. 
Heather sent out a second letter entitled 'Adjourned Annual 
General Meeting', dated 10 March 1960 outlining the 
circumstances for the postponed meeting. Both letters are 
attached to the 1960 Annual General Meeting, on deposit at the 
Guildhall Library. 
32. The nominees were Cyril Bird, William Gardiner and Oliver 
Smedley, MC. 
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defeated, Heather's position was greatly weakened and he 
retired within months. 33 
Notwithstanding the defeat of the Shareholders' Committee, 
the condition of the company remained poor. Between 1954 and 
1961, AMC's average share price had sharply declined from 29/- 
to 5/- and profits had slipped from £541,461 to £234,772. Two 
of the most effective managers, Bert Hopwood and J. M. West, 
had resigned in April and August 1961 respectively, and left 
for different firms. Although the new chairman, T. C. Cowell, 
had a financial background, he too seemed baffled at finding a 
solution to the company's troubles. 
34 
During his speech to the 1962 Annual General Meeting, Cowell 
had further bad news for shareholders. Thanks to continuing 
weak sales, the main Woolwich factory had suffered a 20 per 
cent drop in turnover and lost £27,000. Moreover, plans to 
relocate production in a new facility on the nearby Isle of 
Sheppey had been dropped because of labour shortages. Despite 
the stronger demand for lightweight motor cycles, the Francis- 
Barnett and James subsidiaries, which manufactured a line of 
models in the 98cc to 250cc range, including a scooter, 
33. A circular entitled 'Associated Motor Cycles 
Shareholders' Committee', dated 17 May 1961, which described 
the grievances of the rebels, is reproduced in Hopwood, pR 
gt, p. 167. J. M. West, who was on the Board at the time, 
questioned the motives of the leaders of the Committee, 
terming them "asset strippers", see West interview, November 
23,1994. For press coverage of the AGM, see 'AMC Board 
unchanged by Stormy AGM', Motgr e and Cycle Trader, 11 
August 1961, p. 257, see also The Times, untitled story, 1 
August 1961, p-15- 
34. See Hopwood, op cit and AMC Directors' Report for the 
year ended 31 August 1954 and 31 August 1961, on deposit at 
the Guildhall Library. Cowell, who joined the AMC board in 
1958, had been Assistant General Manager at Barclays Bank and 
was also a director of N. Burston & Co., merchant bankers. 
See Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 24, May 1958, p. 106. 
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continued to do badly. The AMC-built two-stroke engine had 
been scrapped and the company had been forced to return to 
Villiers for the power units for the lightweights models. 
Finally, Cowell had to admit that the Indian Sales 
Corporation, in which AMC had invested £250,000, had turned in 
a £113,000 loss. 
35 
Cowell identified AMC's main weakness as its overdependence 
on motor cycle manufacturing, which constituted 90 per cent of 
its activities. When sales went into steep decline, the 
company had suffered disproportionately. It had also suffered 
from its rapid expansion between 1947 and 1953, when it grew 
from its single factory to become four separate manufacturing 
units. 36 In order to offset losses, the Coventry based 
Francis-Barnett factory (along with its subsidiary Clarendon 
Pressing and Welding Company) were closed down and operations 
moved to the James factory at Greet, Birmingham. Yet, several 
months later, newly appointed chairman Sir Norman Hulbert was 
forced to report a loss of £350,000, which he'attributed to a 
"steadily diminishing demand" for the AMC Group's motor 
cycles. In consequence, the Board decided that it needed no 
35. See Chairman's Speech to the 1961 AMC Annual General 
Meeting, 23 March 1962. On deposit at the Guildhall Library. 
See also 'Cycle Firm Diversifies', The Times, 31 August 1961, 
p. 13 and 'AMC Sheerness plan dropped', Motor Cycle and Cycle 
20 October 1961, p. 32. 
36. As Cowell explained: "The high rate of growth and 
profits during the expansion period of a sellers' market had 
the inherent penalty of vulnerability. " After the motor cycle 
market suffered the 1956 recession, "the industry steadily 
became more competitive, of smaller volume and reverted to the 
pre-war pattern of extreme seasonal trading" leaving the AMC 
Group ill-equipped both as to specialised facilities and 
labour" to respond. See Chairman's Speech to the Annual 
General Meeting, delivered on 23 March 1962, copy on deposit 
at the Guildhall Library. 
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more than two-thirds of its existing motor cycle manufacturing 
capacity and would shut down further factory and plant. 37 
At the next Annual General Meeting, Hulbert reported a loss 
of £658,902, which he claimed was the result of the 
"continuous severe reduction of motor cycle and scooter 
demand. " The Board decided to close the Norton factory in 
Birmingham and transfer operations to Woolwich. The Indian 
Sales Corporation was judged an irretrievable failure and had 
been shut down. The Board, however, still maintained hope for 
larger sales in the USA and had made arrangements for 
distribution there through the Berliner Motor Corporation. 
Finally, for the second year in succession, no dividends were 
paid out. The future looked bleak for this major motor cycle 
producer. 
38 
Nor were the other smaller firms in much better condition 
than the two larger companies. On the surface at least, Royal 
Enfield had managed reasonably well over the past years, so 
well in fact that BSA had considered purchasing it in 1957.39 
It had been helped along by its non-motor cycle activities 
including the manufacture of diesel engines and military 
contracts and maintained its stake in the Madras, India, 
37. See 'Statement' by AMC Chairman Hulbert, dated 5 June 
1962, on deposit at the Guildhall Library. 
38. See Chairman's Speech to the Annual General Meeting, 4 
April 1963, on deposit at the Guildhall Library. See also 
'AMC Group's Big Loss', 26 January 1962, 'AMC Re- 
organisation', 20 April 1962 and 'Norton Motors to be moved to 
Woolwich' 27 July 1962, all in the Motor Cycle and Cycle 
39. 
B 
SA was particularly interested in its US distribution 
network, which Edward Turner thought would be a "very useful 
acquisition. " See Board meeting of 31 October 1957, agenda 
item 11105, contained in Minute Book No. 17, contained in MSS 
19C/20. Negotiations between the two companies proved 
inconclusive. 
317 
plant, which manufactured motor cycles under license, 
including a scooter, the 'Fantabulus'. However, it had been 
hurt badly by fluctuating credit restrictions and recurrent 
labour shortages at its Redditch factory, compounded by the 
overall shrinking of the motor cycle market. In November 1962 
it was purchased by E. & H. P. Smith Ltd., a holding company 
which owned a number of engineering enterprises. After the 
buy-out, the Enfield model line-up, which had ranged from 
148cc to 736cc machines, was reduced to solely the latter 
models, many of which were exported to North America. The 
company was out of business by 1970.40 
Douglas, which after 1957 had dropped production of orthodox 
motor cycles, concentrated on its licensing agreement with 
Vespa, but found itself in trouble as scooter sales flagged in 
the early 1960s. In 1965 it ceased scooter manufacture as 
well. Production lingered on at Panther (Phelon & Moore Ltd) 
whose small factory in West Yorkshire continued to produce 
modest numbers of large capacity single cylinder machines. 
These were frequently used in conjunction with side-cars, 
numbers of which were steadily shrinking on British roads. 
However, the company did manufacture a small displacement 
model, using a bought-in Villiers power unit, and, after 1957, 
began to import a French-built scooter, which was sold as the 
Panther 'Scooterrot'. Neither were very successful. 
Undeterred by this experience, the company, in partnership 
with two lightweight manufacturers, Sun and Dayton, developed 
40. See Peter Hartley, The Story of Royal Enfield, pp. 110 and 
121. See also the Chairman's speech to the Annual General 
Meeting, 30 January 1961 and notice to shareholders, entitled 
'Merger with E. & H. P. Smith' dated 1 November 1962, both on 
deposit at the Guildhall library. 
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its own scooter. Using a Villiers power unit, the Panther 
'Princess' was also a failure, not the least because of what 
were described as "costly and delaying teething troubles. " 
The 1961 recession crippled the company and the following year 
a receiver was brought in. Although production continued, it 
rarely exceeded 1,000 of the big single cylinder models each 
year. By 1968, the firm was defunct. 
41 
The Veloce (Velocette) company also tried to make a tardy 
entrance into the scooter market. Although it continued to 
build the LE, first introduced in 1948, it remained loyal at 
heart to the traditional single cylinder models which were 
frequently used by sporting enthusiasts. However, production 
of the larger models had averaged little more than 3,000 
machines per year during the late 1950s. In 1961, Velocette 
launched the 'Viceroy' scooter, a well engineered machine but 
too heavy and expensive when compared to a Vespa. Nor did the 
fact that it appeared just as the scooter boom was ending help 
sales. Although 5,000 units were scheduled for 1962, only 644 
were actually built, of which a mere 130 were sold. 
42 
As the market for the traditional orthodox motor cycles that 
Velocette specialised in making kept on declining, the company 
tried to diversify its operations. The LE motor unit, for 
example, was adapted to other purposes, for use on ice-cream 
vans and hover-craft. Production of motor cycles, including 
41. See Wilson, British Motor Cycles, volume 4, pp. 19-20. 
42. See ibid, vol. 6, pp. 207-208. One explanation for the 
Viceroy's poor sales may have been its high specifications, 
which included its 250cc engine, with power transmission 
provided by a shaftdrive, an unusual feature on a British 
machine, along with its price of £198. See untitled feature 
on the Viceroy, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 21 October 1960, 
p. 37 and 'Veloce increases prices', ibid, 21 September 1952, 
p. 295. 
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the LE and the larger displacement single cylinder machines, 
continued but did not exceed 1,500 units per year. Finally, 
in mid-1970 the company announced it would go into voluntary 
liquidation. The last motor cycles were produced in early 
1971.43 
A dwindling group of smaller firms, with outputs of perhaps 
a couple of thousand of units each at the very most, had 
managed to survive on the periphery of the industry. Reliant 
on proprietary engine units and catering to more specialised 
segments of the market, their condition began to deteriorate 
badly during the early 1960s. Companies such as Cotton, DMW, 
Excelsior and Norman, which largely manufactured lightweight 
models with two-stroke engines and scooter makers like 
Ambassador, Dayton, DKR and Bond, suffered from much the same 
weaknesses. Low volume production and lack of product 
development facilities meant that prices or design could never 
really be competitive with the imports. Virtually all these 
firms were out of business by 1965.44 
Nor did Raleigh, the bicycle manufacturer which branched out 
into moped manufacture during the late 1950s, have any lasting 
success. Its RMI model, introduced in 1958, was evidently 
"developed in too much of a hurry" and was'dropped in 1960, to 
be replaced with an imported French moped and an Italian 
scooter, the 'Roma'. 
45 Subsequently, it would again try to 
43. See Wilson op cit. See also 'Velocette to phase out 
motor cycles', Financial Times, 25 June 1970 and a photo story 
of the final machine (an LE) produced, Birmingham Post, 3 
February 1971, both in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. 
44. For an overview of these companies, see Roy Bacon's 
; j]liers Singles and Twins, The Postwar British Two-Stroke 
T; ýghtw_ 
qht Motor Cycle and British Motor Cycles of the 1960s. 
45. See 'The problem for the motor cycle makers how to lose 
an image and win a world market' by John Mills, The Director, 
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break into the moped market with the 'Wisp', which was 
introduced with much publicity in 1967. Although it enjoyed 
initially good sales, especially among women, it was 
ultimately withdrawn from production only two years later. 
While Raleigh management blamed its failure on a general 
decline in the moped market, the Austrian Puch company 
continued to profitably sell its models on the British 
market. 
46 
While the industry stagnated, another danger was emerging 
which had nothing to do with civil servants, politicians or 
even motor cars. It took some time before British motor cycle 
producers became aware of developments in Japan, although one 
British enthusiasts' journal had reviewed a Japanese motor 
cycle as early as 1946.47 Although there was no significant 
Japanese motor cycle industry before 1945, a number of small 
firms started up after the war to supply the public demand for 
cheap, lightweight personal motor transport. The industry was 
fragmented into a number of small firms, more than 200 in 
September 1967, pp. 331 and 'Boom in mopeds and scooters', 
ý; nanc aiimes 
clipping 
Time, 25 February 1960, the latter contained in TUC 
fTile 12913, on deposit at the MRC. See also 'New 
Raleigh Scooter', The Times, 4 November 1960, 'Scooter 
Prospects in 1960' 15 January 1960, p. 201 and 'Get into Moped 
market now', 27 July 1962 pp. 192-193. both from Motor Cycle 
and Cycle Trader. 
46. See 'Raleigh taps new market with 'Wisp ", Financial 
; mes, 5 June 1967, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC 
MSS 204/10/1/6 and 'Raleigh drops out of moped market', T 
mý__mes, 12 September 1969 and 'Sales fall forces Raleigh to 
stop producing mopeds', Financial Times, [no date, but 
probably September 1969] both contained in newspaper clipping 
book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. See also 'Now Austrian firm is 
dominant force in moped market as Britain moves out' by Jack 
Hay, Birmingham Post, 17 November 1969, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/8. 
47. The article featured a Japanese lightweight model which 
struck an observer as a copy of a current British model. See 
'A Japanese two stroke', The Motor Cycle, 11 April 1946, 
p. 276. 
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1950, although reduced by intense competition, so that only 
30 remained in business by 1960. By 1969 only four, Honda, 
Suzuki, Kawasaki and Yamaha, had survived. 48 
Soichiro Honda, founder of Honda Motor, the firm which would 
come to be the dominant Japanese producer, had no background 
in motor cycle manufacturing. The company's first post-war 
products were bicycles fitted with small surplus auxiliary 
engines. In 1949 Honda introduced the 98cc 'Dream' and 
progress afterwards was rapid, although the company did not 
produce any model with an engine capacity greater than 250cc 
until 1955.49 
Although Honda, a former automobile racer, was fascinated 
with motor sports, because of the state of the Japanese 
economy, the company focused production on a limited range of 
lightweight models (for many years their largest machine was 
305cc) used for utilitarian purposes. In 1958, Honda 
introduced the 50cc 'Supercub', which came standard with such 
advanced features as an automatic clutch not found on any 
British motor cycle. Although a motor cycle, this model had 
a 'step-through' design which made it look more like a 
motorised bicycle. The 'Supercub' was hugely successful, at 
home and abroad, helping Honda to become Japan's leading motor 
48. See 'Appendix 11 -A brief description of the production 
system of the Japanese motor cycle industry', Boston 
Consulting Group, op cit, pp. 213-224 and Smith, pp. 19-20 and 
pp. 22-23. 
49. See Richard T. Pascale, 'Perspectives on Strategy: The 
Real Story behind Honda's Success', op cit, p. 52, Tetsuo 
Sakiya, Honda Motor: The Men. The Management, The Machines, 
Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1987, p. 62, Roy Bacon, 
unnda - The Early Classic Motor Cycles, London: Osprey 
publishing Ltd., 1985, pp. 100-23 and 'Soichiro' Ladder - 
Twenty-Five Years of Technical Progress' by Kevin Cameron, 
, yg2e, 
September 1985, pp. 60-80. 
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cycle manufacturer. Out of the 285,000 machines built by 
Honda during 1959,168,000 were 'Supercubs'. 50 
This progress did not go unnoticed in Britain. As early as 
1952, columnist Francis Jones warned of the threat posed by 
the rapidly developing Japanese motor cycle industry. Jones 
approved of the manufacturing strategy that was being followed 
by Japanese firms. In contrast to the British, they had 
avoided production of the "high performance motor cycle" in 
favour of lightweight models, a policy which he labelled 
"sound business. " Yet Jones was exceptional in his views. 
Many others were dismissive of Japanese competition. At 
around the same time, Bill Johnson, Triumph's distributor in 
California, acknowledged that, while some Japanese motor 
cycles had already appeared in American showrooms, they should 
not be taken "too seriously. " His views were mirrored in 
Britain as well. Indeed, in contrast to their intense 
curiosity about Germany during the 1950s, the Industries' 
Association did not commission a single report about the state 
of the Japanese industry. 
51 
Because home demand was so strong, the Japanese presence 
overseas built up gradually. During 1958, the Japanese were 
already capable of producing 400,000 mostly lightweight motor 
cycles per year and in 1960 Honda built a new factory with a 
capacity of 30,000 units per month. 
52 That same year, the 
50. See Pascale, op cit, p. 53. By 1983, Honda announced that 
it had built a total of 15 million 'Supercubs'. See Bacon, pR 
cit, p. 25. 
51. See 'The case for lightweights' by Francis Jones, Motor 
cycle and Cycle Export Trader, December 1952, pp. 237-42. Bill 
Johnson's comments are from 'Johnson Motors of California', 
ibid, May 1953, pp. 90-93. 
52. See Pascale, on cit, p. 51. 
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Japanese created the foundation for their subsequent dominance 
abroad. Having "developed huge production volumes in small 
motor cycles in their domestic market, " the resulting 
economies of scale led to cost reductions which put them in a 
highly advantageous position, one which they would soon 
exploit to the full. 
53 
In 1957 columnist Francis Jones, writing in a trade journal, 
had become concerned enough by developments to issue another 
warning to British manufacturers. Not only were Japanese 
motor cycle companies well established they were now "even 
beginning to show originality, and the products are'no longer 
copies of European models. " Furthermore, it was time to 
discard outmoded cultural stereotypes: "British makers can no 
longer treat Japanese competition as a joke, in the way they 
used to do. It has got past that stage and must now be taken 
seriously-i54 Then, in 1959, the Honda factory team made its 
first appearance at the Isle of Man TT, racing in the 
lightweight 125cc class. Greeted at first with what was 
termed "polite derision", the Honda machines finished in 
comparatively poor positions. The following year they 
returned and won all positions between first and tenth 
place. 
55 Shortly afterwards an unnamed British company 
procured a lightweight Honda for examination. According to 
its Managing Director, the results of the investigation were 
highly disturbing: 
53. See Boston Consulting Group, op cit, p. xiv. 
54. See 'Motor Cycle Matters', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
6 July 1957, p. 1866. 
55. See article entitled 'Technical Analysis: Honda 350 
Four' by 'Europa', Cycle World, June 1964, contained in Cycle 
ý; ýrýý On Honda, 1962-1967, Cobham, Surrey: Brooklands Book 
Distribution Ltd., 1988, pp. 30-33. 
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When we stripped the machine it was so good it 
frightened us. It was made like a watch and was not 
a copy of anything. It was the product o original 
thinking, and it was very good thinking. 5 
What particularly worried manufacturers were rumours of 
impending changes to trading relations between Britain and 
Japan. In fact, negotiations between the two governments had 
been in progress since 1955 with the aim of liberalising their 
import restrictions/regulations. In late 1959 the Industries 
Association was informed by the Board of Trade that it would 
shortly commence discussions with the Japanese government for 
the purpose of concluding a bilateral trade agreement. 
57 
Several months later, BSA's motor cycle chief Edward Turner 
informed members of an Industries Association Council meeting 
that he had heard news of a concessionaire canvassing dealers 
around Britain to discover whether or not they would carry 
Japanese motor cycles. This unwelcome information was 
worsened by the fact that the Industries Association was 
unable to prevent dealers from selling imported products, 
thanks to the recent dissolution of long-standing trading 
agreements, implemented because of advice that they were 
illegal under the Restrictive Practices Act. 58 
56. See 'Oriental look for motor cycles', The Statist, 6 
April 1962. 
57. See memo entitled '486/59: Trade with Japan, 1960/1961', 
dated 2 December 1959, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/92. 
58. See minutes of Council meeting held on 31 May 1960, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/93. In a memo to the 
Council, Hugh Palin reported that the dismantling of the 
agreements, "demolished the valuable scheme of trading that 
the industry has built up over a long period of years. " See 
memo dated 13 June 1961, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/96. 
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In July 1960, Palin sent out a report to inform members that 
an interim trade agreement between Britain and Japan had just 
been concluded which was designed to promote greater trade 
between the two countries. He admitted that it contained a 
provision liberalising motor cycle and bicycle imports which 
had come as a "bombshell. " A "strongly worded" letter had 
already been sent to the President of the Board of Trade about 
the lack of prior consultation. 
59 Subsequently, Palin 
discovered that the new agreement, which also contained a 
£100,000 quota clause for imports of scooters and mopeds, 
failed to provide a definition of either vehicle. It was now 
feared the Japanese might take advantage of these ambiguities 
to increase their exports. At a Council meeting held in July 
1960, members discussed the agreement and condemned the 
government's failure to consult with them beforehand. Palin 
was instructed to arrange for a meeting with President of the 
Board of Trade Reginald Maudling as quickly as possible. 
60 
Maudling subsequently acknowledged the "dissatisfaction" 
expressed by several British 
industries about the increased 
import liberalisation. He agreed that "some industries would 
face increased competition" but added that he was "confident 
that there would be no risk of a flood of imports from Japan. " 
True, it would be easier for the Japanese to export to 
Britain, but the agreement would give British exports "new 
opportunities" which, he claimed, "on balance, would be of 
59. See memo entitled '355/60. Director's Confidential 
Report', dated 19 July 1960, contained in ibid. 
60. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 20 July 1960 and the Council meeting of 21 July 
1960, both contained in id. 
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substantial advantage to the UK. "61 Palin met with Maudling 
shortly afterwards, in the company of representatives of the 
photographic, toy and sewing machine industries, who were 
equally enraged about the interim trade agreement. At the end 
of that meeting, Maudling was forced to concede that 
"consultation with various Industries had not taken place and 
it would perhaps have been better if it had. " In future, he 
62 
promised, the government would be more cooperative. Palin 
for one was not reassured. In a report sent out to members in 
November 1960 he stated that the trade agreement was a "major 
blunder". 63 
Why had the British government not consulted with the 
industry before concluding the interim agreement with the 
Japanese? Having met with "many senior Board of Trade 
officials", Palin concluded that, unlike British 
manufacturers, "they really had no conception of the size or 
importance of the Japan [sic] Motor Cycle Industry, and could 
not believe they could constitute a serious threat to us. s, 
64 
In the meantime, however, the Industries Association would try 
and press the government to impose a quota on motor cycle 
imports in place of the current loosening of import 
65 
restrictions. 
61. See 'Imports from Japan. Mr. Maudling's Assurances', 
Financial Times, 7 September 1960, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/4. 
62. See minutes of Council meeting of 20 September 1960, 
contained in op cit. 
63. See memo entitled '517/60. Confidential Report', dated 7 
November 1960, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/95. 
64. . 
bid 
65. See minutes of the Motor Cycle Manufacturers' Section 
meeting of 19 January 1960, contained in ibid. 
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Was the British motor cycle industry, however, justified in 
being so critical of the British Government's failure to 
represent its interests? The fact was that the industry 
itself had not done much to prepare for Japanese competition, 
despite warnings in the trade press. In mid-1960, concerned 
by the increasing activity of the Japanese in various export 
markets, BSA had dispatched Edward Turner, still a Group Board 
member and Managing Director of the Automotive (soon to be 
retitled Motor Cycle) Division, to go out to Japan and conduct 
a first hand investigation. 
His report, dated 26 September 1960, must have caused unrest 
among his'fellow directors. Turner, who toured the Honda, 
Suzuki and Yamaha factories, was much impressed with what he 
saw, both in terms of yearly output (now over a million units 
in total) and quality. Indeed, he noted that the very scale 
of the Honda factory alone, which by then produced 
approximately a quarter million units per year (compared to 
140,000 for the entire British industry) was far ahead of 
anything he had ever previously encountered. Having reviewed 
their operations, Turner concluded that it must "borne in mind 
that we have not now nor ever have had, the quantities of any 
one product which would justify these highly desirable methods 
being used. ""66 
66. Turner's report is reproduced in Ivor Davies, It's a 
T ice, pp. 199-205. In an interview conducted afterwards, 
Turner claimed the rapid growth of the Japanese motor cycle 
industry was brought about by "heavy home market consumption 
caused by the rising standard of living. " He also claimed 
that generous American financial aid had allowed Japanese 
motor cycle manufacturers, among others, to invest in factory 
and plant, "on a lavish scale. " See 'E. Turner visits Japan', 
Motor Cvcle and Cycle Export Trader, December 1960, p. 160. 
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Turner's brief had been to gather information on the 
Japanese industry, in order to enable BSA and Triumph "to plan 
counter measures to try and preserve our own share in the 
motor cycle world markets. " It is unclear, however, just how 
his report, which made no concrete suggestions for action, was 
received by the BSA Group Board. Presumably, as a senior 
Group Board member, any recommendations from Edward Turner to 
change production programmes or initiate new designs must have 
been given the most serious consideration by his colleagues. 
Yet no action would be initiated for another several years, a 
critical period when the Japanese began to consolidate their 
hold on markets previously dominated by British 
manufacturers. 
67 
It is true that during the trade negotiations with the 
Japanese, the British government had priorities which did not 
always take into account the interests of industry. The 
perspectives of ministers and civil servants were coloured by 
the consideration that Anglo-Japanese trade "had begun to 
assume much more importance ... in view of the remarkable 
progress of the Japanese economy. i68 When, for example, the 
President of the Board of Trade visited Japan in April 1962, 
he was informed that there was "little doubt that scope exists 
for a substantial increase in trade between the UK and Japan 
in future. " Specifically, there were "considerable 
opportunities for the sale of machinery of all kinds" such as 
machine tools, office machinery, chemicals and radar. " The 
67. ibid. The surviving BSA Group Board of Directors Minutes 
books have a gap covering the period 1960 to 1969. 
68. See Government's Statement on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 
London: HMSO, 1962. 
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problem was that an increase in Anglo-Japanese trade might not 
benefit everyone. 69 
Indeed, motor cycle manufacturers might have been very 
uneasy had they been aware of certain remarks the President of 
the Board of Trade made before a meeting of the Japan-British 
Society in Osaka in May 1962. The speech, which referred 
generally to the desirability of increasing trade between the 
two countries, included the following statement: 
It is certainly not our policy to preserve 
uncompetitive industries as monuments to Britain's 
industrial past. We recognise that with constant 
technological changes, rising labour costs and the 
growth of production in other countries, some 
branches of industry are bound to decline because 
they are no longer competitive. Our future lies in 
developing new industries, particularly those which 
call for high technological skill, and not in 
seeking to protect those which are out of date or no 
longer economic. 70 
The desirability of increased trade with Japan was also 
shared by the Federation of British Industries. Another 
visitor there during this time was the FBI's Director-General 
Norman Kipping. Before he left Britain, he had been informed 
69. See 'Brief for President's Visit to Japan, April 1962', 
contained in PRO BT 11/5758. Much the same point about the 
priorities of the British government are made in Jim 
Tomlinson's 'British Industrial Policy in a Japanese Mirror: 
Why no MITI in Britain? ', unpublished paper delivered at the 
Fourth Anglo/Japanese Conference, London School of Economics, 
14-16 April 1994. 
70. See 'Draft Speech for the President to give to the Kansai 
Japan-British Society in Osaka, on May 1,1962' contained in 
PRO BT 11/5909. Another consideration held by British trade 
negotiators was the fact that the Japanese bargaining position 
had been "greatly strengthened" by a "substantial improvement" 
in the British balance of trade with Japan. This imbalance, 
one civil servant wrote, might create presure on the British 
government to liberalise existing trade restrictions on items 
such as mopeds, even though such action would be undertaken 
"with some misgivings. " See 'Annex C- Note on the Trade 
Negotiations with Japan, August-December 1961', contained in 
PRO BT 11/5758. 
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by the Board of Trade that the price of liberalising trade 
with Japan might be "materially affected by the treatment of 
Japanese imports in this country. i171 Once in Japan, Kipping 
visited a number of enterprises, including Honda Motor and, 
like Edward Turner before him, was greatly impressed by the 
advanced state of factory and plant. He was also struck by 
the potential market for British exports but was equally 
concerned about the implications of Japan's sizable trade 
deficit with Britain. 72 As a direct result of Kipping's tour, 
the FBI commissioned an in-depth report on Japan by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, which was published in April 
1962. Among other things, the report examined the Japanese 
motor cycle industry and confirmed both Kipping and Turner's 
assessment about its output and quality. It also singled out 
Japanese motor cycle models for special praise, noting that 
they incorporated "original design feature ... [which] are 
showing competitive strength internationally. 1173 
The formal trade agreement was officially signed in London 
during mid-November 1962, in the presence of both Prime 
Ministers Macmillan and Ikeda. Government officials 
71. See 'Director-General's Report', dated February 1961, 
attached to the FBI Grand Council minutes, 1961, contained in 
MRC MSS 200/F/3/S3/2/12. 
72. According to Kipping's itinerary, he toured the Honda 
factory on 10 October 1951. A copy of the itinerary is 
contained in MRC MSS 200/F/3/D3/6/72. For a general account 
of Kipping's Japanese tour, see A Look at Japan, Federation of 
British Industry: London, 1961 contained in MRC MSS 
200/F/4/76/17. In his memoirs, Kipping noted that, after his 
visit to Japan, "we could see many gaps in the products on 
sale that could be filled by British exports, in a market that 
was rapidly absorbing western tastes and standards. " See 
Norman Kipping, Summing Up, London: Hutchinson and Co., 1972, 
p. 173. 
73. See The Japanese Economy, London: Economist Intelligence 
Unit, April 1962. A copy of this report is contained in MRC 
MSS 200/F/4/77/5. 
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discounted fears of undue Japanese competition on the Home 
market as "exaggerated. 1174 The Treaty did provide two 
safeguards against what was termed "disruptive competition. " 
One allowed either signatory party to re-impose restrictions 
should it be shown that imports had arrived "in such increased 
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten 
serious injury to producers of like or competitive products. " 
The other was a list of so-called "sensitive items" which 
needed continuing protection against open competition for a 
period of three years after the Treaty came into force. The 
items on the list included certain yarns and fabrics, radio 
and television components and pottery goods. Inexplicably, it 
did not include motor cycles, scooters and mopeds. 
75 The FBI 
released a statement on the day of signing which welcomed the 
Treaty, on the grounds that it contained "many good features. " 
However, it also cautioned that there were "some (clauses) 
74. The agreement's formal title was Treaty of Commerce, 
Fstabl shment and Navigation, signed on 14 November 1962. 
London: HMSO, 1962. (Cmnd 1874). For various reactions to 
the negotiations leading up to the signature of the treaty, 
see for example 'More competition from Japan', The Economist, 
31 December 1961, p. 1303, 'A Sun still rising', ibid, 3 March 
1962, pp. 786-787, 'Doing business with Japan' by Victor 
Sampson, The Statist, 23 November 1962, pp. 535-539' and Anglo- 
Japanese Trade Treaty is signed', The Times, 15 November 1962, 
p. 2. 
75. See Government Statement on the Anglo-Japanese Commercial 
qty, London: HMSO, November 1962 (Cmnd 1875) pp. 4-9. the 
agreement was was the subject of much discussion in the House 
of Commons, see 'Debate on the Anglo-Japanese Treaty', 
Han ard, [668], 5 December 1962, cols 1335-1443. The 
Government's case was put by Alan Green, Minister of State for 
the Board of Trade, see cols 1336-37 and 1341. There was 
little opposition expressed against the agreement, except from 
MPs representing textile districts in the north. See, for 
example, the remarks of Geoffrey Hirst, MP from Shipley, at 
col 1352. 
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which caused misgivings. " For its part, the National Union of 
Manufacturers expressed "reservations" about the Treaty. 76 
The results of gradual liberalisation of Anglo-Japanese 
trade after 1960 were soon apparent. In September 1960, 
during a meeting of manufacturers and retailers 
representatives, concern was already being expressed about a 
"considerable number of Japanese machines" entering the Home 
market, even though the first Honda 'Supercub' was only sold 
that November. 77 Later the following year, Hugh Palin 
informed members of the Industries Association that, while 
Japanese motor cycle imports during 1960 had been 464 
machines, between January and August 1961 alone they had more 
than doubled to 1,274. Palin noted that the increase was 
"particularly remarkable as it occurred at a time when the 
Home trade was very depressed, and when total imports of motor 
cycles, mopeds and scooters were down by as much as 60 per 
cent on 1960.1j7$ 
The threat was now recognised at the most senior levels of 
the industry. During his address to the 1961 BSA Annual 
General Meeting, Chairman Eric Turner acknowledged that 
foreign competition, particularly from the Japanese, "is 
growing and the effect is now being felt more than at any 
76. See 'Misgivings felt by FBI', The Times, 15 November 
1962, p. 12. See also a copy of the FBI press statement, dated 
14 November 1962, entitled An o-Japanese Commercial Treaty, 
contained in MRC MSS 200/F/3/D3/6/72. 
77. See minutes of the Joint Advisory Committee meeting of 27 
September 1960, on deposit with the Motor Cycle Retailers' 
Association. See 'First Honda 50cc sold in UK', Motor Cycle 
gnd cycle Trader, 14 November 1960, p. 126. 
78. See memo entitled '458/61. Director's Report', dated 15 
November 1961, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/97, see 
also 'Motor cycles for the UK', Financial Times, 20 July 1960, 
contained in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/4. 
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other time since the war, " although he did not provide any 
information about what BSA was going to do about it. 79 
Despite the sales recession, a Honda company representative 
claimed in late 1961 that Western Europe was "still the 
world's largest market for mopeds, motor cycles and scooters. " 
Afterwards the company announced that it was setting up an 
assembly plant in Belgium capable of producing 10,000 
lightweight machines per month - nearly the total monthly 
output of the entire British motor cycle industry. 
80 
Honda's sales effort in Britain was put under the direction 
of J. E. Harrisson, who had been hired from Raleigh Industries, 
where he had been a senior manager, responsible for moped 
sales. By June 1963, Harrisson and his marketing team claimed 
that the Honda 'Supercub'-was selling so well that it now 
represented 40 per cent of sales in the lightweight category. 
Indeed, in only a few months, overall turnover of the 
'Supercub' had increased by nearly 100 per cent, a virtually 
unprecedented achievement and one which did not go unnoticed 
by retailers around the country. So successful was Honda's 
sales campaign that one business journal remarked that it 
proved the prolonged motor cycle recession was less the result 
of Purchase Tax and Hire/Purchase restrictions rather than 
what it termed "producer inaction". Honda, by contrast, "has 
79. See Chairman's speech, 14 December 1961, contained in MRC 
MSS 19A/4/39. 
80. See 'Japanese Motor Cycle Company for Europe', 13 
December 1961 p. 21 and "Honda European Works', 1 June 1962, 
p. 105, both in the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader. At the time, 
Honda production in Japan was reported to be 70,000 units per 
month, of which 20 per cent was exported. 
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clearly discovered an unexploited market where at the moment 
there are few competitors. 1181 
The Industries Association's first response to the arrival 
of Japanese motor cycles was to try and prevent would-be 
retailers from carrying the imports. In April 1961, for 
example, a Coventry department store, Owen and Owen, displayed 
a Honda motor cycle in its front window. An outraged Hugh 
Palin thereupon phoned and successfully convinced store 
management to remove the offending imported machine. 82 
However, many more dealers refused to be moved by pressure 
from British manufacturers. One, for example, wrote in to the 
motor Cycle and Cycle Trader full of praise for Honda's 
British sales operation. "Honda has hit, " he maintained, "the 
high spots in every direction and from the dealers' point of 
view has created a new stimulus to the whole two wheeled 
business which has been lacking for so long. " His enthusiasm 
83 
was not an isolated instance. 
81. The Belgian factory was opened in September 1963, see 'UK 
Honda Sales Scope Limitless. First European Works Opened in 
Belgium', mod, 20 September 1963, pp. 261-263. A brief news 
item about Harrisson being hired by Honda is contained in 
ibyd, 27 July 1962, p. 204. See also 'Biggest Two-wheeler 
Sales Drive Yet', ibid, 9 August 1963, p. 196. For the quote 
about Honda, see 'Motor cycles - facing the 50cc challenge', 
inanc; al Times, 17 October 1963, contained in clipping book 
MRC MSS 2/4/10/l/4. 
82. See memo dated 26 April 1961, entitled '206/61: 
Director's Confidential Report', contained in Guardbook MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/96. 
83. See 'Keep it up, Honda! ', ibid, 20 September 1963, p. 271. 
Other letters to the Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader are 'Honda 
Competition Enterprise', 23 August 1963 p. 233 and 'Well Done 
Honda', 6 September 1963, p. 251. One retailer in Sheffield, 
however, was less impressed with the Japanese. Referring to 
an upcoming tour of Japan, laid on for its dealers by Honda, 
he recalled that there had also been "a trip made by many good 
men in 1942/44 who, due to some small oversight, forgot to 
return. " See 'Selling British - and All Right! ' ibid, 4 
October 1963, p. 287. 
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Early in 1963, the FBI created a Working Party on the Anglo- 
Japanese Commercial Treaty in order to monitor Japanese 
imports and collect evidence for a possible application to 
activate the Safeguard Clause. It was chaired by R. F. K. 
Belchem, who had been hired in 1959 to work directly with then 
BSA chairman Jack Sangster and was still a senior executive 
with the company. Upon questioning by other committee members 
present, including Hugh Palin, Belchem admitted that the FBI 
had not been consulted by the Board of Trade about how the 
Safeguard Clause would operate. 
84 Shortly afterwards, Palin 
expressed his concern about the Clause's future effectiveness. 
It was true that repeated assurances had been issued by the 
Board of Trade, pledging that vulnerable British industries 
would be protected against "disruptive" Japanese competition. 
However, as Palin later wrote to motor cycle manufacturers, it 
was "far from clear how the Government defines the degree of 
injury that must be suffered before action can be taken" nor 
did he know "precisely what is meant by 'disruptive'. ""85 
During the spring of 1963, the industry watched with growing 
dismay as more Japanese lightweight motor cycles, mostly Honda 
50cc 'Supercubs', flooded into the home market. Some 4,270 
had arrived in 1962 but by July 1963, with full liberalisation 
now in force, this number had increased to some 28,454 [see 
Appendix 1, Table XXV]. That autumn Palin informed Industries 
84. See Minutes of the FBI Working Party on the Anglo- 
Japanese Commerical Treaty, dated 11 January 1963, contained 
in MRC MSS 200/F/1/1/217. 
85. Belchem was hired as Sangster's Personal Assistant as of 
12 January 1959. See agenda item 11342, BSA Board meeting of 
22 January 1959, contained in Directors' Minute Book 17, MRC 
MSS 19A. See also memo dated 8 February 1963, entitled 
'45/60: Director's Confidential Report', contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/100. 
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Association members that, despite the large numbers of 
imports, it might not be possible to lodge a formal protest 
with the Board of Trade. The industry must first, Palin 
explained, "establish injury or threat of injury, and this is 
the rub. "86 
Shortly afterwards, during an Industries Association Council 
meeting, members heard Association President Edward Turner 
inform them that he "doubted whether the Industry could 
currently make out a very good case so far as Japanese 
competition was concerned. "87 He expanded on this pessimistic 
statement at a subsequent meeting. According to Turner, "it 
was perhaps true that the bulk of Japanese imports were of a 
type of machine which the industry had not hitherto marketed. " 
Furthermore, he was unable to recommend, as some had evidently 
urged him to do, that a formal protest be made to the Board of 
Trade, accusing the Japanese of 'dumping' their machines on to 
the British market at unrealistically low prices. Again, 
Turner had to admit that such a protest "might be difficult to 
establish as the prices were not altogether unreasonable when 
one considers the vast volume of production. 1188 
86. See memo dated 24 October 1963, entitled '363/63: 
Director's Confidential Report', contained in Guardbook MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/101. 
87. See minutes of the Council meeting of 29 October 1963, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/102. 
88. See minutes of Council meeting of 10 December 1963, ibid. 
In an article he submitted to the Motor Trade Executive at 
about the same time, Turner explained that Honda's success in 
the 50cc engine displacement class could not be attributed to 
unfair trading practices. Their success was the result, he 
wrote, of the size and strength of the Japanese home market, 
"which enabled them to build huge quantities" allowing them to 
make "extremely substantial investment" in manufacturing 
facilities. This placed them, he concluded, "in a very 
favourable position to attack world markets, which they are 
now doing with great success. " See 'The Next Five Years' by 
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Even with diminishing likelihood of success, Palin kept on 
hammering away at the Board of Trade to invoke the Safeguard 
Clause. In December 1963 he arranged to meet with Edward 
Heath, the newly appointed President of the Board of Trade, to 
further press the industry's case. However, as Palin advised 
Industry Association members, he held few hopes for a 
favourable reception. He had, in fact, already been informed 
off-the-record by Board officials that "it will be difficult 
for us to prove injury, or to establish that the decline in 
British motor cycle production and home sales is due directly 
to Japanese competition. 1189 He then wrote to Belchem to 
inform him of another meeting with an unnamed Board official, 
whom he described as "not very sympathetic. " Palin 
subsequently wrote once more to Belchem and quoted from a 
letter he had just received from 'Phillips', another official 
at the Board, rejecting his arguments for invoking the 
Safeguard Clause: 
Our general conclusion ... is that the fall in home 
deliveries of motor cycles this year, during which 
period Japanese imports have become significant, 
continues to an established trend and that the 
Japanese are building up a market which would not 
otherwise have been exploited by the British 
industry. 90 
Palin angrily refuted this statement in further letter to 
Belchem. He denied that the Japanese had created a new 
market; rather, what they had done was to encroach on the one 
Edward Turner, draft copy dated 21 October 1963, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/T91. 
89. See memo dated 5 December 1963, entitled '423/63: 
Director's Confidential Report', contained in MRC MSS 
204/3/1/102. Emphasis in original. 
90. See Letter Palin-Belchem, dated 12 December 1963, 
entitled 'Re: Anglo-Japanese Treaty', contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/79. 
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already serviced by domestic manufacturers: "we are quite 
satisfied that the Japanese machines are not being sold to an 
entirely new public but to precisely the same people who might 
otherwise have bought British. " Yet, Palin had to agree that 
the lightweight Japanese models did attract many British 
consumers: "they are attractive and sell at rather a lower 
price than the cheapest light weight British motor cycle. "91 
Despite repeated rebuffs from the government over import 
restrictions, the Industries Association continued to agitate 
for a relaxation of Purchase Tax. Cutting this tax, 
manufacturers stated, would reverse declining sales on the 
home market and, by implication, make the industry more 
competitive abroad. This argument continued to be met with 
scepticism by officials at the Board of Trade. In December 
1963, having reviewed a recent Industries Association brief, 
one official remarked that while "many statistics can be 
adduced to show that exports go up as the Home market expands, 
and decline as it contracts, " there were "obvious limitations" 
to this line of argument. Cutting Purchase Tax, he continued, 
"may not wholly offset a secular decline in which other 
factors are at work. "92 
Shortly afterwards, another Board official' expressed his 
scepticism about the industry's case. He doubted whether any 
reduction in Purchase Tax would help improve the sales of 
motor cycles, the heavyweight models in particular. As he 
observed, "some will doubtless continue to buy these of choice 
91. See letter, Palin to Belchem, dated 3 February 1964, 
entitled 'Re: Treaty', contained in ibid. 
92. See Minute #2, prepared by K. Taylor, dated 12 December 
1963, contained in PRO BT 258/1889. 
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and a reduction in Purchase Tax might stimulate some slight 
revival in demand. One cannot, however, help feeling that 
people will tend increasingly to prefer a car as they come to 
be able to afford one. " On the other hand, the Japanese "seem 
to have created something of a new market" and cutting the 
Purchase Tax would not necessarily help British producers 
compete with them. 
93 Indeed, the Board of Trade was simply 
not willing to accept the central theme of the industry's 
submissions, the allegation that the cheap Japanese imports 
were somehow represented unfair trading. As another Board 
official concluded: "Given the strength of the Japanese and 
Italian industries, ... and the initiative which the Japanese 
have succeeded in taking in the ultra lightweight [50cc engine 
capacity class] ... it is difficult to accept the industry's 
case without reservations. '' The industry could not expect any 
help from this quarter. 94 
At least one British motor cycle retailer shared the 
conclusions of civil servants. Writing in to a trade journal, 
a dealer from Wigan, Lancaster, explained why he thought 
British consumers had been buying the imports in such 
quantities. The fact was, he wrote, that "British designers 
93. See letter, W. G. Onslow to D. Johnson (Customs and 
Excise), dated 24 December 1963, contained in ibid. 
94. See memo entitled 'In Confidence. Motor Cycle and 
Scooters', no date or author indicated, but attached to a memo 
entitled 'Bicycles and Mopeds' and dated 17 December 1963, 
signed by C. W. Sanders, contained in ibid. This assessment 
was shared by an independent observer. Honda's success in the 
lightweight classes demonstrated that the Purchase Tax was 
less a deterrent to sales than the fact the market for the 
heavy weight models favoured by British manufacturers was 
simply too narrow and showed little likelihood of expansion. 
See 'Motor cycles facing the 50cc challenge', Financial limes, 
17 October 1963, contained in clipping book MRC MSS 
204/10/1/4. 
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have little idea of how to combat the Honda and Suzuki 
machines. " Citing the BSA 75cc 'Beagle', this dealer insisted 
that the specifications of domestically produced machines were 
simply not good enough to match the foreign competition. The 
latter came standard with, among other things, better 
suspension, a speedometer, legshields, and more attractive 
chrome styling. The dealer held little hope for the future of 
British machines: "I have given the Beagle prominence in our 
window display but Wiganers are just not interested. i95 
The relative merits of British and Japanese motor cycles 
were fiercely debated amongst enthusiasts around Britain. In 
one instance, the newsletter of a motor cycle club in Kent 
reported an exchange between supporters of both national 
producers. Partisans of Japanese machines seemed to be in the 
majority. Not only could they point to successes on the race 
track but in comparisons of performance and design, the 
British motor cycles lost out time and again. The Hondas had 
better brakes, an electric starter was standard and they were 
far more reliable. As one enthusiast described it: "Until 
one has ridden a Japanese bike, one doesn't know how 
wonderfully superb they are.,, 
96 
95. See letter to the editor, entitled 'UK-Jap Design 
Contrasts', from D. Rogerson, Manager of Rogerson's in Wigan, 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 1 May 1964, p. 52. BSA 
Production Manager John Balder termed the 'Beagle' "an utter 
flop. " In his opinion, the problem was that BSA tried to 
compete on the basis of price, which meant that "everything 
was skrimped to the point in which it wouldn't work. " In 
contrast, the Japanese machines may have cost more but, thanks 
to superior specification, were far more reliable. See John 
Balder interview, 18 November 1994. 
96. See 'The British-Jap motor cycle controversy', Eltham and 
uenr_ish Times, 19 February 1965, contained in clipping book 
MRC MSS 204/10/1/4. 
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Then, in July 1963, a major British manufacturer joined the 
stampede to buy Japanese motor cycles. AMC, which had been 
conducting secret negotiations with Suzuki, succeeded in 
gaining the distribution rights for their lightweight models 
throughout Britain. The news of the agreement, which came as 
a complete surprise to Palin and virtually everyone else in 
the industry, created great consternation, being the first 
time a significant British manufacturer had cooperated with a 
foreign rival on the home market. Such a split among 
manufacturers ensured the impossibility of a united position 
on imports-97 
For its part, AMC argued that such an arrangement with a 
Japanese producer was inevitable and necessary for its 
continuing survival. In his address at the subsequent 
shareholders' meeting, Chairman Hulbert stated that the 
distribution agreement was "reached only after the most 
careful consideration of the many problems involved. " It was 
the expanding lightweight motor cycle market which showed real 
potential, not the traditional heavyweights which AMC had 
specialised in manufacturing over the years. As Hulbert 
informed the shareholders: 
The products (Suzuki imports] are of a type which 
have not been developed or promoted to any extent by 
the British industry for the very good reason that 
the total demand in this country could never warrant 
the heavy investment required to produce a 
comparably priced product. Once accepting the fact 
97. See letter from Hugh Palin to J. F. Kelleher (Joint 
Managing Director, AMC), dated 1 July 1963, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/T72. See also 'AMC to Distribute 
Japanese Motor Cycles', Financial Times, 26 June 1963 and 
'Surprise at motor cycle link-up', Birmingham Post, 26 June 
1963, both contained in clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/4 and 
'AMC to handle Suzuki' Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 28 June 
1963, p. 154. 
342 
that the vast Japanese home market confers such 
immense benefits in product costs that it is 
impossible for British manufacturers to compete, it 
is then a logical step to develop the type of 
distribution undertaken by your company in support 
of its traditional British motor cycle products 
which are sold in Home and export markets. 98 
The implications of the AMC-Suzuki deal were soon felt at 
the Industries Association. During the October Council 
meeting, the AMC representative present made it very clear 
that his company would oppose any further move to convince the 
Board of Trade to impose import restrictions. Not only did 
the Industries Association fail to make such an application, 
but thereafter the entire issue of imports was a closed 
subject. Several months later, when the managing director of 
a small all-British lightweight motor cycle manufacturer 
inquired about what was being done about increasing numbers of 
imports, Palin admitted that the Industries' Association was 
powerless. Because of AMC's interest in promoting Japanese 
motor cycles, they had now ceased to refer to it anymore for 
fear of aggravating internal divisions. 
99 Nor would the Board 
of Trade help. "We are doing all we can, " Palin declared, but 
are "making no headway at all and it seems pretty clear that 
98. See Chairman's speech, delivered on 27 April 1964, copy 
on deposit at the Guildhall Library. One dealer wrote that 
"now we have the somewhat humiliating picture of [AMC] acting 
as distributing agent for one of the foreign machines - no 
doubt a wise commercial move. But the victories and honours 
could have been ours, surely? " See letter from K. Robert, 
entitled 'Not too late for UK lightweights', Motor Cycle and 
cycle Trader, 26 July 1963, p. 190. In the first year of the 
agreement, some 17,000 of the lightweight Suzukis were shipped 
to Britain for distribution by AMC. See Jeff Clew, Suzuki, 
Sparkford, Yeovil: Haynes Publishing Group, 1980, p. 51. 
99. See memo 363/63, entitled 'Director's Confidential 
Report', dated 24 October 1963 and the minutes of the Council 
meeting held on 29 October 1963, contained in Guardbooks MRC 
MSS 204/3/1/100 and MSS 204/3/1/102. See also letter, Hugh 
Palin to D. P. Cobb (Greeves Motor Cycles), dated 17 August 
1964, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/T80. 
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the present Government is committed to a liberal trade policy 
and only a severe bout of unemployment would, I believe, shift 
them. 1,100 
Although their domestic sales had not revived, industry 
leaders believed that there was a marked improvement in the 
image of motor cycling in Britain, irrespective of the origin 
of the machines. In mid-1964, Hugh Palin reported to Industry 
Association members that, thanks to their publicity work, the 
so-called 'Mods and Rockers' phenomenon, which "could so 
easily have developed into an anti-motor cycle and anti- 
scooter campaign" had not done so, a fact he attributed to "a 
reflection of the much better public relations which now exist 
in relation to two-wheelers. ""101 Shortly afterwards, Hugh 
Palin was invited to a school in Shrewsbury, to witness the 
presentation of a motor cycle to the headmaster as part of an 
initiative to start-up a motor cycle and scooter training 
scheme. As Palin later informed industry leaders, he had been 
"tremendously impressed" by the "significance of this occasion 
for the future of the industry. " Recalling how, "only a few 
years ago, " motor cycling had been looked upon "by many as an 
undesirable activity, you can perhaps imagine my feelings 
sitting on the platform of this modern school, before an 
assembly of all 700 pupils, and listening to the Chairman of 
the School Governors extolling the virtues of the motor cycle 
100. See Palin-Cobb, ibid. 
101. See memo entitled '229/64: Director's Confidential 
Report', dated 4 June 1964, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/103. For more on the 'Mods and Rockers' see Stanley 
Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Oxford: Blackwells, 
1993. See also Ian Harris, 'Myth and Reality in the 
Motorcycle Subculture', OR cit, and Mike Clay, Cafe Racers - 
Rock. Rock 'n' Roll and the Coffee-Bar Cult, London: 
Osprey Publishing, 1988. 
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and the value of training on two wheels. " If this was the 
trend of public opinion, then the industry's publicity 
campaign was finally showing results. The problem was that, 
although motor cycling enjoyed an improved image, the public 
had largely stopped buying British produced motor cycles. 102 
The one place they did continue to sell in substantial 
numbers was in North America, but there too the Japanese had 
made their mark. Japanese machines first appeared on the west 
coast of North America in the late 1950s. 
103 Subsequently, 
Japanese exports to the US and Canada grew rapidly. A report 
prepared in 1961 noted that, during 1958,2,000 motor cycles 
had left Japan for the US1 and this total had jumped to 8,000 
in 1960, a development which was termed "particularly 
menacing" for British importers. This was simply the 
beginning. In 1962,25,000 machines, mainly Honda 50cc 
'Supercubs', arrived and the following year this soared to 
100,000.104 Ironically, the Japanese did not have to worry 
about import restrictions, thanks to the successful Tariff 
102. See unentitled memo to members of the Industries 
Association Council, dated 9 February 1967, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/109. In early 1968, the Industries' 
Association was still sensitive enough about public 
perceptions about motor cycles and motor cyclists that it 
opposed the much delayed release of the film 'The Wild One' in 
Britain. Their opposition was based on the grounds that the 
15 year old movie might have a negative effect "on the 
improved image of the industry. " See minutes of the Joint 
Motor Cycle and Scooter Committe meeting of 6 February 1968, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/110. 
103. For the reaction of one well-established Canadian motor 
cycle dealer, see Frank Hilliard, Deeley - Motorcycle 
zU ionaire, Victoria, Canada: Orca Book Publishers, 1994, 
p. 121. 
104. See memo '271/61. Director's Confidential Report' dated 
5 June 1961, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/96 and 
'Japanese competition helps British Motor Cycles. Paradox of 
Us Sales Expansion', Times, 17 March 1963, contained in TUC 
file 12913, on deposit at the MRC. 
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Board case made by British manufacturers nearly ten years 
before. 
By 1962 one American enthusiasts' journal observed that a 
"cold draft of Japanese competition has sent a shiver through 
the ranks of the [British] industry with both home and export 
sales in the decline. " While the British blamed much of their 
poor sales at home to restrictive legislation, from the 
perspective of American consumers, the problems were more to 
do with the kind of models the British were selling. Not only 
were there "too many machines to choose from" but, if they 
wanted to hold on to their share of the market, they "must 
redesign models that will appeal to the general public in 
neatness, efficiency and above all quietness. " In the absence 
of such changes, their hold on the loyalty of American motor 
cyclists might be shorter than the British manufacturers 
expected. 
105 
Honda, in particular, exploited its initial advantage by 
launching an advertising campaign more extensive and better 
funded than any that had ever been attempted before by either 
the British or American industries. In 1962, Honda hired a 
professional advertising company expressly to devise a change 
in the image of the motor cycle as "a plaything for juvenile 
delinquents. " The campaign, which cost an unprecedented 
$2,000,000 (US), was headlined by the slogan, 'You meet the 
nicest people on a Honda' and, 
in another break with 
orthodoxy, appeared in a number of popular magazines such as 
Tom, The Saturday Evening Post and Playboy. As Honda's 1963 
105. See 'Late news from England' by B. R. Nicholls, contained 
in cycle World On BSA, 1962-1971, Cobham, Surrey: Brooklands 
Book Distribution Ltd., 1987, p. 9. 
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Annual Report put it, their intention was to follow a "policy 
of selling, not primarily to confirmed motor cyclists but 
rather to members of the public who had never before given a 
second thought to a motor cycle. "106 
As in Britain, the boom in the North American lightweight 
motor cycle market was led by the Honda 'Supercub'. During 
1963, for example, out of a total of 149,147 imports, 50,252 
were less than 50cc displacement, 15,573 larger than 250cc and 
83,322 between 50 and 250cc. 107 Intentionally or not, even 
the far larger British machines were pulled along by the 
momentum developed by the Japanese sales campaign. The result 
was increased popularity for the heavyweights, as "novices who 
probably never would have become customers for British 
machines" moved up to the BSAs, Triumphs and Nortons once they 
tired of the lesser performing Hondas. 108 [See Appendix 1, 
Table XXVI]. This phenomenon was well appreciated by British 
motor cycle manufacturers. In 1966, a delegation of industry 
executives visited North America and observed developments 
first hand. They were deeply impressed by the explosive 
106. See Sol Sanders, Honda - the Man and His Machines, 
Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1975, pp. 84-85 and pp. 96-97 and 
Tetsuo Sakiya, Honda Motor, pp. 124-125. See also Bacon, Honda 
- The Early Classic Motorcycles, pp. 23-26, Richard T. Pascale, 
Qp , pp. 47-72 and 
'Thirty Years after Sunrise' by Art 
Friedman, Motorcyclist, July 1989, pp. 51-63. 
107. See memo '307/64. Japanese Exports of Motor Cycles', 
dated 19 August 1964, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/103. 
108. See 'Japanese Competition helps British Motor Cycles. 
Paradox of US Sales Expansion', op cit, 'Lightweight trade 
will increase', by Ted Wassell, Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 
7 February 1964, p. 156 and 'Forward planning essential today', 
ib , 28 February 1964, p. 195. For more on the American 
perspective, see also 'Wooing the 'Mild Ones", Business Week, 
30 March 1963, pp. 26-27, 'How the 'Thunderherd' brought a 
Honda boom to the US' Newsweek, 6 July 1964, pp. 66-67 and 
'Japanese cycles in high gear', New York Times, 20 october 
1965. 
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growth of Japanese imports to the USA, which had increased 
from 300 in 1959 to 313,200 in 1965. While they found it 
disturbing that Britain's share of the US motor cycle market 
had declined from 33 per cent (by value) in 1958 to 12 per 
cent in 1965, "we did not find any feeling of alarm in the 
British importers' camp, and indeed business has never been so 
good. " Indeed, sales had jumped by 25 per between 1964 and 
1965. The fact was that "the great bulk" of Japanese sales 
were in the "small utility machines" which sold for 
approximately $215, "whilst almost all British sales are in 
the retail bracket between $1,000 and $1,500. " In the event, 
and against their earlier fears, the British were not "losing 
sales to the Japanese to any appreciable extent"; instead, "we 
are each operating at opposite ends of the market. ""109 
The delegation also noted that, "in the opinion of many well 
informed observers", the Japanese advertising campaign had 
"done a great deal of good to the motor cycle trade as a 
whole. " The vast sums spent on advertising, "much of it in 
the high class magazines, " had helped "make motor cycling more 
'respectable' and [wiped] out the unfortunate 'leather jacket' 
image. " The overall result was that the Japanese "have put 
tens of thousands of ordinary folks on two-wheels, folks with 
two and three cars very often, and quite a few of these become 
'sold' on motor cycling and graduate to larger machines. " The 
report ended on a note of caution. The lightweight market, 
109. See Report of Mission to the USA, April - May 1966, 
Coventry: British Cycle and Motor Cycle Industries 
Association, 1966, p. 11. Bert Hopwood specifically cites this 
attitude as symptomatic of the self-satisfaction which ensured 
British manufacturers were ill-prepared to meet the Japanese 
heavyweights when they became available several years later. 
See Hopwood, op cit, p. 183. 
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currently dominated by the Japanese, "is not one which the 
British Industry is particularly well equipped to attack at 
present" and it would do well to try and develop. Moreover, 
there was no guarantee that in future the Japanese might not 
decide to move into the heavyweight market. 110 
It was debatable whether or not the British industry had the 
resources to take advantage of the growing demand for motor 
cycles in North America. AMC, for example, remained in poor 
condition. Although its motor cycle sales had been assisted 
by the business generated through the Suzuki link-up, this was 
not sufficient to prevent financial distress. In order to 
counter continual losses, the company tried to diversify into 
general engineering work while also increasing motor cycle 
exports. The export drive was fairly successful (in late 1964 
Chairman Hulbert claimed that between 70 and 90 per cent of 
output was sent abroad, mainly to the USA) but the company's 
efforts to increase production were repeatedly frustrated by 
labour shortages. Moreover, financial losses kept on mounting 
and by 1965 had reached a total of £1.5 million. 
111 AMC 
manager to stagger on for another year but finally went into 
receivership in July 1966 with debts totalling £2.2 million. 
At the time, the business press remarked that the company had 
been brought down by its concentration on large displacement 
110. See Report, OR cit. The delegation came to the same 
conclusions about the Canadian market, although they noted 
that British manufacturers had great difficulty in supplying 
their dealers with sufficient numbers of machines. 
ill. See 'A change in two wheeled fortunes? ', The Statist, 22 
February 1963, p. 571, 'AMC building exports', The Motor Cycle 
and Cycle Trader, 27 November 1964, p. 116, Woollett, op cit, 
pp. 282-283 and 'Motor cycle exports continue to rise', 
_Financial 
Times, 30 July 1965, contained in newspaper clipping 
book MRC MSS 204/1/10/1/4. 
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motor cycles, "the static market for really powerful machines 
bought by racing and rallying enthusiasts. ""112 
AMC's motor cycle operations were thereupon bought up by 
Villiers Engineering, which had earlier been purchased by 
Manganese Bronze Holdings, a diversified engineering concern. 
The assets, comprising five separate motor cycle marques, 
subsequently became known as Norton-Villiers. Severe 
rationalisation followed. By 1969, the Woolwich factory had 
been closed down and production moved to the existing Villiers 
factory in Wolverhampton and a new facility at Andover. The 
model line-up was narrowed down to a 750cc (later 850cc) twin 
cylinder model, the 'Commando', which was essentially a 
modification of an older Norton design, described in the press 
as the "Aston-Martin of motor cycles. " A lightweight 250cc 
machine, marketed under the old AJS name, was also produced in 
small numbers. Virtually all output went abroad, 85 per cent 
alone to the US. 
113 
As the remnants of AMC struggled along under new management, 
BSA was now the industry's overwhelmingly predominant firm, 
accounting for approximately 80 per cent of total output. In 
1960, after selling off the Daimler motor car subsidiary to 
Jaguar for a reported £3.5 million, it appeared as if it might 
112. See 'AMC asks bankers to appoint receiver', 2 July 1966, 
'The cost of failing to move with the times', both in 
ý; Matt ai Times, and 'How America's Mr. Berliner could sway 
theatened AMC', Sunday Times, 7 July 1966. All 
references contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 
204/1/10/6. 
113. See 'Associated Motor Cycles Resuscitated', The Statist, 
22 November 1966, p. 1240. See also 'Villiers takes over AMC 
motor cycles', Financial Times, 14 September 1966 and 'Motor 
cycle exports should aid BSA earnings', Daily Telegraph, 22 
May 1967 and 'Motor bikes ease into top gear' by John 
Mattison, Sunday Times, 9 July 1967, all three contained in 
jbid 
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sideline motor cycles in favour of more lucrative pursuits. 
Instead of investing the proceeds of the Daimler sale into 
existing operations, the BSA Group Board of Directors decided 
to purchase Churchill Grinding Machine for £6 million. 
Chairman Eric Turner justified the expenditure on the grounds 
that there had been a "remarkable upsurge in the demand of 
machine tools" thanks to the requirements of the expanding 
motor, electrical and domestic appliance industries. This was 
the kind of growth sector in which BSA wanted to participate. 
Motor cycles, by contrast, were declining to the extent that 
it was "causing some concern" to the Board. 
114 
The move to diminish the significance of motor cycles in the 
BSA Group's overall production strategy did not last long. By 
1964, Chairman Turner informed shareholders that they were 
again becoming the Group's most important product, thanks to 
expanding North American sales. Turner later claimed that 
recent marketing research had shown that, as the result of the 
stimulation provided by Honda's advertising, there was rich 
sales potential in North America for the large and powerful 
motor cycles that the BSA Group specialised in making-115 
114. For information on the Daimler sale to Jaguar, see 
Jonathon Wood, op cit, p. 144. See also Chairman's Speech to 
the Annual General Meeting, delivered on 16 December 1960 and 
14 December 1961, contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/38 and 39 
respectively. Writing sometime after the fact, Bert Hopwood 
noted that the money spent on Churchill "would have been 
sufficient to enable British motor cycles to survive and 
compete if it had been injected into the BSA Motor Cycle 
Division [as it would become) together with a 'no-nonsense' 
management. " See Hopwood, OR cit, p. 186. 
115. 'See 'Benefits of BSA motor cycle reorganisation', 
Einancial Time, 29 April 1965, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/4. In early 1964, the 
Industries Association had informed Maurice Macmillan, 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury, that "between 60 and 70% 
of all production" was going abroad, a good proportion to the 
USA. See text of letter, which is included in the minutes of 
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Shortly afterwards, BSA's new Motor Cycle Division Managing 
Director, Harry Sturgeon (who had recently replaced Edward 
Turner, now retired although still holding a non-executive 
post on the Group Board), expanded upon this strategy. 
Sturgeon, who had previously been Managing Director of de 
Havilland Aircraft company, also credited Honda for having 
vastly widened by the North American market through their 
successful advertising campaign. This had created significant 
opportunities for BSA. Sturgeon claimed that sales there 
could be much increased, based as they were, "on the national 
acceptability of our machines which in turn would largely 
depend upon their performance in sporting events. ""116 
This intensified export drive was to be facilitated by a 
series of plant improvements at the Small Heath factory, 
beginning with a £750,000 investment over 1964/1965. Several 
years later, the company installed a new computer assisted 
assembly system, modelled on the one already in place at 
Austin's motor car works at nearby Longbridge, which was 
expected to substantially increase production. 
117 Once fully 
implemented, the company claimed its improved factory was "the 
the council meeting of 4 February 1964, contained in Guardbook 
MRC MSS 204/3/1/102. 
116. See Ryerson, op c it, p. 162, 'Motor Cycle Division has a 
new look', BSA Group News, September 1964, p. 1., and 'BSA 
Group 'Fight Back' is on! ', Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 18 
September 1964, p. 210. Sturgeon ruefully admitted that there 
would be hard work ahead in order to increase sales: "we had 
been too complacent ... the industry [is] beginning to learn 
that British products [are] not automatically the best nor the 
most saleable. " See ibid. 
117. See Balder interview, 18 November 1994 and 'The computer 
as a tool for production, planning and control' by John 
Balder, contained in Computer Case Histories, S. Sumersbee 
(ed), London: The Machinery Publishing Co. Ltd., 1970. See 
also 'Motor cycles - far from gloomy', Financial Times, 16 
August 1967, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 
204/10/1/7. 
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most modern motor cycle assembly operation in Europe. " 
Another facet of the decision to increase production was the 
creation of a centralised motor cycle design centre, sited in 
a converted country house located between Birmingham and 
Coventry. In a move intended to inject new blood into 
existing design establishment, the centre was staffed 
primarily by personnel brought in from the aeronautics 
industry, not from long-time factory trained experts. 118 
At first, the decision to promote increased motor cycle 
exports to offset the weak home market seemed to have paid 
off. In 1966 Chairman Eric Turner claimed that motor cycle 
output was up by 50 per cent on the previous year and that 75 
per cent of output was going abroad. Indeed, the level of 
exports was now so high that BSA/Triumph won the Queen's Award 
for industry in both 1966 and 1967. Profits were up as well, 
to a healthy £3.6 million in 1966. In 1967 Turner remained 
breezily optimistic, despite the fact that profits had slipped 
back to £3.2 million, on account of factors beyond the 
company's control 
in the American market, such as poor spring 
weather, a credit squeeze and uncertainty caused by the 
escalating war in Viet-Nam. 
119 The latter factor was 
118. See 'Benefits of BSA Motor Cycle reorganisation', pp 
git. See also 'Overseas sales prospects bright' by Lionel 
Jofeh, Birmingham Post, 16 January 1968, both contained in 
newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. See also Ryerson, 
oc it, pp. 162-163. For 
improvements at Triumph during this 
time see 'These factories are gearing up for 'go ", July 
1963, p. 3., 'Triumph clear the way for more machines', June 
1966, p. 3 and 'Triumph change space to keep up exports', 
December 1966, p. 3., all in BSA Group News. 
119. See 'How the 'Thunderherd' boss brought a Honda boom to 
the US', Newsweek, 6 July 1964, p. 66 and 'Top gear get away 
for BSA', c t. See also 'Cycle sales find road to success 
a bit bumpy', by Bob Thomas, Los Angeles Times, 9 April 1967, 
contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/6. For 
the Queen's Award, see the 'Queen's Award Special Edition', 
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particularly worrying, since it was young men in the main who 
bought the larger, high powered motor cycles produced by BSA's 
factories-120 
Nonetheless, Turner thought these problems were merely 
transitory. North America held boundless opportunities, not 
the least because of its demography. Marketing research, he 
informed shareholders, had indicated that there were now so 
many Americans under age 25 - those most likely to buy motor 
cycles - that they numbered nearly twice the entire population 
of Britain. Most of these were "young people [who] have far 
greater purchasing power than anything we are accustomed to in 
this country. " BSA, as the major supplier of heavyweight 
motor cycles in the North American market, was ideally placed 
to exploit this sales boom, which had been developed "very 
largely for leisure and sporting purposes. ", 
121 
All this, however, was predicated on the assumption that the 
British would continue to hold the heavyweight market largely 
Bj jjngham Post, 28 June 1967, p. 10, contained in MRC MSS 
19A/5/1 and the BSA Chairman's Speech, delivered on 4 December 
1968, contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/46. 
120. The Viet-Nam war temporarily dampened the motor cycle 
market in the USA but 
did result in at least one extra sale 
for BSA in Britain. In 1968 the British Communist Party 
bought a 250cc model and sent it to the Viet Cong to help in 
their struggle with the American armed forces. See untitled 
feature, Morning Star, 20 June 1968, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/6. 
121. See Chairman's Speech, delivered on 6 December 1967, 
contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/45. Two years later, a 
representative of the advertising agency J. Walter Thompson 
told a group of British motor cycle industry executives that 
the key to the success of sales in USA was to present their 
products as "fun vehicles", associated with the "outdoor way 
of life" which, 
in contrast with the old 'leather jacket' 
image, was now "socially acceptable. " See minutes of the 
Motor Cycle Trade Group, held on 28 October 1969, contained in 
Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/117. See also, 'BSA's American 
challenge', Marketing, February 1971, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/9. 
354 
to themselves. Even in 1965 it was quite evident that the 
Japanese were capable of building bigger motor cycle than they 
had until then. That year, Honda introduced a 450cc twin 
cylinder model, which like the established lightweights was 
far more sophisticated than the British competition, coming 
standard with, among other things, an overhead cam engine and 
an electric starter. The significance of its debut was not 
lost on the business press, which observed that Honda now had 
,, its sights obviously fixed on the fast expanding market in 
the US for heavyweight cycles. " Having virtually abandoned 
sales of motor cycles under 250cc and with most of their 
output now exported to the North American market, British 
manufacturers viewed this as a very serious development. 
122 
However, the appearance of larger Japanese motor cycles did 
not seem to provoke the British manufacturers to any sense of 
urgency. Their strategy, larger Japanese models or not, was 
based on the firm belief that, while they were unable to 
effectively compete in categories under 250cc, they still held 
a secure position in their traditional citadel of heavyweight 
sports oriented machines. More particularly, they believed 
that British motor cycles would retain a dedicated and 
expanding market. In late 1966, a press feature on the future 
of the motor cycle industry described this optimistic outlook: 
British manufacturers are confident that they will 
continue to hold the market for bigger machines, 
despite the attempts from Japan to break into this 
market. The British reasoning is that by keeping 
the big machines from here simple in design, they 
appeal to the enthusiast who wants to do his own 
tuning and generally fiddle with the bike ... The 
122, See 'Heavyweight challenge from Japan', Financial Times, 
16 June 1965, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 
204/10/1/4. 
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big Japanese machines, although impressive on paper, 
have been too complex for the enthusiast amateur the 
British manufacturers argue. 123 
This was not an isolated view and it continued to be shared 
by the most senior managers in the industry. 124 
Despite the likelihood that the Japanese would soon produce 
larger displacement motor cycles, BSA had failed to take 
measures to meet future competition. Even though Triumph had 
actually developed a new 750cc triple cylinder model, which 
evidently could have been put into production several years 
earlier, nothing was done. When BSA's senior management heard 
rumours that Honda was working on a four cylinder 750cc 
machines, far and beyond anything they could offer, the 
Triumph triple design was quickly adapted and a crash 
production programme initiated. Although the new Triumph 
750cc model still arrived in the American market in 1968 ahead 
of the big Honda, it was not at first a success. Development 
had been too rushed and it was consequently "a flop. " The 
problems were ultimately sorted out, but valuable time had 
been lost. 
125 
123. See 'The optimistic two-wheeler industry' by Jack Hay, 
Wrmi gham_post, 8 November 1966, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/6. 
124. See, for example, remarks made by BSA Chairman Eric 
Turner during an interview when he identified the "average 
motor cyclist" as one who 
is "very keen on the mechanical side 
and ... wants something 
different to pull apart. " See 'Top 
gear get away for BSA', 27 July 1966, contained 
in MRC MSS 
123X/10/1/3. It was also noted that British motor cycle 
manufacturers, unable to sell their machines on the home 
market, had been saved by "the monied and blase youth of 
America" who had "turned to a more virile method of 
transportation. " See "After ton-up kids, a labour shortage', 
gUardl_am 15 February 1966, contained in TUC clipping file 
12913, on deposit at the MRC. 
125. Although successful on the race track, the 'Trident' 
(which was also badged, with minor technical differences, as 
the BSA 'Rocket 31) was an expensive machine. At $1,750 (US) 
it cost as much as a British Leyland 1.3 litre saloon motor 
car. See 'Accelerated sales of motor cycles and bicycles', by 
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By contrast, when the Honda 750cc arrived in the US market 
during 1969, the reception was highly favourable. 126 Not only 
was it well engineered, its four cylinder engine had overhead 
cams (unlike the more traditional overhead valve Triumph) and 
was capable of speeds up to 120 miles per hour. Furthermore, 
it came standard with such features as an electric starter and 
a disc brake, and did not, like most British motor cycles, 
leak an embarrassing amount of oil. 
127 It was also carefully 
priced to undercut the 'Trident' and was backed by a "major 
advertising campaign. " Yet, BSA Motor Cycle Division Managing 
Director Lionel Jofeh (who had replaced the recently deceased 
Sturgeon in 1967) professed not to be perturbed about this new 
Japanese onslaught. True, Honda had an edge on research and 
development because of its greater production volume, but 
this, he insisted, would be "counter-balanced by the British 
genius for technical innovation. i128 
peter Cartwright, Financial Times, 28 January 1969, contained 
in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. For details on 
the planning of the 'Trident', see Hopwood, op cit, ppl. 197- 
200, p. 212, pp. 212-213 and p. 229. 
126. Despite earlier warnings, BSA's American sales 
representatives later admitted that the appearance of the new 
Honda caught them with their "pants down. " See 'British motor 
cycles fight to get off the starting line', by James Poole, 
cpdev Times, 14 September 1969, contained in newspaper 
clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. 
127. See 'Challenge to the speed men', by Clifford Webb, the 
Times, 8 July 1969, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC 
MSS 204/10/1/7. For contemporaneous reactions to the new 
Honda, see 'Honda's Fabulous 750 Four - The Ultimate Weapon in 
one-upmanship', Cycle World, January 1969, pp. 24-27 and 'Honda 
CB 750', ibid, pp. 41-47, both contained in Cycle World on 
noda 1968-1971, Cobham, Surrey: Brooklands Book Distribution 
Ltd., 1988. 
128. In the 650cc class as well, the Japanese succeeded in 
pricing their machines much cheaper than their British 
competition. For example, a Triumph T120 cost $1,579 (US), a 
BSA A65L $1,474 and a comparable Yamaha only $1,295. See 
'Memorandum on the Birmingham Small Arms Company Inc. ', dated 
12 July 1971, prepared by Cooper Brothers and contained in MRC 
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The higher specifications and greater mechanical reliability 
of the new heavyweight Japanese motor cycles allowed them to 
appeal to a different type of American consumer. As an 
internal report prepared for BSA noted, the decline of sales 
for British motor cycles in North American did not reflect 
weaker demand overall but, rather, the introduction of the new 
Japanese models. North Americans bought them because of their 
advanced engineering and also their design features like extra 
chrome finish and gadgets. The latter was particularly 
significant: 
This is an increasingly important point because the 
mechanically enthusiastic type of customer is 
accounting for a smaller proportion of the market as 
growth in market penetration is coming from a 
different type of person. 129 
Maintaining success in the North American market was also 
dependent on improving productivity levels. These were now 
jeopardised by the inability of the Small Heath and Meriden 
factories, despite all the investment in plant, to manufacture 
sufficient-numbers of motor cycles. This problem was not 
always easy to rectify. In part, the company was subject to 
continual shortages of skilled labour, particularly at the 
Birmingham factory, a point publicly referred to in the past 
by the BSA Chairman on at least two separate occasions. 130 
Production levels, especially after 1965, were also hampered 
by growing labour unrest although this development was largely 
restricted to the Meriden factory. Along with late deliveries 
MSS 19B/TB3. Jofeh's remarks are contained in 'Overseas sales 
prospects bright', op cit. 
129. See Cooper Brothers Report, op cit, p. 6 and p. 34. 
130. See Chairman's Speeches delivered on 16 December 1960 
and 10 December 1964, contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/38 and 42 
respectively. 
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of crucial components, Triumph found it increasingly difficult 
to meet output targets. In 1965, for example, 18,000 motor 
cycles were scheduled for export to the USA. In the event, 
because of various set-backs, only 16,000 were actually 
dispatched-131 
During 1969, BSA encountered further complications at the 
Small Heath factory. The newly installed assembly system did 
not work as well as planned. In part, this was again due to 
the inability of component suppliers to deliver on time, 
resulting in "persistent failures to reach production 
schedules. " One press report described the factory as 
"cluttered with machines unfinished for lack of one or more 
components - perhaps even the final stick-on transfer. " Such 
a breakdown of relations between the factory and its suppliers 
is indicative of the very serious management deficiencies in 
the BSA organisation-132 
Sales also began to flag in the US market as dealers there 
waited to see how BSA would react to the appearance of the 
Honda 750, a situation aggravated when Kawasaki introduced its 
own heavyweight model, a three cylinder 500cc machine, which 
was some 30 per cent cheaper than the 'Trident'. Moreover, 
131. For background on labour relations at the Small Heath 
and Meriden factories, see Koerner, Trade Unionism and 
Bargaining, chapter 3. For figures of Triumph's 
planned and actual production totals for 1965, see information 
contained in the Triumph Engineering Accounts books, MRC MSS 
123/2/3/20/1. 
132. See 'BSA may sack up to 1,050 workers in Birmingham', 26 
July 1969, and 'BSA jobs threat partly due to production 
snags', 29 July 1969, both by Peter Cartwright, Financial 
Tm, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 
204/10/1/7. According to John Balder, relations between the 
industry and its suppliers had been aggravated by fact that 
the manufacturers' buyers had frequently "screwed down" the 
price of the various components. The result was poorer 
quality components. John Balder interview, 18 November 1994. 
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BSA's competitive position was further undercut by its 
continual refusal to incorporate technical improvements, 
despite repeated appeals from American dealers to do so. 
However, BSA management insisted that features such as 
electric starters and five speed gearboxes were 
unnecessary. 
133 
In his speech at the Annual General Meeting later in 1969, 
Chairman Eric Turner attributed BSA's misfortune to a number 
of factors. He conceded that the Japanese had begun to 
undercut the company's position in the vital USA market 
through the introduction of their own heavyweight models. 
This was a matter of some concern with 90 per cent of the 
Group's motor cycle output going abroad, a high proportion to 
the USA. Although BSA and Triumph still held 90 per cent of 
the 650cc and 60 per cent of the 750cc engine capacity classes 
in the American market, it now held only 50 per cent of the 
500cc and a mere 14 per cent of the 250cc segments. Worse 
yet, overall motor cycle turnover had declined 6 per cent on 
the 1968 levels and 11 per cent in the USA specifically. In 
response to the lower profits, the BSA Board had commenced a 
policy of retrenchment, closing down the Redditch factory (at 
a saving of £250,000) and selling off its central heating 
subsidiary-134 
Not only were production level disappointing, but there was 
also now a more serious problem with quality control. The 
133. bid, See also Brooke and Gaylin, op cit, p. 71. 
134. See Chairman's Speech, 4 December 1969, MRC MSS 
19A/4/47. See also 'BSA to close Redditch motor cycle plant', 
by Clifford Webb, The Times, 28 November 1969 and 'BSA to 
close down Redditch motor cycle factory', by Peter Cartwright, 
j pncial Times, both contained in newspaper clipping book MRC 
MSS 204/1/0/1/7. 
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cost of the emphasis on increased output as the overriding 
priority began to show in the greater number of defects 
appearing, and this had an overall detrimental effect on the 
reputation of British machines. 135 During the 1960s, motor 
cycles had arrived in the USA missing important components and 
also badly corroded. American consumers began to lose 
patience. In 1970, for example, a BSA 650cc 'Lightning' 
received a poor review in the American enthusiasts' journal 
cycle world. The test machine, the account noted, suffered 
from a "quite annoying" level of vibration, which the tester 
attributed to loose engine mounts. Although the general 
design was praised, he concluded that overall it was 
"frustrated by poor execution and inattention to certain 
detail. #, 136 Nor were these types of problems restricted to 
export models. At a meeting held between manufacturers and 
home market retailers during 1970, one dealer "pleaded for the 
introduction of quality control on all British machines. "- 
Another was equally critical of the factories' inability to 
135. According to Hopwood, who was then General Manager at 
Triumph, Managing Director Harry Sturgeon was "obsessed with 
the achievement of more production at any cost, " in order to 
supply the North American market. See Hopwood, op cit, p. 207. 
One former BSA production worker, Tony Jeffries, who worked at 
Small Heath during the 1960s, when interviewed for the BBC 
Radio Four Programme 'Magic Moments', recalled that the 
factory was "production mad. " He claimed that it cost the 
company more money than it was worth to stop the production 
line to correct a problem and, in any case, BSA believed it 
could sell whatever it made in the USA, defects 
notwithstanding. The 'Magic Moments' programme was broadcast 
on 4 November 1992. 
136. See 'BSA 650cc Lightning', May 1970, Cycle World, pp. 71- 
75, contained in Cycle World on BSA - 1962-1972, Cobham, 
Surrey: Brooklands Book Distribution, 1987, and Smith op cit, 
p. 36. Complaints from American dealers about weak frames on 
Triumph models had actually begun as early as 1960. 
Unreliable electrical components were also the bane of many 
owners of British motor cycles. See Brooke and Gaylin, ,p j, pp. 63-64 and p. 80. 
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supply him with sufficient supplies of spare parts, nor was he 
able to "get the answers to their service problems. ""137 
In the face of increasing competition from the Japanese, the 
BSA Group Board decided to adopt a more aggressive 
manufacturing strategy. Although as late as September 1969 
Chairman Turner had described the future of the British motor 
cycle as "selling at a premium price for widely recognised 
quality, rather as Jaguar does for cars, " the company 
inexplicably shifted its emphasis back to the light and medium 
weight market segments. Instead of concentrating its efforts 
either on improving the existing heavyweight models, or, as 
Bert Hopwood had been vainly urging for years, to 
fundamentally redesign a new range of machines based on a 
'modular' concept, the Board decided to take a gamble. A 
redesigned line of 13 separate models was prepared for the 
1971 season. At the 1970 Annual General Meeting, Chairman 
Turner grandiosely claimed that they represented "the largest 
number of new machines ever introduced at one time by any 
motor cycle manufacturer anywhere. ", 
138 
In fact, the majority of these 'new' models were essentially 
the same as the ones which preceded them, barring some 
cosmetic changes. 
139 The two exceptions were an entirely new 
137. See 'Notes of a meeting of the motor cycle industry', 
held on 16 September 1970, contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 
204/3/1/120. 
138. See 'Britain's motor cycles fight to get off the 
starting line', by James Poole, Sunday Times, 14 September 
1969, contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7. 
Hopwood, op cit, pp. 93-199 and Chairman's Speech, delivered on 
8 December 1970, MRC MSS 19A/4/48. 
139. one later account of the 1971 range was that "the 'new' 
models were old ones titivated, though the improvements were 
substantial and it must always be arguable how much change is 
required to an old model before it can properly be described 
as a new one. " See Ryerson, op c it, p. 475. 
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350cc machine and the so-called "revolutionary" 50cc Ariel, a 
three wheeled moped. Backed by a £250,000 development 
programme, the lightweight Ariel, which was specifically 
targeted at 'beginners' and commuters, was designed to win 
back ground lost to the Japanese in both home and export 
markets. Despite the Small Heath factory's unresolved 
production problems, it was still believed that the Ariel 
alone would sell up to 40,000 units, including 20,000 in 
Britain. BSA was so optimistic about the potential of the new 
models that, during the course of a sales meeting held during 
September 1970 between dealers and manufacturers, a company 
representative actually claimed that it would produce 160,000 
of all models during the 1971/1972 season. 
140 
In the event, the 1971 season was a complete disaster for 
BSA. Existing problems at both the Small Heath and Meriden 
factories were compounded by frequent changes in design 
specification, which reduced production schedules to a 
shambles. At Small Heath, in particular, the effort of 
producing the new models, even with (or perhaps because of) 
the new assembly equipment, was "probably too great an 
organisational strain. ""141 Consequently, few motor cycles 
were available when the crucial North American selling season 
140. See 'Ariel fun', Financial Times, 27 June 1970, 
contained in newspaper clipping book MRC MSS 204/10/1/7, 
Shilton, op cit, pp. 172-1973, Ryerson, OP cit, p. 168, document 
entitled 'Motor Cycle Division. Review of 1971/72 Sales 
Forecast', prepared by Cooper Brothers, dated 9 August 1971, 
p. 13, contained in MRC MSS 19A/TB3 and 'Notes on a meeting of 
members of the motor cycle industry', dated 16 September 1970, 
contained in Guardbook MRC MSS 204/3/1/120. 
141. See John Nelson, Bonnie, Sparkford: Haynes Publishing 
Group, 1989, pp-53-56 and Boston Consulting Group, op cit, 
Appendix 10, 'A Brief Description of the Production System of 
the British Motor Cycle Industry', p. 206. 
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began the following spring. When they finally did arrive, the 
much vaunted 'new line-up' was a major disappointment. The 
seat height, on some models, for example, had been increased 
so that only the very tallest rider could sit in them 
comfortably. Because of problems in the factory, the 350cc 
model never appeared at all. The Ariel moped, which was 
supposed to challenge Japanese hegemony in the lightweight 
market, was a complete fiasco. 
have been the chief culprit. 
Sloppy design work seems to 
It could not, for example, be 
sold abroad because it failed to meet legal requirements for 
all but two countries. Even 
in Britain, where it was 
available, consumers greeted 
it with overpowering 
indifference. Only between 2,000 to 3,000 were sold and a 
'Mark 2' version, with the many defects corrected, was never 
even attempted. 
142 
Lionel Jofeh left BSA in disgrace during July 1971 and Eric 
Turner followed him later in the year. 
143 A new Board was 
created under the chairmanship of Lord Hartley Shawcross, 
which also included Bert Hopwood. Their challenge was 
daunting. The company had run up a staggering debit balance 
of £8.5 million along with an overdraft with British and 
American banks totalling £10 million. Although there were 
some signs of improvement, by 1973 hopes of Government 
funding, which was critical for the survival of BSA, was not 
forthcoming in sufficient amounts. Instead, the Heath 
142. See Ryerson, op cit, 
and pp"249-250, Smith, op 
Fall of the British Bike', 
143. Jofeh left, however, 
amounting to £35,518. 
See 
listed as item #362 in the 
public Library. 
pp. 175-176, Hopwood, op cit, p. 239 
it, pp. 36-37 and 'The Decline and 
by Tony Osman, op cit. 
with a generous 'golden handshake', 
untitled memo dated 7 July 1971, 
BSA Collection at the Solihull 
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Government brokered a sale of BSA to Manganese Bronze 
Holdings, owner of Norton-Villiers, even though BSA was by far 
the larger firm. The sale was ratified in July 1973, 
effectively leaving Britain with one remaining motor cycle 
manufacturer. The new firm, which was known as Norton- 
Villiers-Triumph (NVT), was not to be a notable success. 144 
Events after the sale have been covered elsewhere. 145 In 
summary, by 1975, NVT had been brought to its knees by a 
combination of poor sales and a bitter labour dispute at the 
Triumph factory at Meriden, which the management had attempted 
to shut down, in order to concentrate production at the BSA 
and Norton factories. Although the government had poured 
money into the industry to prevent bankruptcy, the losses 
exceeded £20 million. In August 1975, having reviewed the 
findings of the Boston Consulting Group's Strategy 
A ernatives for the British Motor Cycle Industry, the Wilson 
government decided enough was enough and ceased financial 
support-146 
The workers at the Meriden factory succeeded in starting up 
a cooperative, with the assistance of Tony Benn, Secretary of 
State of Trade and Industry, which lasted until 1983, 
144. See Chairman's Speeches, delivered on 15 December 1971 
and 5 December 1972, contained in MRC MSS 19A/4/49 and 50 
respectively. See also 'How the British Bikes Crashed', by 
Tom Lester, op cit. 
145. See Smith op cit and Koerner op cit for for a general 
account of events after 1973 and especially Hopwood op cit, 
who describes the final years of BSA/Triumph in some detail. 
A more partisan account was written by NVT during the height 
of the Meriden factory takeover, see Norton-Villiers-Triumph, 
ride - Historical Summary - 1972-1974, London: Norton- 
Villiers-Triumph, 1974. See also Jock Bruce-Gardyne, op cit. 
146. There was a debate in the House of Commons over the 
issue of the Report and the end of funding to the industry. 
See Hansard, (897], 1974/1975,7 August 1975, cols. 734-777. 
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producing a small annual production of traditional heavyweight 
twin cylinder models. This was a remarkable achievement, 
considering the antiquated plant and motor cycle design 
available to them. 
147 NVT carried on producing motor cycles, 
using the Norton name until 1977. There would be subsequent 
efforts to revive motor cycle manufacturing in Britain, 
including a resuscitation of Norton and the abortive Hesketh 
enterprise. In 1990, Triumph was re-launched under new 
ownership, producing the traditional heavyweight, sports motor 
cycles which had been so popular in Britain and around the 
world. 
148 By 1975, however, the British motor cycle industry, 
as it had been known up until then, was dead. 
147. See Martin Fairclough, 'The Political Economy of 
Producer Cooperatives: A Study of Triumph Motorcycles 
(Meriden) Ltd. and Britain's Industrial Decline', (unpublished 
Phd. dissertation), op cit. 
148. See, for example, 'At long last, a Triumphant return to 
form' by Roland Brown, The Independent, 1 December 1990, 
'Triumph accelerates down long road to recovery' by Martin 
Whitfield, ibid, 10 April 1993, 'Making a success out of 
Triumph' by Bill Goodwin, The Engineer, 14 October 1993 and 
'The mild ones' by Justin Doebele, Forbes, 19 December 1994. 
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Conclusions. 
The history of the British motor cycle industry between 1935 
and 1975 presents a rather peculiar case of decline. It did not 
take the form of a consistent downwards trajectory, but instead 
occurred gradually and irregularly over time. Nor is it possible 
to advance any single explanation for the industry's ultimate 
destruction. There were several factors that underlay the course 
of events ending in the bankruptcy of 1975. These are 
highlighted in the three major phases through which the industry 
passed. 
The first occurred as the industry adapted to the abrupt 
collapse of demand, both at home and abroad, after 1930. 
Manufacturers took a highly conservative approach to this crisis, 
concentrating on a loyal but limited market of essentially 
dedicated enthusiasts. Ironically, at the same time as the 
industry found security building motor cycles primarily in the 
medium to heavy weight classes, the motor car industry surged 
ahead, manufacturing economy vehicles in the low horse power 
ranges. Although motor cycle manufacturers had already been 
subject to much criticism from various quarters for their loyalty 
to the larger displacement motor cycles and their orientation to 
sports competition, none of the larger firms made any real effort 
to try and break out of the impasses presented by a contraction 
in the market. If the solution was to try and discover a new 
type of consumer, for the most part the industry was unwilling to 
find out whether or not he or she existed. It was usually left 
to the smaller scale producers to experiment with the lightweight 
models. Nevertheless, the manufacturers survived a very 
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difficult period, but their strategy did little to successfully 
prepare the industry for the future. 
The second phase occurred during the years immediately after 
1945, within the context of an artificially favourable commercial 
environment. Pre-war competitors had been put out of action, at 
least temporarily, leaving British motor cycle manufacturers with 
an unparalleled opportunity to consolidate their renewed 
international supremacy. However, when the industry came under 
pressure from the Attlee government to review and possibly 
modernise its operations, the leadership indignantly rejected any 
suggestion that their manufacturing programmes needed to be 
changed or they might be insufficiently prepared to meet revived 
foreign competition. The industry was a captive of its own 
preconceptions of what the market was and could see no reason why 
it should not continue as it had before. Sales of its products, 
especially the larger displacement, twin cylinder models, seemed 
to be strong, with little sign of slackening. Even though 
imported scooters and mopeds took over and vastly expanded the 
lightweight market by the mid-1950s, the British industry in 
general survived because these imports did not actually directly 
threaten its core market of the medium to heavyweight models. 
Equally significant, the manufacturers had developed the North 
American market which provided a substitute outlet for that part 
of their product either shut out of other export markets or that 
could not be sold in the numbers they had in Britain. 
The third and final phase occurred in the face of Japanese 
competition during the 1960s. Limited by their self-imposed 
structural constraints, motor cycle manufacturers were unable to 
effectively react to the appearance of these new foreign 
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lightweights. Even after they had lost what was left of , 
the home 
market with the implementation of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, 
British manufacturers again found a substitute in the form of 
vastly increased exports to North America. As the British 
industry's last stronghold came under pressure from Japanese 
producers, BSA launched its ill-considered bid to try and re- 
enter the mid and lightweight market. 
These three phases underscore several important factors which 
explain the decline of the British motor cycle industry. 
However, several factors should first be removed as significant 
causes of the industry's collapse. First, government policy was 
not as detrimental as the industry so frequently claimed. The 
manufacturers repeatedly failed to convince either the Board of 
Trade or the Ministry of Transport to grant the concessions they 
sought, particularly the removal of tax and regulations from 
lightweight motor cycles. This, the industry always maintained, 
was the reason it failed to produce a successful lightweight 
motor cycle. But, on the evidence, the industry consistently 
failed to provide the hard facts to substantiate its case. 
Instead, the arguments were virtually always a matter of faith, 
amounting to the proposition that, if the lesser regulations and 
lower taxes worked on the Continent, then they must also work in 
Britain. This point ignored the internal circumstances which 
prevailed in these countries, specifically the matter of relative 
income levels. Moreover, even if the government had granted the 
concessions the industry wanted, it is highly problematic whether 
or not this would have actually worked to the benefit of domestic 
producers. Quite likely, had the concessions been granted, the 
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main beneficiaries would have been the distributors of imported 
mopeds, scooters and lightweight motor cycles. 
Nor can the government be held responsible for the many export 
markets that were closed to the industry over the years because 
of tariffs, import quotas and sterling crises. British motor 
cycle manufacturers did not seem to appreciate the fact that only 
so much could be done in terms of representation by trade 
negotiators, especially in the face of foreign governments who 
were determined to protect their own vital interests. This was 
equally true with respect to the Argentines in 1936, to the 
Japanese after 1950 in fostering their own domestic industry, or 
to the Australians at various times, determined to preserve 
dwindling sterling reserves. 
Secondly, worker militancy and trade union activity must be 
discounted as having any significantly detrimental effect on the 
industry. During most of the time covered by this dissertation, 
there is very little evidence of strike activity or other labour 
unrest. Indeed, other than a brief strike at Ariel Motors in 
1944 and the six month strike at Norton Motors during 1956, there 
is no record of significant disturbance. Moreover, coming as it 
did during the middle of a severe sales recession, the Norton 
strike may not have been an entirely unwelcome development for 
the company management. 
It is true that after 1965 Triumph was subject to fairly 
constant disruption because of work stoppages. However, it is 
also true that the company had other, equally troublesome but 
unrelated difficulties during this time. Additionally, one could 
argue that strike activity at the Meriden factory was associated, 
in large part, more with the atmosphere of militancy which 
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typified the Coventry engineering district during the 1960s than 
industrial relations in the motor cycle industry. More 
significantly, there were also persistent problems with the tardy 
deliveries of component supplies (which were, in turn, sometimes 
the result of strikes in that sector). Not the least, the design 
fiasco of the 1970/1971 season almost certainly inflicted far 
more damage on the company than any strike. 
Finally, it has been suggested that lack of technical skill or 
education on the part of British management generally has been a 
severe handicap to industry. 
1 Yet, on the evidence, this was not 
the situation in the motor cycle industry. Although managers 
rarely had formal, university educations, they were scarcely 
without technical knowledge. AMC Managing Director Donald 
Heather may have been singular insofar as he was a university 
trained engineer, but many of his colleagues were still highly 
respected for their technical knowledge, irrespective of whether 
they had acquired it through experience in the factories or 
through attending night school. For example, several industry 
executives presented papers at meetings of the Institution of 
Automotive Engineers and later at the Automotive Division of the 
Institution of Mechanical Engineers. Indeed, one of them became 
President of the latter organisation during the late 1950s. 
2 
1. See Martin Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the 
Industrial Spirit. 1850-1980, London: Penguin Books, 1987, 
especially pp. 127-154. 
2. See, for example, D. S. Heather (the future Managing Director 
of AMC), 'A Survey of Current Motorcycle Design', Proceedings of 
the Institution of Automobile Engineers Vol. XIII, pp. 247-272, 
Edward Turner (who was Technical Director at BSA Cycles at the 
time, before he returned to Triumph Engineering as Managing 
Director), 'Post War Motor Cycle Development', ibid, Vol. XXXVII, 
1942-1943, pp. 135-154, Joe Craig (Development Engineer at AMC at 
the time, before returning to Norton Motors), 'Progress in Motor 
Cycle Engines - with some Notes on Combustion', ibid, Vol. XXXIX, 
1944-1945, pp. 91-114 and R. A. Wilson-Jones, B. Sc (Eng. ), 'Years 
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They may have had a very conservative attitude to design and 
marketing but that did not necessarily make them uneducated. 
Indeed, the motor cycle industry is far more representative of 
the 'Practical Man' thesis than it is of a version of industry 
declining thanks to the inattention of languid would-be 
aristocrats. 
3 The real management problem was rather different, 
as indicated below. 
A number of other factors have been identified during the 
course of this dissertation which are of greater significance in 
explaining the decline of the industry. The often poor state of 
coordination within BSA, the predominant firm, prevented it from 
taking the leading role its size and diversity warranted. 
Because of poor management at the Group level, the company was 
unable to pull together the separate but potentially mutually 
supporting subsidiaries. Under the direction of a more effective 
management, the ingredients were there for the company to have 
evolved into a powerful industrial combination. Instead, 
internal problems plagued the company throughout the period in 
question and must have hurt the efficiency of the motor cycle 
operations. The period between 1928 and 1932 when the company 
went through three chairmen in nearly as many years is indicative 
of this weakness. The company did well during the 1939-1945 war, 
but the disastrous tenure of Sir Bernard Docker, whose pre- 
occupation with the Daimler motor car subsidiary excluded any 
coherent forward planning and worked to the great disadvantage of 
of Development', Proceedings of the Automobile Division of the 
1_itution of Mechanical Engineers, 1958-1959, pp. 1-20. Wilson- 
Jones was the Chief Engineer of Enfield Cycles and, at the time, 
Chairman of the Institution's Automobile Division Council. 
3. See D. C. Coleman, 'Gentlemen and Players' Economic History 
Rejew, Vol. XXVI (1973), pp. 93-116. 
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the entire Group. Although Sir Bernard was finally toppled by 
his fellow directors, who had tolerated his mismanagement for far 
too long, the company never really recovered. 
Nor did it help that between the retirement of James Leek in 
1956 and the appointment of Harry Sturgeon in 1964, there was no 
effective leadership at BSA's motor cycle operations, which were 
allowed to drift aimlessly. Subsequently, the catastrophic Eric 
Turner/Lionel Jofeh partnership pushed the entire Group into 
bankruptcy. While the lack of effective direction at BSA did not 
necessarily infect the other firms, the industry leadership which 
one could have reasonably been expected from the company was 
seriously compromised. Furthermore, the kind of management 
exercised by Docker, Eric Turner and Jofeh raise questions about 
the amount of discretion granted to senior company executives. 
It may legitimately be asked why so little was done by other 
Board members or by the shareholders to correct this sort of 
activity. 
Another critical factor is the concept of their market which 
was held by senior management in general. Excepting those noted 
above, these men were as a rule, competent managers, albeit with 
a very narrow view of what they conceived as the typical 
consumer. It could be argued that their manufacturing strategy, 
especially during the 1930s, was very conservative but had at 
least kept the industry afloat through some very difficult times. 
Yet it could also be argued with equal force that they had failed 
through their reluctance to at least explore the potentialities 
of the economy ('Everyman') motor cycle of the pre-war era. In 
contrast to the motor car industry, their inability to broaden 
the market by discovering new consumers, such as women, is 
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striking. A new market may or may not have existed in the 1930s, 
but it was this kind of mentality which was to result in their 
inability to either grasp the opportunities open after the war or 
react effectively to the challenges posed by Italian scooters, 
French mopeds and then Japanese lightweight motor cycles. 
A further illustration of this weakness is the industry's 
intense involvement with motor cycle sport. In isolation, this 
was not an entirely bad or harmful commitment, as Honda's 
experience would demonstrate. Nor did the high profile accorded 
to the sport entirely match the reality, at least in terms of the 
way it was portrayed to the public. As the astute columnist 
Francis Jones noted: 
One is apt to think of the TT as a sporting event that 
the trade happens to find worth while to patronise. 
But it is more accurate to consider it as a trade event 
that happens to be of a sporting character... The 
ultimate purpose of the [race] meetings is to sell 4 
motor cycles. 
In fact, the sporting events had two very practical functions. 
First, they provided commercial opportunities in their own right, 
allowing advertising and raising the prestige of British motor 
cycles in foreign markets. 
5 Secondly, they acted as a forum for 
research and development, the extreme conditions prevailing on 
the racetrack being thought an ideal way to improve and refine 
design and mechanical reliability. Many in the industry believed 
it was essential that, from the shop floor to the Board room, all 
should share a strong commitment to motor cycling and motor cycle 
4. See Francis Jones, 'Motor Cycle Matters', The Motor Cycle and 
Qy- e Trader, 15 June 1951, p. 164. 
5. A point well understood by the trade press. According to one 
journal: "Past racing successes have done much to build and 
maintain the supremacy of the British sports motor cycle, and its 
racebred precision has brought it admirers in every overseas 
country. " See leading article, 'Selling for sport', The Export 
=ade r, June 1947, p. 167. 
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sport. As AMC's Donald Heather observed, this was an industry 
which was convinced that "as motor cycles are sold to enthusiasts 
they can only be built successfully by enthusiasts. " 
Unfortunately, the pre-occupation with sports events came at an 
expensive price. Once more, virtually by definition, it meant 
that the industry placed another self-imposed limitation upon its 
market. It created a deep impression of the 'typical' consumer, 
which was continually reinforced every time the managers attended 
a sports event. Even so, many in senior positions in the 
industry thought that this was an ideal way for them keep in 
touch with the market. This outlook was manifested in other ways 
as well. J. M. West, AMC Sales Director, believed that an 
important aspect of his job was to regularly attend owners' club 
meetings in order to maintain close contact with his firm's core 
market. No doubt these types of encounters strengthened loyalty 
to the marque and resulted in frequent exchanges of very helpful 
information about the strengths and weaknesses of particular 
models, but was this the best way to learn about how to sell 
motor cycles to non-enthusiasts or to explore ways to expand the 
existing market? 
6 
In the final analysis, racing was largely enjoyed by those who 
were already convinced enthusiasts but it had little or no 
attraction to those that simply wanted cheap transport and 
nothing else. It may well have been the case that, as one 
advertising slogan went, 'racing improves the breed'; but it also 
created a very specialised breed, with a limited application. It 
6. J. M. West interview, 23 November 1994. This is not to 
suggest that West's practice of attending such club meetings was 
exceptional. No doubt it was also followed by others in 
comparable positions. 
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is far from certain whether or not experience on the race track 
provided any significant help in the development of a better 
commuter machine, whose virtues needed to be simplicity, ease of 
maintenance and economy. 
Moreover, the commitment to sport also inhibited flexibility on 
the part of the manufacturers. The Velocette LE, for example, 
was a good example of a what an economical commuting model looked 
like when produced by a company that was owned and managed by 
enthusiasts. A piece of sound engineering, without the slightest 
doubt, it was, however, a machine which simply did not appeal to 
a wider group of consumers. Indeed, in stark contrast with its 
foreign competitors, the history of the British motor cycle 
industry is littered with various failed attempts to create an 
attractive lightweight machine. Starting with the abortive 
scooter experiments of the 1920s, continuing with the BSA 'Dandy' 
and 'Beagle' of the 1950s and 1960s and ending with the Ariel 
'Three' fiasco, the industry was unable to get the formula right 
and lacked the persistence to keep on trying until 
it did. The 
BSA Bantam superficially contradicts this argument, but it 
originated from Germany not Britain. The industry is best 
remembered for its heavyweight, sports oriented machines, such as 
the Triumph 'Speed Twin' (and subsequent derivatives), the Norton 
'Dominator', the BSA 'Gold Star' and the Vincent 'Black Shadow'. 
There is very little room in the industry's pantheon of fame for 
the humble economy models.? 
7. The machines on display at the National Motor Cycle Museum is 
a case in point. It has been observed, for example, that the 
collection there "is heavily weighted in favor of large, 
glamorous machines and small utilitarian cycles are seriously 
underrepresented. " See Rudi Volti, 'Exhibit Reviews. The 
National Motor Cycle Museum, Birmingham, England. ' Technology 
and Cultu e, January 1987, p. 97. 
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There were other drawbacks stemming from the industry's 
infatuation with the race track. The orientation to the larger 
sports machines meant that the industry consistently manufactured 
precisely the kind of motor cycle which most antagonised the 
public and the government. It was these fast, often noisy 
machines which were most likely to involve their operators in 
accidents. All this brought the entire industry into disrepute 
and created an image of motor cycles and motor cyclists which 
relentlessly dogged the industry from its earliest days to its 
last. There may have been some short-term gain in this respect. 
It did, for example, give motor cycling an image of danger and 
risk which doubtless helped sales among a certain type of 
consumer. However, this advantage must be balanced against the 
damage that was done to the industry's relations with Government 
ministers and civil servants during its attempts to have tax and 
regulations changed. 
Several additional points should also be stressed. The failure 
of the industry to master consistent quality control was an 
important problem which continued to damage manufacturers. In 
part, this was the price paid for insufficient investment in 
modern plant, which burdened the industry with another deep 
seated weakness. As Smith notes, one of the chief 
characteristics of British motor cycle factories was the fact 
that their products were "hand assembled and fitted. "8 This, in 
turn, reflected the importance that the industry assigned to the 
concept of craftsmanship, a quality considered central to British 
motor cycle manufacturing. The end result was a reluctance to 
8. "The fitting being essential when components did not fit 
together automatically but needed careful adjustment and filing 
down. " See Smith, op cit, p. 23. 
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convert the industry to larger scale production. Managers had an 
aversion to building motor cycles in any way other than by their 
traditional crafts based methods. Norton's reluctance before 
1939 to build motor cycles on a track assembly line is a case in 
point. There were also those who believed, even well after 1945, 
that motor cycles, unlike motor cars, were inherently unsuited 
for assembly line production. 
9 
This stubborn resistance to larger scale assembly techniques is 
highlighted in the case of the 'Power-Pak' (a small clip-on 
engine unit made for use on bicycles and popular in early 1950s). 
This machine would seem to have been a particularly ideal 
candidate for larger scale production. Significantly, when it 
was advertised, the manufacturer chose to stress the fact that it 
was built using decidedly old-fashioned techniques. As the ad 
text read: "The Power-Pak is not mass produced. It is the only 
bicycle motor that is handbuilt. Every motor is individually 
tuned and tested. It10 
One must be wary of how manufacturers defined concepts such as 
'handbuilt'. It does not, for example, necessarily mean the same 
thing as 'craftsmanship'. In view of the industry's long- 
standing quality control problems, it could just as easily be an 
excuse for antiquated factory plant and work practices. 
ll The 
9. one popular journalist actually argued that a motor cycle 
could not, by its very nature, be adapted to a modern assembly 
track because it was "too small for more than two men to cluster 
over it at one time. ' See 'Ixion', 'Mass produced motor cycle', 
The Motor Cycle, 1 January 1953, p. 3. 
lo. The ad is contained in a separate leaflet attached to jg 
Motor Cycle and Cycle Trader, 31 October 1953. A story contained 
in the same issue described how a Power-Pak was being ridden 
around the world by an ex-Chindit, as part of a publicity 
campaign designed to emphasis the robust contruction of this 
machine. See 'Lee-Warner back from his world tour', ibid. 
11. As Neil Cossons, director of the Science Museum has 
commented: "British craftsmanship is one of the weights around 
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essential point, however, is that British motor cycle 
manufacturers did not place any great emphasis on developing a 
trouble-free machine. Nor did this seem to cause them much 
concern. After all, even if their motor cycles required close 
and regular maintenance, that was scarcely a drawback for the 
kind of consumer who was thought to cheerfully take up spanner 
and screwdriver without a moment's hesitation. 
The matter of design and the lack of professional designers is 
yet another problem for the industry. Frequently, this work was 
performed by senior managers, more particularly by executives 
such as the Collier brothers who had come into the industry at 
the beginning. On occasion, this practice was used as a form of 
advertising. In 1953, for example, when Triumph launched a new 
model, the factory arranged for Managing Director Edward Turner, 
accompanied by the Works and Service Directors, to ride three of 
these machines from Land's End to John O'Groats. An ad was 
designed around this event, with potential owners assured that 
this motor cycle had been field tested by "The man who designed 
it, the man who made it and the man who will service it. "12 
Many benefits probably resulted from the close association of 
senior management with design work. However, one industry 
commentator noted that there were also shortcomings implicit in 
this relationship: 
The industry had been built up by gaffers who designed, 
made, developed and rode. Inevitably, the gaffers are 
a dying race and, perhaps, because they had largely 
the neck of British industry. Craftsmanship is an excuse for 
things not working. It is hand-made therefore it is better. 
Actually, if it's handmade its almost inevitably inconsistent and 
may well not work. " See The Guardian, 17 February 1992. 
12. See Davies, op cit, pp. 186-192. 
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kept matters in their own hands, there was today a 
shortage on the design and development sides. 13 
Finally, it was the inability of British motor cycle 
manufacturers to develop skills in larger scale production 
engineering which caused a common weakness throughout the 
industry. During the 1950s, the industry reached an annual 
production plateau of between 150,000 and 200,000 units, a level 
at which the various firms could comfortably manufacture. 
Manufacturers appeared willing to trade off their ability to 
increase production for lower investment in plant capacity. 
Alternatively, since the manufacturers made their profits more 
from the higher prices they were able to charge for the larger 
capacity motor cycles, there was no pressing incentive to improve 
productivity. 
14 
Ultimately, the failure to enter larger volume production cost 
the industry dear. BSA, for example, which had nearly always 
used less than 100 per cent of its manufacturing capacity, 
floundered after the mid-1960s when it tried to overhaul its 
Small Heath factory in order to substantially increase output. 
The concept may have been sound, based on experience in the motor 
car industry, but it went seriously adrift in the execution. The 
disappointing results seem to have been mainly caused by sheer 
incompetence, particularly on the part of Motor Cycle Division 
13. See 'Motor cycle design of today and tommorrow' [a precis of 
a paper delivered by Arthur Bourne, editor of The Motor Cycle, to 
a London meeting of the Automotive Division of the Institution of 
Mechanical Engineers], The Motor Cycle, 6 November 1947, pp. 354- 
355. 
14. As AMC Sales Director J. M. West recalled: "A 250cc showed 
no profit, 350cc a reasonable amount and 500cc, which cost little 
more than a 350cc made a substantial profit. " See letter, J. M. 
West to the author, 16 April 1995. BSA's Production Manager John 
Balder observed that the company's main profits were in the 
larger displacement machines, and "that coloured everything. " 
John Balder interview, 18 November 1994. 
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Managing Director Lionel Jofeh, but such was the extent of 
failure that this must have extended beyond one individual. 
It has been the central thesis of this dissertation that the 
British motor cycle industry collapsed primarily because of the 
implications arising from its inability to develop a successful 
lightweight 'economy' model. Because of the nature of the home 
market, it was, virtually from birth, a producer of larger 
displacement models. Unlike its counterparts on the Continent or 
Japan, there was a much weaker tradition of building lightweight 
machines. Thus, British motor cycle manufacturers were never 
able, nor did they ever seriously try, to develop an two-wheeled 
equivalent of the Austin Seven, Morris Minor or the Mini. This 
failure did much to determine their long-term future. 
The foregoing provides an historical explanation for what the 
Boston Consulting Group has identified as 'segment retreat' which 
led to the destruction of the industry and also presents a case 
study of British de-industrialisation, even if only on a small 
scale. It has been the intention of this dissertation to show 
that the decline of the industry was the manifestation of a 
series of constraints created by the manufacturers themselves, 
which had been in existence long before the appearance of 
Japanese competitors. It may well be that the 'segment retreat' 
was not inevitable. Nor was it unique to the motor cycle 
industry. 15 'However, over time, it was the cumulation of these 
self-inflicted wounds that destroyed the industry. 
15. As early as the nineteenth century, it has been noted that 
British industry in general, when "faced with a challenge, [found 
it] easier and cheaper to retreat ... rather than to meet 
competition face to face. " See E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and 
Empire, London: Penguin Books, 1979, p. 191. 
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Appendix 1 
Table I British motor cycle registrations, production, 
imports and exports, 1919-1939. 
Table II British motor car production, registrations, 
exports and imports, 1919-1938. 
Table III Motor cycles registered during the year ended 
30 September, 1933-1938. 
Table IV Type of BSA motor cycle sold, by displacement 
size, 1929 to 1938. 
Table V Production totals for the three major motor 
cycle manufacturing nations. 
Table VI Motor cycle combination and Austin Seven prices 
compared, 1922-1928. 
Table VII Comparisons of prices of new motor cycle 
combinations with second hand cars: selected 
years. 
Table VIII British motor cycle exports, 1929-1938. 
Table IX British exports to selected markets, 1925-1938. 
Table X British and German motor cycle exports, 1933- 
1937. 
Table XI Advertizing expenditure by the cycle, motor 
cycle and motor car industries, 1935-1935. 
Table XII British motor cycle production between 
September 1939 December 1944. 
Table XIII British road accident fatalities, 1950-1960. 
Table XIV Number of motor cycles for which licences were 
current at any time during the quarter ending 
30th September, between 1946 and 1952. 
Table XV British motor cycle exports, 1945 to 1951. 
Table XVI British motor cycle exports to the USA, Canada 
and Australia - 1951 to 1964. 
Table XVII British exports to selected markets, 1945-1950, 
1958 and 1959. 
Table XVIII British motor cycle registrations, production, 
imports and exports, 1945-1975. 
Table XIX Comparative prices, British and imported 
scooters and lightweight motor cycles. 
Table XX Motor car production, registrations, 1945-1975. 
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Table XXI Number of motor cycles for which licences were 
current at any time during the quarter ending 
30th September, between 1951 and 1955. 
Table XXII Number of motor cycles for which licences were 
current at any time during the quarter ending 
30th September, between 1956 and 1959. 
Table XXIII Number of motor cycles for which licences were 
current at any time during the quarter ending 
30th September, between 1960 and 1962. 
Table XXIV Number of motor cycles for which licences were 
current at any time during the quarter ending 
30th September, between 1963 and 1966. 
Table XXV British imports of two-wheeled motorised 
vehicles 1955-1966. 
Table XXVI U. S. total motorcycle registrations, 1945-1980. 
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A Note on Statistics. 
The data contained in the following statistical tables is 
drawn primarily from materials produced by either the 
BCMCMTU/BCMCIA or the Board of Trade. 
The figures do not always agree and, in instances of 
inconsistency, those from the former source will prevail. 
Table I 
$ritish Motor Cycle Registrations Production Imports and 
Exports 1919-1939 
Registrations Production Exports Imports 
1919. 114,722 65,000 8,330 1,481 
1920. 287,739 100,000 21,304 4,277 
1921. 373,200 80,000 8,104 2,130 
1922. 377,943 60,000 7,280 965 
1923. 430,138 80,000 16,156 1,011 
1924. 495,579 110,000 37,911 402 
1925. 558,911 120,000 47,114 867 
1926. 628,955 120,000 48,121 75 
1927. 681,410 160,000 53,000 149 
1928. 712,583 145,000 59,906 76 
1929. 731,298 147,000 62,377 103 
1930 724,319 126,500 42,689 236 
1931. 626,649 74,700 23,247 108 
1932. 599,904 70,400 19,537 16 
1933. 562,656 52,200 17,731 16 
1934. 548,461 58,500 16,807 20 
1935. 521,128 64,700 18,000 0 
1936. 510,242 55,200 20,500 0 
1937. 491,718 82,014 25,400 200' 
1938. 499,265 65,100 19,800 200 
1939. n/a 66.400 18,900 100 
(Sources: BCMCMTU, Review of the British Cycle and Motor Cycle 
Industry 1935; Michael Miller, The British Motor-Cycle Industry 
pefore 1939 (unpublished) and the SMMT, The Motor Industry of 
great Britain. 1939). 
Table II 
British Motor Car Production. Registrations, Exports and Imports. 
1919-1938: 
Registrations . Production Exports Imports 
1919 109,715 n/a n/a n/a 
1920 186,801 n/a 4,294 n/a 
1921 245,882 n/a 1,966 n/a 
1922 319,311 n/a 1,338 12,992 
1923 389,767 71,396 3,256 14,429 
1924 482,356 116,600 11,007 10,800 
1925 590,156 132,000 17,771 31,781 
1926 695,634 153,500 14,858 10,923 
1927 800,112 164,553 16,139 18,194 
1928 900,557 165,352 18,192 22,582 
1929 998,489 182,347 23,891 21,520 
1930 1,075,081 169,669 19,226 9,751 
1931 1,103,715 158,997 17,104 2,118 
1932 1,149,231 171,244 26,942 2,762 
1933 1,226,541 220,779 33,802 3,619 
1934 1,333,590 256,866 34,877 10,851 
1935 1,505,019 311,544 44,193 13,563 
1936 1,675,104 353,838 51,173 12,323 
1937 1,834,248 389,633 53,655 18,609 
1938 1,984,430 342,390 44,130 n/a 
Source: The Motor Industry of Great Brita; n, SMMT, 1939. 
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Production Totals for the Three Major Motor Cycle Manufacturing 
Nations. 
1925 1929 1933.1935 1937 
Britain 120,000 146,700 52,200 63,100 82,014 
Germany 55,980 201,000 53,400 123,100 171,239 
USA 45,000 31,900 7,400 14,110 17,700 
Source: Review of the British Cycle and Motor Cycle Industry, 
Coventry: BCMCMTU, 1925; Imperial Economic Committee, Thirtieth 
Report, Survey of the Trade in Motor Vehicles. London: HMSO, 
1936; US Strategic Bombing Survey, German Motor Vehicle Industry, 
Washington, Munitions Division, 1947; Harry Sucher, Harlev- 
Davidson - The Milwaukee Marvel, Sparkford: Haynes Publishing 
Group Ltd., 1990 and The Iron Redskin, Sparkford: Haynes 
publishing Group Ltd., 1990. 
Table VI 















1922 225 142 155 125 
1923 165 100 115 17s 107 
1924 155 85 10s 107 90 
1925 141 87 88 5s 77 10s 
1926 145 74 82 17s 71 10s 
1927 145 n/a 67 12s 71 10s 
1928 125 66 10s - 66 10s 
Source: Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car Industry to 1941 
by Roy Church. London: Europa Publications, 1979. 
Table VII 
Comparisions of Prices of New Motor-Cycle Combinations with 
Second Hand Cars: Selected Years 
Sales Season 1929/30 1932/32 1934/34 1936/37 
Comparison I. 
1. Price of a new £63.3 £64.7 £66.0 £68.1 
350cc Combination 
2. Price of a2 year £81.2 £73.1 £66.1 £66.6 
old 8 hp car. 
Comparison II. 
1. Price of a new - £72.9 £74.7 £79.3 
500cc Combination. 
2. Price of a3 year - £72.2 £65.4 £68.5 
old car not exceeding 
10 hp. 
Ratio: 2: 1 n/a . 99 . 88 . 86 










1929. 15,170. 28,934. 839. 17,434. 62,377. 
1931. 1,231. 11,763. 834. 9,419. 23,247. 
1933. 2,749. 6,128. 1,173. 7,681. 17,731. 
1935. 5,985. 4,473. 647. 6,969. 18,074. 
1937. 10,833. 6,197. 1,177. 7,143. 25,350. 
1939. 5,526. 7,569. 1,121. 4,739. 18,955. 
Source: MSS 204/13/1/1. (Modern Records Centre) 
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British and German Motor Cycle Exports. 1933-1937 
British. German. 
No. £ No. £ 
1933 17,731. 670,712. 2,006. 64,090. 
1934. 16,497. 648,998. 1,904. 75,999. 
1935. 18,074. 701,938. 5,702. 179,682. 
1936. 20,460. 799,414. 14,612. 377,736. 
1937. 25,350. 1.026.776. 31.708. 596-246. 
Source: Memo 47/38: Germany: Export Trade in Bicycles and 
Motor Cycles. BCMCMTU Guardbook, MSS 204/3/1/44. (Modern Records 
Centre) 
Table XI 
Advertizing expenditure by the Cycle. Motor Cycle and Motor Car 
Industries. 1935-1938. 
1935.1936.1937.1938. 
Cycles. £160,985 £200,446 £223,335 £173,912 
Motor Cycles. £36,441 £38,821 £39,206 £34,823 
Motor Cars. £901,089 £877,141 £911,726 £853,799 







0 %D 1- N M 10 r"I 
r-I %D ON LO N H N co 1- I- %D r- 
(0 tf1 0 ft Ui cN M N M d' M 
41 % W % CO CO - - r-1 d. N 
O Ul H 0 %D - % CO r-1 " " co 





N N 'V' 0A co ri 
N w N 10 O M O 0 
v N In v cl ri to r 
sr in I %D - 1 H 






%D M v d' 'S 
N N in 0 tO N rl to r"4 
M 01 N I- %D 0 N CO d' CO 
It N - - cri N N - N 0 %D % 0 
G1 10 CA 0 M 10 Cl "-1 





in to cl N ''l 


































- N H 
r-1 
- 
I I - 
CO V' LO 01 
" 
v-I ?1 





MO %D co 0 co U) 




































, cam a a) 0 
, L7 ",. I 
U) Ic: 
. 14 .. 
r-4 N r l N 0 )~ 'LS H w U U "-I N v 4. ) 0 U c0 E-ý O 34 
"14 U 4 W U !~ P "rI H un 0 4J O: 34 te cq 9 X (a 0 S4 a) "rI St 0 ZO 0 
a a ' co w w l z E+ > Z 0 E-4 
Table XIII 






1950 2,251 805 1,129 827 5,021 
1951 2,398 800 1,175 877 5,250 
1952 2,063 743 1,142 748 4,706 
1953 2,233 720 1,237 900 5,090 
1954 2,226 696 1,148 940 5,010 
1955 2,287 708 1,362 1,169 5,526 
1956 2,270 650 1,250 1,197 5,367 
1957 2,225 663 1,425 1,237 5,550 
1958 2,408 668 1,421 1,473 5,970 
1959 2,520 738 1,680 1,582 6,520 
1960 2,708 679 1,743 1,840 6,970 
* Twin wheeled motor vehicles. 
Source: Department of Transport Road Accidents. Great Britain 
1992. London: HMSO, 1992. 
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Table XVI 
British Motor Cycle Exports to the USA. Canada and Australia - 
1951 to 1964. 
USA Canada Australia 
1951 8,195 2,876 n/a 
1952 7,095 1,407 6,872 
1953 5,136 2,031 6,678 
1954 8,172 1,595 9,474 
1955 9,598 1,196 6,692 
1956 13,651 2,562 3,925 
1957 12,383 1,411 4,490 
1958 10,601 1,228 2,271 
1959 12,834 1,387 1,921 
1960 12,285 1,043 1,632 
1961 7,998 741 932 
1962 10,022 642 1,090 
1963 14,898 702 1,236 
1964 20,977 596 813 
Source: Data contained in MSS 204/13/1 and various issues of 
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Britax 'Scooterette' (48cc)* £99 
ore' 
Vespa (125cc) £158 
DMW 'Dolomite' (249cc) £240 
Dayton 'Albatross' (224cc) £182. 
Lambretta (123cc) £149 
Zundapp 'Bella' (148cc) £170 
Prices of selected British-built light weight motor cycles. 
BSA 'Bantam', (123cc) £81. 
BSA 'C10' (250cc) £256. 
Excelsior 'Consort F4' (98cc) £66. 
Francis-Barnett 'Falcon' (98cc) £127 
Royal Enfield 'Ensign' (148cc) £93. 
Triumph 'Tiger Cub' (149cc) £127 
Velocette 'LE' (192cc) £163. 
Source: 'Buyers' Guide', contained in The Motor Cyr, 18 
November 1954. 
x This model, used an imported engine unit. 
Table XX 
Motor Car Production and Registrations, 1945-1975 
Production Registrations 
1945 16,938 1,521,581 
1946 219,162 1,807,067 
1947 287,000 1,983,505 
1948 334,815 2,002,201 
1949 412,290 2,178,411 
1950 522,515 2,307,379 
1951 475,919 2,433,172 
1952 448,000 2,564,686 
1953 594,808 2,824,789 
1954 769,165 3,172,869 
1955 897,560 3,609,400 
1956 707,594 3,980,511 
1957 860,842 4,282,438 
1958 1,051,551 4,651,021 
1959 1,189,943 5,080,510 
1960 1,352,728 5,650,461 
1961 1,003,967 6,113,764 
1962 1,249,426 6,706,159 
1963 1,607,939 7,546,650 
1964 1,867,640 8,436,193 
1965 1,772,045 9,131,075 
1966 1,603,679 9,746,887 
1967 1,552,013 10,554,193 
1968 1,815,936 11,078,000 
1969 1,717,073 11,504,300 
1970 1,640,966 11,801,780 
1971 1,741,940 12,357,870 
1972 1,921,311 13,022,760 
1973 1,747,321 13,815,000 
1974 1,534,119 13,947,934 
1975 1,267,695 14,060,973 
Source: SMMT: The Motor Industry of Great Britain, 1976. 
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British Imports of two-wheeled motorised vehicles 1955-1966. 
Mopeds Scooters Motor Total 
Cycles. 
1955 38,000 20,000 2,000 60,000 
1956 23,000 25,000 1,000 49,000 
1957 38,500 69,000 2,300 109,800 
1958 17,500 55,000 1,200 73,700 
1959 62,300 109,200 1,536 173,036 
1960 48,400 85,800 1,961 136,161 
1961 42,411 34,923 4,789 82,123 
1962 27,225 33,316 7,402 67,943 
1963 70,541 21,197 54,993 146,731 
1964 55,809 28,536 102,340 186,685 
1965 19,830 23,514 37,952 81,296 
1966. 7,654 20,879 30,141 58,674 
Source: MSS 204/3/1/86. (Modern Records Centre) 
Table XXVI 





















1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975' Est. ' 
1980 
'Total U. S. and several state registration figures for recent years may be inflated due to the implementation of staggered 
registration renewal systems and off-highway vehicle registration reporting systems, and the reporting of dual registration 
and titling transactions. No accurate revisions are available at this time. 
Source: 1981 Motorcycle Statistical Annual ' 
Irvine, Calfornia, USA: Motor Cycle Industry Council, 1981. 
